

THE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
BETWEEN CHINA AND GERMANY
SINCE 1898

FENG DJEN DJANG

iss. Baltimore
1936.

*

39424.

THE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
BETWEEN CHINA AND GERMANY
SINCE 1898

BY
FENG DJEN DJANG

A DISSERTATION
SUBMITTED TO THE BOARD OF UNIVERSITY STUDIES OF
THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY, IN CONFORMITY WITH
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF
PHILOSOPHY, 1930

THE COMMERCIAL PRESS, LTD.
SHANGHAI, CHINA
1936

THE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
BETWEEN CHINA AND CECILIA
1911-1912

THE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

THE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
BETWEEN CHINA AND CECILIA
1911-1912



THE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
BETWEEN CHINA AND CECILIA
1911-1912

TO
MY PARENTS
AND
GRAND PARENTS
WITH
FILIAL DEVOTION

PREFACE

THE author's purpose of writing this dissertation is twofold: first, to present the historical facts as they are in the diplomatic relations between China and Germany during the different periods after 1898; and second, to disclose to the world the example of Germany whose aggressive policy toward China in the beginning had left nothing of permanent value save hatred and animosity, although her new status in China as a non-extraterritorial Power has gained for her the growth of an amicable feeling between the two peoples and a rapid increase of trade, which none of the special privileges enjoyed by Germany before the World War had been able to procure. It is also of interest to observe that Germany was the first among the foreign Powers to start the international scramble for concessions and leased territories in China and she was also the first great Power to sign the equal treaty with China after the World War, abolishing extraterritoriality and other special privileges which she enjoyed before the War.

The relinquishment of extraterritoriality is to Germany by no means a loss, but a gain. The Chinese merchants are more willing and have more confidence to deal with German traders now than before because they are assured that if trouble should later come up, their cause will be tried before a Chinese court and decided in accordance with Chinese laws. It is not because Chinese courts will show more favor to their own countrymen but rather because the Chinese merchants have a right to expect that if they carry on trade in China, Chinese laws shall be applied to govern the security of transactions. This will explain the fact that Germany now is ranked second only to Great Britain, so far as imports to China are concerned.

In concluding this preface, the author wishes to make grateful acknowledgment of her indebtedness to Professor Westel W. Willoughby, formerly head of the Department of Political Science of

the Johns Hopkins University and to Professors James Hart, Johannes Mattern of the same Department and to Professor C. W. Young, formerly of the same institution for their constant and valuable advice and criticism during the preparation of this work. She also wishes to extend her grateful thanks to Miss Lavinia Engle and Dr. Tsung Yuh Nyi for their kind assistance and suggestions; to her sister and brother-in-law, President and Mrs. Lo Chia-luen of the Central University, Nanking, China, for their kind help in making available all the Chinese documents, memoirs of Chinese officials, official reports and other authentic works in Chinese; to Mr. Charles Fahs of Missionary Research Library, New York, to Miss Da June Lu, Mr. W. S. Wong, Dr. Arthur W. Hummel and Mr. M. A. Roberts of the Library of Congress, Washington, D. C. for making accessible many documents, memoirs and other authentic works in Chinese, English, French and German. For all the errors in this work, the author alone is responsible.

F. D. D.

CONTENTS

	PAGE
PREFACE	iii
CHAPTER	
I. Early Relations Between China and Germany Before 1898	1
II. The Lease of Kiaochoh	20
III. The Administration of Kiaochoh by Germany . .	65
IV. Germany's Participation in The Boxer Expedition .	93
V. Germany's Participation in The Boxer Expedition (Continued)	121
VI. China, Germany and the World War	171
VII. German Cultural, Commercial and Industrial Enter- prises in China	206
VIII. Conclusion	257
BIBLIOGRAPHY	262
INDEX	271
VITA	282

THE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN CHINA AND GERMANY SINCE 1898

CHAPTER I

EARLY RELATIONS BETWEEN CHINA AND GERMANY BEFORE 1898

A general review of the early relations between China and Germany will be of great interest to students of history as well as to those of political science and international law. The first stage of the Sino-German relations was unofficial. About 1615 there were two Catholic Jesuit priests of the German nationality preaching in China, Schaal and Koffler.¹ The latter succeeded in persuading the ex-empress of the late Ming Dynasty to accept the Christian faith and baptized her after the Imperial Ming family had escaped to Kwangtung. With the accession of the Manchus to the throne of China at Peking, Schaal was appointed the president of the tribunal of mathematics. After the death of the first Manchu Emperor, Schaal became the instructor of the young Emperor, the celebrated Kang Hsi. In 1664, Schaal and another German Catholic priest (a Jesuit), Verbiest, were accused by a mandarin of very high rank of perverting the old customs of the Empire and were later arrested by the Court, imprisoned and bound with heavy chains. However, they were both released shortly afterwards and declared innocent.

In spite of this attempted persecution, the Catholic missionaries were permitted to preach Christianity again by the year 1671.

¹ For an account of the earliest activities of the German missionaries in China, see Charles Gutzlaff: *Chinese History*, Vol. II, pp. 121-5. See also G. E. Burkhardt: *Kleine Missions-Bibliothek*, Vol. III, *Die Evangelische Missions in China und Japan*, pp. 151-3; Georg Franzius: *Kiautschou, Deutschlands Erwerbung in Ostasien*, pp. 121-2.

Verbiest, being more subtle than Schaal, found great favor with the young Emperor, Kang Hsi, and soon became his tutor in metaphysics, mathematics and physics. What was more surprising was the fact that he participated in the direction of the most intimate affairs of the nation as a private counsellor of the Emperor. Mention must be made that these early German missionaries came under the command of the Roman See, since the German Empire was not in existence then. Thus the German Catholic missionaries were the first pioneers to begin the Sino-German relations in an unofficial way. Ever since they have continued to preach in China.

Before the year 1820 trade had begun between China and Germany, marking the second period of the relations. Sometimes German goods came to China on land by way of Siberia through Russia during the eighteenth century. In 1836 the Russian Government levied a transit tax on foreign goods. Thus trade between China and Germany was greatly hindered. So gradually German textiles were carried to China by English ships, though they were very slight in comparison with her exports to other European countries. Matches, dyes, hardware and sewing needles were some of the exports to China. In Germany, the Hanseatic League, a commercial organization, tried to promote trade between Chinese and German ports. Some members of the League were of the opinion that German trade in China was not successful because of the difference between the tastes of the Chinese and the Germans for in many cases the German articles did not meet the needs of the Chinese.²

During this same period missionary work was gaining ground in the coastal cities like Canton, Hongkong, and the Island Macao in the South.³ Aside from doing their religious work, the missionaries like Gutzlaff, a German, Bridgeman Parker, an American and Callery, a French, during the Opium War of 1839-42 between China and Great Britain, served as interpreters and secretaries for Great Britain, the United States and France in the negotiation of the Treaties of Nanking with China. This participation in negotiations by missionaries for their own countries (except Gutzlaff, a German

² See Frederick Hirth: *Chinesische Studien*, Vol. I, pp. 104-5.

³ See K. S. Latourette: *A History of Christian Missions in China*, pp. 170-5.

for England) was viewed and highly praised by both the Catholic and the Protestant missionaries "as marking a new era in missions and advantage was at once taken of them."⁴ This action on the part of the missionaries marked the beginning of co-operation between the missionaries and their respective governments for furthering their mutual interests in China, as we shall later see.

An evangelical campaign was begun by German Catholic missionaries in China about 1835. At that time Gutzlaff, the German missionary who participated in the negotiation of the Treaty of Nanking for Great Britain, had a friend from the Basel Mission in Germany, visiting him and this representative wrote home asking the Mission to send two more men to penetrate into the interior of China. Gutzlaff, after finishing the negotiation of the Nanking Treaty for England, went to Hongkong developing a plan to evangelize the whole of China.⁵ In order to regain the former prestige of the Roman Catholic scientific center in China, he desired to have a German astronomer and a mathematician come to China. Furthermore, he wished to penetrate the Chinese Empire by employing Chinese Christians stationed in each province with churches, which would be assisted by unions in Europe. Thus he aroused much enthusiasm in the native Christians. By 1850 he had several scores of Chinese preachers who sent him reports of their distribution of Scriptures and the formation of Christian churches in the eighteen provinces, Kansu being only excepted. On the other hand, he wrote voluminously back to Germany giving detailed description of his enterprise and urging its support. By 1847 in responses to his appeal, the Rhenish Missionary Society and the Basel Missionary Society sent Roster, Genahe, Hamberg and Rudolf Lechler to Hongkong⁶.

In 1849-50 Gutzlaff was himself in Europe speaking of his activities in China, preaching and organizing unions. A Berlin Missionary Society was formed to aid Gutzlaff by sending its agent to China in 1850. At the same time a Berlin Women's Missionary

⁴ See K. S. Latourette: *A History of Christian Missions in China*, pp. 231-2.

⁵ See Burkhardt: *Kleine Missions-Bibliothek*, Vol. III, *Die Evangelische Missions in China und Japan*, p. 179 ff.; D. Julius Richter: *Das Werden der Christlichen Kirche in China*, p. 324, ff.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 182-4; Latourette: *A History of Christian Missions in China*, pp. 243-55.

Society for China was also organized. This Society sent a representative to Hongkong to establish a mission for girls who were abandoned by their parents. This still exists to-day. Gutzlaff, during his stay in Germany, urged the Moravian *Unitas Fratrum*, a missionary society to preach to the Mongolians in China. An appeal was issued by this devoted body for volunteers to the most difficult and remote region. Three men were selected out of thirty who responded. These three planned to reach Mongolia by way of Russia and Siberia. They left Europe in 1853. Being unable to obtain passports, they went through England and India. Reaching Calcutta and failing in their efforts to enter Tibet, they settled down in the Himalayas to learn Hindustani, Tibetan, and Mongolian languages instead of preaching. It should be noted that the above stated Protestant missionary societies, namely, the Berlin Missionary Society, the Basel Evangelische Society, the Rhenish Society and the Berlin Women's Missionary Society, had concentrated their work in Hongkong and Kwangtung since 1850 and did not expand into new regions until 1897 when the German fleet occupied Kiaochow after the murder of two German Catholic priests in Shantung in November, 1897.⁷

The third period in the Sino-German relations began when China as one party and Prussia and the Northern German States as the other entered into formal diplomatic relations by signing the Treaty of Tientsin on September 2, 1861.⁸

Thus Germany's entry into China through formal diplomacy marked Germany (though before its unification in 1871) as the fifth world Power to come into China since 1842. Graf Eulenburg was authorized to negotiate a treaty for Prussia and the members of the German Zoll and Handels-Verein, consisting of Bavaria, Saxony, Hanover, Wurtemberg, Baden, Electoral Hessen, Grand Ducal Hessen, Brunswick, Oldenberg, Luxemburg, Grand Ducal Saxony, Saxe, Meinigen, Saxe-Altenburg, Saxe-Coburg, Gotha, Nassau, Waldeck, Pyrmont, Alhalt-Dessau-Kothen, Anhalt-Bernburg, Lippe, Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt, Schwarzburg, Sondershausen, Reuss elder

⁷ See, for the missionary activities in South China before the occupation of Kiaochow, Latourette: *A History of Christian Missions in China*, pp. 400-3.

⁸ See, for the text of the Treaty, *China Maritime Customs: Treaties, Conventions, etc., Between China and the Foreign States*, Vol. II, p. 115 ff.

line, Reuss younger line, the cities of Frankfort, Meisenheim and Hamburg, Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Mecklenburg-Strelitz and the Hanseatic cities of Lubeck, Bremen and Hamburg. Eulenburg's sudden arrival at Shanghai was a surprise to the Chinese authorities.⁹ He went to Tientsin asking the High Commissioner of Trade, Chung How, to open negotiations. In return this official notified Eulenburg that the Treaties of 1858 compacted by China with Great Britain, Russia, France and the United States provided the rules for the conduct of the trade of all Western nations; therefore Chung How declined Eulenburg's request. Being dissatisfied with this answer, Graf Eulenburg sent two members of his staff to Peking to prepare a residence in order to facilitate his transferring the negotiations to the capital. Realizing Eulenburg's firm determination to make a treaty, Chung How, the High Commissioner of Trade, and Chung Lun, another official, opened negotiations with Eulenburg at Tientsin. By the middle of August an agreement was reached and signed by Eulenburg, Chung Lun and Chung How on September 2, 1861. China by this treaty granted Prussia and the other Northern German States the right to trade and to have consular jurisdiction at the treaty ports, but China declined to allow the Prussian envoy to reside at Peking at once on the ground that unrest still existed in China at that time, and postponed this right of residence for five years.¹⁰ However, Prussia could send her chief consul, consuls and vice consuls to reside at the treaty ports, enjoying the same privileges that the consuls of other nations were enjoying in China. Passports could be obtained by German subjects travelling in the interior of China with the exception of Peking from the Chinese authorities and the German consuls. Rights to study Chinese, teach German, buy Chinese books and sell German books in the provinces were granted by China to subjects of Prussia and other Northern German States. Furthermore, China recognized the right of the Prussians and Germans to embrace Christianity in China. Lastly the Treaty of Tientsin gave German subjects the right to join the staff of Englishmen, Frenchmen and Americans in the Customs Service of China. In 1861 there were three

⁹ See M. von Brandt: *China und Seine Handelsbeziehungen zum Auslande, mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Deutschen*, p. 36 ff.

¹⁰ See H. B. Morse: *International Relations of the Chinese Empire*, Vol. II, p. 116.

Englishmen, three Americans, one Frenchman and one German. The Prussian Government was requested to nominate ten Germans in 1869. By the year 1873 the executive branch of the Customs Service consisted of eight Americans, fifty Englishmen, twelve Frenchmen, eleven Germans and four of other nationalities while there were in 1912 fourteen Americans, one hundred and forty-five Englishmen, thirty-two Frenchmen, thirty-eight Germans, sixteen Russians, thirty-three Japanese, fifty-nine of other nationalities and twenty-six Chinese.

After the unification of Germany in 1870, the German Catholic missions, because of the struggle between Bismarck and the Roman Catholic church, were stationed at Steyl in Holland not far from the German frontier. These missions in 1879 began sending two missionaries, one of whom was Anzer, to Shantung to establish a mission which later proved not only to be important religiously, but also to be significant in extending the German power in China.¹¹ In 1887 a secret society in Shantung led the anti-Catholic riots in that province. Bishop Anzer of the Society of the Divine Word appealed to the German authorities in 1890 to force China to open Yenchow in Shantung to missionaries. After touring through the entire province of Shantung, the German Consul at Tientsin aroused so much animosity in his crude treatment of the officials of the *Tsungli Yamen* (Foreign Office) that Yenchow was not opened to the German missionaries until 1896. This haughty attitude of the German Consul and the desire of the German missionaries to expand their missionary work against the will of the Chinese authorities may be two of the causes of the Anti-Missionary Movement in Shantung which eventually led to the murder of two German Catholic priests in November, 1897.

The German envoy in the spring of 1876 demanded the revision of the Treaty of Tientsin, but as China was involved in the Yunnan case with Great Britain, the question was dropped for the time being. But Herr von Brandt again on December 1, 1876, sent to the *Tsungli Yamen* an ultimatum presenting three specific minor demands. The latter opened negotiation in the spring of 1877, while Herr von Brandt mentioned no revision of the Treaty of

¹¹ See Georg Franzius: *Kiautschou, Deutschlands Erwerbung in Ostasien*, p. 124 ff.

Tientsin, but insisted on the execution of the provisions of the existing treaty. These initial actions brought the question of likin and the transit passes into discussion. In order to increase the provincial revenue, the Chinese provincial authorities attempted constantly to limit inland trade into likin channels by restricting the use of the transit passes. On the other hand, the legations firmly resisted. In November, 1879, the representatives of Great Britain, Germany, America, Netherlands, Peru, Italy, Austria-Hungary, Russia, Denmark, Spain, France, and Belgium sent a joint delegation to the *Tsungli Yamen*, asking China to make propositions regarding the transit and the likin, but they were not successful in their attempts. Again a set of regulations for inland transit was submitted to the diplomatic representatives in April, 1880, by the German Minister, Herr von Brandt and was later sent to the *Tsungli Yamen*. However, it was dropped again because of the objections raised by the *Tsungli Yamen*.¹²

On March 31, 1880, the Supplementary Convention between China and Germany was signed.¹³ By this agreement shipping facilities were given to Germany by China, at Woosung in addition to the ports opened to foreign trade by the Chefoo Convention; namely, the harbors of Ichang, Wuhu, Tatung, Wusueh, Lukikow and Shasi in Hupeh, Anking in Anhwei, Wenchow in Chekiang, Pakhoi in Kwangtung, Hukow in Kiangsi, and Woosung in Kiangsu. In return Germany agreed that the Chinese Government should have the right of appointing consuls to all the towns of Germany in which the consuls of other states are admitted and that they should enjoy the same rights and privileges as the consuls of the most favoured nation. China granted an extension of tonnage dues and privileges, while Germany agreed to the conditions attached to the privileges accorded by China to other Powers, known as the most favoured nation treatment. Next China agreed to the establishment of bonded warehouses, while Germany agreed to present the ships' manifests imposed by other treaties. Germany consented to the pilotage regulations; China reduced the

¹² See Manuscripts on Diplomatic Affairs now kept by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 外交部檔案.

¹³ See China Maritime Customs: Treaties, Conventions, etc., Between China and the Foreign States, Vol. II, p. 193 ff.

duty on her coals. China exempted German ships undergoing repairs from the payments of tonnage dues; Germany agreed that no Chinese flags would be used by German ships, while China promised that no Chinese ships would use German flags. Germany obtained the exemption of import duty for the materials of the ships broken up, while she agreed that German travellers should take out passports for travel in inland for identification. Thirteen months were set as a limit for the validity of passports and transit passes. Lastly China exempted deck materials from duty. In short China granted Germany the most favoured nation treatment, while Germany accepted the conditions attached to it as existed in the treaties entered into by China with the other Powers.

The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5 was viewed with serious apprehension by the treaty Powers when it broke out in the summer of 1894, as it was thought that it might affect their rights and privileges in China.¹⁴ The successive crushing defeats forced China to sue for peace. Throughout the year 1894 China four times appealed to the Powers to intervene on her behalf. The first attempt of Russia and Great Britain in asking the other Powers for a general intervention turned to be a failure on account of Germany's refusal. Again, early in February, 1895 when China asked for help, England, France and Russia were ready to intervene. But the German Government again stood aloof.

After learning through the Japanese Ambassador, Viscount Aoki, that Japan would demand the cession of Formosa and the Pescadores Islands, an indemnity of 200,000,000 Kuping taels, the cession of the Liaotung Peninsula and the recognition of the independence of Korea at the beginning of March, Germany suddenly decided to act alone. At once the German Government instructed her Ambassador in Tokyo, Herr von Gutschmid, to recommend to Japan that she conclude peace with China immediately upon moderate terms, warning her that her acquisition of the southern part of the Liaotung Peninsula would provoke intervention by the Powers. This warning the German Ambassador delivered to the Japanese Government on March 8, two days after he received instructions from home government. In reply Japan

¹⁴ See George Nye Steiger: *China and the Occident, The Origin and the Development of the Boxer Rising*, p. 45.

expressed her appreciation for this "friendly information" giving assurance that her demands would not be high. Nevertheless, Japan did not let this warning from Germany influence her negotiations beginning March 18, with China for the Peace of Shimonoseki.¹⁵

On April 17, when China was signing the Peace of Shimonoseki with Japan, the Russian Foreign Minister informed the German Ambassador that Russia still intended to prevent Japan from occupying the Liaotung Peninsula. In case Japan refused to comply with this advice, military actions would be necessary. Russia counted on the support of Germany and France. To this request Germany enthusiastically sent her reply saying that she had instructed her ambassador in Japan and her admirals in Chinese waters to coöperate with the Russian representatives. France also gave her consent.

Thus, on April 23, the three ambassadors in Tokyo called on the acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, Baron Hayashi, to recommend that Japan renounce her permanent occupation of the Liaotung Peninsula. The Russian and the French Ministers delivered their instructions in a conciliatory manner, while the German Envoy, faithful to the instructions he had received, pressed on the Japanese Minister with the threat that if Japan did not comply with the recommendation of the three intervening Powers, the latter would resort to force which they deemed necessary. Again, on April 29, these three ministers asked the Japanese Government to answer their respective governments within ten days before the date arranged for the exchange of the ratifications of the Peace of Shimonoseki. On May 1, Japan in reply promised to return the Liaotung Peninsula to China after the exchange of the ratifications, while she would retain Port Arthur as a compromise. This reply proved to be very unsatisfactory to the three Powers. So Japan had to yield on May 5, promising to renounce her possession of the entire Liaotung Peninsula including Port Arthur. Thus China and Japan exchanged their ratifications on May 8, in Chefoo, China. On May 13, Japan renounced her permanent possession

¹⁵ See Erich Brandenburg: *From Bismarck to the World War*, pp. 53-60; G. N. Steiger: *China and the Occident*, pp. 46-7; Minghien Joshua Bau: *The Foreign Relations of China*, p. 33.

of the Liaotung Peninsula in a proclamation issued by the Emperor, while China agreed to give Japan an additional indemnity amounting to 30,000,000 taels. Thus the success of the Tripartite Intervention helped China to hold her territorial integrity.¹⁶

The crushing defeats that China suffered from the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5 revealed to the world the whole weakness of the Chinese Empire in government and military organization. Thus at the end of the war, the international struggle for concessions began, marking a new era in China's diplomatic relations with other nations. This struggle on the part of the world Powers was prompted by the fear of each nation that unless she should at once seize them, any chance of getting concessions from China otherwise would be improbable. Of the three Powers that intervened in the negotiations for the Peace of Shimonoseki between China and Japan for maintaining the peace of Eastern Asia, France was the first one to exact her share of compensation from China, by receiving a delimitation of the boundaries between Tonkin and China much in her favor by signing two separate conventions with China on June 20, 1895. Furthermore, France obtained a part of Kianghung and the opening of Lungchow, Mengtsz, Hokow and Szemao for trade, special mining privileges in Yunnan, Kwangsi, and Kwangtung, and the right of extension of the Annan Railway to China.¹⁷

Germany was the second Power in the Tripartite Intervention in 1895 to demand compensation. She, being very late in colonization, was very anxious to follow the footsteps of Great Britain, France, Russia and the United States in getting concessions from China. Waiting for a chance she instructed her Consul in Shanghai, Dr. Steubel, to secure a concession in Hankow, one of the most important commercial centers in China, for her subjects to live and trade. Negotiations were carried on by Dr. Steubel, the German Consul in Shanghai and Yun, the Superintendent of Foreign Trade in Hankow. After getting the approval of their respective superior authorities, they concluded the

¹⁶ See Erich Brandenburg: *From Bismarck to the World War*, pp. 53-65; G. N. Steiger: *China and the Occident*, pp. 45-8; M. J. Bau: *The Foreign Relations of China*, p. 33.

¹⁷ See M. J. Bau: *The Foreign Relations of China*, pp. 37-40; G. N. Steiger: *China and the Occident*, p. 52 ff.

Convention for the Concession at Hankow on October 3, 1895.¹⁸ By this Convention China ceded an area of 600 *mow* or 100 Chinese acres in the market-town, Hankow, to the German Government in perpetuity. For this Germany promised to pay an amount of 121.32 taels each year to the Hanyang District Magistrate as land tax for the lease. The German Consul would bring about the transfer of the land in the Concession from the Chinese into foreign ownership, Chinese were not allowed to reside in the Concession, and the German Consul was to be the chief administrative officer. Compensation was fixed according to the rules made for Germans or other foreign subjects concerning the purchase of land in the Concession from the Chinese. The same held for private temples, ancestral halls, guild halls and public temples. The Chinese authorities were to effect the compulsory expulsion of the Chinese owner upon the application by the German Consul. In case any foreigner other than German subjects desired to buy land in the Concession, he should first obtain the sanction of the German Consul, who alone was entitled to apply to the Chinese authorities for issuing a title-deed. The Chinese Government would establish a mixed court and other public buildings on her former land in the Concession. China had to cancel her former plan for building roads and railway tracks in the German Concession, which was in the boundaries of the Treaty Port of Hankow. Chinese jurisdiction was exercised by a Chinese judge upon foreigners residing in the German Concession, who had no consuls of their own country represented in China. In cases where a German or another foreigner was the plaintiff or the injured party and in cases dealing with violation of the orders in force in the German Concession on the part of the Chinese, the Chinese judge was to decide only in the presence of the German Consul or his representative. Appeal could be made to the Superintendent of the Customs through the medium of the German Consul, against the decision of the Chinese judge. The establishment of the German Concession would not interfere with the rights of the non-German foreigners who had previously acquired lands within the present German Concession. Thus by this Convention China

¹⁸ See J. V. A. MacMurray: *Treaties and Agreements with and Concerning China*, pp. 42-4.

gave up her land as well as her sovereignty in the Concession to the German Government as she had done to the British Government.¹⁹

While the German Consul was getting the Concession at Hankow for Germany, the German Minister at Peking was negotiating the Concession at Tientsin for the German Government with the *Tsungli Yamen* (Foreign Office) in Peking. On October 30, the Convention for the Concession at Tientsin was signed by the German Consul at Tientsin, von Seckendorff and the Chinese Superintendent of Trade of the Northern Ports. By this Convention China ceded to Germany the Concession at Tientsin in perpetuity, and the local Chinese authorities were to apply force in compelling all the Chinese in the Concession to sell their land or houses in case they were unwilling. The German Consul at Tientsin was to pay on behalf of the German Government, seventy-five taels for all the lands in the Concession regardless of the situation of the various plots. The Chinese cemetery of the Canton, Fukien and Chekiang Guilds covered with tombs in the Concession would remain unmolested, and the ceremonies for the dead would not be interfered with. Furthermore, these guilds did not need to pay any taxes nor were they to be forced to sell. For the fixing of expropriation value of houses within the German Concession a German-Chinese Commission was to be created. Three months were set as a limit for the Chinese to move out of the Concession by selling their houses and lands to the Germans. One tael was to be paid by the German subjects to enable the Chinese to remove their ancestral tombs out of the German Concession in case they desired. After the sale of his house or land the Chinese owner was to send to the Chinese local authorities a copy of the contract of the sale regarding transfer of the plot to German ownership for the fixing of the official seal to be forwarded to the German Consul for safe-keeping. An annual payment of 1,000 big cash as land tax per *mow* (Chinese acreage) was to be paid by the German Consul to the office of the City Magistrate beginning with the purchase of land by the German authorities. In case the German authorities

¹⁹ See J. V. A. MacMurray: *Treaties and Agreements with and Concerning China*, Vol. I, pp. 46-50.

intended to build roads in their Concession, the owners of the tombs lying in the designated places of those streets might, by negotiation with the Chinese local authorities, be induced to remove their ancestral tombs. An exception was made in regard to the tombs of notable families, to change the course of the streets in case they were not willing to comply. Concerning the matter of jurisdiction no mention was ever made in the Convention. Another thing that distinguished this Convention for Concession at Tientsin from that of Hankow was that there was no provision whatsoever made in regard to the previous plan of the Chinese Government for building roads or railway tracks in the Concession at Tientsin. Thirdly, instead of the German authorities the local Chinese officers were to force the Chinese owners in the Concession to sell their houses or lands to the German subjects or authorities. Fourthly, no mention was made for allowing any non-German foreigner to reside in the German Concession at Tientsin. Lastly there was no provision in this Convention for the purchasing of private temples, ancestral halls, guild halls and public temples by the German subjects. After China declared war against Germany on August 14, 1917, these Concessions were returned to China by Germany.²⁰ These German Concessions at Hankow and Tientsin in addition to the Supplementary Treaty of 1880 marked the entry of Germany into China to compete and enjoy the special privileges and the most favoured nation treatment with other world Powers.

Being left alone without sharing the financial compensation by her former allies in the Tripartite Intervention, namely, Russia and France for making the first loan to China in enabling her to pay the first due of indemnity to Japan, Germany gladly accepted the English offer for making an Anglo-German loan to China. Both Germany and Great Britain authorized their respective banks, namely the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation and the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank in China to form an Anglo-German Syndicate for furnishing a five per cent gold loan to the Chinese Government. An agreement was reached on March 23, 1896, between the *Tsungli Yamen* representing the Imperial Chinese Government and the Anglo-German Syndicate, which

²⁰ See M. J. Bau: The Foreign Relations of China, pp. 128-9.

represented the British and the German Governments.²¹ By this agreement the Imperial Chinese Government authorized the Syndicate to issue a five per cent sterling loan amounting to sixteen million pounds sterling in two series. The first of ten million pounds sterling was to be issued after the signing of this agreement, while the next was to be made before October, 1896; thus these two to be extinguished simultaneously. An annual five per cent rate of interest amounting to eight hundred thousand pounds was to be paid by the Chinese Government to the Syndicate in monthly installments beginning from April 1896, according to the amounts and the dates scheduled in this agreement. Thirty-six years was set as the term of this loan. An annual sinking fund of £169,952 was to be paid by the Imperial Chinese Government to the Syndicate in monthly installments. There was to be no increase in the amortization, nor converting the loan, nor redeeming the loan by the Chinese Government during the term of thirty-six years. A monthly payment of £80,519 and 6s. 8d. was to be made by the Chinese Government for amortization and interest to the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation and Deutsch-Asiatische Bank at their branches in Shanghai on the date named in the schedule. The Syndicate was authorized to issue to subscribers of the loan bonds for the total amount of the loan in pounds sterling in the form, languages and amounts as it (the Syndicate) deemed fit, while the Chinese Minister in either London or Berlin was to seal the bonds as an evidence that the Chinese Government was bound thereby. The Chinese Maritime Customs Revenue was the security; in case it proved to be insufficient to support the service of the interest or repayment of this loan the administration of the Imperial Maritime Customs of China were to obtain funds from the other sources for the same purpose. Furthermore, during the currency of this loan, this agreement was to guarantee the constitution of the staff of the administration of the Chinese Maritime Customs. Priority was given by China to this loan regarding its interest and principal over all future loans, charges, and mortgages during the entire term of this loan or any part of

²¹ See J. V. A. MacMurray: *Treaties and Agreements with and Concerning China*, Vol. I, pp. 55-9.

it when unredeemed so far its security, the Imperial Maritime Customs Revenue was concerned.

The Customs Bonds issued by the *Tsungli Yamen* and the Board of Revenue for the total amount in sterling of this loan, principal and interest, were also securities having the priority. To the German legation at Peking, the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation and the Chinese Government, these Customs Bonds were to be handed in equal shares. There was also the deposit of sterling Customs Bonds made with the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation and the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank equal together in value to the total amount of the loan, principal and interest sealed by the Chinese Superintendent of Customs at Shanghai, the Viceroy of the *Liang Kwang* provinces and countersigned by the foreign Commissioner of Customs at Shanghai. This was another security for this loan. The Chinese Government agreed not to issue any further loan until six months after the issue of the total amount of this loan, in addition exempting all bonds, coupons and payments made and received in connection with the service of this loan, from taxes and imposts. Ninety-four per cent net was the rate on the nominal principal taken by the Syndicate to the Chinese Government. The Syndicate reserved its right to withdraw the contract regarding the balance of this loan, then unissued, in the event of any political crisis in Europe within six months, or in case that the markets and the prices of existing Government stocks would be so violently affected as to render the successful issue of the balance of the loan impossible upon the terms agreed upon. Without responsibility for each other, the English and German Syndicates were to take in equal shares the loan, which was to be confirmed and sanctioned by an Imperial Edict of the Chinese Government. Thus this Anglo-German Loan together with the Franco-Russian Loan witnessed the beginning of the international rivalry for the conquest of China through loans.

The opening of China by the European powers in 1842 and the loss of her dependencies to them and Japan gave birth to the secret societies against the Manchu Dynasty as well as the foreigners. The Chinese people from time immemorial have had an attitude of superiority toward foreigners, always considering them as barbarians without any degree of civilization, judging by the standard

of the Chinese.²² Keeping in mind the fact that China has enjoyed an unbroken history of nearly five thousand years, developed a unique civilization, and possessed a population of 400,000,000 (one-fourth of the total population of the world) and an area of 42,000,000 square miles (one-fourth of the total land area of the entire globe), we can see the real cause for the growth of the feeling of superiority among the Chinese. Naturally then, the Chinese resented bitterly the forced intercourse with the Western nations. As the aggression of the Western Powers increased first in opening China and later in taking China's former dependencies, the anti-foreign feeling was increased with equal rapidity. This "anti-foreignism" was closely connected with the spread of Christian missions, especially those of the Catholic, who besides enjoying the right of consular jurisdiction in the treaty ports, carried their rights into the interior of China in violation of the treaty and claimed jurisdiction over their native (Chinese) converts, which jurisdiction properly belonged to the Chinese Government. Because of the constant demands of the respective foreign powers for the dismissal or reprimand of local officials, the local Chinese authorities began to allow the missionaries to interfere in the local jurisdiction in favor of the Chinese Christians regardless of the nature of the individual cases, so as to please the foreign missionaries. As a result, justice was not properly administered to the injured parties and therefore hatred against missionaries grew with these injustices whenever the non-Christian Chinese suffered. This growing grievance and hatred was the third element of anti-foreign movement.²³ Lastly, was the fear, among the educated Chinese at least, of China's partition among the Western Powers and Japan.

Beginning with the year 1870, unorganized attacks against the missionaries came one after another, reaching their height in the Tientsin Massacre of the French Catholic missionaries in 1870 and the murder of Margary, a British Consul, near the frontier of the Yünnan Province in the South in 1875. Throughout

²² See G. N. Steiger: *China and the Occident*, pp. 28-31; M. J. Bau: *The Foreign Relations of China*, pp. 20-1.

²³ See M. J. Bau: *The Foreign Relations of China*, pp. 20-1; G. N. Steiger: *China and the Occident*, pp. 33-6; H. B. Morse: *International Relations of the Chinese Empire*, Vol. II, pp. 220-36.

the year 1890, anti-missionary riots occurred in Tsinanfu of Shantung, Chungking, Hankow, Chinkiang, Yanchow, Wuhu and Wusih against both Catholics and Protestants. For checking these riots the legations sent a joint representation to the *Tsungli Yamen*. The latter not only issued vigorous orders to the provincial authorities commanding them to repress disorder and protect the missionaries, but also held the missionaries responsible for the riots by their claiming to exercise a jurisdiction which properly belonged to the Chinese authorities. Furthermore, British, French, American and German warships were sent to these provinces for intervention. Reparation was given by China upon demands made by these Powers for these missionary troubles. Secret societies, whose chief aim was to overthrow the Manchu Dynasty had long been in existence and in 1808, the Manchu Emperor, Chia Ching, issued decrees which attempted to suppress them. These societies, all associated, went under various names, *I Ho Tuan*, the "Righteous Harmony Fist," the "White Lotus Society," the "Eight Dragons Sect," the "Red Fist Society" and several others of a similar nature.

That their aim was revolutionary and non-religious was clearly shown by the deliberate attack upon the Christians by a religious secret society, called the *Chi Tsai Ti* or "Vegetarians" at Kucheng in Fukien Province.²⁴ A number of Protestant missionaries at Kucheng were murdered in the summer of 1895 by the members of the "Vegetarian Society." During the trial, it was brought out that the murderers held the missionaries responsible for asking the governor of the province to move the troops into the districts where they (the members of the "Vegetarian Society") were actually in control, and that for that reason they had attacked them. Then there was another secret society, the *Ko Lao Hui* or the "Elder Brother Society" which often joined in the anti-foreign outbreaks in order to involve the Manchu Dynasty in difficulties with the Powers.

²⁴ See G. N. Steiger: *China and the Occident*, pp. 128-30: Thus Dr. Steiger in his *China and the Occident* says: "The seizure of Kiaochow by the Germans and the occupation of Weihaiwei first by the Japanese and subsequently by the British, had, as early as the spring of 1898, resulted in the spontaneous formation of unauthorized bands for local resistance to further foreign aggression notably the bands of the *Tai Tao Hui*;" H. B. Morse: *International Relations of the Chinese Empire*, Vol. II, pp. 175-91.

Within ninety years, the *I Ho Tuan* had absorbed all the above mentioned secret societies. Among these unauthorized bodies the most powerful was the *Tai Tao Hui* or the "Big Sword (or Knife) Society" which for two years after 1896 fought with the Roman Catholic missionaries. By special decrees after November 5, 1898, the *I Ho Tuan* became a legalized and customary body of local militia in the provinces for resisting further foreign aggression. After the coup d'état and the decrees relating to the militia system, these unauthorized groups had been absorbed into the "Righteous and Harmonious Militia," whose name and ritualistic gymnastic exercises made a strong appeal to the popular imagination.²⁵

As the foreign aggression increased, this organization of local militia, (the *I Ho Tuan*) grew accordingly, culminating in the second nationalistic movement, the Boxer Rising of 1900, which was a crude form of defense and which represented the desperate attempt of the Chinese in the North to drive all foreigners to the sea.

With the increasing aggression of the Western Powers in China and the growth of secret societies for revolution and anti-foreign or missionary movements, the seed of trouble was sown. On November 1, 1897, at the village of Tshantyachuang, Chuyaihyeh, Tsouchufu of Shantung in the south-western corner of Shantung two German Catholic priests, Fathers Franz Nies and Richard Henle, were murdered by a band of armed men who broke into the house of a resident missionary where these two Catholic priests were merely spending a night. Even now it has never been proved what was the nature of the band and the aims of the murder. There were several suppositions. According to the official history of the Manchu Dynasty, these two priests were murdered by a body of local ruffians inspired by the general hatred against the Christian religion; others alleged that the murderers were armed robbers attacking the whole village, while still others thought that these Catholic priests were victims of those men who had been so aroused to fury by the interference of the local priest in exercising a

²⁵ See G. N. Steiger: *China and the Occident*, pp. 123-51.

jurisdiction over the Chinese Christians. Let us consider the effect of the murder.²⁶

Two weeks after the murder, the German fleet hastened to Shantung and seized the Kiaochow Bay, one of the most important naval bases of China together with its fortifications, forcing the commanding general, Chang Kau-yuen to retreat. The Germans made six demands to the *Tsungli Yamen*; namely, the dismissal of the governor of Shantung, Li Ping-ying, with the promise never to employ him again in the government, a reparation amounting to 660,000 taels for building the cathedrals, and an additional sum of 3,000 taels as reparation for the things robbed or stolen, an amount of 24,000 taels for building the houses of the Catholic priests at seven places in Shantung, guarantee that there would be no further murder or anti-missionary outbreaks, the establishment of a corporation by joint capital from the Chinese and the Germans for building the railways of the entire province of Shantung with the right to open mines near the railways, and an indemnity for the expenses incurred upon the German Government for this murder case. Negotiations were carried on for four months and finally on March 6, 1898, the Lease of Kiaochow was signed by China and Germany.²⁷ By this treaty China leased the Kiaochow Bay to Germany for ninety-nine years, permitted the German Government to construct two lines of railway in Shantung, one running from the Kiaochow Bay via Weihsien, Tsingchowfu, Poshan, Tzechwan, Tsowping to Tsinan and the boundary of Shantung, and the other from Kiaochow to Ichowfu, via Laiwuhsien to Tsinan, and gave the German merchants the right to open mines for a distance of thirty *li* from each side of those two railways thus recognizing the German sphere of influence over the entire province of Shantung. So it may be seen how this Convention for the lease of Kiaochow to Germany opened up a new era in the diplomatic history of China, after 1842. The next chapter will be devoted to the lease of Kiaochow.

²⁶ See G. N. Steiger: *China and the Occident*, pp. 64-5; *Official History of the Ch'ing Dynasty*, Vol. V, pp. 40-50.

²⁷ See *Official History of the Ch'ing Dynasty*, Vol. V, pp. 50-60; J. V. A. MacMurray: *Treaties and Agreements with and Concerning China*, Vol. I, pp. 112-8.

CHAPTER II

THE LEASE OF KIAOCHOW

THE sudden seizure of Kiaochow, one of the most important harbors and naval bases in the Far East, by Germany in 1897, was an outstanding event. Not only did it open a new era in the diplomatic relations of China with other countries, but it also set a novel precedent for the Powers in their struggle for concessions from China. Before approaching the events leading to the military occupation of Kiaochow, it is necessary to observe the conditions both in China and in Germany. The year 1842 marked the beginning of China's recent diplomatic history, when China opened her ports to the commerce of the world after the Opium War with England, in which China was the loser. The second period, from 1860 to 1895, witnessed the loss of China's dependencies to the other Powers.¹ These events only exposed to the world indications of China's weaknesses.

The crushing defeats that China suffered during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5 revealed her internal weaknesses; namely, the inefficiency of governmental organs and military equipment. Not only did China have to borrow huge sums of money from Russia, France, England and Germany to enable her to pay the war indemnity to Japan, but she also had to give up her sovereignty over Korea in favor of Japan, and to cede Formosa and the Pescadores Islands, while Liaotung was barely saved by the Triple Intervention of Russia, France and Germany.² The revelation of China's

¹ Mingchien Joshua Bau: *The Foreign Relations of China*, Part I, Chapters I-IV, pp. 3-93.

² About the Triple Intervention, enough has been discussed in the preceding Chapter. *Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette*, 1871-1914, Vol. IX, Nos. 1416, 2207, 2213, 2217, 2227, 2230, 2231, 2233, 2235, 2238-43, 2245, 2251-4, 2258, 2260-72, 2287, 2291-5, 2298-300, 2304-5. All these diplomatic correspondences between the German Foreign Office and the German Minister in China and between the German Ministers in China and Japan with the diplomatic representatives of Russia and France resulted in the Triple Intervention of Russia, France and Germany, by which Japan promised to return the Liaotung Peninsula to China and accept 300,000,000 taels as total payment of the war indemnity.

weakness to the world gave rise to the fear that the dissolution of the Celestial Empire was then imminent.³

Rapid progress in Germany's commerce and industries⁴ accompanied by the aggression of the other European Powers upon Chinese territorial rights, tended to inspire her attempt to acquire a naval base and coaling station in the Far East.⁵ Thus in the correspondence between Hohenlohe and Marshall was revealed the desire of the Kaiser to acquire a harbor in the Eastern waters in view of the English, Russian and French aspirations to occupy strategical points in China. Secretary Marshall records the Kaiser's words:

Under no circumstances may we let ourselves be placed at a disadvantage or to be taken unaware. We must also secure a firm position in China, a country with which our yearly trade amounts to 400,000 marks.⁶

Thus Germany had gained a market in China as well as in becoming a rival of England in her Chinese trade, since the German merchants studied the tastes and the needs of the Chinese and sold their high quality goods at a low price.⁷

Such was the situation between China and Germany. The former had repeatedly shown her inability to maintain herself against foreign aggression, while the necessity of having an oriental harbor had for the latter become imperative.⁸ There was every encouragement

³ G. N. Steiger: *China and the Occident*, pp. 48, 52, 58; *Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. IX, Nos. 2219-20, where the Kaiser discussed the attempted dissolution of China by England, France and Russia, and asserted that Germany must have her share too.

⁴ Furst von Bülow: *Imperial Germany*, Chapter XIX, pp. 270-2: In 1882, the number of men employed in agriculture was as much as those in commerce and industry together, while in 1895, the number of people in agriculture was less by almost 2,000,000 than those in industry alone.

⁵ *Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. IX, No. 2219 (November 17, 1894, Hohenlohe to Marshall).

⁶ *Ibid.*, Vol. XIV, No. 3663: Note of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Marshall who lamented that only Germany had no firm fulcrum in the Far East while England, Russia and France did have. For the anxieties among the German naval officers and the German public, opinion is expressed in newspapers, representing the views of the different political parties in later years; see also No. 3662: Note of the Treaty Council in the Foreign Office, March 18, 1896.

⁷ W. Schrameier: *Kiautschou, seine Entwicklung und Bedeutung*, p. 18.

⁸ For Germany's motives to acquire a seaport and naval base in the Far East, see Ex-Kaiser: *My Memoirs*, p. 1; Liu Yen: *The Recent Diplomatic History of China*, p. 264; Paolo Giordani: *The German Colonial Empire, Its Beginning and Ending*, p. 57; Schrameier: *Kiautschou, seine Entwicklung und Bedeutung*, p. 17.

on the part of Germany to make use of her "iron fist" for the acquisition of such a fulcrum or naval base despite the former German policy which had been against any acquisition of colonies. In this connection, it would be well to summarize briefly the foreign policy of Germany before the acquisition of Kiaochow. We may divide the history of Germany's foreign policy into the following periods: (1) The Period of Bismarck, (2) The Period of Emperor William II, and (3) The Republican Period. Under the first, Germany was in the process of formation, while other European nations had already been well established in colonizing activities. So, as far as colonization is concerned in that period, Germany was behind the other Powers. During the second period, the rapid increase of population in Germany had occupied the minds of the leading statesmen. The limitation of Germany's territory, her natural resources and her inability to feed the increasing population compelled her to seek some means or other to save herself.⁹

Under the first period, Bismarck defined the German foreign policy of the time. While the German Empire was then very young as compared with the other European Powers, Bismarck's policy is correctly stated by Brandenburg in his "From Bismarck to the World War" as follows:

The supreme object of Germany's policy which was controlled by Bismarck until 1890 in spite of the contretemps, was the maintenance of peace—the growing motives or causes of this policy being (1) the presence of many races in Germany, (2) the German Empire in the process of formation, (3) sharp differences in religious and social matters which constitute a menace to Germany and (4) Germany's infancy and the German prosperity urgently required peace.

Another characteristic feature of Bismarckian diplomacy is his advocacy of making alliances with other Powers, especially England. Thus Bismarck's foreign policy after the founding of the Empire was the maintenance of peace with European nations, the strengthening of her frontiers and the development of her natural resources. All of these were incompatible with colonizing activities.¹⁰

⁹ See and compare W. H. Dawson: *The Evolution of Modern Germany*.

¹⁰ In the Kaiser's Memoir was disclosed the discord between the Kaiser and Bismarck in regard to colonial policy, to which the former was inclined. Ex-Kaiser: *My Memoir*, Chapter I, Bismarck, pp. 6-9.

Notwithstanding Bismarck's disinclination towards colonization abroad, he did have colonial ambitions in East Asia. He had Kiaochow in his mind even before 1870,¹¹ but other political conditions made him drop the idea. After his fall in 1890, the Colonial Party came into power. Then followed colonial activities, among which is the lease of the Kiaochow Bay. Before going into the treatment of the said lease of territory, it would be appropriate to narrate some actual attempts on the part of Germany to acquire a stronghold in China and how Kiaochow was made the final object of choice.

Even prior to the unification of Germany, an attempt was made by Graf zu Eulenburg, who had been sent by Prussia and twenty-six Northern German States as minister to China to sign the Treaty of Tientsin in 1861, and to make a survey of Formosa, which he found to be suitable.¹² In November, 1883, after the unification, another abortive attempt was made by a private German firm, the Rolin Company, in conjunction with the German Consul and the German Squadron in Swatow, who unwarrantably seized a large tract of public land in Swatow (in the province of Kwangtung) and hoisted thereon a German flag as a sign of occupation. As this piece of land was chosen by the Chinese Government for a port, the land afterwards was given back and the dispute was settled, after China had launched a strenuous protest.¹³

No definite action was taken until the last part of the year 1894, during the middle of the Sino-Japanese War, when the influence of the European Powers (that is, England, France and Russia) in East Asia became a menace to the German interests. It was the Kaiser who set the whole machinery into motion.¹⁴ Thus the

¹¹ Schrameier: *Kiautschou, seine Entwicklung und Bedeutung*, p. 17; Otto Pohl: *Die Überlassung von Kiautschou seitens Chinas an das Deutsche Reich*, Introduction, p. 1.

¹² *Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. IX, No. 2219, in which was mentioned Graf Eulenburg's report on the survey of Formosa, etc.

¹³ *Official History of the Ch'ing Dynasty*, Vol. V, pp. 7-8.

¹⁴ *Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. IX, Nos. 2219-29, in which William was shown to be the most anxious towards annexing a territory in the Far East for the protection of German economic interests and the balance of power in his telegram to the then Chancellor, Hohenlohe, urging him to be ready for sharing in the threatened dissolution of the Chinese Empire. He also mentioned Graf Eulenburg's report on the survey of Formosa, etc., pp. 245-6.

German aspirations, which were in fact due to rapid growth of German commerce and industry, and fostered by the apparent approach of the dissolution of the Celestial Empire, sought a pretext to justify Germany's action in the murder of the missionaries.

From November, 1894 till November, 1897, much effort was exerted on the part of German statesmen, diplomatic officers and technical engineers or advisers for the selection of a suitable place on the China coast. Places suggested were, besides Formosa as above mentioned, Chosan, Tinghai, Mirs Bay, Kulangsu, Pescadores Islands, Amoy, Weihaiwei, Montebello Islands, Chefoo, Samsah Bay, Quemoy and Kiaochow. Places more seriously considered were Formosa, Chosan, Amoy and Kiaochow, while the rest received only passing attention.

In spite of its suitability as a naval base, the Island of Formosa had been abandoned for fear of creating differences with other Powers, especially, Japan and France.¹⁵ Chosan, near the port of Ningpo, was desirable, but the English sphere of interest around that district was an obstacle.¹⁶ The location of Amoy was considered disadvantageous, both from the military and the economic viewpoints, because of the costliness of fortification and the nearness to the great market of the Orient, Hongkong.¹⁷

Consideration of other suggested places was brief and slight. Thus Tinghai was considered to be too difficult for accession;¹⁸

¹⁵ *Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. IX, No. 2219: It was suggested that Japan had to be consulted, while France seemed to be also reaching for it. In *Die Grosse Politik*, No. 3645: It was said that "Formosa was out of the question because it would involve conflict with other countries."

¹⁶ *Ibid*, No. 2222: Marshall to Hatsfeldt: "Chosan is well-situated and good for trade. However, if England should intend to take it for herself, Germany would abandon her claim." In *Die Grosse Politik*, No. 3650: It was said that Chosan was out of the question because of an agreement between China and England, made in 1846. In *Die Grosse Politik*, No. 3674: Heyking, Minister at Peking, to Hohenlohe, Chosan was considered unfavorable both from the point of view of the navy and of the trade.

¹⁷ *Die Grosse Politik*, No. 3650: It was said that Admiral Hollmann considered Amoy to be a good naval base, but Minister Brandt considered that "the acquisition of Amoy following its nature as a treaty harbor would face insurmountable difficulties." See also *Die Grosse Politik*, No. 3674: Heyking to Hohenlohe: "The low and poor commercial relations with the interior gives the future of this harbor (Amoy) no important hope..." See also *Die Grosse Politik*, No. 3656.

¹⁸ *Ibid*, No. 2227, footnote.

the Mirs Bay near Hongkong was held "unimportant;"¹⁹ because it was "badly situated,"²⁰ so it was with Kulangsu near Amoy;²¹ the Pescadores were out of the question, because they were owned by Japan;²² Weihaiwei was also eliminated, because at that time it was held by Japan.²³ Neither did Hohenlohe, then the Chancellor, think the location suitable.²⁴ The Montebello Islands near Korea met all the demands, but then the future prosperity was conditioned upon the development of Korea.²⁵ Chefoo on the Shantung Peninsula was described as an "entirely useless anchoring place during rough weather."²⁶ Samsah Bay, the surveyors reported, was a poor naval base, and besides, it lacked the possibility of economic development because it was too remote from the interior.²⁷

Aside from the above mentioned places, it is to be seen that certain suggestions were made to occupy some other points either in Shantung, or to exchange possession with England in case Germany's final choice for a harbor in the Orient should happen to be within the English sphere of interest. Thus in the secret German diplomatic correspondence²⁸ is revealed the inquiry put to Schenck, the German Minister to Peking, "whether any other point in Shantung would be impossible," in view of the Japanese

¹⁹ Die Grosse Politik, Vol. IX, No. 2220.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, No. 3650.

²¹ *Ibid.*, Nos. 2220, 3674.

²² *Ibid.*, Nos. 3645, 3650.

²³ *Ibid.*, No. 3649, dated September 2, 1895, Marshall to Hohenlohe. See also Die Grosse Politik, No. 3656.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, No. 3648.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, No. 3646: Hollmann to Marshall, April 17, 1895: "The Montebello Islands situated at the southern extremity are favorable in their climatic conditions. The harbor meets all the demands. The possession of these islands will be of high significance, if Korea will be opened to European trade and culture."

²⁶ *Ibid.*, No. 3664: The report of Heyking, Minister at Peking to Hohenlohe, August 22, 1896.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, No. 3674: The report of Heyking to Hohenlohe, dated May 5, 1897: "Secret Council, Franzius and Captain Zeye went with me that they surveyed Amoy and Samsah Bay. Both gentlemen gave their unanimous opinion that the Samsah Bay as a naval base for us is out of the question, because aside from the technical insufficiencies of the harbor this place lacks the possibility of economic development. The Samsah Bay is separated from the interior by the high mountain passages and has an exclusively economical and poor population in the neighborhood in this relation."

²⁸ *Ibid.*, No. 3651, dated September 15, 1895.

interest in Weihaiwei²⁹ and China's intention, with the acquiescence of Russia, to fortify Kiaochow for herself.³⁰ Likewise the German Government had been for a time contemplating the exchange of possessions with England. It was suggested that either Kamerun in South Africa or Samoa, an island in the Pacific be given to England in exchange for a harbor in East Asia in case such a harbor would be within the English sphere of interest.³¹

On the very day that the Treaty of Shimonoseki was signed by China and Japan, it was suggested to the German Foreign Office by the Secretary of the Navy Department to occupy two naval bases in China, one in the North, and the other in the South. In this report Hollmann urged that at least two stations were necessary for the German ships in order to protect the German trade and other interests. On the basis of his four necessary requirements regarding the nature and the location of the places, Hollmann discussed the six places, classifying them into three groups. In the first group he mentioned Chosan in the North as strategically situated, and spoke of the Island Amoy with Kulangsu in the South as a good harbor with active trade. Secondly, in case the English should claim over Chosan and prevent Germany from obtaining it, the Kiaochow Bay in the North and the Mirs Bay in the South came into consideration. Kiaochow Bay on the southern coast of the

²⁹ *Die Grosse Politik*, Nos. 3648-9, dated September 1-2, 1895, respectively.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, Vol. XIV, No. 3650, dated September 9, 1895, the note of the Acting Secretary of Foreign Office: "Kiaochow alone promises a relative success, because China alone would be concerned in it. Even here are disadvantages in that it might lead to difficulties with China and that it would not be important commercially, unless a system of railroads be built there." It is to be seen that during the time of the correspondence, the Russian interest in that Bay was not yet felt; *Die Grosse Politik*, No. 3676, dated July 3, 1897, Radolin to Hohenlohe: "The Chinese consider this harbor as their best and most important and will fortify it, to which the Russians do not object . . ."

³¹ *Ibid.*, Vol. XIV, No. 3658; Note of Hohenlohe, dated November 11, 1895: "It seemed to his Majesty (Kaiser) that as the result of war entanglement there is hope for his future gain. I told him that this hope is uncertain because of the underlying danger. As I spoke of the exchange of possessions with England, he said that we could change with Kamerun. He held Samoa for a suitable exchange object. Of course we did not come to a conclusion or result, as the conversation was purely an academic one. However, I observed that the Admiral (Knorr) expressed doubt, if the treaty between England and China relating to Chosan is still in force." So it is to be seen that if Chosan was chosen as the German naval base, as Admiral Knorr desired, England would be compensated.

Shantung Peninsula offered a spacious harbor, amply protected against the wind from all directions, while the Mirs Bay possessed a good harbor, but was too near Hongkong, the English market and concession. Lastly were the Montebello Islands in the North and the Pescadores Islands in the South. The former are situated at the southern extremity of Korea with a good harbor, favorable in their climatic conditions, but of importance only if Korea was to be opened to European trade and culture, while the latter would be valuable only to the possessor of Formosa, which forms the hinterland.³²

Thus far Germany had encountered great difficulty in selecting a suitable naval and commercial base on the coast of China. Germany was also concerned to avoid any aggressive policy or take drastic measure, fearful of endangering her existing commercial interests in China. Much delay was the natural result.³³ The final choice of Kiaochow as a naval and coaling station by Emperor William II, the Foreign Office, and the German Navy Department, is of great interest. Even before 1870 Bismarck had fixed his choice on Kiaochow, but political considerations had then prevented him from doing so.³⁴ Basing on the report of Hollmann, the Acting Secretary of the Foreign Office, Freiherr von Rotenhan considered

³² On April 17, 1895, Marshall, the Secretary of the Foreign Office in Germany received a secret dispatch from Hollmann, the Vice Admiral and the then Secretary of Navy in which Hollmann stated that at least two bases or stations, one in the North and the other in the South on the Chinese coast were necessary as German sphere of interest. His four requirements were (1) a well protected harbor against wind and ocean with a good anchoring place, (2) bases on the main ocean traffic, (3) good facilities for the erection of fortifications suitable for defense and (4) not too great proximity to the stations of the Powers. *Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. XIV, No. 3646; J. V. A. Mac-Murray: *Treaties and Agreements with and Concerning China*, Vol. I, *The Treaty of Shimonoseki signed by China and Japan on April 17, 1895*.

³³ *Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. XIV, No. 3648, in which Hohenlohe, the Chancellor, when ordered by the Emperor to be ready with the cruisers to seize either Weihaiwei or any point on the Gulf of Pechili expressed his view to the Secretary of Foreign Office, Marshall, that a peaceful occupation of a station would be advisable for Germany.

³⁴ a. Schrameier, cited above, and footnote No. 11, p. 5.

b. British Foreign Office: *Peace Handbook*, No. 42, p. 89; German Colonization. It is worthy of note that even a quarter of a century earlier Kiaochow had been prominently marked on the German map of acquisitions, desirable but not then expedient. It has been reported on to this effect by the scientific expedition of Baron von Richthofen, which was sent to China by the Prussian Government in 1860.

c. Giordani, cited above, p. 57.

it alone as the possible choice, since Germany would have to deal with China alone, without encountering any difficulties with the other Powers, although he promised to attempt the occupation of Amoy first.³⁵

Even in November, 1895, the German Emperor opposed the acquisition of Kiaochow very strongly upon the advice of the Admiral Knorr, who was afraid of the opposition of Russia to Germany's acquiring it.³⁶ Nine months passed after the German Minister, Freiherr von Heyking, sent a secret dispatch to Prince von Hohenlohe, the Chancellor, informing him that the Kiaochow Bay offered an easy and safe anchorage and could be fortified at small expense, according to the result of the investigation of Admiral Tirpitz who met him in Chefoo. Furthermore, Kiaochow had a very healthy climate and there were rich coal beds in the neighborhood.³⁷ Being greatly influenced by the Minister's dispatch, the Emperor ordered the Commanding Admiral of the Navy, von Knorr, to take Kiaochow Bay into reconsideration with Herr Detring. As a result of his investigation, Admiral von Knorr submitted a strictly secret note to the Foreign Office on November 9, 1896. In this he mentioned seven points in favor of Kiaochow (in contradiction of his former opinion against Kiaochow a year ago, November 11, 1895); namely, (1) its control over the importation and exportation both of Shantung as well as the entire North of China, (2) its favorable situation for the dock and wharf enterprises and its nearness

³⁵ Die Grosse Politik, Vol. IX, No. 2221: The German Minister in China to Hohenlohe; Vol. XIV, No. 3645: Marshall, Secretary of the Foreign Office to Hollmann.

³⁶ *a.* Die Grosse Politik, Vol. XIV, No. 3656: Hohenlohe's note, on November 11, 1895, after Admiral Knorr's visit during which Admiral Knorr opposed against the selection of Kiaochow as well as Amoy, but he favored Chosan very strongly asserting that Germany had hope of getting it.

b. *Ibid.*, No. 3657: Footnote to the dispatch (deciphered telegram) dated November 30, 1895, of the German Minister in China to the Foreign Office stated that William II in his immediate proposal objected Kiaochow and Quemoy, but favoured Chosan (his proposal dated November 11, 1895).

³⁷ *Ibid.*, No. 3664: The secret dispatch of Freiherr von Heyking to Prince von Hohenlohe reporting his meeting the Admiral, Tirpitz, in Chefoo together with the result of the Admiral's investigation about Kiaochow. The marginal remarks of the Emperor William II on the secret dispatch sent by Heyking (Heyking said that Admiral Tirpitz attributes the unfavorable result of the inspection of the Kiaochow Bay taken during the previous year to the insufficient observation, etc.) were: (1) So much for all that! (2) We could have had the Bay last summer and then you did not desire the navy; I was determined for it! (3) We have cost ourselves dearly!

to the Yangtze River, (3) the richness of the Hinterland in containing coal, iron and other minerals, (4) the fact that it was one of the good routes for a road to Peking, (5) the desirability of the inhabitants both intellectually and physically, (6) the suitability of the climate for a European colony and (7) the ease of deepening the harbor. In addition, he stated that, according to the report of Rear Admiral Tirpitz, which had just arrived, Kiaochow for the most of the time was ice-free.³⁸

In spite of this above detailed report in favor of Kiaochow, the Emperor became so impatient then that he notified Hohenlohe that he was going to telegraph Admiral Tirpitz, who was then stationed in China, to be ready to occupy Amoy at once upon order.³⁹ Two days later (November 29, 1896) in replying to the Emperor's notification Hohenlohe urged William II to wait for an excuse, and then seize the Samsah Bay in Chekiang Province, which was referred to as next to Chosan by the Chief of the Asiatic Squadron, Admiral Hoffman as a "dead pledge" for later negotiation with the Chinese to obtain this place as a limited cession for a time.⁴⁰ The very next day, after he received Hohenlohe's immediate proposal (November 30, 1896), the Kaiser ordered Admiral Knorr to prepare a plan for the seizure of the Kiaochow Bay.⁴¹

About the middle of December, 1896, through the Navy Department, the Emperor sent an expert hydraulic engineer, Franzius, the Naval Council (Marinebaurats), to China to examine the Kiaochow

³⁸ Die Grosse Politik, Vol. XIV, No. 3665: Note of the Commanding Admiral of the Navy, von Knorr, submitted to the Foreign Office on November 9, 1896, as a result of his reconsideration and discussion with Mr. Detring of Kiaochow Bay, after he was ordered by the Emperor on November 2, 1896. For the advantages of Kiaochow, see also *Ibid*, No. 3664: Heyking's telegram to Hohenlohe, August 26, 1896; Compare also with Schrameier, p. 26; and Schrameier: Kiautschou und die Ostasiatische Fragen, p. 10.

³⁹ *Ibid*, No. 3668: William II to Hohenlohe, November 27, 1896: "We must now act hastily and resolutely. Amoy must be occupied at once. Following the occupation, negotiations can be opened with China." The remainder of the dispatch tells the acquiescence of the English towards the German plan with regard to Amoy and therefore nothing was on Germany's way, and her action must be immediate, etc., etc.

⁴⁰ *Ibid*, No. 3669: Note of the Treaty Council in the Foreign Office, by Klehmet, November 28, 1896; No. 3648: Peaceful gain of a station is advisable.

⁴¹ *Ibid*, No. 3669: In the footnote: "... the Emperor gave order to Admiral Knorr on November 30, 1896, to prepare a plan for the seizure of the Kiaochow Bay and the preparation of the means."

Bay.⁴² In the secret dispatch of Freiherr von Heyking, written on May 5, 1897, the results of Franzius's examination of all Eastern harbors were reported to Chancellor Hohenlohe. After having discredited the Samsah Bay, Amoy, Kulangsu, and Chosan, the dispatch continued to state the opinion of the engineer and Captain Zeye that "only Kiaochow remains to be a commanding place from the technical point of view for our aim in question."⁴³ Although the Emperor had already resolved in favor of Kiaochow even before the sending of the engineer to China, as the secret diplomatic

⁴² Die Grosse Politik, Vol. XIV, No. 3670: Secret dispatch from the Secretary of Navy, Admiral Hollmann to the Secretary of the State for the Foreign Affairs, Baron von Marshall, dated December 8, 1896, in which Hollmann stated: "Following an immediate proposal of Mr. Chancellor in the presence of Your Excellency and mine, His Majesty, the Emperor has graciously ordered the sending of a high hydraulic engineer to the Far East to examine there the Kiaochow Bay for its suitability as a base or station for his Majesty's ships." (Footnote: The fact that the Emperor has resolved in favor of Kiaochow at this occasion even though the final decision is made to depend upon the report of the Naval Council, Franzius, who has gone to China as a hydraulic engineer, etc.); Giordani, cited above, Chapter IV, thus Giordani said: "In the beginning of 1897 an official mission went to China to examine from a technical point of view the different ports proposed, and Franzius, Director of the works of the port of Kiel, who was one of the commissioners, has given an account of the studies of his journey in a volume illustrated by William II. Since the conclusions of the Commissions were in favor of Kiaochow, negotiations were immediately opened with the Chinese Government," p. 58.

⁴³ Giordani, cited above, p. 58; Die Grosse Politik, Vol. XIV, No. 3674: Baron von Heyking's secret dispatch from Peking to the Chancellor, Prince von Hohenlohe, dated May 5, 1897. Heyking gave a detailed report of his welcoming the coming of Franzius and three others to China and the detailed report of the result of the investigation of the Commission on the five harbors of the Chinese coast; namely, (1) Samsah Bay, (2) Amoy, (3) Kulangsu, (4) Chosan and (5) Kiaochow Bay. Thus Heyking said: "These men reached their conclusion basing upon their previous view that only the Kiaochow Bay remains as a commanding place from the technical point of view for our aim in question. Secret Council, Franzius and I are of the opinion that lately in Berlin the view in relation to the Kiaochow Bay, in the authoritative positions as well as in the naval circle, experienced a real change that during the time when Admiral Hoffmann commanded the cruiser division in the Far East, the judgment upon the suitability of the Kiaochow Bay sounded unfavorable, people now reached at the conclusion, based upon the report of Admiral Tirpitz, that the Kiaochow Bay would be a valuable possession." *Ibid*, No. 3674: It is also important to notice the encouraging aspects of this report contained in the same dispatch which are twofold: 1. Both Franzius and Heyking sensed a real change of view in Berlin circles in favor of the Kiaochow Bay, 2. Captain Zee and Admiral Tirpitz had been assured by the Russian Commanding Admiral Alexejew that Russia's claim for Kiaochow was empty and unfounded; *Ibid*, No. 3688: Even a few days after the murder, Hohenlohe persuaded the Emperor to seize Tsangtao (near Chosan) instead of Kiaochow, which the Emperor desired.

dispatches had revealed,⁴⁴ this favorable expression given by a technician of high repute was like putting oil on the fire, so the German desire for Kiaochow became too intense to be repressed.⁴⁵

Before treating of Germany's negotiations for the cession of a harbor it is indispensable to have a brief mention of the tacit understanding as well as consent between the Emperor of Russia, Nicholas II and William II. After the success of joining in the Triple Intervention, the German Emperor wrote to Nicholas II on April 26, 1895, asking his help in his acquisition of "a port somewhere in China, where it does not 'gêne' you."⁴⁶ In answering to this letter Nicholas declared his agreement for the German acquisition of a Chinese harbor as shown in Hohenlohe's letter on September 13, 1895, to the Emperor, William II:

Hence the Czar said that he has written to Your Majesty in this spring that he will have nothing to oppose, if Your Majesty make a territorial acquisition in East Asia. I answered that Your Majesty communicated this to me, remarking that this is to be kept entirely secret. I conclude that His Majesty, the Emperor of Russia, has not spoken this until now to Prince Lobanov (the Russian Foreign Minister). The preliminary condition that Russia also acquired something was not mentioned.⁴⁷

Thus only nine days after the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki between China and Japan, the German Emperor revealed his aim of participating in the Triple Intervention by entering into this understanding.

Russia had entered into a secret convention with China, by which China leased the Port of Kiaochow to Russia for fifteen years but China had retained the right to buy at the end of this period all the barracks, godowns, machine shops and docks built there by Russia during her occupation. This agreement aroused much suspicion

⁴⁴ See note 41 above.

⁴⁵ Die Grosse Politik, Vol. XIV, No. 3688.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, No. 3648: The Kaiser's expression "where it does not gêne you" means where it will not affect the Czar's rights and privileges in China.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, No. 3648: Ex-Kaiser's telegram to Hohenlohe, included in Hohenlohe's telegram to Marshall, September 1, 1895, from Werk, William II said: "I have secured a written consent for the occupation of a Chinese place, etc."

in the minds of the German officials,⁴⁸ and on many occasions Germany asked her Ambassador in Petersburg and her ministers and admiral in China to find out the details of the transaction.⁴⁹ The many answers given by both the Chinese officials and the Russian ministers were so conflicting that they caused the German Emperor and the Chancellor to adopt a different procedure.⁵⁰ So William

⁴⁸ *Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. XIV, No. 3657: In this telegram dated November 30, 1895, the German Minister, Baron v. Schenck, in China advised the Foreign Office to occupy Quemoy as a desirable gain on the Chinese coast, as he expected Russia's opposition to the acquisition of the Kiaochow Bay; No. 3665: Herr Detring's affirmation about the Russian interest and intention in the Kiaochow Bay; MacMurray: *Treaties and Agreements with and Concerning China*, Vol. I, pp. 79-81: The Cassin Convention, October 28, 1896; The memoirs of Count Witte, pp. 92-3, telling of the signing of the secret agreement of alliance between Prince Lobanov-Rostovski, Count Witte and Li Hung-chang, during Li's stay in Moscow for attending the coronation of Nicholas II in April, 1896.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, No. 3660: In this telegram sent by Marshall, the Secretary of the State for Foreign Affairs from Berlin (February 1, 1896) to Freiherr v. Schenck in Peking, informing him that he also questioned the Chinese Minister in Berlin (Hsu Ching-cheng, who was also accredited to Petersburg) that since Russia has been conceded recently at Kiaochow Bay what other Power could oppose Germany's acquiring a harbor or station in China?; *Ibid.*, Nos. 3660, 3663-4; for all these see footnote 48; *Ibid.*, No. 3665: Note of the Commanding Admiral of the Navy, von Knorr, dated November 9, 1896 (a completely secret note, submitted to the Foreign Office), which is the result of the reconsideration of Admiral Knorr with Mr. Detring (who has been serving in the Customs office of China for some years previously) on the Kiaochow Bay ordered by the Emperor. Mr. Detring's affirmation about the Kiaochow Bay.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, No. 3663: Marshall's note (June 19, 1896) recording his conversations with Li Hung-chang, who visited Germany, after he attended the coronation of the Russian Czar, Nicholas II, representing the Chinese Emperor (he started from China on March 28, reached St. Petersburg on April 18, 1896, three weeks before the coronation); Witte's Memoir, pp. 85-6, which Marshall tried to influence Li in order to gain a station for Germany by saying that Russia has already been allowed to anchor her ships in the Kiaochow Bay, therefore Germany should be compensated, too, according to her urgent need. In answering to this pretext of Marshall, Li asserted that "Russia has no right on this Bay; China put this Bay for the disposal of the Russian fleet only for a few months;" *Ibid.*, No. 3664: In this secret dispatch of the German Minister in Peking, Baron von Heyking to Hohenlohe, the Chancellor (August 22, 1895, arrived on October 11, 1895), he reported that "immediately I objected the Admiral's proposal, as I have known so much that the Russians consider the Kiaochow Bay as belonging to their sphere of interest, since several Russian warships already stayed there during the last winter." Count Cassini, the Russian Minister, in Peking said to Heyking (same report) thus: "If the German ships would come to the Kiaochow Bay for the winter, we will welcome them and also the French ships, too." *Ibid.*, No. 3663, footnote 48: About Li Hung-chang's answer to Marshall's question regarding the cession of Kiaochow to Russia. *Ibid.*, No. 3674: The secret dispatch of the German Minister, Baron von Heyking to the Chancellor, Prince v. Hohenlohe, dated May 5, 1897, from Peking. In this dispatch Heyking reported that "Admiral Tirpitz (the German Admiral

II accompanied by Prince von Hohenlohe and Prince von Bülow visited the Czar in Peterhof or Peter-Court from August 7 to 10, during which visit the Kaiser succeeded in getting the consent of Nicholas II to let the German battleships anchor in the Kiaochow Bay, after getting the permission from the Russian Admirals.⁵¹ However,

stationed in Chefoo, China) already communicated to me by letter that the Russian Commanding Admiral Alexejew repeatedly made it clear that on "the side of Russia there is no claim for the Kiaochow Bay and that this harbor so far as the Russian wish or endeavor is concerned is empty and unfounded." Heyking continues: "A confirmation for the continuous failure of the Russian view for the Kiaochow Bay must be regarded as meaning, according to my opinion, that the Chinese lately took this place for a war harbor for themselves, as I have reported to Your Honor and designed a plan for the fortification of the same. In fact the members of the *Tsungli Yamen* at various occasions gave energetic assurance that China cedes to no friendly Power any right of possessing the Kiaochow Bay." No. 3675: In the secret draft of Baron von Rotenhan to the Ambassador in Petersburg, Prince von Radolin, dated June 22, 1897, the Acting Secretary of the State for the Foreign Affairs. Rotenhan informed Radolin of the remark of the Russian Admiral Alexejew to the German Admiral Tirpitz and Captain Zeye, see No. 3663, No. 3676: In the dispatch of Prince Radolin to the Imperial Chancellor, Hohenlohe, dated July 3, 1897, from Petersburg, reporting to him Radolin said: "Count Lamsdorff asserted that the Russians do not object to Chinese fortifying the harbor of the Kiaochow Bay, since the Chinese are the masters themselves and also that the distance between Vladivostok and the Kiaochow Bay is too great for Russia to have a special interest in claiming this harbor for herself." No. 3677: Radolin's dispatch to Hohenlohe, dated July 8, 1897, in which the Russian Foreign Minister, Count Muraviev again stated that he maintained the knowledge of the fortification of the harbor, but did not object to it.

⁵¹ Die Grosse Politik, Vol. XIV, No. 3678: Prince Hohenlohe's telegram to the Acting Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Baron von Rotenhan, (July 12, 1897) asking him to inform Prince Radolin, the German Ambassador in Russia, that Hohenlohe intended to settle the question of the Kiaochow Bay directly with the Russian Government during his approaching visit in Petersburg; No. 3679: Deciphered telegram of the Acting Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Bernhard von Bülow then in Petersburg to the Foreign Office (August 11, 1897): "Upon His Majesty's order I summarize the political conferences as have been held here (Petersburg) and the entire course of the visit of His Majesty the Emperor in Russia" (Footnote to this: Emperor William II stayed in Peterhof visiting the Russian Emperor from August 7 to 10, accompanied by the Chancellor, Hohenlohe and the Acting Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Bülow) 1. Kiaochow Bay: see next page, footnote, The Memoirs of Count Witte, Chapter IV, p. 101, Witte says: "During his visit to Peterhof in the summer of 1897, he had practically forced from Emperor Nicholas a tacit agreement to Germany's occupation of Kiaochow." Die Grosse Politik, Vol. XIV, No. 3679, 1. Kiaochow Bay: "His Majesty asked the Emperor Nicholas whether Russia has taken a view or prospect for the Bay. The Czar replied, 'Russia has an interest on it, to secure admittance to this Bay until she disposes it in favor of another, which has been considered already, situated in the North, namely, the Pingjiang which is not far from Port Arthur.' Upon the question of Our Gracious Lord whether Emperor Nicholas has any objections to the action in case the German warships should anchor in the Kiaochow Bay as a measure of necessity due to Germany's lack of a naval station and after

having obtained permission from the Russian naval authorities, the Russian Czar answered with assurance in a voluntarily obliged manner. After His Majesty had informed me about the exchange of opinions concerning the Kiaochow Bay, it was presented in writing by the Chancellor in the following form: This form was read to the Russian Foreign Minister and finally was fixed by His Excellency in a letter to Count Muraviev (the following is the exact dispatch written in French translated into English): 'His Majesty, the Emperor of Germany having asked His Majesty, the Emperor of Russia whether Russia had any intentions upon the Kiaochow Bay, His Majesty (Czar) replied that in effect Russia was interested in assuring for herself access to the said Bay until she has obtained a more (septentrional) port than the one (Pechili) which she had in view. The German Emperor having asked whether the Russian Emperor saw any inconvenience in the fact that the German ships in case of need after obtaining the permission from the Russian naval authorities anchor in the Kiaochow Bay. His Majesty, the Emperor of Russia answered negatively.' " No. 3681: Secret draft (Reinkonzept) of Hohenlohe to Radolin, the German Ambassador in Petersburg (September 9, 1897) in which Hohenlohe requested Radolin to inform Count Muraviev that Germany was to communicate the recorded conferences taken in Peterhof between the German Emperor and the Russian Emperor, to the Chinese Government: "We maintain our right to anchor our warships in the Kiaochow Bay in the course of the coming winter in case of need. This will happen at any time according to the agreement with the Russian authorities of the harbor." No. 3682: From Radolin to Hohenlohe in a secret dispatch reporting that Count Muraviev expressed that he wished to report to the Emperor of the intention of the German Government according to the Warsaw notification; Ex-Kaiser, William II: My Memoirs 1878-1918: Chapter III, Hohenlohe, pp. 61-7: "Months elapsed; my visit to Peterhof of August, 1897, was imminent. In agreement with the Prince, my uncle (Hohenlohe), I decided to discuss frankly the entire matter in person with the Czar, and if possible, put an end to Muraviev's notes and evasions. The conversation took place at Peterhof. The Czar stated that he had no interest in the territory south of Tientsin-Peking line, which meant that there was no reason why he should place obstacles in our path in Shantung; that his interest was concentrated upon the territory on the Yalu, around Port Arthur, etc., now that the English had made difficulties for him at Mokpo; that he would in fact, he was pleased if Germany would locate herself in future on the other side of the Gulf of Chili as Russia's welcome neighbor." The Memoirs of Count Witte, Chapter XIV, My Experiences with the Kaiser, p. 410: "During the German Emperor's stay at Peterhof there occurred an incident which was destined to have the most far-reaching effects upon the course of Russian history. It was afterwards related to me by Grand Duke Alezey Alexandrovich. Once when the two emperors were driving alone out in the country, so our Emperor told the Grand Duke, the German Kaiser asked his host whether Russia had any use for the Chinese Port of Kiaochow. He added that he would like to occupy that port and use it as a base for German shipping, but that he did not wish to take the step without his, Nicholas's consent. His Majesty did not tell the Grand Duke whether or not he actually gave his consent to the occupation of Kiaochow. What he did say was that his guest had placed him in an awkward position and the whole incident was extremely distasteful to him. I have but little doubt that His Majesty, who is exceedingly well-mannered, found it impossible to refuse his guest's request point-blank and that the latter interpreted this attitude as indirect approval and implied consent. Some time later, Count Muraviev, in discussing with me my opposition to the occupation of Port Arthur, let the cat out of the bag. He admitted that we had, in his words, 'rashly given our consent to the step which Germany had taken.' "

the dispute between Germany and Russia during and after the German occupation of the Kiaochow Bay went on until Russia herself seized Port Arthur and Talienwan and obtained from China the cession of these places for a lease of twenty-five years.⁵²

The negotiations for a cession of a station or harbor by Germany prior to the seizure of the Kiaochow Bay are full of interest. The motives for gaining a base, as advanced by German diplomats, are (1) the necessity of protecting the expansion of German

⁵² My Memoirs, Ex-Kaiser William II, Chapter II, Hohenlohe, p. 63: "The last piece of information arrived at about the same time as the answer from the Russian Foreign Minister, Count Muraviev, sent through the German Ambassador, relative to the sounding of Russian opinion which had been made pursuant to instructions from the Chancellor. Muraviev explained that Russia certainly had no direct claims (based on treaty with China) to the Bay, but that she, nevertheless, laid claim to it on the basis of the 'droit du premier mouillage' (right of first anchorage), seeing that the Russian ships had anchored there before those of any other fleet. This answer, it will be seen, ran counter to the report of our East Asiatic Division relative to the statements made by the Russian Admiral. Afterwards I had a talk with Muraviev. He employed all his arts, wriggled backwards and forwards in his statements and finally brought up his famous 'right of first anchorage.' That was all I wanted. I now passed to the offensive myself, striking out at him squarely with the opinion delivered by Perels. When I told him, finally, as the Czar desired, the result of the conversations between us two sovereigns, the diplomat was even more embarrassed, lost his assumed calm and capitulated. Admiral Hollmann declared that he, in all his experience of foreign service, had never heard of it; that it was nonsense and an invention of Muraviev, whose only motive was unwillingness to have some other nation settle on the shores of the Bay. I advised that the Privy Councillor of the Admiralty, Perels, one of the most famous living experts and an acknowledged authority on international maritime law, in this domain, be asked to deliver an opinion in order to clarify the question. This was done. The opinion tore Muraviev's contention to pieces, corroborated that of Hollmann, and completely did away with the legend of the 'right of first anchorage.'" *Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. XIV, No. 3693: Telegram of the Acting Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Frei. v. Rotenhan to Emperor William II, dated November 10, 1897, (6 days after the murder of the German missionaries in Shantung, China) contained the telegram sent by the Russian Government to the Russian Chargé d'Affaires informing him to send the batteries to Kiaochow to affirm the right of first anchorage, etc. and Muraviev's remarks or answer to the German Chargé d'Affaires; No. 3706: Telegram of the Russian Foreign Minister, Count Muraviev to the Russian Ambassador in Berlin, informing him of the Czar's surprise of William's interpretation to his telegrams to William II. Nos. 3707, 3711, 3717: Witte's opposition to Germany's occupation: Nos. 3719, 3742: Muraviev's and Czar's attitude towards Germany's occupation changes.

commerce in China,⁵³ (2) for the balance of power in East Asia,⁵⁴ (3) for the protection of the German missionaries,⁵⁵ (4) for facilitating

⁵³ My Memoirs, Ex-Kaiser William II, Chapter III, Hohenlohe, p. 61; Schrameier: Kiautschou, seine Entwicklung und Bedeutung, p. 17; Paolo Giordani: The German Colonial Empire, Chapter IV, pp. 56-7; Die Grosse Politik, Vol. IX, No. 2221, Vol. XIV, Nos. 3651, 3662-3. In all these correspondences it is stated that since most of the trade of Germany with China is carried under the English flag, it is necessary for Germany to gain a basis for its important trade interest in China.

⁵⁴ Die Grosse Politik, Vol. IX, No. 2219: The Kaiser telegraphed to Hohenlohe (November 17, 1894): "England seems to intend to secure a firm basis in China. This will doubtlessly cause Russia and France also to occupy strategical points in China. Under no circumstances should we let ourselves be placed at a disadvantage or be taken unawares. We must also secure a firm position in China, a country with which our trade amounts to 400,000,000 marks a year." No. 3645: Secret draft of Marshall, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to Hollmann, Secretary of Navy (March 11, 1895) in which Marshall said: "Since the Powers will be likely to gain bases in China in case of her defeat, it would be advisable for Germany to do likewise." No. 3663: Marshall's note dated June 19, 1896, after his conversation (political) with Li Hung-chang: "The present situation compells us to take coal at other stations and anchor at foreign docks for repairing, and this corresponds neither to the dignity of Germany nor her interests." No. 3653: Marshall to Radolin, October 25, 1895, balance of power in China. My Memoirs, p. 61, where Kaiser said: "The station is to serve the ends of commerce, before all else the military measures being limited solely to the protection of the trading center as it develops; they did not contribute an end in themselves or a basis for further military enterprises."

⁵⁵ Pohl, cited above, p. 2: "Furthermore it was necessary, not for the development, but for the mere existence of the Chinese mission in Shantung, that Germany should occupy Kiaochow." Schrameier: Wie Bandordnung von Kiautschou entstand, p. 3: "In order to provide at once effective protection to the mission, etc." Die Grosse Politik, Vol. XIV, No. 3650: "Another profit of acquiring Kiaochow Bay for us is to give actual protection and support to the numerous resident German Catholic missions." Given in the recorded note of the Acting Secretary of Foreign Office, Freiherr von Rotenhan, dated September 9, 1895; *Ibid.*, No. 3653: William II, to the Foreign Office telegram deciphered (dated September 23, 1895) asking the Foreign Office to forward to the Commanding Admiral von Knorr an order for Knorr to be ready to proceed to Weihaiwei at once upon telegraphic order in the name of protecting the missions; Yen Liu: The Recent Diplomatic History of China. Chapter IX, p. 264, The Beginning of the Partition of China by the Powers, Section II. The German Sphere of Interest in China. "Bismarck in 1883 attempted to take back the right of protecting the German Colonial Policy. In 1887 Bishop Anzer came back to Berlin, when Bismarck honored him, telling him hereafter the German Government would protect the propagation of Christianity in China, persuading him to place the Catholic stations in the

the expansion of the German Navy,⁵⁶ (5) as an act of compensation for the services that Germany rendered to China during the Triple Intervention, by forcing Japan to return the Liaotung Peninsula

south of Shantung under the protection of the German Empire. Anzer gladly consented to this. Since then the German Catholic mission stations in the south of Shantung have not been under the control of the French Minister in China. Originally by the Treaty of Tientsin (between China and France in 1860) France obtained the right of protecting all foreign Catholics in China. So when the murder of the German Catholic priests in Kiaochow occurred, Germany sent her troops there instantly. For this political motive of protecting the Catholic missions, see also George M. Stenz: *The Life of Father Richard Henle*, Chapter VIII, At Yenchowfu, "The Holy City" pp. 79-84; Giordani, cited above, *The German Colonial Empire*, translated by Mrs. Gustavus W. Hamilton, Chapter IV, *The Lease of Kiaochow* (*The Pachtgebiet of Kiaochow*) pp. 50-7: "to protect the lives of the missionaries more effectively than by the continuous presence of German troops."

⁵⁶ Pohl, cited above: *Die Überlassung von Kiautschou seitens Chinas an das Deutsche Reich*, Introduction, p. 1: "Already for three years before the occupation of Kiaochow, had the need for a protecting point or a naval base in East Asia been felt, but other political situations made it impossible at that time to go further into the matter. Only when the German navy grew very rapidly and when the Sino-Japanese War occurred, the necessity of this station became again felt." *Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. XIV, No. 3651: Entirely secret dispatch of von Rotenhan, the Acting Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to Freiherr Schenk in Peking (September 15, 1895) in which he said: "It appeared that the further development of the matter (Sino-Japanese War) guaranteed us the opportunity to step forward with our prepared claim or pretension. What points (places or harbors according to the report No. 3646, of Admiral Hollmann, State Secretary for the Navy, on the six chosen places on the Chinese coast, submitted to the Secretary of Foreign Office, Freiherr von Marshall, dated April 17, 1895) would you prefer in the interest of our sea power?" *Ibid.*, No. 3662: Note of the Vortragenden Rats in the Foreign Office, Klehmet (March 18, 1896) "The Chief Commander, the Imperial Marine Office as well as the chief of the Asiatic Cruiser Division or Squadron have repeatedly and unanimously demanded the acquisition of a coaling and naval station (in China) as a pressing necessity." *Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. XIV, No. 3669: Footnote (2) to this note: "It is stated in a later memoir of the Foreign Office on March 19, 1897, which is to the following effect: It is allowed to bring forth a retrospect which took the question of the station in the course of investigation or discussion. The same would be mentioned in 1895 by a letter of the Foreign Office to the Imperial Naval Department, wherein would be referred that since the European Powers could come to the acquisition of territories, it is not possibly following the end of the Sino-Japanese War and perhaps we have the opportunity to acquire a coaling station for our navy also on our part. Gradually the coaling station is to be transformed into a naval station, then a fulcrum of trade." Giordani, cited above, *The German Colonial Empire*, Chapter IV, pp. 56-7; Von Bülow: *Imperial Germany*, Chapter VIII, pp. 117-8.

to China⁵⁷ and (6) for the founding of a German colonial domain in China.⁵⁸

Six months after the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, the German Foreign Office instructed her Ambassador in Petersburg, Prince von Radolin, to call the attention of the Chinese Minister (Hsu Ching-cheng, who was both accredited to Petersburg, Russia as well as to Berlin, Germany, but stayed in Petersburg most of the time) to the benefit and practicability of having a strong German fleet in the Chinese water for protecting China as well as for preserving the balance of power in East Asia. Prior to this instruction, the German Foreign Office sent a telegram to her Minister in Peking, instructing him to present the German request for a coaling station as a necessity for preserving the German commercial interest as well as the balance of power in the Far East.⁵⁹ In replying to the

⁵⁷ Die Grosse Politik, Vol. XIV, No. 3645: Footnote to the heading (A secret dispatch from Marshall to the Secretary of Navy, Vice Admiral Hollmann, dated March 11, 1895, in which it is stated that Germany's attempts to gain coaling stations and naval bases in China "were partly responsible for Germany's participation in the East Asiatic Triple Intervention or Alliance," but they could not be realized at the time, because there was disagreement as to the location and because no suitable occasion arose. *Ibid.*, No. 3663: Marshall's note after his conversation with Li Hung-chang (June 19, 1896) in which Marshall records what he said to Li Hung-chang in the following: "I expected when the Chinese Government should be once convinced first that in truth Germany returned Liaotung to her, so also she could not deny herself to fulfil the demand of Germany. This is indispensable if she is to carry her policy of compensation further. I am far from accusing some one of the interested Powers for selfishness, but I bring into prominence that the unselfishness of Russia, England and France would be confirmed really against China, if Germany comes forth supporting as an active factor in the East Asiatic question upon a naval station." Also see No. 3654.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, No. 3669: This note written by Klehmet, the Vortragenden Rats in the Foreign Office (November 28, 1896) as an immediate proposal of the Chancellor, Hohenlohe, which is to be submitted to the Emperor, William II, in reply to his order (Emperor's order for the hasty seizure of Amoy without any cause whatsoever). The note states: "Finally we are asked to demand a place for the founding of a German colonial domain (Kolonialgebiet). It is doubtless that by carrying further the aspect, the advancement of the matter would be difficult and retarded. Several favorable opportunities must have been neglected, because the question of place, however, was not cleared. They remained with the original modest point of the Foreign Office, that is, the view only upon the coaling station for the navy, the aim would have been reached long ago." Schrameier: Kiautschou, seine Entwicklung und Bedeutung, Chapter II, pp. 20-1.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, No. 3653: Marshall's Reinkonzept to Prince von Radolin (October 25, 1895), containing two telegrams, one to the German Minister in China and the other to Radolin; Official History of the Ch'ing Dynasty, Foreign Relations, Germany, p. 8.

request of the German Government, China objected to it on the ground that if she were to grant Germany a station, other Powers would make similar demands.⁶⁰ Being flatly refused by China, the German Minister in China (Baron Schenck) and the German Ambassador in Petersburg, Prince von Radolin, advocated to the German Government the application of force or military seizure of a place on the Chinese coast, followed by negotiation, which suggestion the German Government adopted at the end of the year 1897.⁶¹ But as a counter request, China asked Germany to negotiate for a new commercial treaty for the increase of the custom or tariff, which was evaded by the German Foreign Minister, Marshall.⁶² Thus ended the negotiations between China and Germany for a cession of a harbor.

The murder of two German Catholic priests in Tshantyachuang, Chuyaihyeh, Tsouchufu, of Shantung on the evening of November 1, 1897, was the pretext used by Germany for her military occupation of the Kiaochow Bay (evening of November 14, 1897). According to George M. Stenz's narration, these two German Catholic priests, Fathers Francis Nies and Richard Henle while visiting his friend, George M. Stenz (the author of this book, *The Life of Father Henle*) and staying with him at his house were killed just before midnight by a band of armed men (robbers or murderous gang as Stenz called them) who broke into the house of the resident missionary suddenly. This only lucky survivor, George M. Stenz, attributed this killing to the hatred of the anti-Christian Boxers, the *Tai Tao Hui*

⁶⁰ *Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. XIV, No. 3655, dated October 29, 1895; No. 3659, dated December 15, 1895 (arrived February 1896); No. 3660, dated February 1, 1896; and No. 3663, dated June 19, 1896 (p. 30) and No. 3671, dated December 16, 1896: China's definite refusal contained in Heyking's on the same ground, December 27, 1895.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, No. 3657, dated November 30, 1895, from the German Minister, Baron von Schenck to the Foreign Office in which he advocated the military seizure of Quemoy near Amoy; Nos. 3661 and 3666: From Prince Von Radolin in Petersburg, dated February 15, and November 19, 1896 (secret dispatch).

⁶² *Ibid.*, No. 3663: Marshall's note oft. cited, dated June 19, 1896, and No. 3671: From Heyking, dated December 16, 1896, reporting on his discussion with the *Tsungli Yamen*

or the "Big Knife Society" members.⁶³ It is interesting to note that Father Stenz and Father Richard Henle were the European missionaries, whom the Boxers had decided to kill, as Father Stenz narrated, but due to either the special dispensation of Divine Providence or a mere trick that Stenz played on his two victim guests (he invited these two priests to stay overnight at his place and assured them that his locality was safe). "It was a long time also since I had seen Father Nies last and thus we conversed with one another until a late hour at night. He had been recently attacked and wounded by robbers and related his adventure to us, whereby he asked whether it was dangerous at the present time in Tsouchufu—it was the first time he traversed the 'Land of Bandits,'—but I assured him of the contrary," Stenz escaped scot-free.⁶⁴ The fact that these devout Catholic priests energetically interfered in the local jurisdiction of the Chinese courts in Shantung in favor of their native Christians, intensified the hatred of the non-Christians against Christianity and Christian priests. This will be evident from the following quotations from Stenz's "Life of Father Henle." Thus he asserted: "Father Henle tried to be on good terms with the officers and the rich and learned men and often contrived to induce these 'friends' to pronounce a just sentence. Even the most cunning mandarin could not resist his amiable manner and in regard to shrewdness, Father Henle was equal to

⁶³ Stenz: *The Life of Father Richard Henle*, Introduction, p. 9; *Ibid*, Chapter XIV, The Motive and Consequences of the Murder: Thus Stenz asserted: "Besides this, the hatred on the part of the Boxers towards the Christians had in the course of time developed into actual hatred of religion; Steiger, cited above, p. 64: Dr. Steiger does not believe that the Boxers were the murderers. He said: "The nature of the band and the motives for the murder have never been conclusively established. It has been variously alleged that the murderers were armed robbers attacking the village; that they were a body of local ruffians, inspired by general hatred for the Christian religion; and that they were a group of men who had been roused to fury through the inter-meddling of the local priest, who escaped by mere chance the vengeance which unintentionally fell upon his innocent guests." Writing a year later, Bishop Anzer, the German Bishop of Shantung, identified the assassins as a band of the "Big Knife Society," but this identification is entirely convincing. Morse, Vol. III. p. 106, Village of Kiachwang, Kiyehshien, Tsauchufu, in the southwestern corner of Shantung.

⁶⁴ *Ibid*, p. 131: "The latter (Boxers) now decided to kill a few Europeans and amongst these Father Henle and myself were nearest to them;" p. 9, Introduction: "I was to share the same lot and only by an altogether special dispensation of Divine Providence did I escape. Father Nies who died in my place was apparently dead, when I came to him, etc."

any mandarin. For the same reason he also studied the laws, morals and customs of the Chinese to the smallest point." Again he said: "Even his kindness could not prevail over the hatred of a few malignant enemies, which caused Father Henle, with his 'golden tender heart,' indescribable pain and anguish. His friendly intercourse with the rich and the mandarins proved a great advantage to him in this respect and a great benefit for the extension of Christianity."⁶⁵

Moreover, the fact that Germany utilized the anti-Christian movement in Shantung for the seizure of a harbor constituted another cause of this incident. Bismarck, in 1887, succeeded in persuading the German Catholic Bishop, Anzer, who returned to Berlin on furlough in that year, to place the Catholic mission stations in the south of Shantung under the protection of the German Empire.⁶⁶ Thus Stenz records: "In 1890 the Bishop, Anzer, undertook the prescribed journey to Rome and on this occasion placed his mission under the protection of Germany. The German Empire gave at once a decided proof of its protection and its first act consisted in sending Count von Seckendorff as Consul to Shantung to regulate the affairs in Yenchowfu." Bishop Anzer, desiring to force China to open to Catholic missions the "Holy City," Yenchowfu, near the birthplace of Confucius, Chufo, (which place was closed to missionary enterprise by the Treaty of Tientsin, 1860, between China and France) asked the German Government to send a consul to Yenchowfu, Shantung, without the consent of the Chinese Government. As a result, a riot broke out upon the arrival of Count von Seckendorff at Yenchowfu and the rioters forced the German representative to return to Germany.⁶⁷

Early in September, 1895, the German Emperor telegraphed to the Foreign Office and the Secretary of Navy ordering the German warships to go to Swatow, and the rest of the cruiser division to Chefoo, to protect the missionaries there and await orders to seize

⁶⁵ Stenz, cited above, Chapter IX, pp. 88-92.

⁶⁶ Liu, cited above, Chapter IX, Section II: The German Sphere of Interest in China, pp. 265-7: "According to the Treaty of Tientsin (June 18, 1858, ratified in 1860), France obtained the right to protect the Catholic missionaries from other countries in China. Bismarck attempted to take back this right of protecting the German Catholics in China in 1883."

⁶⁷ Stenz, cited above, Chapter VIII, pp. 79-84.

Weihaiwei.⁶⁸ Having no outburst of anti-Christian sentiment among the Chinese, Bishop Anzer petitioned the German Government violently for an energetic action or advance in the interest of the mission for inspiring the respect of the Chinese with the threat that "otherwise his missionaries might urge him to return to the French protection in order to prove effective."⁶⁹ Again waiting for eight months, the Emperor became so desperate and impatient that he was on the point of ordering his Admiralty to seize Amoy without any cause. In advising the Emperor, William II, Hohenlohe urged him to wait for an excuse and then seize the Samsah Bay at once, retaining it as a "dead pledge" for later negotiations with the Chinese, since causes for advance are found in the last two years; for example, in the relations of our missionaries or in the matter of our German instructors (in China).⁷⁰ As a last proof of

⁶⁸ Die Grosse Politik, Vol. XIV, No. 3652: Emperor William II's telegram to the Foreign Office and the Naval Department (September 23, 1895), in which he said: "According to the recent news in China, universal fermentation of a great persecution of Christians is possible. It is necessary to send our ships, "Arenas" and "Cormorans," to protect our missionary stations in Swatow, however the majority of our colonies or establishments are in the Shantung Peninsula, so let the rest of the cruiser division go to Chefoo both to protect the missionaries there and wait for further orders to seize Weihaiwei at once."

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, No. 3662: Note of Vortragenden Rats, Klehmet, in the Foreign Office (March 18, 1896). This he records: "The minister in Peking repeatedly and urgently recommended an advance and he recommended the utilization of the delay of the settlement of the trouble of our Catholic missionaries for the precedence in Yenchowfu. Otherwise he feared a serious danger to our prestige in China. The repeated accusation of Bishop Anzer now already receives no respect both from the officials and the population. Germany only threatens; she has big words, but no deeds. Bishop Anzer requested violently an energetic advance in the interest of his mission to inspire the respect of the Chinese again. He explained that otherwise his missionaries might urge him to return to the protection in order to prove to be powerful or efficient."

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 3669: The note of the Vortragenden Rats, Klehmet, drawn for Hohenlohe's immediate proposal to Emperor, dated November 28, 1896 (Hohenlohe's proposal was submitted to William II on November 29, 1896) thus Hohenlohe said: "But we only could take Samsah in peace if China gives us a cause through the damage of our right or at least a pretext. The irreparable compromise of our policy by a naked violation of law will not be able to balance or square itself by a gain of a coaling station." Again he said: "The only way for us to attend to it is to wait till the Chinese give us a cause for a reprisal and then seize the Samsah Bay at once, retaining it as a dead pledge and negotiate with the Chinese, at first a limited cession of a place for a time." Still again he stated: "We will not have to wait too long for the pretext. Also cause for action is found in the last two years; for example, in the relation of our missionaries or in

the co-operation of Bishop Anzer with the German Government, Rotenhan, the Acting Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in his telegram to Foreign Secretary, Bülow, reported that Bishop Anzer expressed the hope, saying:

Now we would utilize the opportunity to seize Kiaochow, as the best and the most capable base of development for us in every respect.

On November 16, Bishop Anzer was received by the Emperor William II, in an audience. According to the telegram of the Emperor to the Foreign Office on November 17, the Bishop on this occasion said to him:

It is the last moment for the German Empire to attain a position generally in Asia and to establish the somewhat lessened prestige anew. It costs what it desires, but we, under no circumstances, need to give up Kiaochow which has an economical and industrial future, which will be greater and more important than Shanghai. The occupation of Kiaochow astonishes nobody in the Orient, because all the people there have expected it for a long time.⁷¹

Having decided to occupy Kiaochow after thirty-seven years' investigation and survey over all the Chinese coast, William II

the matter of the German instructors. Until the present, it has been necessary to refrain from the utilization of such occasions, because the navy, whose opinion must be decisive in such matters concerning the administration of the foreign policy, had not come to a definite conclusion in its difficult consideration of the question of the place to be chosen."

⁷¹ Die Grosse Politik, Vol. XIV, No. 3694: Telegram (draft) of the Acting Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Freiherr von Rotenhan to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Bernhard von Bülow who was then in Rome, dated November 9, 1897. The footnote to this telegram states: "Bishop Anzer, a Catholic Bishop of the province of Shantung, who at the time of the Kiaochow incident, lived in Berlin." Also in Rotenhan's own note, November 7, 1897, it was stated that Bishop Anzer stayed in Berlin during the Kiaochow incident. Louis Elkins Longmans: The German Emperor's Speeches (being a selection from the speeches, edicts, letters and telegrams of the Emperor William II, translated by the author. Fragmentary paragraphs relating to China, p. 61. William II said: "The Catholic Mission in China has always enjoyed the support of the Emperor. The Catholic missionary, Bishop Anzer, has when visiting Berlin, often been the guest of the Emperor, and has advised him on various important Chinese affairs. The action undertaken against China in the year 1900 was partly in aid of the Catholic missions. The Archbishop of Cologne, the Bishop of Metz, and the Archbishop of Posen and Gnesen issued instructions to their clergy that prayers should be offered in the churches on behalf of the expedition to China."

ordered the Navy to make plans for the seizure on November 30, 1896.⁷² Waiting a year for an excuse, the German Emperor was only too glad to hear the news of the murder of two German Catholic priests in the province of Shantung. At once he ordered the squadron consisting of the "Kaiser," "Princess Wilhelm" and "Cormoran" to proceed to Kiaochow immediately. His telegram of November 6 (five days after the murder incident) to Admiral Diederich, who was stationed in Woosung reads:

Please start instantly with your entire squadron to Kiaochow, seize a suitable place or strategic point or town there and take suitable means of revenge upon them. The greatest energy is necessary. Keep your journey of the goal secret.⁷³

For executing the order instantly, even without waiting for the answer from the Chinese Government, Admiral Diederich sailed toward the Kiaochow Bay with his entire East Asiatic Division, landing a small force ashore early at eight o'clock in the morning of

⁷² Die Grosse Politik, Vol. XIV, No. 3669: Footnote to this note of Klehmet which was dated November 28, 1896, drafted for Hohenlohe as his immediate proposal to the Emperor. It says: "The Emperor gave order to Admiral v. Knorr on November 30, 1896, to prepare a plan for the seizure of the Kiaochow Bay. The plan was submitted to the Emperor on December 15, 1896. Knorr communicated to Marshall on February 17, 1897, that the Emperor had decided that the seizure and the maintenance of the places should be the work of the cruiser division, until the arrival of the garrison troops of the navy."

⁷³ *Ibid.*, No. 3686: Emperor's telegram (deciphered) to the Foreign Office, dated November 7, 1897: "I have just read in the press the news of the attack upon the upright German Catholic mission under my protection in Shantung. The fleet or navy must secure plentiful atonement by energetic action. The squadron must instantly sail to Kiaochow, occupy the port and threaten with severest reprisal unless the Chinese Government pays a high indemnity in gold and punishes the criminals. I am firmly resolved to abandon our over-cautious and weak policy and henceforth show the Chinese with full severity and if necessary, with the most brutal ruthlessness, that the German Emperor cannot be made sport of and that it is bad to have him as an enemy. Please telegraph answer of agreement, so that I may immediately instruct the admiral by telegraph. Such energetic action is incumbent on me so that I may show my Catholic supporters, including the Ultramontane group, that I have their welfare at heart, and that they can count upon my protection as well as my other subjects. William I. R." No. 3687: The Chiffre in the Imperial Retinue or attendance, Franceson to the Foreign Office, telegram deciphered, dated November 6, 1897: "Regarding the telegram of to-day, His Majesty, the Emperor will give telegraphic order to Admiral von Diederich of Woosung: 'Please start instantly with your entire squadron to Kiaochow, seize a suitable point and town there and enforce the complete vengeance upon them, etc. Wilhelm I. R.' Franceson." Ex-Kaiser, William II, My Memoirs, Chapter IV, pp. 65-6, 86.

November 14, and took possession of the heights surrounding the Kiaochow Bay. The landing party of the "Cormoran" staying farthest inside the Bay was instructed to take the powder magazine. Near nine o'clock they completed the taking of these points, while the flag lieutenant sent an ultimatum to the Chinese General, Kao Yuan-chang, giving him only three hours within which to clear the whole fortress. As a threat the ships, "Kaiser" and "Princess Wilhelm," anchored around with their guns pointing at the forts. Being deprived of any means of defense, the General with his soldiers withdrew into the interior. The German flag was hoisted at two o'clock on the east fort and a salute of twenty-one guns was given as a sign of victory over the bloodless military seizure of the naval base. The report goes on: "The Admiral made a speech to the crews and gave three cheers to the Kaiser. At once the forts were occupied and measures were taken to guard the country against plundering."⁷⁴

Immediately following the occupation, a proclamation was issued on the same day by Admiral Diederich, instructing the inhabitants in the occupied territory to continue their professions as before and abide within the Chinese law with the ultimate warning:

No opposition to Germany will be permitted. Deliberate opposition will not bring any advantage to those who offer it; it will only invite misfortune.

The Chinese officials (civil and judicial) were allowed to perform their duty within the seized territory and in case of difficulty of settling any question or cases, they were to submit those cases to the German military Governor for decision, while no lands could be transacted without the permission of the German Governor.⁷⁵

⁷⁴ Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, 1899, Vol. CV: Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of China: Sino-German Convention. The Occupation of Kiaochow, p. 28. Inclosure 1 in No. 71, MacDonald's Message to the Minister, Salisbury (received January 31, 1898) Extract from the *North China Daily News* in November 29, 1897; Alexis Krausse: The Story of the Chinese Crisis, pp. 127-9.

⁷⁵ Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, 1898, Vol. CXCIV, p. 29. Inclosure 2 in No. 71, also with the message of MacDonald to Minister of Salisbury. Proclamation issued by Admiral von Diederich, Commander-in-Chief of the German Squadron in Eastern Waters (translation November 14, 1897).

On November 15, the day following the seizure of the Kiaochow Bay, the city of Kiaochow was taken over by the same German Admiral.⁷⁶ These seizures were accomplished by the Admiral before the arrival of the proclamation from the German Government.⁷⁷

Upon receiving the news of the murder (November 6, eight days before the seizure), the Chancellor immediately instructed the German Minister in China by telegram to present severe demands of indemnity to the Chinese Government both for the murder in Shantung and for the Wuchang incident (the stoning of the mob at the officers and the crew of the "Cormoran" at their landing on October 30, 1897, a day before the murder in Shantung).⁷⁸ But knowing nothing about the attitude of the Powers towards Germany's sending the squadron to Kiaochow, especially that of Russia, whose Government had obtained the cession of Kiaochow in 1896 for fifteen years,⁷⁹ the German Emperor inquired of the Czar whether he had any objection. Nicholas II replied: "Cannot approve or disapprove your sending the German squadron to Kiaochow as I

⁷⁶ Liu, cited above, Chapter IX, Section II, The German Sphere of Interest in China, pp. 266-7.

⁷⁷ Die Grosse Politik, Vol. XIV, No. 3696: Hohenlohe's telegram to the Emperor, dated November 11, 1897, and footnote.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, No. 3686: Emperor's telegram to the Foreign Office, dated November 6, 1897, telling the news of the murder of the two German Catholic missionaries in Shantung; *Ibid.*, No. 3688: Hohenlohe's telegram to the Emperor, dated November 6, 1897, containing a duplicate copy of the telegram which he sent to the German Minister in Peking: "The following is a telegram to Your Majesty's Minister in China: 'Please hand severe demands of indemnity to the Chinese Government, together also for the accident in Wuchang in co-operation with the Admiral. (Footnote to this: On October 30, the commander and several officers of the anchoring "Cormoran" and also the crew of the steamboat under the flag upon landing were stoned at by the mob there).'

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, No. 3688: Hohenlohe asked the Emperor whether or not he should ask for the Russian understanding; *Ibid.*, No. 3689: Emperor's telegram to Hohenlohe, dated November 7, 1897: "For the arrival of my ships in Kiaochow I have inquired of the Czar personally. He answered me just now that he has nothing to permit or hinder over Kiaochow. He is convinced again, as before, that that harbor has been in the temporary possession of Russia for the period 1895-6. Hence I advised the Naval Department to dispatch to the Admiral the telegram I drew yesterday. We must utilize the favorable opportunity before another great Power provokes China or helps China! Right now or never!" The Russian text states: 'Cannot approve or disapprove your sending German squadron to Kiaochow as I have learned that this harbor has been only temporarily ours in 1895-6.' Wilhelm I. R."

have lately learned that this harbor was only temporarily ours, in 1895-6." Thus "by hook and crook" the Kaiser immediately ordered the Department of Navy to send his telegram to Admiral Diederich at Woosung instantly (this telegram was drawn by William II on November 6, a day before) for proceeding to Kiaochow, after he secured the Russian Emperor's indifferent answer.⁸⁰

On November 15, following the military occupation of Kiaochow, the important German Government officers, namely, the Chancellor, the Commanding Admiral, the Secretary of State for the Navy, Admiral Tirpitz, the Chief of the Naval Cabinet, Admiral von Secden-Bibran, the General Adjutant von Plessen and the Under-secretary Freiherr (Baron) von Rotenhan held an important meeting for the purpose of laying down the basis of negotiations to meet this emergency. First they decided that the seizure of Kiaochow by Germany would not prejudice the interests of Russia, since it was necessary for Germany to protect her Catholic missions. Secondly, the Government would settle any difficulties against the continued seizure of Kiaochow. Thirdly, three more warships, namely, the "Kaiserin Augusta," the "Gefion," and the "Germany" together with the enlistment of 1,200 men as protectorate troops should be sent to Kiaochow. Fourthly, Germany should prevent China from making war on her because of the recent seizure of Kiaochow and would preserve the sovereignty of China wherever possible. Germany would take Kiaochow from China only for a long lease. Lastly, in the negotiations Germany would make her demands so high that China could not fulfil them, thus giving a justification for a further seizure.⁸¹

⁸⁰ Die Grosse Politik, Vol. XIV, No. 3688: Footnote 79.

⁸¹ *Ibid*, No. 3701: Note on November 15, 1897 (Footnote to this note: The contents of the note were communicated to Grafen Hatzfeldt by the Secretary of State, Bülow, in Rome). Unsignierte Reinschrift. Berlin, November 15, 1897: The note states: "On the present day the discussion for the accomplishment of the seizure of the Kiaochow Bay has taken place under the Chairmanship of Mr. Chancellor at his place with the participation of the Commanding Admiral, Knorr, the Secretary of State, Admiral Tirpitz, etc. Our intention should remain secret until the explanation on the political situation (about Russia's attitude) has taken place. The "Kaiserin Augusta" can depart at once, as soon as she is in possession of the map. Furthermore, we should prevent China from making war on us, with the seizure and to preserve the sovereignty of China wherever possible. Perhaps we will take land from China only for a long lease. Our demands are so high to meet, in case China cannot fulfil our

The day after the occupation of Kiaochow, Baron von Heyking, according to the instructions from the Foreign office (on November 10, the Foreign Office sent telegraphic instructions to Heyking for making the demands to the Chinese Government) presented the following demands to the *Tsungli Yamen*; namely, (1) deposition and permanent degradation of Li Pi-ying, the Governor of Shantung, (2) building of the Cathedral begun by Bishop Anzer and erecting residences for the Catholic priests in seven places, with the setting up of an Imperial tablet in Shantung by the Chinese National Government, (3) severe punishment of all guilty persons and full indemnity, (4) securing against repetition of the same occurrence or incident, (5) compensation to the German Government for the cost arising from the occurrences and (6) the building of the Kiaochow-Peking Railway in Shantung Province with the Chinese and German capital and complete management of the mines along the railway by the Germans. On the same date, Heyking was instructed not to raise the demands for the vengeance before November 16. Again on November 19, Heyking was ordered to proceed with the negotiation "carefully on the point of the demand of building the Kiaochow-Peking Railway, so as not to drive the Chinese into the Russian arms."⁸²

The Chinese Government was shocked by the sudden seizure of Kiaochow and then the above demands; at once she turned to Russia for help since she allowed the latter country to use the port for wintering her ships. The Russian Government at first instructed her Minister Chargé d'Affaires at Peking that warships had been dispatched to the port, Kiaochow; however, on the 15,

demands, it gives a justification for another seizure." *Ibid*, No. 3698: Very secret draft or dispatch of Hohenlohe to the Ambassador, Grafen von Hatzfeldt, dated November 13, 1897 (a day before the seizure of Kiaochow). The footnote to this dispatch reads as follows: "According to the letter of Admiral Koester on November 6, the Head of the Naval Department does not only wish the acquisition of Kiaochow together with the booty or profit of the coal mines in Shantung and the building of railways from Shantung to Peking, but also the cession of territory in Woosung and Tschungtau."

⁸² *Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. XIV, No. 3712: Telegram of Freiherr von Heyking, the German Minister in Peking, China, to the Foreign Office, dated November 21, 1897, reporting his handing the demands to the Chinese Government and the reply of the Chinese Government as well as the mediation of the Russian Chargé d'Affaires to the German Minister. The Official History of the Ch'ing Dynasty, Foreign Relations, Chapter V, Germany, p. 9.

the following day, that order was canceled on the ground that she was persuading the German Government to reach a speedy settlement with China.⁸³ After waiting for five days in vain, the Chinese Government in reply to the German Minister requested the immediate evacuation of the German marines, who were stationed at the four forts around the Kiaochow Bay as a preliminary condition for the opening of the negotiation.⁸⁴ But the German Chancellor at once (November 21) refused the request because of the previous experience of the German Government in having difficulty in forcing the provincial authorities to execute such treaty agreements and therefore "we would superintend the execution of the relative orders and remain in Kiaochow until further notice." Hohenlohe continues his reasons of refusal:

They can always be intelligible later. But now are all kinds of evasions, no matter what kind they are by which the Chinese Government seeks to withdraw from performing a compensation for our useful aim, because we will boast through the necessity to reveal early our maps, as it passes to us.⁸⁵

The *Tsungli Yamen* refused negotiation on November 22 unless the German troops and warships withdrew first. Immediately

⁸³ Count Witte's Memoirs, Chapter IV, pp. 98-9, also see footnote 84; Die Grosse Politik, Vol. XVII, No. 3705-6.

⁸⁴ Die Grosse Politik, Vol. XVII, No. 3712: Baron von Heyking's telegram to the Foreign Office, dated November 21, 1897, reporting on the six demands he had made to the *Tsungli Yamen* and the request of the latter for the evacuation of the troops as a preliminary condition before the negotiation. Heyking also stated that the Russian Chargé d'Affaires communicated with the *Tsungli Yamen* urging the Chinese Government to reach a settlement for the compensation of the incident and his hope for the early evacuation by Germany.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, No. 3713: Hohenlohe's telegram to the Emperor, dated November 21, 1897, Hohenlohe reports: "Your Kingly Majesty, please allow me to submit most humbly the telegram just arrived (No. 3712, above). The Chinese Government requests the evacuation of Kiaochow as a preliminary condition for the negotiation of the compensation. I am able to decline or refuse in the mildest form the shameless or impudent pretention or requirement, in the following: "We do not doubt the intentions of the Central Government concerning our just demands, but our experience has taught us that we could not force the provincial authorities to execute such orders. We therefore would superintend the execution of the relative orders, and remain in Kiaochow until further notice." C. Hohenlohe; Marginal remarks of the Emperor, William II (written down by Hohenlohe) "This shamelessness is groundless or unreasonable! Agree. Good."

the German Minister telegraphed to the Foreign Office asking for further instruction:

May I declare to the *Tsungli Yamen* that we would direct and maintain as pledge the occupied district or territory with provisional administration until the settlement of the demands?

So the second request of the Chinese Government for the evacuation of the German troops and the withdrawal of the war-ships from Kiaochow caused the German Emperor and his officers to take action. Within a week the protectorate troop consisting of 1,200 men was formed so that it could be transported the next month. On November 30, the Emperor made a speech to the Reichstag appointing Prince Henry of Prussia to the East Asiatic Division, while Baron von Heyking was authorized by William II to make the above declaration to China on the ground that the latter might make too much delay.⁸⁶

⁸⁶ Die Grosse Politik, Vol. XVII, No. 3716: Telegram from the German Minister in Peking, Heyking, to the Foreign Office, dated November 22, 1897, in which he reported that the *Tsungli Yamen* refused to enter into negotiation unless the German troops and ships would withdraw first; then he accused the Russian and the French Chargé d'Affaires in Peking as having advised the *Tsungli Yamen* to postpone the matter without making any concessions. (Footnote to this telegram) Marginal remarks made by Emperor William II: It is necessary to order the recruitment for the forming of the colonial troops for Kiaochow, so that the crews who for weeks have been away from their ships may at least return on board. On November 26, Emperor William II repeated in a telegram from Görde the instruction to the Chancellor to proceed with the formation of the colonial troops for Kiaochow and their earliest embarkation, which has been decided in the Council on November 5 (No. 3710). On November 27, Prince Hohenlohe reported on the recent preparation for the forming of a protectorate troop of 1,200 men ready for transportation within 23 days. Ex-Kaiser William II, My Memoirs, Chapter III, Hohenlohe, pp. 65-6: "Thus the soil was prepared, politically speaking. In the autumn came the news from Bishop Anzer of the murder of two German Catholic missionaries in Shantung. The entire German Catholic world, particularly the Colonials in the Center Party, demanded energetic measure. The Chancellor proposed to me immediate intervention. While I was engaged in the winter hunting at Lotalingen, I consulted with him, in one of the little towers of the castle there, as to what step was to be taken. The Prince proposed to entrust Prince Henry of Prussia, who was present, with the command of the squadron that was to be sent out to reinforce the East Asiatic Division. I informed my brother of this in the presence of the Chancellor, whereat the prince and others present were highly pleased. The Chancellor sent the news to the Foreign Office and the new Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Herr von Bülow, who was away on a journey. Kiaochow was occupied in November, 1897. In December of that year Prince Henry, on board the "Deutschland" (Germany) sailed with his squadron to Eastern Asia, where he later took over the command of the entire East Asiatic Division.

For ten days the Chinese Government waited for the results from the mediation offered by the Russian Government. Count Witte attempted to advise the German Emperor to evacuate Kiaochow through the German diplomatic representatives in St. Petersburg:

In the interest of both my country and Germany I counseled and urged him to withdraw from Kiaochow, after having punished the guilty of the assassination of the missionaries.

but this advice was flatly rejected by William II in his answer as follows:

I see from Witte's words that some very important details relating to the matter are unknown to him. Therefore we cannot follow his advice.⁸⁷

Having thus failed in persuading the German Government to evacuate, Witte again advised the German diplomats to take a harbor south of Shanghai instead of Kiaochow, in which case neither Russia nor Japan would be obliged to seek compensations, but again the Government declined to accept his advice.⁸⁸

Being utterly unsuccessful in asking the German Government to evacuate Kiaochow, the *Tsungli Yamen* began negotiation with Baron von Heyking early in December. Agreement was soon reached, in which the *Tsungli Yamen* accepted the first three demands; namely, (1) the deposition and the permanent degradation of the Governor of Shantung Province, (2) the building of three Cathedrals (including one begun by Bishop Anzer, total expense amounting to 66,000 taels) and the erection of the residences for

⁸⁷ Memoirs of Count Witte, Chapter IV: Count Witte said: "The Kaiser's answer was substantially as follows: 'I see from Witte's words that some very important details relating to the matter are unknown to him. Therefore we cannot follow his advice.'"

⁸⁸ Die Grosse Politik, Vol. XVII, No. 3717: Note of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Bülow, dated November 30, 1897, in which he recorded Witte's advice to the German diplomats urging the German Government to take a harbor south of Shanghai, "in which case neither Russia nor Japan would be obliged to seek compensations." In answering to this, Bülow argued in his telegram to Radolin that Germany's establishment in Kiaochow would make herself lean more to Russia than to England, which reply silenced Witte, therefore "he advised Germany to take in the form of an apparent lease."

the Catholic priests in seven districts (Chuyeh, Wudau, Swatseng, Tanhyeh, Tsaohyeh, Yutai and Wusoo) of the province of Shantung (amounting to 22,000 taels) by China at her own expense, together with the setting up of an Imperial protection tablet, and (3) severe punishment of all guilty persons and full indemnity amounting to 3,000 taels to the families of the murdered, while the fourth and sixth demands were rejected and regarding the fifth demand, China agreed that Germany could build a railway from the Kiaochow Bay to Tsinanfu, the capital of Shantung Province. Finally they all agreed that the evacuation would take place after the fulfilment of the provisions, although the German Minister made his agreement for the evacuation evasively. Thus the preliminary agreement was reached between the *Tsungli Yamen* and the German Minister on December 4, 1897.⁸⁹

Three days later the German Minister, not having succeeded in his ultimate mission, presented his demand for the lease of Kiaochow to the *Tsungli Yamen* on the ground that Germany had withdrawn her sixth demand which requested the Chinese Government to pay Germany for the expenses in seizing Kiaochow; then since Germany had returned the Liaotung Peninsula to China in the Triple Intervention, China should voluntarily, out of gratitude, cede the Kiaochow Bay to Germany "as an eminently friendly

⁸⁹ Die Grosse Politik, Vol. XVII, No. 3722: Telegram from the German Minister in Peking to the Foreign Office, dated December 4, 1897, reporting that the Chinese mandarins accepted the demands with the exception of demand six and both the Chinese delegation and Heyking agreed to the evacuation of his answer or agreement evasively. (Footnote to this telegram: Heyking informed the Foreign Office in his telegram dated November 28, 1897, No. 83, that the two Chinese officers, Chang Jing-hwang and Weng Tung-ho, declared that the Chinese Government would not touch upon the question of the evacuation of Kiaochow for the time being, which was urged so strongly a few days ago; The Official History of the Ch'ing Dynasty, p. 9, stated that China agreed to the demands (1), (2) and (3), rejected (4) and (6) and compromised (5) by agreeing to let Germany build a railway from the Kiaochow Bay to Tsinanfu, the capital of the province of Shantung. Included in the memorial presented by the *Tsungli Yamen* to the Emperor; U. S. Foreign Relations, December 5, 1897, published in 1901, pp. 187-8: The American Consul, Mr. Charles Denby's report on the German Occupation of Kiaochow, No. 2884, dated March 9, 1898, from Peking to Mr. Sherman, in this Memorial of the *Tsungli Yamen*, it is said that the German Minister asked full compensation or indemnity for the loss of lives to the missionaries, two more cathedrals should be built by China in addition to the one begun by Bishop Anzer in Chiningchow, these two should be built in the city of Tsaochow and Changchiachuang in the district of Chuyeh.

touch to the arrival of Prince Henry."⁹⁰ In reply to his demand, the members of the *Tsungli Yamen* accepted this suggestion of the German Minister in principle by offering to "open Kiaochow as treaty harbor and promise to cede it to no other Power" while letting Germany have a settlement there together with the building of the railroad and ceding to Germany a harbor in the south.⁹¹ But this above suggestion of the *Tsungli Yamen* and the favorable recommendation of the German Minister was flatly rejected by the German Government.⁹²

On December 16, Prince Henry sailed on board the *Deutschland* with his squadron (including the cruiser, "Gefion") thus showing Germany's determination to get Kiaochow at any price, assumed

⁹⁰ Die Grosse Politik, Vol. XVII, No. 3727: Deciphered telegram of the German Minister, Baron von Heyking, to the Foreign Office, dated December 7, 1897. In this telegram Heyking reported: "I have suggested to the Chinese or the members of the *Tsungli Yamen*, Chang Jing-hwang and Weng Tung-ho at the third visit to-day that after we declare the missionary affair as completely settled and desist from an indemnity for the costs which Germany had spent, the Emperor of China should voluntarily and out of gratitude for the return of the Liaotung Peninsula hand over the Kiaochow Bay to Prince Henry, as I pointed out that this would give an eminently friendly touch to the arrival of the Prince, in contrast to the existing impression."

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, same no., continued quoting: "The mandarins have accepted the suggestion in principle, however, they offered with urgent recommendation to declare Kiaochow as a treaty harbor; and to promise that it will be ceded to no other Power and we shall receive a settlement there together with the building of the railroad, besides ceding another harbor in the south. Because I had insisted previously on Kiaochow, the mandarins did not refuse this, but emphasized that the appearance of China would be restored by this proposal and requested me to submit this proposal to His Majesty. The Chinese place the conditions attaching to this proposal that we evacuate Kiaochow before the transfer of a harbor and before Prince Henry enters. The acceptance of a southern harbor together with the privileges in Kiaochow appears profitable to us, since the Chinese lay the advantage in the importance of outside appearance and in the security against some other claim. The Chinese vehemently urge the hastening of the conclusions with us, as it seems that is caused from the fear of the Chinese, for the territorial seizure of England or Japan. Heyking."

⁹² *Ibid.*, No. 3728: Telegrams of State Secretary of the Foreign Office, B. v. Bülow to the Minister in Peking, Heyking, drafted by Holstein (Vortragenden Rats, von Holstein), dated December 8, 1897 and December 12, 1897, in which Bülow instructed Heyking not to give as a reason for Germany's participation in the Triple Intervention the returning of the Liaotung Peninsula to China and to notify the Chinese Government that Germany would prefer the cession of Kiaochow than any other place on the Chinese coast; No. 3749: Bülow's telegram to Hatzfeldt, January 12, 1898, avoiding conflict with England; No. 3530.

the command of the entire East Asiatic Squadron or Division.⁹³ On the other hand, an agreement was reached between the German Minister in Peking and the Foreign Office in Germany to insert the demand of Kiaochow into the fourth demand; namely, security against repetition of the same occurrence or incident. Thus Heyking suggested:

We retain Kiaochow as security until further notice and add that the settlement of the cost remains in a later agreement, but we may put a secret supplementary article, that we will request no indemnity for the cost so long as we remain in Kiaochow.⁹⁴

As a result of diplomacy, force and negotiation exerted by Germany on China, an agreement, officially called "Convention Between

⁹³ Die Grosse Politik, Vol. XVII, No. 3716, Footnote included in this number: "Emperor William II in his speech from the throne on November 30 to the Reichstag, chose Prince Henry of Prussia for the command of the East Asiatic Expedition. On December 16, Prince Henry sailed on board the cruisers, "Germany" and "Gefion;" Ex-Kaiser, William II, My Memoirs, p. 66: "In December of that year Prince Henry, on board the "Deutschland," sailed with his squadron to Eastern Asia, where he later took over the command of the entire East Asiatic Division."

⁹⁴ *Ibid*, No. 3735: Heyking's telegram (deciphered) to the Foreign Office, dated December 16, 1897, Heyking reported: "Upon my resolute declaration that discussions or negotiations should be devoted to Kiaochow rather than any other harbor, the Chinese representative answered that China is ready to grant us the cession of Kiaochow, if the English Minister did not demand a harbor from the *Tsungli Yamen* for England, as soon as one would be ceded to us. Japan expressed herself in a similar way and would follow the claim of other Powers. Finally the mandarins declared themselves ready to permit us to maintain Kiaochow silently without mentioning any time limit and without written cession. In case this is sanctioned, I suggest to add to point (4) (the 4th demand in the six demands made by Germany and presented to the *Tsungli Yamen* by Heyking the day following the murder) that we retain Kiaochow as security until further notice and add point (5) or demand that the settlement of the cost will be put into another agreement with the secret supplementary article, that we will request no indemnity for the cost so long as we remain in Kiaochow. Please give me instructions whether I am allowed to negotiate further upon this basis in order to avoid a conflict and would reserve for us to enter into a treaty of cession later at a suitable time. Also please instruct me whether I should maintain the entire district of Kiaochow mentioned in the proclamation of the Admiral." *Ibid*, No. 3736: Bülow's telegram to Heyking, drafted by the Reporting Council, Klehmet, dated December 17, 1897: "You are authorized to cancel the demand for indemnity." The Official History of the Ch'ing Dynasty, cited above, Vol. V, Section on Germany, p. 9: After the conclusion of the preliminary negotiation, a rumor broke out that there would be another murder of Germans and driving away of Catholic priests.

China and Germany Respecting the Lease of Kiaochow" was finally signed by the *Tsungli Yamen*, Ministers, Li Hung-chang and Weng Tung-ho representing China, and Baron von Heyking representing Germany, on March 6, 1898, in Peking.⁹⁵ This treaty contains three important sections.

The first section provides for the terms of the lease. Article I sets out the rights ceded to the German troops, providing that the Chinese Emperor is to allow the free passage of the German troops in the so-called Neutral Zone which surrounds the Kiaochow Bay consisting of fifty kilometers (100 Chinese *li*) at any time while reserving all rights of sovereignty in that zone. On the other hand, the Emperor of China also reserves the right to himself for stationing troops within that zone and for taking other military measures. Article II provides for the territory leased to Germany covering both sides of the entrance to the Bay of Kiaochow for a term of ninety-nine years, and permits Germany to construct fortifications for defensive purposes. Article III defines the limits of the leased territory, in which Germany is allowed to exercise the right of sovereignty. The whole leased territory consists of the whole water area of the Bay, all the islands lying seaward from the Kiaochow Bay, the Island of Chiposan and Potato Island and the two arms or peninsulas of the Bay. The rights of the Chinese ships in the Kiaochow Bay to enjoy the same privileges as those of other foreign nations on friendly relations with Germany are provided by the

⁹⁵ U. S. Foreign Relations, 1901, German Occupation of Kiaochow, No. 2884: The Memorial of the *Tsungli Yamen* submitted to the throne is included in Mr. Charles Denby's letter to Mr. Sherman from Peking, dated March 9, 1898. This memorial of the *Tsungli Yamen* set forth the terms and conditions arrived at with the German Minister in the matter of the lease of Kiaochow giving a full report on the negotiations between the *Tsungli Yamen* and the German Minister; Official History of the Ch'ing Dynasty, Vol. V, Foreign Relations, Germany, pp. 9-12 (written in Chinese), published by the Peking Government in 1927, states that immediately after the murder of two German Catholic missionaries, the German squadron steamed into Kiaochow, and forced the Commander of the fortress Chang Kao-yuan to retreat, while the German Minister in Peking, Baron von Heyking presented six demands to the *Tsungli Yamen*. After the conclusion of the preliminary negotiations, there was a rumor that the Catholic priests and foreigners (Germans) were driven away from Tsaochowfu. Therefore the German Minister took this rumor as a threat of the other calamity and demanded the lease of Kiaochow as a security against the repetition of the incident. The *Tsungli Yamen* could not refuse his demand, so they signed a special treaty of the lease of Kiaochow containing three sections.

same article. Article IV provides for the construction of navigation signals and the collection of port dues by Germany on the islands and at the entrance of the Bay. Article V sets a unique precedent in providing that, in case Germany wishes to return Kiaochow to China before the expiration of the lease, China will refund all the expenses and cede a more suitable harbor to Germany while the latter pledges only not to transfer the leased territory to another Power. Finally the Chinese population in the leased territory are subject to the German laws and regulations.

Section II provides for the railway and mining concessions. Article I allows Germany to build two railways in Shantung, one running from Kiaochow to Tsinan, the capital of Shantung and the boundary of the province, while the other running from Kiaochow to Tsinan via Ichowfu and Laiwuhsien, thus placing the whole province within the German sphere of interest. Article II provides for the formation of a Sino-German Company, in which both Chinese and German merchants are free to invest money and appoint the directors for the management of the railway work. Article III states that China and Germany in the near future shall draw up a further agreement relative to the management of the railway by the company. Mention is made in the same article that the object of this agreement is solely the development of commerce and that in constructing this railroad, there is no intention to seize any land unlawfully in the province of Shantung. Article IV provides that German subjects are allowed to hold and develop mining property for a distance of thirty *li* (equal to fifteen kilometers) from each side of those railways and along the whole extent of the lines. Many places along the two railways are particularly specified for mining operations. Similar mention is made concerning the joint investment and other operations by Germans and Chinese under the same conditions as in the railway concessions.

Section III provides for the commercial operations in Shantung, in which the Chinese Government binds itself in all cases, to apply to German merchants and manufacturers, for assistance in persons, capital or material needed by China for any purpose whatever within the province of Shantung. Special mention is also made that if the German merchants or manufacturers are not inclined to furnish the assistance for such works or materials, China can act

as she pleases. The treaty was drawn in four copies, two in Chinese and two in German, and was ratified by the sovereigns of the two countries.

Thus by this treaty China ceded the best and the most important harbor to Germany together with the right of sovereignty in that territory by lease for ninety-nine years without receiving any payment of rent.⁹⁶ Next the Chinese ships can enjoy only the same privileges in the Kiaochow Bay as those allowed to other foreign nations which are on friendly relations with Germany. Furthermore, the Chinese population in the leased territory should be under the protection of the laws and regulations of Germany. Again Germany can exploit the mines in Shantung together with the building of the two railways through that province. Financially speaking, Shantung is under the control, or at least influence, of Germany. Lastly, the most ridiculous fact is that China binds herself to ask the German merchants and manufacturers for assistance either in person or capital or material regarding Chinese plans in Shantung while the latter are free to furnish the same to the former as they deem it fit.⁹⁷ Thus Germany gets a lion's share in China as well as succeeding in demanding her "place under the sun."⁹⁸

⁹⁶ Zia, cited above, pp. 3-6: Zia said: "Kiaochow is the best harbor as well as the best naval base in China, since Port Arthur is narrower, being situated at the northern bank of the Yellow Sea, while Kiaochow is just at the middle of the Yellow Sea. It is more convenient for bringing communications between the Yellow Sea and the Pacific." Schmacher: *Kiautschou und die Ostasiatische Frage*, Chapter 1, p. 9: Schmacher said: "Since Kiaochow is the entrance or door leading to Peking as well as Korea, therefore Germany in acquiring Kiaochow can act as a policeman whenever the interests of the Fatherland require."

⁹⁷ MacMurray, cited above, Vol. I, pp. 12-6.

⁹⁸ *Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. XVII, No. 3725: Bülow's speech to the Reichstag was included in the private telegram from von Holstein of the Foreign Office, to the German Ambassador, Prince von Radolin in St. Petersburg (dated December 6, 1897). Holstein reported: "The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs is still in the Reichstag, where he is striving at success from all sides with a short and eminent address. (Footnote: In his short address for the new naval law, Secretary Bülow said on December 6 on the Kiaochow question the following: 'We are full of benevolent and friendly views toward China. We wish neither to (brüskieren) nor to challenge China in spite of the fact that great injustice happened to us, the occupation of the Kiaochow Bay has been carried out in an economical way. The massacre of our missionaries was a forced ground for our intervention, as we think that these pious people who pursued their sanctified profession peacefully should be considered as outlawed. Viewed from this sad incident we have another complaint against China. We must not permit the view to be established

The leased territory of Kiaochow consists of (1) the whole water area of Kiaochow Bay, (2) the Island of Chiposan and Potato Island, (3) all islands lying seaward from Kiaochow Bay, (4) the peninsula bounded on the northeast by a line drawn from the northeastern corner of Potato Island to Loshan Harbor and (5) the peninsula bounded to the southeast by a line drawn from the southwest of Chiposan Island in the direction of Tolosan Island.⁹⁹ The whole area contains about 540 square kilometers or about 200 square miles, exclusive of the Bay which is about fifteen miles square. It lies in the province of Shantung, on the northeast coast of China, between 35° 43' and 36° 18' north latitude and 120° 56' east longitude. The greater part of the territory is mountainous, the islands mostly bare and sandy. However, the low valleys have fertile soil, and about three-quarters of the leased area are under cultivation.¹⁰⁰

The favorable situation of Kiaochow as a naval base and station for commercial expansion is an undeniable fact. The harbor is protected from the north winds by the mountainous regions behind the Bay, so that it affords a good anchoring place for the fleets which can find an easy access into the Bay.¹⁰¹ Being at the doorway

in China that they dare to do the things to us which they dare not do to others. We must demand that the German missionary, the German contractor, the German merchandise, the German flag and the German ships will be so honestly respected in China as those of the other Powers. Finally we are quite willing to take the interests of the other great Powers in East Asia into account with certain prudence just like the way in which our interests will be duly respected. In other words, we wish to place nobody in the shadow but we must demand our place under the sun. In East Asia as well as in the West Indies we have been striving faithfully to preserve our interest according to the tradition of the German policy without necessary sharpness or austerity, but also without being soft." Bernhard von Bülow: *Imperial Germany*, Chapter VIII, pp. 116-9, in which Bülow said: "It is quite true that the fact that we established ourselves on the coast of China, was directly and intimately connected with our naval program and was our first practical step along the path of world politics. A few weeks after this, we concluded the Shantung Treaty with China, which was one of the most significant actions in modern German history and which secured for us a "place in the sun" in the Far East, on the shores of the Pacific Ocean, which have a great future before them."

⁹⁹ The Official History of the Ch'ing Dynasty, Vol. V, pp. 9-10; MacMurray, cited above, Vol. I, p. 112.

¹⁰⁰ British Foreign Office: *Kiaochow and Weihaiwei Handbooks*, No. 71, pp. 1-2; Job Fr. Gottlob Koetzler: *Neuer Wegzeiger für die Deutschenschutzbgebiet in Afrika, der Südsee, und Ostasien*, pp. 106-9.

¹⁰¹ Koetzle, cited above, p. 108.

of north China, Kiaochow assumes a position resembling that of a sentinel in that part of China.¹⁰² Its proximity to other important points in East Asia is worth attention.¹⁰³ As the harbor faces the Yellow Sea, it is opened to foreign commerce. Through Tsinan, Kiaochow can be linked up with the northern China, to Tientsin, Peking and Manchuria and the Yangtze Valley in the south, to Nanking, Shanghai. With the completion of the Lung-Hai Railway, it is in easy touch with western China, like Shensi, Kansu and Sinkiang.¹⁰⁴ Its promised future success depends upon the building of a railroad from the leased territory of Kiaochow to Tsinan, the capital of the province and this the Germans were keenly aware even before the lease and they actually did later.¹⁰⁵ It is claimed by Germany that her lease of Kiaochow was not for the purpose of acquiring extensive landed property, but rather a safe and suitable point for military operations and a base for economic penetration into the interior of China; also that the inclusion of the junk harbor, Taputour in the lease of Kiaochow was not due to the German desire, but due to the insistence of the Chinese Boundary Commission members, who thought the inclusion indispensable for the interests of Germany.¹⁰⁶ But on the Chinese side, it is a notorious fact that the inclusion of more than 100 *li* (50 kilometers) around the Bay (this 100 *li* being authorized by the Treaty) was arbitrarily done by the German Boundary Commission members,

¹⁰² Schmacher: *Kiautschou und die Ostasiatische Frage*, Chapter 1, p. 10.

¹⁰³ Zia, cited above, Chapter 1, pp. 3-4.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid*, pp. 3-6, in which the author says: "In the future when the Lung-Hai Railway is completed, communications can be brought from Tsingtao (the leased territory) to Shensi, Kansu and Sinkiang; thus it being situated in the East, reaches the North, Central and Northwestern parts of China."

¹⁰⁵ Schmacher: *Kiautschou und die Ostasiatische Frage*, Chapter 1, p. 9, in which Schmacher prophesied: "The benefit in acquiring Kiaochow lies in the fact that it brings the trade and political relation of China to Germany in uniting Hanchow (near the Yangtzekiang) with Peking, thus escaping from Shanghai by railway from Kiaochow, just as the Siberian Railway does to Russia in connecting Peking and Tientsin with the latter."

¹⁰⁶ Schrameier, cited above, *Kiautschou, seine Entwicklung und Bedeutung*, Chapter II, pp. 23-4: "The territory of Kiaochow does not consist of the two counties or towns of Kiaochow and Tsimo. Germany intentionally renounced them, because she did not care to have extensive landed property, but rather a safe and self-sufficient station. The home government was willing to renounce even the important junk harbor, Taputour, but the Chinese Boundary Commission realized that possession of that place was indispensable to the interests of Germany

and grudgingly permitted by the weak Chinese mandarins who were charged with the boundary affairs.¹⁰⁷

The effect of the acquisition of Kiaochow by Germany was utterly disastrous for China. First it started the international struggle for concessions and leases in China. Following the footsteps of Germany, Russia sent five warships in the beginning of December of 1897 (only one month after the brilliant demonstration of Germany's seizure of the Kiaochow Bay) to Port Arthur on the Liaotung Peninsula for getting her shares under the pretensions of protecting China from further foreign aggression. By negotiations, bribery, ultimatum and force Russia succeeded in signing the Lease of Port Arthur and Talienwan on March 27, 1898, for a term of twenty-five years under practically the same terms as contained in the Kiaochow Convention.¹⁰⁸

Under the pretext of the balance of power, Great Britain first steamed her man-of-war into Port Arthur at the same time that the Russian ships rushed there, both being actuated by the same purpose. Failing to obtain Port Arthur and Talienwan at the end of 1897, when China ceded them to Russia, Great Britain sent her fleet from Hongkong to the Gulf of Pechili, seizing Weihaiwei, another naval base in the north of China on March 26, 1898. As a result of a desperate act of presenting a two-day ultimatum from the British Minister at Peking, China leased Weihaiwei, including the Island of Liukung and all the islands in the Bay to Great Britain for a term of twenty-five years upon the same conditions as the above two leases (June 1, 1898).¹⁰⁹ Furthermore, England (February 11, 1898, and February 13, 1898) secured from China

¹⁰⁷ Zia, cited above, Chapter I, p. 67: Zia said: "The Kiaochow Convention provided that the Kiaochow Bay as a leased territory consists of 100 *li*, but during the delimitation of the boundary of this leased territory, the German delegate drew the boundary himself, thus exceeding the limit of 100 *li*; Schrameier, cited above, Chapter II. Schrameier recorded: "Only with difficulty did von Talkenhayn, as the member of the Boundary Commission succeed in constructing a boundary over the top of Laushan (mountain) which is very suitable for military requirements. Added to this is the equally large area of the Bay of Kiaochow."

¹⁰⁸ The Memoirs of Count Witte, Chapter IV, pp. 98-104; Steiger, cited above, Chapter IV, pp. 64-71; Bau, cited above, Chapter III, p. 41; MacMurray, cited above, Vol. I, pp. 119-23.

¹⁰⁹ Steiger, cited above, Chapter IV, pp. 72-6; Bau, cited above, Chapter III, pp. 42-3; MacMurray, cited above, Vol. I, p. 152.

declarations stating that the Inspector General of her Maritime Customs should be a British subject when the British trade predominated and not to alienate the Yangtze Region to any third Power.¹¹⁰ Again in May, June and October of 1898, Great Britain obtained three railway loan agreements and three mining concessions and the concession for the extension of Hongkong Territory.¹¹¹

The last of the three great Powers in the Triple Intervention, France, came to exact her demands for the lease of Kwangchowwan in the province of Kwangtung in the south of China as a coaling station, the right of administration by a representative of France for the Chinese Post Office Staff and the right to build a railway from Tonkin (China's former dependency which she ceded to France in 1884) to the province of Yünnan in the southwest of China and the right to build a railway from Kwangchowwan to Leichou in the same province (Kwangtung). Again China was too weak to resist these demands of a great Power, so she had to grant all these concessions, leasing Kwangchowwan for a term of ninety-nine years together with the same conditions as contained in the leases of Kiaochow, Port Arthur and Talienwan and Weihaiwei.¹¹²

Japan, having convinced the Powers of her military strength in defeating China, also obtained her share in the international struggle for concessions, a declaration from China for the non-alienation of the province of Fukien as Japan's sphere of interest and a concession for establishing Japanese settlements in Amoy, Shasi, Shanghai, Tientsin and Hankow in April and August of the same year (1898).¹¹³

Italy came too late (February, 1899) in her demand for the lease of the Sanmen Bay in the province of Chekiang, even with the support of Great Britain, since China was under the rule of the strong-willed Empress Dowager instead of the former Emperor Kwang Hsu. This Empress Tze Hsi ordered the viceroys of the Yangtze Valley to make full preparations for armed resistance against any further seizure of Chinese territory by force. Thus Italy withdrew

¹¹⁰ Steiger, cited above, Chapter IV, p. 104-6; Bau, cited above, p. 42-3.

¹¹¹ MacMurray, cited above, Vol. I, pp. 127, 130-1, 173, 179, 181, 183, 519, and 700.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 123-4, 128.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 91-4, 126.

her demands when she saw that China was determined to resist with force, thus ending this international struggle for concessions and leases in China.¹¹⁴

The second result of this actual partition of China by the Powers led by Germany was the movement for reform, constitutional, economical, educational, military and governmental in nature. The officials of all grades and all subjects were given the right to submit memorials directly to the throne, while a number of minor boards (ministries) in Peking were abolished. The merchants in the provinces were encouraged to take over the governmental naval dockyards, arsenals and shipbuilding yards and work them on the commercial basis, while three railways were constructed with private Chinese capital upon the order of the Central Government; namely, one from Shanghai to Soochow in Kiangsu Province; the second between Chinkiang to Tientsin and the third from Tientsin to Lukouchiao, near Peking. Agricultural schools, ordinary schools and colleges, medical schools and other technical schools were to be established in every province, while the Essay System of Examination was abolished. Besides, schools were to be established abroad under the auspices of the legations for educating the Chinese residing in other countries. The army and the navy were reorganized with the appointment of Yuan Shih-kai at the head. A national army with Western drill was organized and trained by foreign officers, based on conscription, while the old type Chinese army was abolished. A number of the warships and large quantities of ammunition were bought from England and Germany. Finally, there was the dismissal of a number of military and civil officers who were guilty of incapability and cowardice in defending against foreign aggression during the Sino-Japanese War.¹¹⁵

The third consequence of the lease of Kiaochow was the coup d'état of the Empress Dowager in seizing the control of the government and imprisoning the Emperor, Kwang Hsu on September 22, 1898, thus beginning a new era of counter-reforms.

¹¹⁴ Steiger, cited above, Chapter V, pp. 89-90; Bau, cited above, Chapter III, p. 43.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 81-6; H. B. Morse: *International Relations of the Chinese Empire*, Vol. III, pp. 128-44; Bland and Backhouse: *China under the Empress Dowager*.

She first terminated the international scramble or grabbing for concessions and leases by rejecting the demand of Italy for the lease of the Sanmen Bay (in Chekiang Province, on the southeast of China) with force of arms.¹¹⁶

The last effect of Germany's seizure of Kiaochow on China was the outbreak of the Boxer Rising in 1900, which was a patriotic attempt on the part of the Boxers to save the threatened Celestial Empire against further foreign aggression. The seizure of Kiaochow and the subsequent international struggle for concessions and leases or the actual partition of the Chinese coast aroused deep-rooted hatred and furious indignation in the Chinese people, both the literati and the ignorant. Thus Alexiz Krausse in his "The Story of the Chinese Crisis," commenting on the causes of the Boxer Rising said:

One of the most prominent features in the present complicated situation is the marked anti-foreign feeling which has of late been evinced by the Chinese. The exciting causes of the Chinese animosity towards the presence of the foreigners among them are not difficult to discern. First and foremost comes the aggressive action of Germany, not only in the unjustifiable seizure of Kiaochow and the claim to the exclusive influence in the province of Shantung, but even more so in the aggressive and hectoring attitude assumed by the German Emperor towards the Chinese. The terms extorted by Germany in compensation for the murder of two missionaries in 1897 provoked bitter hostility on the part of the Celestials and the high-handed manner in which an attack on three Germans, who escaped without material injury, was punished by the burning of two considerable villages aroused a feeling of indignation throughout the country akin to madness. There can be no doubt that it was this insensate action that set in motion the deep hatred of foreigners which culminated in the recent barbarities in Peking.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁶ E. T. Williams: *A Short History of China*, pp. 356-68; Bland and Backhouse, cited above; Morse, cited above; Steiger, cited above, pp. 87-106.

¹¹⁷ Krausse, cited above, p. 201.

Many other authoritative writers on the Boxer Rising were of the same opinion regarding the causes of the outbreak.¹¹⁸

The consequence of Germany's seizure of Kiaochow on herself is equally disastrous, though the effect was not felt until fifteen years later when the Great War broke out. Prince Bernhard von Bülow, the then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs asserted the truth saying:

It is from the year of Kiaochow that the growth of the formidable German navy dates! wrote *The Times*. In the course of the present war this paper has from the first followed the development of our sea power with eyes sharpened by envy. It was quite true that the fact that we established ourselves on the coast directly and intimately connected with our naval program and was our first practical step along the path of world politics. Up to the end of the nineteenth century Europe had been able to work only on the outskirts of China. Since then, the interior has been opened up more and more. By seizing Tsingtao, one of the most promising harbors on the Chinese coast, we had provided ourselves with a firm basis. After the fall of Tsingtao, a German traveller, who had recently been in Asia, wrote in *The Vienna Neue Freie Presse*: 'For Germany, struggling to gain a position in the world, Tsingtao was the most important of all her Eastern colonies, it was of great military consequence, the point of support of her commerce and her reputation in Asia, a material and moral result of her grand development. With the loss of Tsingtao the hope of a brilliant future has been destroyed.'¹¹⁹

Indeed it is truly proved that Germany's first practical step along the path of world politics in seizing Kiaochow is the ultimate cause of the defeat of the German Empire in world politics.

¹¹⁸ Steiger, cited above, Chapter VIII, *The Boxers in Shantung and Chili*. Steiger said: "The greater activity of the militia movement in Shantung and in southeastern Chili is not difficult to understand. These were the regions which had been most vitally affected by the seizure of 'leased' territories during the winter of 1897 and the spring and summer of 1898. These were the regions from which the modern-armed regular soldiers had been withdrawn for the purpose of concentrating them around Peking in anticipation of further aggressive moves on the part of the Europeans. These were the regions in which recruiting for the newly formed bodies of imperial troops was most actively carried on and into which news of the apprehensions and military preparedness at Peking spread with greatest rapidity." Pages 47-8; Bau, cited above, Chapter III, p. 46.

¹¹⁹ Bülow, cited above, Chapter VIII, pp. 117-8.

CHAPTER III

THE ADMINISTRATION OF KIAOCHOW BY GERMANY

THE seizure of Kiaochow by Germany on November 14, 1897, marked the beginning of the administration of the district by the Germans. Thus a provisional government was set up by the German Admiral von Diederich, Commander-in-Chief of the German squadron in Eastern Waters (meaning Chinese seas) with the employment of the Chinese civil officials to continue their work until the settlement of the Chu Yeh Hyeh Incident, the murder of the German Catholic missionaries. On February 11, Captain Korvett and Chief Lieutenant Truppel took over the command of the German troops, and in order to assist Admiral Diederich, ordered the barracks made ready for the garrisoning of troops and announced the administration under the Imperial German Naval Department (Reichs-Marine-Amt).¹ Thus Diederich as the Provisional German Military Governor in Kiaochow issued a proclamation allaying the fear of the inhabitants and permitting civil officials (all Chinese) to follow their pursuits and continue their performance of the official duties under his supervision and prohibiting the purchase and resale of land within the occupied area.²

¹ Das Staatsarchiv: Sammlung der officialen Aktenstücke zur Geschichte der Gegenwart, Anlage (Appendix, p. 3-4, dated February 15, 1898, received by the Imperial Marine Office on April 22): Admiral Diederich's Report on the transference of the administration to the Imperial Marine Office: Admiral Diederich made a very detailed report mentioning the problems of canalization and draining of the support of the barracks (Unterkunfts-lager) of the troops, of the protection of the wells of the warehouses and the necessity of organizing a health commission and of building a landing bridge in the interior of the Bay.

² Dr. W. Schrameier: Kiautschou, seine Entwicklung und Bedeutung, p. 22: Dr. Schrameier was one of the officers who accompanied Admiral Diederich in Kiaochow to negotiate with the Chinese and organize the government, especially in the purchase of land from the Chinese. He stated that the German Consul in Shanghai, Dr. Stubel, was ordered to Kiaochow by telegraph to work out the suggestions for the administration and execute the acquisition of land. Parliamentary Papers: The Diplomatic Correspondence, 1898, Vol. CV, Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of China—Sino-German Convention—Kiaochow. Inclosure 2 in No. 71, also with the

The delimitation of the leased area and the Neutral Zone was finished a little later after the signing of the Convention between China and Germany respecting the Lease of Kiaochow, by the Boundary Commission composed of Chinese and German members appointed by their respective governments. The German boundary officers tricked the Chinese officers into agreeing to the boundary which the former indicated and which exceeded one hundred *li* (Chinese mileage) including an extra junk harbor.³

message of the English Minister, MacDonald, to Marquis of Salisbury. Proclamation issued by Admiral von Diederich, Commander-in-Chief of the German Squadron in Eastern Waters. (Translation) "The Admiral has, in obedience to the commands of the Emperor of Germany, landed at Kiaochow and occupied the neighborhood, together with all the islands near at hand. The boundaries of the ground occupied are as follows: The topographic details cannot be followed on any available map, and give no clear idea of the extent of the occupation.

German missionaries having been murdered at Shantung, redress must be sought from China and the territory indicated above is to be held as a guarantee according to the terms of the reparation sought by Germany. A proclamation thereby is issued to inform the population of the districts concerned that they are to follow their avocations as before and not to listen to rumors concocted by unprincipled persons.

"The relations between China and Germany are friendly. Lately when hostilities occurred between China and Japan, Germany came to the rescue with all her power, in order to show her good will to China. The present landing of troops does not mean that there is enmity to China and the people of the district are not to harbor suspicion.

German officials will, of course, protect law-abiding persons. All they desire is that their ships may be unmolested, and no trouble arise. Offenders against the peace of the district will be punished with the utmost severity according to Chinese law. Any person daring to do injury to a German will be tried and dealt with according to German military law. Wherefore the Admiral impressed these facts upon the people: 'No opposition to Germany will be permitted. Deliberate opposition will not bring any advantage to those who offer it; it will only invite misfortune.'

In the territory held by Germany it is expedient that all Chinese officials should continue to fulfil their duties conscientiously. Matters reported hereafter and cases which the Chinese officials can not settle well themselves, must be submitted to the German Military Governor resident at the Brigadier's Yamen who will examine into and deal with them. No buying or selling of land can be transacted without the authorization of the German Governor. November 14, 1897."

³ Zia Kai-shun: Kiaochow in the Last Twenty-two Years (written in Chinese), Introduction, pp. 6-7. Zia said that during the time when the boundary of the Neutral Zone was about to be fixed, the Chinese delegate or boundary member allowed the German member to choose the line as the Neutral Zone, thus the Neutral Zone exceeded the limit of one hundred *li* (Chinese mileage); Schrameier, cited above, p. 23: He stated that the German Boundary Member, von Falkenhayn succeeded in constructing a boundary over the top of Laushan, which is very suitable for military purpose, etc.

The acquisition of land in Kiaochow on the part of the Germans from the Chinese inhabitants was an extremely high-handed trick.⁴ By force and threats the German officers seized the land in Kiaochow from the Chinese, driving them out of the districts without due payment and then selling the land to the Chinese and German merchants at a very high price, thus gaining 33½% of the profits in the resale annually since October 3, 1898.⁵ The method of monopoly in the purchase and the resale of the land in Kiaochow and the surrounding districts as employed by the German Government was in the form of an agreement between the Admiral and the real estate owners (Chinese).⁶ A land tax was placed on the land owners

⁴ Staatsarchiv: Sammlung der officialen Aktenstücke zur Geschichte der Gegenwart, Anlage: Admiral Diederich's Report on the transfer of the administration, pp. 5-6: In this report Admiral Diederich stated: "The ground in the neighborhood of the troop-camp was the place chosen for the barrack hospital (Baracklazarett). The land must pass into our hands and I proclaim the price for three classes of land, which in the future should be reckoned or based for all land, which the government would like possession of. With firm execution of this proceeding the trifling unrest or uneasiness will soon die down."

⁵ Zia, cited above, pp. 16-7: Zia asserted that the German officers in Kiaochow forced a price much less than the actual value of the land on the farmers, compelling them to sell the land. In case of opposition, the owners would be beaten by the Germans and driven out of their lands and houses with little payment; Schrameier, cited above, pp. 36-7.

⁶ Schrameier, cited above, p. 322: In this book Schrameier stated that Dr. Stubel, the German Consul, who was ordered to Kiaochow after the occupation, suggested that the method of monopoly in purchase and resale of the land in Kiaochow and the other occupied districts should be applied by the provisional government, which suggestion was adopted. Thus the German Provisional Government made an agreement with the land owners or real estate owners, who promised the former not to sell their land to anybody, except the German Admiral, Diederich. So at the end of October, 1901, nine villages were purchased by the Admiral. The average price for 1,000 square meters was sixty marks in the purchase of land. The method of auction or the resale of land to the highest bidder by the German Government in Kiaochow was employed. The fact that the German Government sold for 1,800 marks per square meter to the people is in itself an evidence of the profit-making policy of the German Government; Graf von Bülow, Denkschrift an Reichstag, 1900-3, regarding the development of the domain of Kiaochow during October 1901-October 1902, Chapter I, pp. 8-10: Bülow reported that during this year 18,834 square meters of land were sold for \$13,849,850 to nine Europeans and three Chinese. During the latter part of September, 1902, in the ground book were 124 European land owners with 28 *ha*, 42 *a*, and 75 square meters and 120 Chinese land owners with 12 *ha*, 27 *a*, 56 square meters; Paolo Giordani: The German Colonial Empire: Its Beginning and Ending (Translated by Mrs. G. W. Hamilton) pp. 64-5: They settled on the eastern peninsula and drove away the proprietors, methodically indemnifying them, then traced the plan of a huge city, the Hongkong of the North.

as a means of a special income for the government.⁷ A further injustice done to the Chinese there in the leased territory was the creation of a European section in which the Chinese were permitted to hold land, but not to reside, except as servants or employees, while two communities or sections were specially made for the Chinese only; namely, in the eastern and the western sections of Tsingtao, the Taitungtzun and the Taisietzun. This condition of separation and prejudice existed until 1912.⁸ It should be noted

⁷ Schrameier: *Wie die Landordnung von Kiautschou entstand*, pp. 17-23: A tax of 6% according to the value of the land was to be paid to the government annually by the land owner. In case there is no resale during twenty-five years, the government has the right to claim 1/3 of the increase in the value of the land. The following profits have been realized through sales:

1900	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	107,500 marks
1901	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	341,800 marks
through the land taxes									
1900	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	31,400 marks
1901	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	52,800 marks

For regular detailed figures annually: Schrameier: *Aus Kiautschou Verwaltung, Die Land, Steuer und Zoll politik des Kiautschougebietes*, pp. 61-2; F. W. Mohr: *Handbuch für das Schutzgebiet Kiautschou*, pp. 238-45: Mohr stated that the land owner must pay 33% of the pure profit gained by resale, to the government. The government has the right to prevent the owner from selling his ground at the price stated. The government reserves the right of leasing and selling land to institutions or organizations for the promotion of the common good. These are the decrees issued by Governor Rosendall in November 1898. Regarding the transfer of land among the Chinese population, Governor Truppel issued decrees that any purchase and resale of land would be made by the government from the Chinese according to the price set after the occupation of Kiaochow. Concerning all detailed regulations for land and land owners, see the same book, pp. 228-77.

⁸ Schrameier: *Aus Kiautschou Verwaltung*, pp. 26-30: Schrameier states that a great number of coolies came into the leased territory seeking work and lived in such crowded sections that epidemics broke out among them. The government allowed the entrepreneurs to build coolie houses of brick. He said: "Thus the two Chinese communities of Taitungzun and Taisietzun arose." As a result, a German newspaper, *Ostasiatischer Lloyd* criticised the German Government in Kiaochow for not allowing the Chinese to participate in the auction of lots in the business section (the European Section). The German Government first took the land from the Chinese after the occupation, which drove the Chinese inhabitants away from their land and living, and then began to exploit labor, since the poor farmers and fishers had to seek for living in their own land; Schrameier: *Kiautschou, seine Entwicklung und Bedeutung*, pp. 37-60, Schrameier said: "Already in 1898, the Chinese population of the village of Tsingtao had tripled. Attracted by good wages, the new settlers made necessary the erection of a number of mat-tents, because of the absence of adequate housing. In the 'Mat-Village' of Tapautau a serious epidemic of spotted typhoid fever (*Flecktyphus*) broke out in the summer of 1899." Again he said: "The European Section was

that the German Government sold land to the Shantung Railway Company at a much lower price and gave large tracts of land to the German missions free of charge.⁹

In describing the Chinese population in the occupied territory, Admiral Diederich divided them into two classes; namely, the peasantry and the middle class. The former is "in general quiet, innocent and easy to manage," while the latter consisting of "the small merchants, the small land owners and the literati of inferior grade are very suspicious and secretive."¹⁰ The people in the six villages of the leased districts were farmers and fishers numbering from 70,000 to 80,000.¹¹ The result of their being ousted from their homes and crowded into a separate section was the breaking out of an epidemic of typhoid in the summer of 1899, when they had to live in the mat-tents for more than a year.¹² With the beginning of the German administration, Germans, Russians, English, Americans, Koreans and Japanese came to live in the leased area. In all there were about 220,000 inclusive of the

in the region towards the south, where it was protected against the north-easterly winds and exposed to the southern breeze." Still again Schrameier thought that the separation of Chinese from the Germans in living in the different sections was a good plan since it was easier for the German Government to make regulations for the building of homes in the Chinese city, because the "Chinese bodily constitution is more resistant to the changing climate than that of the European as well because of the racial prejudice and hatred of the Europeans against the Chinese, which led to the unjustified persecution of the Chinese by the Germans."

⁹ Schrameier: *Wie die Landordnung von Kiautschou entstand*, pp. 31-2, Schrameier said that under the system adopted at Kiaochow, the land gains in value when it is used for the benefit of the community as a whole. Thus the Shantung Railroad Company bought the land at a much lower price than usual, while the German Missions in Shantung were given large tracts of land free of charge by the German Government; Schrameier: *Aus Kiautschou Verwaltung, Die Land*, pp. 61-2 stated that 148 ha of land was given to the Shantung Railroad Company before 1905; Schrameier: *Kiautschou, seine Entwicklung und Bedeutung*, p. 85: The Missions, Railroads and the Customs Offices are free from land taxation.

¹⁰ Admiral Diederich's report on the transfer of the administrations, p. 10, other parts quoted in footnotes Ncs. 1 and 4.

¹¹ Zia, cited above, pp. 26-9; Schrameier: *Kiautschou, seine Entwicklung und Bedeutung*, pp. 55; J. F. Gottlob Koetzle: *Neuer Wegzeiger für die Deutschen Schutzgebiet in Afrika, der Südsee und Ostasien*, pp. 108-9.

¹² *Ibid*, Schrameier: *Kiautschou, seine Entwicklung und Bedeutung*, pp. 37-9; Kaiser-Wilhelm-Dank, Verein für Soldatenfreunde: *Deutschland als Kolonialmacht, Dreizeig Jahre deutsche Kolonialgeschichte*, pp. 251-2.

Chinese and among them 2,000 Europeans and 160,000 Chinese as the statistics of 1914 showed.¹³

Even two months before the signing of the Kiaochow Convention between China and Germany, William II issued an edict on January 27, 1898, authorizing the Reichs-Marine-Amt (the Imperial Naval Department) to take charge of the administration of the leased area of Kiaochow and ordering the Secretary of the Reichs-Marine-Amt for the military garrisoning of this territory.¹⁴ Again on March 1, 1898, the Kaiser issued an Imperial decree stating:

At the head of the military and civil administration of the territory of Kiaochow will be a naval officer with the title of Governor (with the exception of the post office and the ordinary courts, which later are subject to the Governor only in questions concerning the administration of the courts). The Secretary of the Reichs-Marine-Amt has the right to inspect the marine infantry and the marine artillery in connection with the military garrisoning of the protectorate of Kiaochow.¹⁵

Before April 1898, the German Reichstag and the Imperial Government made an appropriation of 5,000,000 marks for the development of Kiaochow at the beginning of the administration.¹⁶ Admiral Diederich in his report on the transfer of the administration immediately after the occupation, advised the home government to adopt the English colonial system by which there should be a chief or commanding officer of the troops during the absence of the governor. Secondly, he suggested the placing of a governor at the head of the administration and making him independent of home

¹³ Schrameier: Kiautschou, seine Entwicklung und Bedeutung, pp. 54-5; Schrameier: Aus Kiautschou Verwaltung, p. 63; Mohr: Handbuch für das Schutzgebiet Kiautschou, pp. 443-4; Australians, Danish, Americans, English, Italian, French, Germans, Russians, Norwegians and Hungarians, numbering 9,000 more, came to Tsingtao from 1902-10, while the Chinese population increased from 14,705 in 1902 to 34,180 in 1910.

¹⁴ Mohr: Handbuch für das Schutzgebiet Kiautschou (this book contains all the Imperial decrees, edicts and laws for the German Protectorate of Kiaochow, compiled by F. W. Mohr, formerly assistant interpreter of the Kiaochow Government), pp. 6-7, Imperial Decree issued by Emperor William II in Berlin Castle, January 27, 1898.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, Imperial Decree issued by William II on March 1, 1898, at Wilhelmshaven, pp. 7-8.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, (translated into Chinese by Sing-zai Chang, Kwei-fung Chang and Hai-San Tsui), pp. 195-6.

government for reasons of expediency and time-saving. Lastly, he advocated that well trained and qualified military officers be sent to Kiaochow for training the colonial troops and upholding "the dignity of the German Empire."¹⁷

Meyer-Waldeck had been Acting Governor for Kiaochow until April 1898, when the administration¹⁸ of Governor Rosendahl began. His organization of the government¹⁹ consisted of two departments; namely, the Civil and the Military. The Civil Department was divided into two big bureaus; namely, (1) the Bureau of Internal Affairs, and (2) the Bureau for Chinese Affairs. The former was again divided into the Committee on Forestry, Committee on Land, Committee on Registration, Committee on Census and Committee on Police, while the Bureau for Chinese Affairs was divided into three divisions; namely, (1) The Chinese Committee, (2) the Court of Justice for the District of Tsingtao, (3) the Court of Justice for the District of Leetsung (in German spelling it is called Listun).²⁰

The Military Department was divided into the Third Naval Battalion, the Naval Artillery Detachment, the Artillery Executive Committee, the Garrison Executive Committee, the Executive Committee for Hospital Work, the Surveying Detachment and the Committee for Harbor Work.²¹

In addition to these organizations of the government in Kiaochow, there was a Council formed of all the heads of the various administrative divisions and of four members chosen from among the population of the leased area. Kiaochow was proclaimed the German Protectorate in the Far East on April 28, 1898, with the Imperial Governor (Kaiserlich Gouverneur) at the head of the Council, as well as the "Chef der Civil und Militarverwaltung, Oberst Befehlshaber der Besatzugstruppen."²² The Governor nominated one of the four civil representatives, while the non-Chinese firms or commercial houses selected the second. The third

17 Staatsarchiv: Sammlung der officialen Akten zur Geschichte der Gegenwart, Einundsechzigster Band, pp. 8-9.

18 Mohr, cited above, p. 288; Schrameier, cited above, p. 40.

19 Schrameier, cited above, p. 36.

20 Zia, cited above, p. 28-30.

21 Gottlob, cited above, p. 118.

22 Giordani, cited above, pp. 60-1.

was chosen among those who annually paid at least fifty dollars, without distinction of nationality, and the remaining one by the Committee of the Chamber of Commerce. Thus this Government Council (Gouvernementsrat) consisted of the Governor as Chairman and the following members: The Chief of the Admiralty Staff, the Civil Commissary, the Commissary for Chinese Affairs (since 1910 this office had existed, while the Civil Commissary performed this task), the Government Superintendent (Gouvernement-sintendant), the Government Physician, the Building Director and the four representatives of the population in the Protectorate of Kiaochow.²³

The Council was to give advice to the Governor regarding the annual budget and the drafts of the decrees to be issued by the Governor. The Governor might consult the Council on other matters, while the representatives could submit suggestions during the regular meeting, but the Governor might refuse these on political or military grounds. Finally the members of the Council were to keep secret those matters which the Governor wished and were not to divulge the minutes of the meetings.²⁴ This Council which was created by the Imperial decree of March 14, 1907, was intended to be a stepping stone towards final local autonomy in relation to the German Government, according to Governor Truppel.²⁵

The police organization and functions in Kiaochow are worthy of mentioning because of their perfection and efficiency. Headquarters were established at Tsingtao with a chief Police Officer (Polizeioffizier), and subordinate to this headquarters were the branch stations in each of the districts in the leased area.²⁶

The police in Kiaochow were classified according to the nature of their work; namely, (1) the Building Police (Baupolizei),²⁷ (2)

²³ Giordani, cited above, pp. 60-1; Mohr, cited above, pp. 14-5, Decree issued by Governor Truppel on March 14, 1907, in Tsingtao.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 17-9, Included in the same decree cited in No. 23.

²⁵ Schrameier, cited above, pp. 63-6: Schrameier stated that the representation of the civil population was established in Kiaochow earlier than in any other German colonies in which the Governor appointed all the representatives of the population.

²⁶ Mohr, cited above, pp. 105-6.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 206-17.

the Safety Police (Sicherheitspolizei),²⁸ (3) Street Police (Strassenpolizei),²⁹ (4) Traffic Police (Verkehrpolizei),³⁰ (5) the Trade Police (Gewerbepolizei),³¹ (6) the Forest and Agriculture Police (Forst-und-Landwirtschaftspolizei),³² (7) the Food-stuff and Veterinary Police (Nahrungsmittel-und-Veterinärpolizei),³³ and (8) Servants Police (Gesindepolizei).³⁴ The Chief of Police (Polizeioffizier) was to take care of the administration of the Chinese and police prisons (there were separate prisons for the Chinese and the Europeans), supervise the police work as a whole and inflict punishment on the guilty in case he was a Chinese.³⁵

The German Government in Kiaochow took special care concerning the control of the Chinese population. Since the Chinese were forced to live in the eastern and western sections of Tsingtao, separate from the European section which was situated in the south, two towns arose. In addition another Chinese town, Tapautao came into existence.³⁶ On April 15, 1902, the German Government in Kiaochow issued the decree organizing a Chinese Committee consisting of twelve Chinese representatives from the Chili, Shantung and other Chinese merchants in Shantung. These twelve were appointed by the Governor and they chose two representatives from among themselves to attend the regular meetings of the Council, while the Chinese Committee was to record the number of Chinese houses and persons living in Tsingtao and Tapautao and was empowered to settle the private disputes on commercial matters among the Chinese merchants and family difficulties, and any questions regarding the welfare of the Chinese and the inheritance

²⁸ Mohr, cited above, pp. 107-22: These policemen were to take safety measures and prohibit the Chinese in the leased territory from owning any weapons of any kind in their houses without a police permit.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 122-8: They were to keep the streets clean and sanitary, and number the houses.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 129-35.

³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 135-50: They were to give permits to all kinds of traders.

³² *Ibid.*, pp. 151-2.

³³ *Ibid.*, pp. 153-64: They were to control the milk trade, supervise the killing of the cattle and the examination of the meat.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 164-5: These policemen were to control the Chinese servants according to the strict regulations of the police department.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 105-6.

³⁶ Schrameier, cited above, pp. 58-65.

of property.³⁷ In addition the Governor of Kiaochow appointed nine District Administrators and several Tax Collectors and Local Supervisors (usually from the heads of the clan) among the Chinese. All these Chinese officials were under the supervision of the Commissary for Chinese Affairs. After August 18, 1910, this Chinese Committee was abolished, and a new system of appointing four Chinese Confidence Men was instituted to take its place. The Governor appointed two members from the Shantung-Chili Guild, one from the Sankiang Guild and the other one from the Kwangtung Guild.³⁸

The German officials were so afraid of an uprising among the Chinese population that they refused to give the Chinese permission to post Chinese proclamations or public announcements at the public places. The Governor's permission was also necessary for all meetings of non-religious character, public parades, displaying of fireworks and theatrical performances by the Chinese with the exception of marriage and funeral processions. No Chinese was allowed to enter the streets between 9 P.M. and sunrise without taking a lantern with him.³⁹

After the occupation of Kiaochow by the German squadron, Admiral Diederich administered justice for the Chinese by means of beating and detention for small offenses, according to the existing Chinese penal law, but he did not know what to do with the greater crimes; fortunately, none happened during the three months between the time of the occupation and the signing of the Leased Convention of Kiaochow.⁴⁰

The Leased Convention of Kiaochow signed by China and Germany on March 6, 1898, provided:

The Chinese population dwelling in the ceded territory shall at all times enjoy the protection of the German Government, provided that they behave in conformity with law and order.⁴¹

³⁷ Mohr, cited above, pp. 7-9; Die Deutsche Kolonial Gesetzgebung, Vol. VI, 1901-2, published in 1903, pp. 621-3.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 19-23.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 23-4.

⁴⁰ Staatsarchiv: Sammlung der officialen Aktenstücke zur Geschichte der Gegenwart—Einundsechzigster Band. Admiral Diederich's Report on the Transfer of the Administration after the Occupation, pp. 10-11.

⁴¹ MacMurray, cited above, pp. 114-5.

Thus China was compelled to waive her right of administering justice to her own subjects in the leased territory.

There were two types of courts organized in Kiaochow, one for the administration of justice for the Chinese and the other for all foreigners.⁴² There were three courts of justice in the leased area for the Chinese with one judge and three or four secretaries and interpreters in each court in the districts of Tsingtao, Listun and the Court of Justice or tribunal (Kaiserliche Gericht) of Kiaochow. In addition there was appointed a (Chinese) head in each clan and a (Chinese) District Administrator in each district for assisting the courts and judges in their administration of justice to the Chinese together with four assessors (Beisitzers) and fourteen assistant assessors.⁴³

The second type of courts, instituted for the foreigners, consisted of two classes; namely, (1) the Kaiserliches Gericht von Kiaochow, which is a court of first instance (the judges of this court were called Kaiserliche Richter), and (2) the Kaiserliches Obergericht von Kiaochow and the judges of this court. This court corresponds to the Appellate Court, since it was the court of appeals. The Chief Justice (Oberrichter) and judges administered justice with the Governor and the Secretary of Reichs-Marine-Amt (Navy). In addition there were four assessors, several attorneys-at-law and notaries of the public appointed by the Oberrichter (Chief Justice) among the German subjects. The Chief Justice did the most important work of authorizing the judges to do certain work, appointing assessors, attorneys-at-law and notaries of the public, and setting dates for the holding of the trials, with the approval of the Governor.⁴⁴

Just as two different sets of courts were provided for trying the Chinese and non-Chinese cases, so two different sets of laws were made for the same crimes committed by the Chinese and non-Chinese. According to the laws made for the Chinese it was stated:

⁴² Zia, cited above, pp. 27-9.

⁴³ Mohr, cited above, pp. 71-2; Zia, cited above, pp. 27-79; Schrameier, cited above, pp. 48-9: The trials in the Chinese courts were both held in Chinese and German languages.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 65-70.

If the Chinese and non-Chinese are equally involved in a crime or a civil law suit, then the Chinese are also subject to the *Kaiserliche Gericht* (Court of Justice for the non-Chinese in Kiaochow) and the laws for non-Chinese are to be applied equally to the Chinese. All the Chinese cases are to be tried and decided by the judge and officials appointed by the Governor (in the Chinese court).

Village leaders and other suitable persons were asked to give testimony. Let us examine the criminal law made for the Chinese, as it provided:

All of the following acts are punishable: (1) Those acts which the Governor considered as punishable as contained in his decrees, (2) Those which are punishable according to the laws of the German Empire, as misdemeanors against the Empire or against the health, life, liberty and property of other persons, (3) Those which tend to injure the interest of public orders, (4) Those which are punishable in the Chinese Empire.

Bodily punishments, not exceeding one hundred blows, fine not exceeding ten dollars, imprisonment not exceeding fifteen years, life imprisonment and death sentence (decapitation) were the penalties decreed by the Governor. Furthermore, these punishments might be given singly or in combination with each other or in combination with banishment from the protectorate. All persons reaching the age of twelve (Chinese age equal to eleven in Western custom) could be punished according to the penal law. In case of imprisonment they were separated from other criminals, while the father, or elder brother, or the guardian could be punished for the crimes of the minor (child under the Chinese age of twelve). Only Chinese women criminals were exempted from receiving bodily punishments. Death sentences to be given to the criminals must first be approved by the Governor, who decided the manner by which the execution should take place.⁴⁵

In civil cases in which the parties were Chinese the Governor was to decide as to which of the laws of the German Empire were to be applied. Documents, testimonies of the experts, witness and investigations of the objects or places could be counted as proofs.⁴⁶

⁴⁵ Mohr, cited above, pp. 72-5.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 76-7.

Higher payments were given to the non-Chinese witnesses, experts and interpreters, while the court might decide upon the fees for Chinese witnesses, experts and interpreters according to the proclamation issued by Chancellor on May 20, 1892.⁴⁷ Members of foreign, colored races (Koreans, etc.) were placed on the same status as the natives (the Germans called the Chinese natives) with the exception of the Japanese.⁴⁸

The Civil and Criminal Laws in force in Germany were also applied to the Germans, other Europeans, Americans, and Japanese in Kiaochow.⁴⁹ There were separate prisons for the Chinese and the non-Chinese.⁵⁰ Another fact of great interest is that according to the law of the protectorate issued on July 25, 1900, foreigners as well as natives (Chinese) who settled in the protectorate could become German subjects through the process of naturalization by applying to the Secretary of the Imperial Navy.⁵¹

On September 2, 1898, Governor Rosendahl of Kiaochow issued a proclamation declaring the opening of Tsingtao in the Kiaochow Bay as a free port for the commerce of all nations of the world, with the exception that every ship entering this harbor had to pay a fee of 2½ cents per ton for the maintenance of the lighthouses and for the improvement of the port.⁵² By the treaty between China and Germany (April 17, 1899) a Maritime Customs Office was officially established at Tsingtao; the Chief or Commissioner and the members of the European staff were to be of German nationality. This Customs Office was to collect the Opium Tax for the German Government in Kiaochow. No import duty was to be levied by

⁴⁷ Mohr, cited above, pp. 99.

⁴⁸ *Ibid*, p. 61: This Protectorate Law was issued in 1900.

⁴⁹ *Ibid*, pp. 47-51.

⁵⁰ Zia, cited above, p. 28; Schrameier, cited above, pp. 48-9: Schrameier mentioned the Chinese prison in Listun where the Chinese convicts were taught industrial work.

⁵¹ Mohr, cited above, pp. 39-42.

⁵² *Ibid*, pp. 278-80, Deutschen Asiatische Warte, Amtsblatt, 1900, p. 23: Proclamation issued by Governor Rosendahl, Tsingtao, September 2, 1898; Schrameier, cited above, p. 136; Giordani, cited above, pp. 72-4; Zia, cited above, p. 15; British State Papers, 1897-98, No. 90, p. 1039.

the Customs Office on merchandise brought to Tsingtao, except those passing the German frontier at Kiaochow into the interior of China. When Chinese merchandise or products brought from the interior of China into German Territory of Kiaochow were shipped from Tsingtao to other places, the export duty was to be levied on them according to existing treaties. Furthermore, this Customs Office was to take no part in the collection or administration of the tonnage, lighthouse, or port dues. In case of frauds or contraventions committed by merchants against the Maritime Customs rules, a separate agreement was to be made, while the German tribunals at Tsingtao were to carry out all judicial procedures.⁵³

This Customs House at Tsingtao was authorized to issue inland navigation papers after the signing of the agreement on April 17, 1904, regarding the Inland Steam Navigation between China and Germany.⁵⁴ But the Sino-German Agreement signed on December 1, 1905, practically closed the free harbor at Tsingtao, cutting off foreign competition entirely. This action especially affected the Japanese goods which tended to compete with the German commodities in Tsingtao. The Chinese Maritime Customs House at Tsingtao was to levy all the duties payable on goods passing outside the free area and was to hand over 20% of the net import duties collected annually to the German officials, as its contribution to the expenses of the territory.⁵⁵

The following table shows the expenditures, incomes of the German Colonial Government of Kiaochow and the subsidies from the German Government.⁵⁶

⁵³ MacMurray, cited above, Vol. I, pp. 189-91; Schrameier, cited above, pp. 158-93; Mohr, cited above, p. 278, regarding opium tax.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 191-2; Schrameier, cited above, pp. 194-200.

⁵⁵ MacMurray, cited above, pp. 192-203; Schrameier, cited above, pp. 201-44; Giordani, cited above, pp. 37-8.

⁵⁶ Mohr, cited above, p. 195; Schrameier, cited above, pp. 143-7: Schrameier expressed that the purpose of the German Protectorate in Kiaochow is "a military base, in order to enable the mother country to participate with words and swords in the political and economical changes occurring in that part of the world." Thus the author (Schrameier) thought that the Reichstag had appropriated a generous subsidy every year for meeting the purpose.

<i>Year</i>	<i>Expenditures</i>	<i>Subsidies</i>	<i>Incomes</i>
1898	M. 5,000,000	M. 5,000,000	nil
1899	8,500,000	8,500,000	nil
1900	9,939,000	9,780,000	M. 213,000
1901	11,050,000	10,750,000	300,000
1902	12,404,000	12,044,000	360,000
1903	12,808,142	12,353,142	455,000
1904	13,088,300	12,583,000	505,000
1905	15,296,000	14,660,000	636,000
1906	14,198,000	13,150,000	1,048,000
1907	13,278,200	11,735,500	1,542,700
1908	11,465,753	9,739,953	1,725,800
1909	12,165,602	8,545,005	3,620,597
1910	12,715,884	8,231,016	4,584,868
1911	13,538,610	7,703,940	5,834,670

The above table shows that the annual income of the Kiaochow Government was always inadequate to defray the expenses of the administration. The main item in the expenditures was for military defenses.⁵⁷ After 1908 the amount of the income increased, while that of the subsidies from the Government decreased. Since Kiaochow was under the control of the Ministry of Marine instead of the Ministry of the Colonies, its budget was also separate from that of the other colonies.⁵⁸

The taxation policy of the German Colonial Government in Kiaochow was a sound one. The amount of taxes and fees and dues were purposely not heavy, in order to encourage the Chinese to live in the territory and thus make the port of Tsingtao attractive to internal and international commerce.⁵⁹

There were two kinds of taxes in Kiaochow; namely, the direct tax, and the indirect tax. The former consisted of the Land Tax and a tax on the transfer of land⁶⁰ (in the purchase and resale of

⁵⁷ Giordani, cited above, pp. 68-9; Schrameier, cited above, pp. 91-2: Schrameier expressed the hope that Kiaochow would be able to support the expense of its military fortification.

⁵⁸ Great Britain: Peace Hand Book Series, Kiaochow and Weihaiwei, No. 71, 1920, pp. 38-40, table on p. 16; Giordani, cited above, pp. 68.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 39-40; Mohr, cited above, pp. 196; Schrameier, cited above, pp. 76-8.

⁶⁰ Great Britain Hand Book Series, Kiaochow and Weihaiwei, p. 39; Schrameier, *Wie Landordnung von Kiautschou entstand*, p. 23; Schrameier, *Kiautschou seine Entwicklung und Bedeutung*, pp. 81-3.

land by the Government, as it had adopted a governmental monopoly in this purchase and resale of land, for which see the beginning of this chapter). The rate of the Land Tax between October 1898 and September 1913 was 6% annually while that of the tax on the transfer of land was 1/3 of the increase of the value of land.⁶¹ Every three years an assessment of the value of the land was made and the rate was raised accordingly. On September 20, 1913, the German administration in Kiaochow issued a decree dividing the tax into three rates according to the value of the land. The first class consisted of lots for houses, orchards, vegetable gardens and thrashing floors. The annual rate of tax was 35% of the price per *mow* (Chinese acreage). The second class consisted of good tillable soil and its annual rate was 25% of the price per *mow*, while the third class contained tillable land in mountains and sandy districts with 15% per *mow* as its annual rate of tax.⁶² This new classification of rates was in force since September 26, 1913.⁶³

The indirect tax of the German Colonial Government in Kiaochow consisted mostly of fees for licenses for the opening of trade; namely, (1) trade permits,⁶⁴ (2) permits for the building of houses, (3) permits for storing goods⁶⁵ in the sheds of *Kajen* (storage house, I guess; the word, *Kajen*, is the direct spelling of the Chinese pronunciation), (4) permits for the extraction of salt on the beaches of the coast,⁶⁶ (5) dog tax, hunting fees, and (6) fees on concessions such as railroads, mining, banks.⁶⁷

In addition to the above fees, there were port dues, dues for the lighthouses and fees for permitting the navigation in inland waters.⁶⁸ Since the signing of the Agreement (Amendment to the Agreement)

⁶¹ Schrameier: *Wie Landordnung von Kiautschou entstand?* pp. 17-22; Schrameier: *Aus Kiautschou Verwaltung*, pp. 75-8; 90-4.

⁶² Mohr, cited above, pp. 282-4; Schrameier: *Aus Kiautschou Verwaltung*, pp. 90-9.

⁶³ Schrameier: *Aus Kiautschou Verwaltung*, pp. 91-9.

⁶⁴ Such as bathing houses, auction sales, carriages of any kind, theaters, inns, hotels, sale of opium, opening of gambling houses, drug stores, and tea houses and the sale of water.

⁶⁵ Great Britain Peace Hand Book Series, Kiaochow and Weihaiwei, pp. 39-40; Mohr, cited above, pp. 278-80; 286-8; 125-42; 187-212 and 367-83.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 287-8; Schrameier: *Aus Kiautschou Verwaltung*, p. 133.

⁶⁷ Schrameier: *Aus Kiautschou Verwaltung*, pp. 121-32.

⁶⁸ Great Britain Peace Hand Book Series, Kiaochow and Weihaiwei, pp. 39-40; Mohr, cited above, p. 309.

for the Establishment of a Customs House in Tsingtao on December 1, 1905, between China and Germany, all the import and export duties payable on goods entering and leaving Tsingtao were levied by the Chinese Customs House at Tsingtao, with the exception of the articles for the German troops (such as uniforms, stores and provisions) and articles for the general public such as machinery, plants, articles for ordinary repairs, all postal parcels destined for private use in the German territory, and personal luggages not containing dutiable or contraband goods. The Chinese Government in return handed annually to the German Officials at Tsingtao 20% of the net import duties collected.⁶⁹

German marks and pfennigs were used in the leased territory together with the bank notes issued by the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank in China. In addition, the German Government issued nickel coins after October 1909.⁷⁰ The new Chinese ten-cash pieces were also in use at Kiaochow, but Japanese and Korean ten-cash pieces were prohibited.⁷¹

In 1898 the German Post Office was established with a staff of one Post Master or Director, one first mail assistant, one mail assistant, one supervisor and five Chinese lower officials. Between 1898 and 1899, branch post offices were established in Kiaochow, Pingtu, Weihsien, Chingchow, Tsouping, Tsinanfu, Taianfu, Tai-erlchuang and Yichoufu in close connection with the main office in Tsingtao.⁷²

After July 16, 1903, all parcel post packages and freight packages by mail between the German Post Office in Kiaochow and the other branches of the German Post Office in China were subject to customs

⁶⁹ MacMurray, cited above, pp. 192-203; Mohr, cited above, pp. 149-50; 308-34.

⁷⁰ Great Britain Peace Hand Book Series, Kiaochow and Weihaiwei, p. 40; Mohr, cited above, pp. 340-3: According to the decree issued by the German Chancellor, von Bülow, on June 8, 1906, the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank was allowed to issue bank notes in the protectorate of Kiaochow for a period of fifteen years.

⁷¹ Mohr, cited above, p. 538: The Acting Governor, Jacobson, issued a decree on July 22, 1904, in Tsingtao recognizing the circulation of the Chinese ten-cash pieces (Chinese coin equal to a penny in U. S. A., in use but not in value) in the protectorate and prohibiting the use of the Japanese and Korean ten-cash pieces (in form and substance the Korean and the Japanese ten-cash pieces resembled the Chinese, being all made of copper. My note).

⁷² Koetzle, cited above, p. 111.

inspection.⁷³ All packages passing the territory of Kiaochow from the interior of China to Peking or foreign countries were also under the inspection of the Maritime Customs House. No duty was levied on the packages from Kiaochow to the other Chinese harbors.⁷⁴ Beginning with the first of July, 1907, the Tsingtao German Post Office connected itself with the British Post Office in Hongkong and through it exchanged mail with the British Post Office in British India, Straits Settlements, Mauritius, Cape Colony, Natal, Macao Portuguese India and Transvaal.⁷⁵ By 1912 there were twenty German post offices established in Nanking, Shanghai and Chinkiang (Kiangsu Province), Tientsin and Peking (Chili Province), Hankow and Ichang (Hupeh Province), Swatow and Canton (Kwangtung Province), Foochow and Amoy (Fukien Province), and Tsingtao, Loasan, Taipatau, Litsung, Changkou, Sze-fang, Viehyeh, Yientai and Tsinanfu (Shantung Province) without China's consent and with the lack of any treaty provision or sanction.⁷⁶

⁷³Die Deutsche Kolonial Gesetzgebung, Sammlung der auf die Schutzgebiete bezüglichen Gesetz,—Verordnungen, Erlasse und internationalen Vereinbarungen mit Anmerkungen, Sachregister, Vol. VI, (1901-2), Berlin 1903, pp. 308-11.

⁷⁴ *Ibid*, p. 312.

⁷⁵ Mohr, cited above, pp. 384-6: The German Post Office Master announced on January 1, 1906, that all packages passing through the protectorate from the interior of China were under the inspection of the Customs Office at Tsingtao and that senders in the interior would have to pay twenty cents for the inspection fee. In April 1910, mail or postal packages between the German post offices in China and European countries passed over Siberia. In 1911 the German post offices in China made their connections with Japan and the Australian Confederacies.

⁷⁶ *Ibid*, p. 251; Zia, cited above, pp. 107-8: Zia stated that the German Government in Kiaochow established ten post offices in Tsingtao and Shantung, although at that time there was a Chinese post office in Tsingtao. But the majority of the population in the leased area used more of the German stamps than of the Chinese. In 1910 the Chinese post office in Tsinanfu coöperated with the German post offices in Shantung in their exchange of mail matters in Tsingtao, Shanghai and Chefoo. After the Japanese seizure of Kiaochow in 1915 more post offices were opened in Tsingtao, Tsinanfu, Taitungtzung, Taipatau, Takkong along the Kiaochow-Tsinan railway stations, Tientsin-Pukow railway stations and several other offices in Shantung. They were of two kinds; namely, (1) the Common Post Offices and (2) the Battle Field Post Offices.

On June 1, 1898, a telephone system was installed at Tsingtao with twenty-six subscribers.⁷⁷ Later telephone systems were established in Litsung, Saizekow and Loasan.⁷⁸

In addition a telegraph line between Tsingtao and Tsinanfu and from there to connect with the Tientsin-Pukow was established by the Germans in Kiaochow. There were two cable lines established by the German authorities, one from Tsingtao to Shanghai and the other from Tsingtao to Chefoo. These two lines were in turn connected with the Pacific lines of the Dutch and German Cable Company and with all the other wireless lines in Germany and other countries of the world. The Chinese Telegraph Company in Tsingtao was used by the Germans too.⁷⁹

There was a naval wireless station established on the Singyoh Mountain in Tsingtao which was connected with the wireless station in Tsingtao and the wireless stations in the Malay Island. In Changkakow, Peking, Jehol, Woosung, Nankow, Foochow, Swatow and Canton eight wireless stations were established after the signing of the contract between the Chinese Government and the German Telephone Company.⁸⁰ Special protection was demanded by the German Government for the telephone and telegraph lines on land and cables in the sea against any possible injuries by the populace.⁸¹

The roads, streets and highways of the leased territory of Kiaochow were very well planned and built. The German Government divided the area into three sections. The first section contained the whole city of Tsingtao with the buildings, houses, constructed after the German style and streets marked with German names.

⁷⁷ Koetzle, cited above, p. 111.

⁷⁸ Zia, cited above, p. 110: All the telephone systems that the German Government installed in the four places in Shantung were of a commercial nature. The machines were made in Germany and imported to Tsingtao and other places. After the Japanese occupation in 1915, the Japanese established a military system of telephones, but still maintained the old German telephone systems. The Germans used men as operators, but the Japanese used Japanese women.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 108; Mohr, cited above, pp. 388-9: According to the decree issued by the German Emperor, William II and the Chancellor, Prince von Bülow on October 16, 1901, the German Empire alone has the right of establishing a telegraph system in the leased territory of Kiaochow. This decree was published in *Die Deutsche Kolonial Gesetzgebung*, 1903, p. 589; Kaiser-Wilhelm-Dank: Verein für Soldatenfreunde, Kameradschaft, Deutschland als Kolonialmacht, p. 252.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 108-9.

⁸¹ *Die Deutsche Kolonial Gesetzgebung*, 1903, pp. 589-600.

The second section, Taipau District and the third, Putu District, both being to the north of Tsingtao were somewhat different. The former (Taipau District) contained houses with semi-Chinese and semi-Western architecture and had streets with Chinese names, while the latter (Putu) had houses of similar style and streets with some Chinese and some German names. The German Government built 53,000 meters of roads and streets in and around Kiaochow and even between Kiaochow and Tsinanfu (the capital of the Shantung Province, outside the leased area) a long wide road parallel to the Kiaochow-Tsinan Railway was constructed.⁸²

According to the Convention for the Lease of Kiaochow signed between China and Germany, the latter obtained the right to build two railways in the province of Shantung. The Government in Germany granted the concession to the Shantung Railway Company in 1898. By 1904 the Shantung Railway Company (Schantung Eisenbahn Gesellschaft) had completed 250 miles of railroads between Tsingtao and Tsinanfu; another line of railroad twenty-eight miles long was finished between Changtien and Poshan in 1906, and the last one between Tsaochwang and Taierhchwang, consisting of twenty-six miles, was built in 1910. (Chapter VII will be devoted to the cultural, commercial and industrial enterprises of the Germans in China and in it the German railroad enterprise will be discussed in detail).⁸³

With a capital of 50,000,000 marks the German Government built a great commercial harbor at Tsingtao, which was divided into three sections.⁸⁴ All wharfs were made of wood, equipped with lifting machines and connected with railroads.⁸⁵

⁸² Zia, cited above, pp. 44-8.

⁸³ Great Britain Peace Hand Book Series, Kiaochow and Weihaiwei, 1920, No. 71, pp. 9-10; Schrameier, cited above, pp. 41-2.

⁸⁴ (1) The Great Harbor consisted of a great circular dam of 5,700 meters long connecting the small islands around Tsingtao, (2) for the entry of Chinese junks only, the Small Harbor, south of the Great Harbor, about a mile long with two dams each 665 meters long facing each other, and (3) the Harbor for the repairing of ships. The Great Harbor consisted of three big wharfs, with a floating wharf between the first and the second. The Small Harbor contained only one wharf.

⁸⁵ Zia, cited above, pp. 60-4; Great Britain Peace Hand Book Series, Kiaochow and Weihaiwei, 1920, No. 71, p. 13.

The Harbor Administration consisted of a Director in the person of a naval officer and several assistants.⁸⁶ The port or harbor regulations were very strict.⁸⁷

In his report to the Reichstag, Fürst von Bülow, the Chancellor stated that the Government Repair Shop for Ships and Machinery had been in operation since April 1902 with eighty Chinese apprentices from Shantung Province and European technical instructor. These students were trained in the German language, writing and arithmetic in order to provide cheap Chinese workers for supervisors' posts in the Repair Shop and also for supplying private industrial workers.⁸⁸

In 1898 Germany subsidized ninety-six German steamers within eleven and a half months in order to have them enter the harbor of Tsingtao. The table on the next page shows the rapid growth of the port of Tsingtao.⁸⁹

Thus as a result of Germany's energetic improvement of the Port and of her giving subsidies to steamers and boats, Tsingtao became sixth in importance among the forty-five ports on the Chinese coast open to foreign commerce.⁹⁰

⁸⁶ Zia, cited above, p. 62.

⁸⁷ Mohr, cited above, pp. 356-63: Governor Truppel's decree on December 24, 1907, on Port and Navigation Regulations: Ships of more than 100 net register-tons had to pay a fee for hiring a pilot before entering the harbor. All boats and ships had to anchor at designated places. Within twenty-four hours all ships except war vessels entering the harbor of Tsingtao had to report to the Harbor Office, presenting their ship papers or manifestors for inspection. The captain of the ship was to deliver all the mail entrusted to him to the German Post Office and take the mail given by the latter. There were strict rules prohibiting the entry of ships in cases of contagious diseases (quarantine). The captain of the ship was required to report every death on board to the Harbor Office and the Register Office, but if the dead person happened to be a Chinese the report to the Register Office was not necessary. Finally, the Captain or Director of the harbor had the power to decide whether the ship could enter the harbor or not, if the nationality of the ship was not represented by a consul in Kiaochow; Schrameier: *Kiautschou, seine Entwicklung und Bedeutung*, pp. 40-1: The Kiaochow Harbor administration was modeled after that of Hamburg in Germany.

⁸⁸ Bülow, cited above, pp. 15-6.

⁸⁹ Mohr, cited above (Anlage, Appendix, p. 457); Koetzler, cited above, p. 111.

⁹⁰ Kaiser-Wilhelm-Dank: *Verein für Soldatenfreunde, Kameradschaft, Deutschland als Kolonialmacht*, 1914, pp. 254-5.

THE NUMBER OF SHIPS AND CHINESE JUNKS ENTERING THE PORT

Year	German	English	Japanese	Chinese	Norwegian	Other States	Total	Tonnage
1898	114	37	10	—	2	23	186	—
1899	122	39	12	3	2	18	196	—
1900	187	36	9	—	—	15	247	271,330
1901	207	14	28	—	10	12	271	340,154
1902	196	13	27	—	2	13	251	267,979
1903	210	17	53	1	5	11	297	317,395
1904	204	98	3	6	34	10	353	398,628
1905	267	84	4	6	43	12	416	431,474
1906	250	103	40	8	28	8	437	492,793
1907	282	128	81	5	19	2	497	551,983
1908	220	108	80	20	15	3	446	551,941
1909	263	121	70	42	17	6	519	693,069
1910	259	177	78	29	11	1	555	821,563

The military department of Kiaochow was the most important item in the administration of the leased area by the German Government, because of its advantage in furthering the German World Policy in the Far East. After the seizure of Kiaochow, Admiral Diederich asked the German Government to send the best trained officers and assistants to Kiaochow to instruct the colonial troop and relieve the guard.⁹¹ In December Prince Henry, with the second division (consisting of three men-of-war, the "Deutschland," the "Kaiserin Augusta" and "Gefion"), a naval battalion and a detachment of naval artillery, sailed for Kiaochow to re-enforce the fleet there, according to the German Emperor, William II's plan for making Tsingtao the German Naval Station in the Far East. Besides the Chinese artillery depot, a mine depot, a military hospital and a harbor office were also seized for the use of the navy by the German Marine during the occupation.⁹²

The garrisoning marines of Kiaochow consisted of the third sea battalion (the first battalion was stationed in Germany, the second

⁹¹ Staatsarchiv: Sammlung der officialen Aktenstücke zur Geschichte, Einundsechzigster Band, 1898, Admiral Diederich's Report on the transfer of the administration after the occupation, February 15, 1898, p. 8.

⁹² Kaiser-Wilhelm-Dank; Verein für Soldatenfreunde, Kameradschaft, Deutschland als Kolonialmacht, pp. 282-4.

in the German colonies of South Africa), which was made up of five groups of marine infantry and one marine-field battery, the sailor's artillery division made of two groups, and the military army. The soldiers serving in the fortress, the artillery, the mine depot and the Government Hospital for soldiers were all recruited directly from military institutions in Germany.⁹³ The four of the five groups of the marine infantry were stationed on the Bismarck Mountain (The Fanyen Mountain, the Chinese name) where the Governor's office building was located. The fifth was the cavalry stationed on Sainyuh Mountain, to the north of Bismarck Mountain. The rest were stationed in the twelve fortresses of Kiaochow, which were built by the German Government there.⁹⁴

The Governor was appointed the Chief Commander of the Army and Navy in Kiaochow by decree of the Kaiser, on March 1, 1898.⁹⁵ The other officers appointed were: the adjutant, the artillery lieutenant (Offizier vom Platz), the fortification servant, the garrison physician, the garrison auditor, the intendature official and the commander at service (Zur Dienstleistung) serving in the Military Department of the German Government in Kiaochow.⁹⁶ The troops in the territory were all Germans, since all the Chinese troops had been transferred to the police service after the occupation. Germans residing either in Germany or in Kiaochow, who were of military age (20th year) could be called to serve in the marine division at Kiaochow according to the Compulsory Military Service Law and the Imperial decree of February 27, 1899.⁹⁷

⁹³ Otto Hovermann: *Kiautschou, Verwaltung und Gerichtsbarkeit*, pp. 16-7; *Die Deutsche Kolonial Gesetzgebung: Sammlung der auf die deutschen Schutzgebiete bezüglichen Verordnungen, Erlasses und internationalen Vereinbarungen mit Anmerkungen, Sachregister*, p. 637.

⁹⁴ Zia, cited above, pp. 35-6.

⁹⁵ Mohr, cited above, pp. 7-8.

⁹⁶ Koetzler, cited above, p. 118.

⁹⁷ Mohr, cited above, pp. 415-22: According to the decree issued by Emperor William II and the Acting Secretary of the Reichsmarineamt (Imperial Department of the Navy) on February 27, 1899, it was stated that in cases of urgent necessity or danger, Germans who had finished their military service in the protectorate and were on furlough in Kiaochow could be ordered to join the reinforcements by the Governor. There were two classes of military service; namely, the one year voluntary service and the three year voluntary service.

For administering justice to the troops and the military and naval officers in Kiaochow, a military court, called "Gericht des Gouvernements von Kiautschou" was established.⁹⁸

After the occupation Admiral Diederich started the work of public health and sanitation by appointing a commission to inquire into the sanitary conditions of Kiaochow and decide on how to combat the epidemic in the occupied area.⁹⁹ After the signing of the lease, the Governors of Kiaochow issued decrees consecutively for the maintenance of public health and sanitation.¹⁰⁰

Eight hospitals were established.¹⁰¹ There were two kinds of German physicians, the Marine Physicians and the Mission Physicians. Most of the nurses and a few physicians (trained in Europe)

⁹⁸ Otto Hovermann: *Kiautschou, Verwaltung und Gerichtsbarkeit*, pp. 15-7.

⁹⁹ Das Staatsarchiv: *Sammlung der officialen Akten zur Geschichte der Gegenwart*. Einundsechzigster Band, 1898, Appendix containing Admiral Diederich's report on the transfer of the administration after the occupation, pp. 4-5, also see page 4 footnote 12.

¹⁰⁰ Mohr, cited above, pp. 23-6: This is a compilation of all decrees and laws for the German Protectorate of Kiaochow by Mohr, who had once been an assistant interpreter of the Kiaochow Government; *Ibid*, pp. 153-64: Regulations were made concerning the building of houses in the leased area and making the owner of each house responsible for the cleanliness of the house and yard and the streets in front and back of the house. Stables for housing the oxen, cows, hogs, goats and sheep were under government inspection. Permits were given to owners of cows for selling milk after due examination by government inspectors, who were also in charge of examining cows, calves, hogs, goats, sheep, horses, mules and donkeys. The slaughtering, skinning and cleaning of the meat of the animals were to be done in the public slaughtering houses provided by the government. Compulsory vaccination, compulsory report on cases of contagious diseases (such as leprosy, Asiatic cholera, pestilence, small-pox, diphtheria, child-birth fever, dysentery, scarlet fever, typhoid and lyssa or hydrophobia) and compulsory chimney sweeping were rigidly enforced. Then too there were strict laws of quarantine regarding the entrance of boats and persons on them and for keeping clean the streets, market places and cemeteries; *Ibid*, pp. 25-6, *Die Deutsche Kolonial Gesetzgebung: Sammlung der auf die deutschen Schutzgebiet bezüglichen Gesetz, Verordnungen, Erlasse, und internationalen Vereinbarungen mit Anmerkungen, Sachregister*, Vol. VI, 1901-2 (published in 1903) pp. 290, 646: Every child before the end of the calendar year following the year of its birth had to be vaccinated as did also every member of a public school before he completed his twelfth year, unless successfully vaccinated within the preceding five years.

¹⁰¹ The Tsingtao Catholic Hospital, the three Faber Hospitals (by German Missions) in Taipautao, in Taitungtung (Taitungchen) and in Kaumi, the Kiaochow Military Hospital (by the government), the Leetzung Hospital, also by the government) the Muihyen Hospital and the Kiaochow Hospital

were Chinese.¹⁰² On the top of Laushan, the most beautiful mountain in the Shantung Peninsula, was a sanitarium (Mecklenburghaus). Besides there was a little sanitarium for the army and navy in Sootzekou near Tsingtao,¹⁰³ and a bacteriological and a chemical laboratory for examining cases of sickness and other matters regarding public health.¹⁰⁴

Morphine and other narcotic drugs were not allowed to be manufactured in Kiaochow and could be imported only by physicians and druggists upon conditions stated in the government permits. Plants yielding opium could not be cultivated in Kiaochow except by the German Government which had the right of monopoly in selling a limited amount of opium.¹⁰⁵

The facts regarding the administration of Kiaochow by Germany during the period of 1898-1914 having been given, the question arises, in which nation, China or Germany, did the sovereignty lie during that period? Before answering the question, it is necessary to state what sovereignty is. Prof. W. W. Willoughby in his *Fundamental Concepts of Public Law* says:

Viewed as a quality or faculty of Statehood, and as connoting legal omnipotence rather than physical power, sovereignty is, by its very nature, a unity.¹⁰⁶

Considered from the point of view of international law, sovereignty is independence according to the same learned author.¹⁰⁷ Independence, in turn, is defined as the right of a state to administer all her external and internal affairs without the control of other states.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰² Zia, cited above, pp. 52-8; Schrameier: *Kiautschou seine Entwicklung und Bedeutung*, pp. 49-53.

¹⁰³ Mohr, cited above, p. 180; Zia, cited above, pp. 52-9.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 52-9.

¹⁰⁵ Mohr: *Handbuch für das Schutzgebiet Kiautschou*, pp. 67-9 (This book is translated by three Chinese, Sing Za-chang, Kwei Feng-chang, and Hai San-tsui).

¹⁰⁶ W. W. Willoughby: *The Fundamental Concepts of Public Law*, p. 72.

¹⁰⁷ W. W. Willoughby: *Foreign Rights and Interests in China*, 2nd Edition, Vol. I, p. 48.

¹⁰⁸ J. T. Lawrence: *Les Principes de Droit International*, p. 120: "L'indépendance peut se définir le droit d'un État d'administrer toutes ses affaires extérieures ou intérieures sans contrôle des autres États. Ce droit d'action indépendante est le résultat naturel de la souveraineté. C'est, en fait, la souveraineté considérée du point de vue des autres nations."

To return to the problem in question, it is of great importance to examine the Convention for the Lease of Kiaochow. According to this treaty, it was explicitly provided in Article I that:

His Majesty, the Emperor of China, guided by the intention to strengthen the friendly relations between China and Germany and at the same time to increase the military readiness of the Chinese Empire, engages, while reserving to himself all rights of sovereignty in a zone of fifty kilometers (one hundred Chinese *li*) surrounding the bay of Kiaochow at high-water, to permit the free passage of German troops within this zone at any time, as also to abstain from taking any measures or issuing any ordinances therein, without the previous consent of the German Government and especially to place no obstacle in the way of any regulation of the water courses which may prove to be necessary. His Majesty, the Emperor of China, at the same time, reserves to himself the right to station troops within that zone, in agreement with the German Government, and to take other military measures.

Again in Article V it was stated:

Should Germany at some future time express the wish to return the Kiaochow Bay to China before the expiration of the lease, China engages to refund to Germany the expenditure she has incurred at Kiaochow and to cede to Germany a more suitable place. Germany engages at no time to sublet the territory leased from China to another Power.¹⁰⁹

Bearing in mind these provisions of the Convention, we may assert that the sovereignty remains with China, since she only delegated some rights of sovereignty to Germany, such as the rights of stationing troops, of building fortifications, of administration, of partial taxation and of having jurisdiction both over the Chinese and non-Chinese in Kiaochow.

First of all China reserved her right of reversion over the lease by promising to refund to Germany all the expenses incurred in the

¹⁰⁹ MacMurray, cited above, Vol. I, pp. 112-4; Chinese Customs, Treaties between China and Foreign States, pp. 208-11; Pohl, cited above, pp. 23-4: Pohl asserted that the exercise of sovereignty over Kiaochow was transferred by China to Germany, but China reserved the sovereignty herself; Chin-lin Hsia: Studies in Chinese Diplomatic History, p. 101: China has right as the lessor of the proprietary (Quoting Westlake's opinion).

territory, while Germany pledged not to transfer the leased territory to any other power.¹¹⁰ This right of reversion by China over the leased area was exercised by the Chinese Government in 1917 when China declared war against Germany, abrogating all treaties between herself and the latter, when the latter failed in her delegated duty for protecting Kiaochow.¹¹¹

Secondly, the Chinese inhabitants living in Kiaochow did not change their nationality automatically when the German Government took over the administration and declared Kiaochow a protectorate. Instead the German Government in Kiaochow made laws for naturalizing the Chinese and other foreigners residing in Kiaochow, who were required to apply to the Imperial Chancellor to become subjects of the German Empire.¹¹² Although the lease provided that:

The Chinese population dwelling in the ceded territory shall at all times enjoy the protection of the German Government, provided that they behave in conformity with law and order.¹¹³

the fact showed that the German Government administered the Chinese Civil Law to the Chinese, but slightly changed the Chinese Criminal Law.¹¹⁴ In short, the Chinese were under the German jurisdiction when staying in Kiaochow and retaining their Chinese citizenship, but they were under the Chinese jurisdiction when they were outside of the leased area.¹¹⁵

Thirdly, the limitation of the period of the lease to ninety-nine years again proves the fact that China only leased the territory to

¹¹⁰ MacMurray, cited above, pp. 112-4; M. T. Z. Tyau: *Treaty Obligations Between China and Other States*, pp. 66-9; Hsia, cited above, p. 109.

¹¹¹ Willoughby: *Foreign Rights and Interests in China*, p. 268.

¹¹² Pohl, cited above, pp. 23-4; *Ibid*, pp. 36-9; Mohr, pp. 39-42.

¹¹³ MacMurray, cited above, pp. 114-5; Chinese and German text in *Treaties between China and Foreign States* by the Chinese Customs Office, Vol. II, pp. 211-2.

¹¹⁴ Mohr, cited above, pp. 71-8: *Law of the protectorate (Schutzgebietz)* of July 25, 1900. Article IX of this law authorized the Imperial Chancellor to take charge of naturalizing the natives (Chinese) as well as foreigners residing in the protectorate.

¹¹⁵ Pohl, cited above, p. 39: Pohl said that the Chinese living in Kiaochow were under the German jurisdiction, but the minute they left the territory they were under the Chinese jurisdiction. In contrast the people living in the other German protectorates were under the German jurisdiction and protection even after they left the protectorates. Another fact of interest is that all the other German protectorates and colonies were under the control of the German Colonial Office (a branch office of the Ministry of Foreign Office of the German Imperial Government) while Kiaochow was under the control of the German Ministry of Marine or Navy; *Ibid*, pp. 37-8.

Germany within this period, while she retained her sovereignty.¹¹⁶ If China ceded both her territory and sovereignty to Germany, then it was unnecessary for both countries to agree to the limited period of the lease.

Fourthly, the fact that China asked Germany to evacuate her troops which were stationed in the Neutral Zone, fifty kilometers, Kiaochow and Kaumi (a district near Kiaochow in Shantung Province) showed that she still retained her sovereignty. Germany promised to remove from Kiaochow and Kaumi (in the Neutral Zone of fifty kilometers, one hundred Chinese *li*) her troops which she had sent during the Boxer Expedition of 1900, while the Chinese local authorities and police officers were to supervise and protect the Zone and the railways. Next China promised to pay \$400,000 to the German Government for all the works which Germany had constructed in Kiaochow and Kaumi during the five years of occupation, such as barracks, stables, drill grounds, roads, water works and the houses, together with the foundation in four instalments within two years from the date on which the barracks at Kiaochow and Kaumi were given up. In addition Germany was to notify the Chinese Government a few weeks before, if she should in accordance with the treaties (the Convention for the Lease of Kiaochow, March 6, 1898) require her troops to pass through Kiaochow and Kaumi, so that China might assign a vacant place for their temporary stay without charge.¹¹⁷

Thus the sovereignty of the leased area of Kiaochow remained with China during the time of the lease (1898–1915) although it must be admitted that China delegated the exercise of certain sovereign rights to Germany for that period.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁶ Pohl, cited above, pp. 21–3: Pohl said that China retained the right of refusing to renew the lease at the end of the period of ninety-nine years.

¹¹⁷ MacMurray, cited above, Vol. I, p. 118: Agreement for withdrawal of German troops from Kiaochow and Kaumi, November 28, 1905.

¹¹⁸ Willoughby: *The Fundamental Concepts of Public Law*, p. 74: The exercise of sovereignty may be delegated; Pohl, cited above, pp. 24, 33: Pohl said that this lease occupied a special place in international law. It was a limitation of *Gebietschoheit* and therefore on the same level as the *Staats-servitut*, the *lien* and the right of patronage and administration. The sovereignty remained with the lessor (*Verpachtende Staat*) state, while the *Hoheitsrechte* could be exercised wholly or in part by the lessee (*Pachtende*); *Ibid*, p. 39: The same author stated that the fact China had reserved the sovereignty for herself, kept Germany from incorporating Kiaochow more closely into the German Empire, such as might be possible with the other protectorates in accordance with the Amendment of Article I of the Imperial Constitution.

CHAPTER IV

GERMANY'S PARTICIPATION IN THE BOXER EXPEDITION

BEING an unintelligent and unwise anti-foreign movement as well as a nationalist movement, the Boxer Rising of 1900 in China shocked the whole outside world. Its causes lay deep-rooted in China's contact with the Western nations historically since 1842 when China was defeated by Great Britain and forced to open five of her ports to the commerce of the world.

There were several causes leading to the Boxer Rising. First the international struggle for concessions and the leasing of China's important naval bases and commercial harbors was an immediate cause which threatened the Chinese populace with the fear of the actual partition of the country by the Powers.¹

¹ T. W. Overlach: *The Foreign Financial Control in China*, pp. 41-2, in which he said: "The permanent foreign pressure for concessions, the territorial acquisitions and constant attempts at introducing Western ideas into China during the period of 1897-98 had brought about a strong anti-foreign sentiment all over China. The result was the Boxer Rebellion of 1900. Referring to its causes, Lancelot Lanton quotes from one of the proclamations issued by the rebel leader, Yu Tung-chen, who wrote: 'The Foreigners who under the pretext of trading and teaching Christianity, are in reality taking away the land, food and clothing of the people, besides overturning the teaching of the sages; they are poisoning us with opinion and ruining us with debauchery. Since the time of Tao Kwang, they seized our territory and cheated us out of our money; they have eaten our children as food and piled up the public debt as high as the hills; they have burnt our palaces and overthrown our tributary states, occupied Shanghai, devastated Formosa, forcibly opened Kiaochow and now wish to divide up China like a melon.' This passage shows that the Boxer Rising though fanatical in its aspect, was none the less evidence of the awakening of a national spirit." *Memoirs of Count Witte*, p. 107: Witte blamed Russia and the other European Powers for seizing China's territory, as a cause of the Boxer Rising. M. von Brandt: *Zeitfragen*, pp. 286-92: Brandt who was the German Minister to China 1875-93 said that for six years China has been forced to give concessions of mines, railways and lands or harbors to foreign nations, while the foreign press was incessantly speaking of the decay of the Chinese Empire and its pending partition. Therefore it was not a surprise to see the Boxer Movement, a clumsy reaction on the part of the Chinese people to prevent such an immediate partition by the Powers. See G. N. Steiger: *China and the Occident*, p. 107.

A second cause was the intensified hatred of the Chinese toward the foreign missions. The coöperation of some of the missionaries with their government in furthering the acquisition of land or naval bases and commercial harbors from China inflamed the Chinese, whose indignation amounted almost to madness.² The bad characters of certain foreigners, such as the sailors, merchants and diplomatic representatives in China was the third cause.³ Even the conduct of certain missionaries toward the other missionaries and the Chinese invited contempt. According to Arthur H. Smith, a missionary for twenty-nine years in China in his book "China in Convulsion" said:

In an article in the 'Chinese Recorder' in November, 1899, the Rev. Immanuel Genahr, of the Rhenish Mission, who had been in China sixteen years, gives the details of a shameful attack by a Catholic priest named Julien upon the Rev. Franz Zahn and his native assistants, in which the latter were set upon, knocked down, bound with chains, and treated as criminals unworthy to live, all on a fictitious charge of leading a band of robbers, whereas the priest Julien was himself the leader of such a band, which despoiled a village, sacking the houses of Protestant inquirers and converts, doing damage to the extent of thousands of dollars. Then the author continued: "Whenever a Christian has a dispute with a heathen, no matter what subject in question may be, the quarrel is promptly taken up by the priest, who, if he cannot intimidate

² Die Grosse Politik, Vol. XIV, No. 3662: According to this note of the Treaty-Councillor, Klehmet, of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dated March 18, 1896, Bishop Anzer, the head of the German Catholic Missions in the South of Shantung, requested violently the German Government "to take an energetic action in the interest of his mission." Again in the same volume, No. 3694: On November 16, 1897, fifteen days after the murder of two German Catholic priests in Shantung, while staying in Germany, he was accepted in an audience with the Ex-Kaiser. At this occasion the Bishop, Anzer, said: "It is the last moment for the German Empire to attain a position generally in Asia and to establish the somewhat lessened prestige (Missions in Shantung) anew. It costs what it desires, but we need under no circumstances to give up Kiaochow, which has an economical and industrial future. The occupation of Kiaochow astonishes nobody in the Orient, because all the people there have waited for a long time." Also see Will: World Crisis in China, p. 7, Will said: "The seizure of Kiaochow by Germany as indemnity for the murder of two missionaries served in marked degree to inflame the Chinese against the Christian proselyters." See H. B. Morse; The International Relations of the Chinese Empire, Vol. III, pp. 60-74, 161-75.

³ See A. H. Smith, cited above, Vol. I, preface, XI; Will, cited above, pp. 1-9.

the local officials and compel them to give right to the Christian, represents the case as one of persecution, when the French consul is appealed to. Then is redress rigorously extorted, without the least reference to the justice of the demand.⁴

Fourthly and lastly was the expressed desire of the government officials to train the local militia and the members of the secret societies for a national army so as to prepare for a united front against any further foreign aggression. In the latter part of 1898, Empress Dowager, Tze Hsi issued decrees to the governors of the provinces for improving and strengthening the local militia for forming a regular army with the use of modern arms.⁵

The anti-foreign Chinese who styled themselves "Boxers" or the members of the "Big Sword Society" or *Tai Tao Hui* were banded together with the purpose of protecting the reigning dynasty and expelling all foreigners out of China.⁶ It was nothing more than a feeling of patriotism which prompted them to defend China voluntarily.⁷ Ichoufu and Yenchoufu in Shantung were the hot beds of these Boxers, where the Roman Catholics exerted much influence and antagonized the Chinese most.⁸

After the occupation of Kiaochow by Germany and the lease of the territory by China to Germany, conflicts and troubles between German Catholics and Germans and the Chinese in the leased area as well as other parts of Shantung reached a very acute stage, several times.⁹ With a fervent belief in the gods or divinities, the Boxers were able to convince and convert the populace as well as the government officials (later the court together with the Empress Dowager).¹⁰ Thus these fanatic Boxers spread from

⁴ Smith, cited above, Vol. I, pp. 53-5, 102-23.

⁵ Memoirs of Minister Hsu Chin-cheng (former Chinese Minister to Russia and Germany during 1895-1900, written in Chinese), Vol. I, pp. 18-22; Memoirs of Minister Liu Hai-kwan (Chinese Minister to Germany 1900-05, written in Chinese), Vol. II, pp. 10-11; Vol. IV, pp. 2-9, 41-4; Steiger often cited above, pp. 136-7 and footnote.

⁶ Steiger, pp. 133-4, 138 and footnote.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 138; Memoirs of Minister Hsu, pp. 18-22; Memoirs of Minister Liu, Vol. II, pp. 10-11; Vol. IV, pp. 2-9, 41-4.

⁸ Smith, cited above, Vol. I, pp. 155-7.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 155-61; Morse, Vol. III, pp. 173-6, 169.

¹⁰ Memoirs of Minister Liu Hai-kwan (in Chinese), Vol. II, pp. 10-11; Vol. IV, pp. 2-9, 41-4; Smith, Vol. I, pp. 169-73; Memoirs of Hsu Ching-cheng (in Chinese), Vol. I, pp. 18, 22.

Shantung to Chili.¹¹ Realizing the value of reorganizing the *I Ho Tuan* or the "Boxers," Empress Tze Hsi twice ordered the governors of the North to improve the local militia (*I Ho Tuan* thus concentrating them into regular troops around the capital for emergency of national defense.¹² It must be noted that at this time China was in constant danger of being attacked by Italy, when the latter sent gun-boats into the Chinese water with the support of Great Britain, in demanding the lease of Sanmen Bay in the province of Chekiang in the south of China, without any excuse.¹³

The outbreak of the Boxer Rising was staged in two periods; namely, the attacks and killing of the Chinese Christians and then the foreigners including the missionaries.¹⁴ Since the spring of 1898 after the seizure of Kiaochow by Germany, the occupation of Port Arthur and Tailienwan by Russia, Weihaiwei by Great Britain and Kwangchowwan by France, serious riots broke out against the missions and Germans in the different parts of the Shantung Province, in which the leased territory of Kiaochow was situated.¹⁵ Concerning the attack against "a party of three Germans prospecting on the way inland from Jihchao by a mob of a hundred villagers," Morse relates:

The German authorities took prompt action to check the anti-foreign feeling pervading the whole of southern Shantung. For the offense of the three engineers a party of one hundred and twenty-five soldiers burned to the ground two villages from which the mob had come. Another body of one hundred and twenty-five soldiers marched to Jihchao, fifteen miles inland, to exact punishment for the arrest there and maltreatment of a German missionary and seized the town and held it. This produced no effect and after holding the town for

¹¹ Steiger, cited above, pp. 141, 147-72.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 136.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 89-90.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 151; Smith, Vol. I, pp. 208-9.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 147-8; H. B. Morse: *The International Relations of the Chinese Empire*, Vol. III, pp. 173-4; U. S. *Foreign Relations*, 1898, Nos. 2878, 2888, 2893, 2901, 2916, 1573, 1581, 1588, 1592, 136, 33, pp. 191-9: A Chinese medical student working for the hospital in Chungking, Szechwan, owned by the American missions, was killed by the bandits there and indemnity was demanded of the Chinese Government which paid it later; then the people there entertained the fear that China was going to be partitioned by the Powers.

six weeks, the captain in command invited the officials and gentry to a conference at which he informed them that he intended to take five of the gentry to Tsingtao as hostages to secure the settlement of the case; there was great consternation and he was charged with breach of faith, but the captain acted on his announced intention and carried off the hostages. The German claims were then settled; reparation was made for other Roman Catholic losses.¹⁶

Being not rigorously prevented or perhaps even passively encouraged by the officials, the Boxers pursued their activities in Shantung and Chili with more vigor and enthusiasm in 1899. Foreigners were attacked near the capital, Peking, by the Boxers, but without serious consequence as no one was hurt. Fearing that the situation might become more grave, the foreign legations at Peking placed guards and marines for the second time since the beginning of the diplomatic history of China. Furthermore, the diplomats notified the *Tsungli Yamen* of their sending for the guards without asking the permission of the Chinese Government.¹⁷

Unfortunately a certain Mr. Brooks, an English clergyman of the S. P. G. Mission was killed by a band of six men in Feicheng district of the Shantung Province. He had been captured by these men and after attempting an unsuccessful escape, was overtaken and cut down in the excitement of the chase. But the provincial authorities promptly arrested, tried, and punished the guilty men, erected a memorial tablet and paid an indemnity of nine thousand taels.¹⁸ Yet the British Minister was not satisfied with this action.¹⁹

During the last two months of 1899 the foreign diplomats separately began protesting to the *Tsungli Yamen* for the incessant activities of the Boxers in Shantung and Chili on behalf of their nationals, including the missionaries who were the majority in these areas. In some cases these diplomats even addressed grievances for the Chinese Christians who were attacked or threatened by the members of the "Big Swords Society," demanding

¹⁶ Morse, cited above, *The International Relations of the Chinese Empire*, Vol. III, pp. 174-5.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 178; Steiger, cited above, p. 148.

¹⁸ Steiger, cited above, pp. 162-3; Smith, cited above, Vol. I, pp. 182-7.

¹⁹ Morse, cited above, Vol. III, p. 179.

that the Chinese Government take urgent measures for the suppression of the Boxer activities.²⁰ Later identical notes were sent to the *Tsungli Yamen* by the representatives of five Powers; namely, Great Britain, the United States of America, France, Italy and Germany. In response the Chinese Government issued decrees to the viceroy of Chili and the governor of Shantung for suppressing the Boxers named as "the rebellious ruffians."²¹ The *Tsungli Yamen* answered that the viceroy of Chili and the governor of Shantung were ordered to suppress the Boxers. Being dissatisfied with this answer, the diplomats of the five Powers, twice sent an identical note to the *Tsungli Yamen* with the request that the latter fulfil their former demands. There was also a threat of a naval demonstration of the warships of the five Powers concerned in the Gulf of Pechili. This demonstration actually took place in the months of March and April of 1900, after the delay of the answer of the *Tsungli Yamen*.²² But the reactions, the diplomatic pressure and threats produced were just the opposite to what was expected; the Chinese Government successively published in the *The Peking Gazette* two decrees honoring the former governmental officials who showed their patriotism by serving in the defense of China.²³ Not until the publication of the "Supplementary Memorial" on April 14, 1900, were the foreign warships ordered to depart.²⁴

However the diplomatic gestures and the naval demonstrations made by the representatives of America, France, Italy, Germany and Great Britain as well as the repressive measures adopted by the viceroy of Chilli served to instil fear of impending foreign invasion into the minds of the people, and to hasten the recruiting of the Boxers. Six weeks later the Roman Catholic villages near Paotingfu were destroyed and sixty-one Chinese converts were killed.²⁵ On May 19, after receiving a letter from the Catholic

²⁰ Steiger, cited above, pp. 173-5; Smith, cited above, Vol. I, pp. 187-9.

²¹ *Ibid*, pp. 180-2; Smith, cited above, Vol. I, pp. 192-3.

²² Morse, cited above, Vol. III, pp. 186-7; Steiger, cited above, pp. 184, 190; Steiger stated that only the warships of four Powers, America, Italy, Germany and Great Britain were sent to Taku stationing there for several weeks.

²³ *Ibid*, pp. 185-9; Smith, cited above, Vol. I, pp. 192-3.

²⁴ *Ibid*, pp. 190-1.

²⁵ *Ibid*, pp. 193.

Bishop, Favier, who depicted the situation of the Boxer activities around Peking with such horror the diplomatic representatives held a meeting at which a note was drawn and sent to the *Tsungli Yamen* demanding the arrest and execution of all individuals including the Boxers and those connected with them. A motion to bring the guards to Peking was rejected, but the suggestion for a united naval demonstration at Shanhaikwan was favored by most of those present, but was left to be voted on five days later. The fact showed that:

On the same day (May 19) after the letter was written, a party of French naval officers arrived at Peking and were able to make a trip to the Great Wall forty miles north of the city without any unpleasant incident.²⁶

In the reply of the *Tsungli Yamen*, the doyen (the Spanish Minister) was notified that the Chinese Government had already issued a decree ordering the officials to adopt strict measures of repression along the general lines indicated by the doyen's dispatch and that they had now memorialized for the issuance of an additional decree on the subject.²⁷ Being dissatisfied with this answer, the diplomatic representatives held several meetings of which the question of placing legation guards was discussed, but not adopted, being postponed to the twenty-eighth of May. The diplomatic representatives on the other hand harbored suspicions against each other due to their own national rivalries and jealousies. In his report to the home Foreign Office on the same day May 27 the Russian Minister stated:

During yesterday's meeting the German Minister declared quite openly that the landing of available troops was not a sufficient measure and that the moment has come for a more active intervention by the Powers. I think, however, that he will not succeed in leading his colleagues into this dangerous path, which would threaten the partition of China and that things will go no further than summoning the marines.²⁸

²⁶ Steiger, cited above, pp. 194-6.

²⁷ *Ibid*, pp. 197-202.

²⁸ Krasny Archiv, Vol. XIV, quoted by Steiger, cited above, pp. 197-8.

Such was the situation of "the assumption of sovereignty by the representatives of the Treaty Powers," before the violent attacks against the foreigners²⁹ (before the May Crisis.)

So the more the Chinese Government was dictated to by the representatives of the Powers, the deeper was the hatred of the people intensified toward the foreigners. One result of this hatred was the attack of a mob against a French railway official and the railway station at Fengtai, the junction point of the Peking-Paotingfu and the Peking-Tientsin lines on the morning of May 28, 1900.³⁰ An alarming report of this incident was made in the meeting of the diplomatic representatives, which was to consider the reply of the *Tsungli Yamen* of May 27, the Frenchman was wounded and the station was occupied by the mob.³¹ The unanimous decision of the meeting was to summon fifty or more marine guards for the protection of the legation by each minister present and to authorize the doyen to inform the *Tsungli Yamen* of this decision and request them to provide the means for the transportation of the detachments.³² In reply, the *Tsungli Yamen* begged the doyen and the ministers to postpone sending the marine detachments. This request was rejected by the ministers at a subsequent meeting and the first detachment of three hundred and thirty-seven American, British, French, Japanese, Italian and Russian marines entered Peking, on May 30.³³

The German Minister, being too enthusiastic, exceeded the instructions given him from his home government, by expressing at the meeting of the ministers on May 30, that the moment had come for the partition of China. This remark aroused so much

²⁹ United States Foreign Relations, 1900, p. 88, No. 312; Steiger, cited above, pp. 199-201.

³⁰ Steiger, cited above, p. 202; Smith, cited above, Vol. I, pp. 208-9.

³¹ *Ibid*, p. 202-4; Smith: p. 31; Die Grosse Politik, Vol. XVI, pp. 3-4: Foreign Minister, Count von Bülow to the Emperor, May, 29, 1900, including the telegram of the German Minister, Freiherr von Ketteler of May 28, asking the 50 men from Tsingtao to Peking, as America, Austria, England, France, Italy, Japan and Russia each sent 50 more to Peking.

³² *Ibid*, pp. 202-4.

³³ U. S. Foreign Relations, 1900, p. 137, No. 383, inclosures 8 and 9; Steiger, cited above, p. 204.

suspicion in the minds of the English and Russian ministers³⁴ that he was severely condemned by the Foreign Minister, Count von Bülow, who stated:

The remarks you mentioned might be interpreted as if we were urging for greater (or more aggressive) action. This is not in the direction of our policy and not supported by the instruction which is given you. It is not useful to express any truth.³⁵

Gradually conditions became worse, as several engagements occurred between the Boxers and foreigners and foreign missionaries with the result that many lives were lost on both sides, while the railway tracks between Tientsin and Peking were obstructed at several points by the Boxers on June 3-4 when the German and Austrian marines were going to Peking.³⁶ On June 4 as soon as the report of the severance of the railway traffic was made to the diplomats, a meeting was immediately held, in which they decided unanimously to request their home governments which had war-ships in Chinese waters to instruct their naval commanders to take a united action for the relief of Peking, in case the telegraphic communications should be cut.³⁷ The Chinese Government on the other hand ordered General Nieh with 6,000 troops to the east of Tientsin for restoring the railway service of the Peking-Tientsin Line, while assuring the representatives of the Powers that the uprisings would be put down.³⁸

³⁴ Die Grosse Politik, Vol. XVI, p. 4, No. 4512: Secretary of the Foreign Office, Count von Bülow's telegram dated May 31, 1900, to the German Minister, Freiherr von Ketteler, saying: "The English and the Russian Governments have received reports that you had expressed yourself during the last meeting of the Ministers to the effect that you saw these occurrences as the beginning of the partition of China. This remark led to an exchange of opinions between London and St. Petersburg. I beg you to wire the text and occasion of your remark."

³⁵ *Ibid.*, Vol. XVI, Nos. 4512-4: Telegrams between Bülow and the German Minister, von Ketteler, dated May 31, June 2 and 5, 1900, in the last one Bülow reproached Ketteler for exceeding his instructions.

³⁶ Steiger, cited above, pp. 207-9 and footnote of 209.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 208; Die Grosse Politik, Vol. XVI, p. 16, No. 4515: Ketteler's telegram to the Foreign Office reporting the decision of the meeting of the diplomatic representatives at Peking for asking their governments to instruct the chiefs of their squadrons to unite for the relief of Peking legations. The German cruiser squadron arrived at Taku on June 8.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 209.

But the diplomats were not satisfied with the assurance, so they demanded an audience with the Empress Dowager, a request which was not granted.³⁹ International jealousies and rivalries among the Powers were rampant in their harboring suspicion against each other. The fact that the Russian Government desired to have her colonel of the squadron at Taku take the chief commandship of the allied marines and squadrons and send four thousand men to protect not only the Russian legations and Russian subjects, but also the foreign legations and foreigners as well, prompted strong opposition from the English and the German Governments.⁴⁰ This action caused the German Emperor to send his Marine Infantry and "Fürst Bismarck" or "Prince Bismarck" to China at once,⁴¹ while the British Admiral, Seymour, was elected commander of the combined forces (marine infantries) and the Russian colonel as his chief-of-staff by the council of the naval commanders of the foreign squadrons at Taku.⁴² On June 17 the allied naval forces attacked and seized the Taku forts, but the next day the imperial troops acting in coöperation with the Boxers returned the attack making the foreign detachments retreat to the settlements at Tientsin.⁴³

After renewing their strength, the Seymour expedition of the allied forces reached half-way to Peking, while the four members of the *Tsungli Yamen* called upon several legations pleading with them not to send more than one thousand and two hundred men to Peking for fear of further trouble.⁴⁴ But the foreign ministers turned a deaf ear to their plea. So the result was that the telegraph lines between Peking and Tientsin were cut just "a few hours after the first detachment of the relief force left Tientsin." Events moved so rapidly that the British "Summer Legation" on the Western

³⁹ Steiger, cited above, p. 210; U. S. Foreign Relations, 1900, pp. 142-3: Telegram between Minister Conger from Peking and Secretary Hay in Washington; British State Papers, 1900, Vol. XCIV, p. 1086.

⁴⁰ Die Grosse Politik, Vol. XVI, pp. 9-12, Nos. 4519, 4521-4: Deciphered telegrams from German diplomatic representatives in St. Petersburg, von Tschirschky, Count von Hatsfeldt in London, and Count Baotao von Wedel to Bülow the Foreign Minister and from the latter to the Ex-Kaiser.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 12, No. 4524: Bülow's telegram dated June 18 to William II.

⁴² Steiger, cited above, p. 216; U. S. Foreign Relations, 1900, p. 143.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, pp. 217-8.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 219-20.

Hills was burned by the Boxers on June 10. The next day, the Chancellor of the Japanese legation, Mr. Sugiyama, was killed at the gate of the city, while on his way to the railway station to meet the expected reinforcements; and on the thirteenth the first Boxer bands appeared within the walls of the capital. Thus beginning the conflicts of the *I Ho Tuan* members and the armed legation guards.

That very afternoon the German and Italian guards, instead of defending or watching the legations (which were not attacked), raided a near-by temple capturing a few weapons, while the next evening German marines on the city wall near their legation opened fire on a Boxer mass meeting which was being held in the 'Chinese' southern city.⁴⁵

Again on June 17 several Chinese soldiers were killed by a "small German outpost," which incident was regretted by both the American and the British ministers as "these exhibitions of skill and courage on the part of the foreign troops are good object lessons."⁴⁶ The allied forces on June 17 took possession of the Taku forts after fighting with the Chinese soldiers. In return, the imperial troops bombarded the foreign settlements at Tientsin in the afternoon, thus beginning a stage of real war without formal declaration.⁴⁷

The murder of the German Minister, Baron von Ketteler, on June 20, 1900, by a Manchu soldier in Peking during the crisis did not come as a surprise either to the governments in Europe or to the people in North China, after his unnecessary expressions and the conduct which he had shown a few months before, and after the brutal actions of the German officials in Shantung at the beginning of the Boxer Rising. The most important reason for this unfortunate incident, was the application of force by Germany in the seizure of Kiaochow after the murder of two German Catholic priests in November, 1897, (for detail see Chapter II: The Lease of Kiaochow). Another cause was the constant interference by the

⁴⁵ Steiger, cited above, pp. 219-21.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 222; U. S. Foreign Relations, 1900, p. 151, No. 393.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 222-6: The allied forces first gave an ultimatum to the Chinese officials at the forts on June 16, limiting them within twenty-four hours to evacuate, but when the Chinese did fire at the foreign warships at 1 P.M., an hour before the expiration of the time limited by the ultimatum.

German Catholic priests in the local jurisdiction in Shantung and in other parts of the Chinese Empire without any treaty provision on behalf of their Chinese converts, (see Chapter II for detail). A third was the confiscation of land from the Chinese inhabitants by the German officials in Kiaochow without sufficient compensation, (see Chapter III: The Administration of Kiaochow by Germany) after the occupation of Kiaochow in the years of 1897-98. The brutal acts of the German officials in Shantung outside the leased area during the beginning of the Boxer Trouble before 1900, was another contributing factor.⁴⁸ Next the unwarranted expressions predicting the immediate partition of China by the Powers, uttered by Baron von Ketteler in the meetings of the diplomatic representatives in Peking during the May crisis of 1900 was one of the immediate causes;⁴⁹ in that it did not only arouse international jealousies but also intensified the hatred of the Chinese against him and Germany.⁵⁰ The fact that the German marines instead of guarding or defending the German legation, successively attacked and killed the Boxers and the Chinese soldiers alike before the time of the siege of Peking was yet another cause.⁵¹ Finally Baron von Ketteler's beating and imprisonment of the Boxers in his legation without cause or any treaty right whatsoever five days before his death was the direct cause;⁵² which with all the others paved the way for Baron von Ketteler's death. On June 20, 1900, at 8 A.M., a special meeting of the diplomatic representatives was held, since no reply had been given by the *Tsungli Yamen* to the request of June 19, of the ministers for an interview with Princes Ching and Tuan. In this meeting all the ministers reached the decision that it would be useless to proceed to the *Yamen* since it was likely that there would be no one to receive them.⁵³

⁴⁸ Morse, cited above, *The International Relations of the Chinese Empire*, Vol. III, pp. 174-5, quoted on page 5.

⁴⁹ Krasny Archiv, Vol. XIV, quoted by Steiger, p. 198; *Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. XVI, Nos. 4512-4: Bülow's telegrams dated May 31, June 5, reprimanding the German Minister for exceeding the instructions given to him by the home government and Ketteler's telegram dated June 2, explaining his remarks to Bülow, the Foreign Minister.

⁵⁰ Morse, cited above, Vol. III, p. 224.

⁵¹ Steiger, cited above, p. 222.

⁵² Smith, cited above, Vol. I, pp. 236-56; Frederick Brown: *China's Day-spring after Thirty Years*, p. 86.

⁵³ Steiger, cited above, p. 231; Morse, cited above, Vol. III, p. 222

In spite of all the protests and apprehensions of the other ministers urging him not to go, Baron von Ketteler informed them "that he had given notice of an individual visit" during which he intended to warn the members of the *Tsungli Yamen* of the possible grave consequences of asking the ministers of eleven nations to leave the capital and the possibility that it would mean the end of the Manchu Dynasty.⁵⁴ At the morning meeting, his colleagues one and all protested, pointing out the danger to himself, but he brushed aside all arguments, and started for the *Yamen*, accompanied only by his interpreter Herr Cordes and a ceremonial escort of unarmed Chinese. About a quarter of an hour later when the sedan chairs carrying the German Minister and Herr Cordes were on the way to the *Yamen*, a Chinese (Manchu) soldier following the movements of the envoy's chair fired his rifle killing Baron von Ketteler instantly as Herr Cordes shouted a warning. The chairs were at once dropped by the terrified bearers, and Herr Cordes, wounded in the thighs, affected his escape to the Methodist mission.⁵⁵

The fact that thrice was the report made about the death of the German Minister even before June 20, 1900 (the day on which Baron Ketteler was murdered in Peking), merits our attention. Morse says in "The International Relations of the Chinese Empire":

One curious and quite unexplainable incident was connected with this murder. On June 14, six days before it occurred, a report was current in Tientsin, emanating from Peking, that a foreign envoy had been killed; and on the 17 Sheng Hsuan-hwai, the head of the telegraph administration, received at Chefoo a telegram from London, 'It is rumored here that the German Envoy has been murdered.' The London evening papers of June 16 contained telegrams of the Laffan news

⁵⁴ Morse, cited above, Vol. III, pp. 222-3; Smith, cited above, Vol. I, p. 254, Smith said: "His determination to have an interview with the *Tsungli Yamen* quite independently of his colleagues was a characteristic trait and was due to the conviction that he had a message to the *Yamen* of an important nature, although not by any means new."

⁵⁵ Morse: Vol. III, p. 223.

agency from Tientsin saying that 'the German Minister in Peking has been murdered.'⁵⁶

So this unfortunate incident was even predicted by many in China as well as England through the newspapers.

The *Tsungli Yamen* due either to its ignorance of the fact of the death of the German Minister or due to its attempt to evade the responsibility of killing a diplomatic representative by a Chinese, on that very afternoon sent a dispatch to the German legation informing them that two Germans proceeding that route had fired upon the crowd and had been fired upon in return, one of them being killed and they demanded to know the names.⁵⁷ On the other hand the other legations each received from the *Yamen* a note which replied that it would not be safe for the diplomatic representatives to have an interview with the *Yamen* as was requested and which extended the twenty-four hour time limit for the foreign ministers to leave Peking. At 4 P.M., the expiration of the time limit, the Chinese troops fired upon the legations. Thus began the siege from June 20 to August 14 in Peking.

Upon receiving the news of the murder of Freiherr von Ketteler, the German Government on the same day asked its diplomatic representatives in Chefoo, London, Tokyo, Shanghai and St. Petersburg to ascertain the validity of the news. But

⁵⁶ Morse, cited above, Vol. III, p. 224; *Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. XVI, No. 4525, pp. 12-3: Emperor William II's deciphered telegram to Prince von Bülow, then Secretary of the Foreign Office, dated June 18, 1900. The Ex-Kaiser informed the Secretary that he received reports from the German Consul in Chefoo regarding the destruction of the legations and the murder of the German Minister, Freiherr von Ketteler, from the Japanese, dated June 16. The Emperor was so outraged that he ordered immediate mobilization of the marine infantry together with the addition of the Prussian Infantry Division to China for exacting vengeance.

⁵⁷ XX, XXI, XXII, and XXIII Jahresbericht des Wurtembergischen Vereins für Handelsgeographie und Förderung deutscher Interessen im Ausland. It stated that on the same morning the Chinese sent a note to the German legation saying that a German had entered the Chinese section without permission and therefore he was killed there and asking that such things should not happen again; Smith, cited above, Vol. I, p. 256; *Memoirs of Li Hung-chang*, Vol. XXII (in Chinese), pp. 32-4, Li Hung-chang telegraphed to the Chinese Minister in Berlin, asking him to inform the German public that the mob killed Baron von Ketteler.

it was of no avail.⁵⁸ It was not until June 29 when the Chinese Government issued an Imperial decree stating that "the legations continue to receive the protection of the Chinese Government," but they admitted the murder of the German Minister at Peking, at the same time attributing all the trouble that had arisen to the attack on the forts at Taku.⁵⁹ Again on July 17, an Imperial decree was issued promising for the speedy arrest and punishment of the murderers by the Chinese Government.⁶⁰

Deep regret was expressed to the German Emperor by the Chinese Emperor in regard to the death of Baron von Ketteler through the Chinese Minister in Berlin on July 21, who asked William II to resume friendly relations with China again, attributing the "unexpected murder"⁶¹ to the conflict between the Chinese population and the Chinese converts. On the other hand as an act of retaliation, the Chinese Minister in Berlin was refused admission since July, 1900, for several months by the German Foreign Office when he went to call on the Secretary to explain or deliver any messages to the German Government.⁶² Many times the Chinese legation and the Chinese Minister were threatened with attacks by the mob or populace in Berlin, so that he dared not go out of the legation until the mob fury was quieted down by the aid of the German police whose help was ordered by the German Foreign Office, upon the request of the Chinese Minister.⁶³

⁵⁸ Smith, cited above, Vol. I, p. 257.

⁵⁹ Parliamentary Papers, 1901, Vol. XCI, China No. 1 (1901), No. 33, p. 13.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 22, 27, Nos. 60, 67; U. S. Foreign Relations, 1900, pp. 280-1.

⁶¹ Parliamentary Papers, 1901, inclosure in No. 78, Note verbal, translation of the telegram sent by the Chinese Emperor, p. 31; The Memoirs of Minister Liu Hai-kwan, Vol. II, pp. 8-12: These pages (these volumes are in Chinese) contain telegrams from Li Hung-chang, Governor Liu (of Shanghai) and Viceroy Chang Tze-tung to Minister Liu asking him to express regret for them and to inform the German Government that they would protect all foreigners along the Yangtze district and Shanghai.

⁶² Parliamentary Papers, 1901, p. 31, No. 78 and inclosures; British State Paper, 1901, pp. 1154-6; Die Grosse Politik, Vol. XVI, No. 4581: Bülow's note dated July 21, 1900, recording his refusal to deliver the telegram of the Chinese Emperor to William II, in which he asked the German Emperor to help him suppress the Boxer Rising and establishing peace in China; Memoirs of Minister Liu, Vol. I, pp. 11, 12, 19, 21; Vol. II, p. 13.

⁶³ Memoirs of Minister Liu, Vol. I, Preface III, p. 1, 2, 8, 9: The Chinese Minister was not attacked by the mob, but his assistant secretary was stoned by a child

Soon the Manchu bannerman, a soldier, En Hai, who killed the German Minister, Baron von Ketteler, was arrested by Japanese soldiers who turned him over to the Chinese magistrate. During trial, En Hai confessed that he had murdered the German Minister out of loyalty to his commanding officer, who ordered him to kill every foreigner he saw, as well as to satisfy his feeling of patriotism. On the following day he was decapitated by the Germans at the spot where Baron Ketteler was killed.⁶⁴

The story of the relief of the legations by the allied troops revealed much about the international jealousy and rivalry among the participating Powers. Taking advantage of the bitter rivalry, chiefly between Russia and Great Britain, Germany tried to assume the leadership in the Boxer expedition.⁶⁵ Upon receiving the rumor of the news of the death of the German Minister, on June 18, 1900 (two days before the murder of the German Minister), the German Emperor in opposing either Russia or Japan or any other one European Power's sending their troops to China alone, ordered the mobilization of the marine infantry and the Prussian infantry division to go to China at once. The very next day William II telegraphed his Secretary of Foreign Office to call an urgent meeting of the ambassadors in Berlin, saying:

We must prepare at once for an extensive common military action. Call immediately a meeting of the ambassadors and make them ask their governments for instructions concerning this proposal. Peking must be given a regular attack and must be leveled to the ground. I shall perhaps put the commander-in-chief at my disposal, for the entire action must be guided energetically. We must never let either Russia or Japan control this affair alone and kick out Europe. My own troops will avenge for the murder of the German Minister. England might take the command on the ocean. The marine infantry must leave immediately. This is the fight of Asia (meaning China) against all Europe!⁶⁶

⁶⁴ J. O. P. Bland and E. Backhouse: *China under the Empress Dowager*, pp. 305-6; *The History of the Ch'ing Dynasty* (in Chinese published by the Chinese Government), Vol. XXIII, pp. 13-4.

⁶⁵ *Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. XVI, Nos. 4518-24.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, Nos. 4525-7: Quotation taken from the last, dated June 19, 1900, Emperor William II's telegram to Prince von Bülow, deciphered.

Agreeing in principle, Prince von Bülow twice asked the Emperor to wait until the conflict or rivalry between the Anglo-Japanese and the Russo-French groups should be matured enough so that:

The chief commandship for the European forces could be transferred to neutral Germany. It would be advantageous for our prestige if we should in the end obtain it. But we must by no means push ourselves to the front now.⁶⁷

As a result of the bitter rivalry between Russia on the one hand and Japan and Great Britain during the first week of July, 1900, the Russian Minister of War, Kuropatkin, even expressed great regret that Prince Heinrich of Prussia (Emperor William II's brother) who would be best suited to take over the position of commander-in-chief in the expedition was not in China then, since the Russian Government was unwilling to place the Russian troops under the commandship of either Great Britain, or Japan or the United States of America.⁶⁸ Immediately after an attack of the Japanese and English troops against the Russian force in Tientsin, the German Government was asked by the Japanese Government to send a German General to China to assume the command over the forces there.⁶⁹ However Great Britain was of the opinion that she would rather send her troops to relieve the legations under the

⁶⁷ Die Grosse Politik, Vol. XVI, No. 4528: Bülow's telegram to the Emperor, dated June 19, 1900; No. 4529: Bülow's telegram to the Foreign Office, dated June 22, 1900, in which he informed that William II has urged the sending of an army division to China, but Bülow advised the Emperor to wait for a chance until the conflict or rivalry between the Anglo-Japanese and Russo-French became so acute or matured etc., see above quoted.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, Nos. 4548, 4580: Telegram of Richthofen, the Acting Secretary of the Foreign Office, to Bülow, the Secretary, dated July 4, 1900, in which Richthofen reported on the contents of the telegram from the German Chargé d'Affaires in St. Petersburg regarding Russia's unwillingness, etc.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, No. 4558: Emperor William's telegram to Bülow, dated July 8, 1900, "The report from Tientsin on the fight of the English and Japanese troops against the Russian forces, which would render a necessary attack against a hostile (meaning Chinese) battery impossible, is the most stupid manifestation of this policy of individual interests which has ever occurred in the history of wars." No. 4561: Telegram of the German Chargé d'Affaires in Tokyo, Count B. von Wedel to the Foreign Office, which arrived in Berlin July 9, 1900, Wedel reported that the Japanese Foreign Minister, Viscount Aoki, asked him to communicate to the German Government confidentially that the Japanese Government opposed to place its troops under the commandship of the Russian Admiral, Alexeyew, and hoped that Germany would send a General to command the Japanese troops and officers.

commandership of her own general and it would be advisable for the Powers to dispatch their troops to Peking in individual groups.⁷⁰

On July 18, 1900, the Russian Government after hinting to the other Powers that she would prevent the temporary occupation of Chili (in which Peking lies) Province by the troops of the Powers, since she claimed Chili as a part of her sphere of interest, submitted a written proposal to the Powers asking them to enter into an agreement concerning the chief or supreme commandership upon the basis of either the seniority in service or the strength of the troops or forces.⁷¹ Following on the heels of Russia, Germany on July 20, 1900, through her ambassador, Graf (Count) von Hatzfeldt in London made a suggestion to the ministers of the English Cabinet asking the English Government to transfer the command to Germany.⁷² At the same time, the Secretary of the German Foreign

⁷⁰ The dispatch of the German Ambassador, Radolin, in St. Petersburg to Prince von Hohenlohe, the Chancellor, dated July 12, 1900, in which he reported on the conversation he had with the French Ambassador, Count Montebello, on the attitude of the English Government regarding the questions of expedition and of chief commandership.

⁷¹ Die Grosse Politik, Vol. XVI, No. 4574: Telegram of the Acting Assistant Secretary of the Foreign Office, Gesandter von Derenthall to Count von Hatzfeldt, the German Ambassador in London, dated July 18, 1900, informing him that the Russian Ambassador and Ministers submitted a written report to the Powers asking them to come to an agreement concerning the chief commandership of the allied forces; No. 4575: Telegram of Derenthall to Hatzfeldt, July 18, 1900. Also in the telegram of Count von Bülow to William II of the same date, Bülow stated that he received a report in code (Zifferbericht) from the German Ambassador in St. Petersburg, Prince von Radolin that Russia considering Chili as within her sphere of interest would prevent the temporary occupation of Chili (including Peking) by the troops of the other Powers.

⁷² Die Grosse Politik, Vol. XVI, No. 4578: Deciphered telegram of Count von Hatzfeldt to the Foreign Office, dated July 20, 1900, reporting that he was exerting much influence on the prominent ministers of the English Cabinet to make them suggest the transfer of the chief commandership to Germany. Also No. 4579: Deciphered telegram of Hatzfeldt to the Foreign Office, of the same date (July 18, 1900) Hatzfeldt said: "You see, Lord Salisbury wishes to think over the matter, before he makes a definite suggestion. As far as I know, Balfour and Chaplin are in our favor during the meeting of the cabinet (Ministerrat). Since I am not able to intervene directly with Lord Salisbury, I beg to be given a few more days. Monday, Lascelles will return . . . and I shall send him into the front line. Nothing will be lost, as we (meaning himself) have initiated this matter in three different ways." Again on July 21, 1900 (just the next day), Hatzfeldt in his telegram to the Foreign Office

Office, Count von Bülow very tactfully hinted to the ambassadors of the other nations in Berlin that:

The German Emperor would consider it his duty to accept such a task, should he be asked by all the participating Powers, but he would not aim to obtain such a commission. Regarding our tested confidential relationship to the Vienna Cabinet and my personal friendship with Count Goluchowsky I should like to mention the fact that I am very anxious that Russia, France, Great Britain and the United States of America should suggest for the chief commandership.⁷³

In response to this subtle hint of the German Government, the English Government gave an evasive reply on July 31, 1900, saying that:

(No. 4583) said: "I have been assured from good sources that Lord Salisbury also agrees with the transfer of the chief commandership to Germany in principle, but before he can make the suggestion, he must wait for the reply from the English Embassy in St. Petersburg, which has been instructed to ask Count Lamsdorff to explain the Russian circular on the question of chief commandership (see 72 footnote). The text of the English return question is in the English Blue Book. China No. 1, 1901, Hatzfeldt. No. 4584: The Ambassador in London, Count Hatzfeldt to the Foreign Office. Telegram, deciphered, private, for Baron von Holstein. London, July 21, 1900. In connection with telegram No. 439, (f.n. see No. 4583), it is obvious, from remarks made by Mr. Barrington, the private secretary of Lord Salisbury, that the latter is interested to know whether Berlin would be willing to assume supreme command. It seems to me that it would now be advisable to be somewhat more frank in the matter. I should, therefore, if the secretary of state agrees to it, inform Barrington that I could, of course, not guarantee the acceptance, but that I, personally, do not doubt that His Majesty would not refuse the task put to it by Europe, should England make the suggestion and the other Powers accept it. I beg for detailed reply, whether the secretary is satisfied with this. (f.n. Bülow telegraphed his complete approval (No. 241) on July 22.) Hatzfeldt. No. 4588: Bülow's telegram to Hatzfeldt, July 25, 1900, p. 467.

⁷³ Die Grosse Politik, Vol. XVI, No. 4586: Secretary, Count von Bülow's telegram to Count von Puckler, the German Chargé d'Affaires in Vienna, dated July 22, 1900, in which he said: "I have been asked indirectly by all the ambassadors as to what attitude Germany is taking regarding the question of the chief commandership in the Chinese expeditionary force. These inconveniences could be avoided, if some less interested Powers should eliminate in advance the appointment of a republican candidate for the chief commandership. Will you please inform Count Szecsen (Chief of the division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Austria and Hungary) at once with absolute frankness?"

Since the news from China is improving and the question of a march upon Peking is no longer as urgent, it would not take place just then and the commanders-in-chief might come to an agreement in China then.⁷⁴

Nor did Russia agree to Germany's proposal, as she wanted her own general to be the chief commander of the allied forces.⁷⁵ Being so impatient in receiving negative replies from both England and Russia, William II taking advantage over the weakness of the Russian Czar, Nicholas II, telegraphed the latter on August 5, 1900, saying:

According to your and my military experts an advance on Peking is impossible before the end of the rainy season, i.e. the beginning of September. The main necessity to assure absolute success is that there be a commander-in-chief for the combined forces. The only strong troops, which are really worth speaking of, will be the Russian, German and the Japanese. Is it your special wish that a Russian should be the commander-in-chief? Or would you eventually like any of my generals? In the latter case I place Field-Marshal, Count, von Waldersee at your disposal.⁷⁶

To this imposing request of the Kaiser, the Russian Czar replied:

After having thought much about your proposition, concerning the question of the commander-in-chief, I am happy to tell you that I fully agree to the nomination of Field-Marshal, Count von Waldersee to that post. I know him well; he is certainly one of your most able and experienced generals,

⁷⁴ Die Grosse Politik, Vol. XVI, No. 4592: The Acting Assistant Secretary, Derenthall's telegram to Bülow, July 29, 1900, stated that: "The imperial ambassador (Hatzfeldt) in London telegraphed: 'I Have learned from reliable source that the local military circles wish to petition the government to demand the chief commandership for England. Lord Wolsey (The English Minister of War) has been especially active in this direction. He himself would like to take the chief commandership. However, it is most likely that personal as well as political considerations will make the choice of Wolsey by the cabinet impossible.'" Also see No. 4596: Hatzfeldt's telegram to the Foreign Office, July 31, 1900.

⁷⁵ See footnote 72; Die Grosse Politik, Vol. XVI, No. 4601: Bülow's telegram to William II, dated August 5, 1900, reporting that the Russian Minister of War, General Kuropatkin, wished to be the chief commander of the allied forces to China.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, No. 4601: Bülow's telegram to William II, dated August 5, 1900. The Kaiser's telegram to the Russian Czar was included in the footnote under the final remark of the Emperor. Also see No. 4578 and footnote.

whose name stands high in the Russian army. With full confidence I place my troops in Pechili under his command.⁷⁷

This unwilling or compelled approval of the Russian Czar suggested the notion that the Russian Government preferred that Germany rather than England should have the chief commandship, if she could not have it herself.

Having succeeded in getting Russia's approval, the Kaiser on the next day (August 6, 1900) ordered Count von Bülow by telegram en clair "to inform the other Powers at once and to secure replies as quickly as possible."⁷⁸ To this request, Japan on August 9, two days later was the first to give her consent,⁷⁹ while England unwillingly approved with the condition that:

If the Powers who have the forces in Pechili should decide to place these forces under the chief command of the Field-Marshal, Her Majesty's Government will gladly concur in this policy and will give instructions to its commanders. It will be necessary that instructions which go more into the details should be drawn up if the project goes forward.⁸⁰

⁷⁷ Die Grosse Politik, Vol. XVI, No. 4602: William II's telegram en clair to Bülow, dated August 6, 1900, including the answer of the Russian Czar; No. 4603: The Acting Assistant Secretary, Derenthall's telegram to Bülow, Aug. 8, 1900. In spite of the Czar's consent the Russian Minister of War still opposed the appointment of Waldersee very bitterly. See also No. 4605.

⁷⁸ *Ibid*, No. 4602: William II's telegram en clair to Bülow, dated August 6, 1900, which contained the answer from the Czar to the Kaiser, quoted in footnote 77; British State Papers, 1901, Vol. XCIV, pp. 1182, 1183, 1195; British Parliamentary Papers, Vol. XCI, 1901, p. 60, No. 128.

⁷⁹ *Ibid*, No. 4602: Kaiser's telegram en clair to Bülow, dated August 6, 1900, in which he included the Czar's reply of an approval for his suggestion to appoint Count von Waldersee as the Commander-in-Chief of the allied forces. He further considered Japan, France and the United States as already in favour of his proposal. But the formal consent of the appointment from Japan was sent to Germany on August 9, 1900. British Parliamentary Papers, 1901, Vol. XIX, pp. 67, Nos. 146-9.

⁸⁰ British Parliamentary Papers, 1901, Vol. XCI, p. 66, No. 143; *Ibid*, p. 76, No. 181: Austria-Hungary, and America consented on August 12, 1900; British State Papers, 1900-1, Vol. XCIV, pp. 1188, 1196; Die Grosse Politik, Vol. XVI, No. 4607, dated August 10, 1900; British State Papers, 1900-1, Vol. XCIV, pp. 1189, 1191, 1209: France approved on August 14, 1900, being the last one.

Thus gradually Italy, America, Austria-Hungary and France all gave their consent.⁸¹

When the German Emperor received the approval from the last Power, France, the armed forces of America, England, France, Japan and Russia independently started the march to Peking on the evening of August 13; the Russian soldiers first started from Tungchow (a city between Tientsin and Peking), then the French troops followed suit, while the American, the British and the Japanese forces all rushed an attack upon the gates of Peking.⁸² The fact that the British troops entered the Tartar (Peking) city first,⁸³ showed that the governments of the different Powers had already instructed their respective generals in Tientsin to start first.⁸⁴ Again the fact that the German force numbering twelve thousand which reached Peking late on August 23, could and did not participate in the relief, merits our attention.⁸⁵

The next day after the relief of the legations by the forces of the five Powers: America, England, France, Italy and Russia, Earl Li Hung-chang, who was appointed the Chinese Plenipotentiary on July 13 by the Empress Dowager to negotiate peace with the representatives of the Powers in Peking, telegraphed to the governments of America, England, France, Germany, Italy and Russia, asking them to stop hostilities at Tungchow and not to enter Peking so as to avoid the unnecessary shedding of blood of the innocent,

⁸¹ British Parliamentary Papers, 1900-1, Vol. XIX, p. 70, No. 158: Italy gave her consent, on August 10, 1900. *Ibid.*, p. 76, No. 181: Austria-Hungary and America consented on August 12, 1900; British State Papers, 1900-1, Vol. XCIV, pp. 1189, 1191, 1209: France approved on August 14, 1900.

⁸² Baron Binder Kreigstein: *Die Kämpfe des Deutschen Expeditions-Korps in China und ihre militärischen Lehren*, 1902, pp. 1-5.

⁸³ British State Papers, 1900-1, Vol. XCIV, p. 1212; Morse, cited above, Vol. III, pp. 275-7.

⁸⁴ British State Papers, 1900-1, Vol. XCIV, pp. 1193, 1212, 1217, 1218: Russia refused to listen to Germany's request for starting in September; *Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. XVI, No. 4598: Bülow's telegram (deciphered) to the Foreign Office, dated August 3, 1900, informing that the German Chargé d'Affaires in Paris reported that the generals of the Powers had set August 15 as the date for the march of Peking by the allied forces.

⁸⁵ Morse, cited above, Vol. III, p. 286; *Deutsche Marine- und Kolonialgeschichte im Rahmen einer Geschichte der Seefahrt und des Seekrieges*, 1903, pp. 235-6. On August 14 when the troops of the five Powers stormed Peking, four hundred German, Austrian, Italian soldiers remained in Tientsin; *Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. XVI, No. 4598: The German Emperor, on August 3, ordered the dispatch of squadron and troops to Taku to join the march upon Peking with the allied forces.

terrifying the Emperor and the Empress Dowager, causing irreparable damages to the Manchu Dynasty and hurting the feeling of the 400,000,000 Chinese.⁸⁶ Again on August 19, Li Hung-chang requested America, England, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and Russia to appoint a plenipotentiary to negotiate peace in Peking with him.⁸⁷

To this request Germany gave an absolute negative reply, while on the other hand, she persuaded the other Powers, with the exception of Russia and the United States of America to help her in her attempt to capture Li Hung-chang either in Tientsin or on his way to Peking.⁸⁸ Thus the Kaiser ordered:

We must simply attempt by all means to capture Li Hung-chang as soon as he leaves Shanghai and to secure him as a valuable hostage for ourselves. In the near future, the sword will decide, but not diplomacy.⁸⁹

To return to the story of the appointment of Field-Marshal, Count von Waldersee, it is necessary to state that the German Emperor as soon as he received the affirmative reply from the Russian Czar, on August 7, 1900, telegraphed to Count von Waldersee

⁸⁶ Die Grosse Politik, Vol. XVI, No. 4598: Bülow's telegram (deciphered) to the Foreign Office, dated August 3, 1900, in which he said that the commanding Admirals of the allies decided to attack Peking on August 15; British State Papers, 1900-01, Vol. XCIV, p. 1208: Li's telegram to Sir Chihchen Lofenglüh, when Li was in Shanghai, August 15, 1900; Li Hung-chang was appointed to the Chili Viceroyalty, July, 13, 1900. Li Hung-chang's Memoirs, pp. 239-41.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, No. 4613: Telegram (deciphered) of the Acting Secretary of the Foreign Office, Count von Derenthall to the Councillor in the Imperial Retinue, Count Metternich, August 21, 1900; No. 4614: The latter's telegram to the former of the same date as a reply in which he told Derenthall that Emperor William wished to capture Li Hung-chang, etc. See also British State Papers, 1900-01, Vol. XCIV, p. 1210.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, Nos. 4617-8: The Kaiser's telegram to Bülow, dated August 23, 1900, in which he said: "His Royal Highness (Prince of Wales) is in an excellent humor. England is ready to fight. They distrust Li Hung-chang and do not wish to negotiate with him. The Prince remarked that it would be very desirable to capture him. I confirmed him in this view. I said that you have already instructed your admirals to that effect. I hope he will be seized, and if the British will capture that dog, the Russians will not be able to negotiate."

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, No. 4615: The Emperor's telegram (deciphered) to the Foreign Office, August 21, 1900; No. 4614: Count von Metternich's telegram (deciphered) to the Foreign Office, August 21, 1900, on behalf of the Emperor in which he quoted what William said; State Papers, 1900-01, Vol. XCIV, pp. 1221-2; United States of America opposed the decision of the admirals in Tientsin to capture Li Hung-chang.

who was then residing at Neverstorff, appointing him as the Commander-in-Chief in China and summoning him to Wilhelmshohe at once to discuss the situation with him. Mention must be made that the German Emperor, William II, had already appointed Count von Waldersee to be the Field-Marshal at the beginning of May (three weeks before the actual outbreak of the Boxer Rising in Chili against foreigners, the first attack of the Boxers against the foreigners happened on May 28, at Fentai the railway station between Peking and Tientsin Line). In his diary, Count von Waldersee wrote on May 10, 1900, saying:

During the six days of my visit to Berlin I saw the Kaiser several times every day. My promotion to the rank of Field-Marshal, which he announced to me in extremely flattering words, is undoubtedly a great honor.

Again he wrote on July 29 (nine days after the murder of the German Minister in China):

Whether it would be a grateful task to undertake the Supreme Command is very questionable. It would, however, be extremely interesting, and it would be a fine culmination to my career were I to return home as Conqueror of the Chinese. I have made no move since I parted with the Kaiser. I am waiting quietly and leaving my fate in God's hands.⁹⁰

When Waldersee went to Wilhelmshohe the next day, the Emperor placed both the land and naval forces under him in the preparation for the expedition to China. Everything being complete in the course of preparation, Waldersee with his army and navy and staff went to Kassel on August 18 to bid farewell to the Emperor,⁹¹ who

⁹⁰ Alfred, Count von Waldersee: A Field-Marshal's Memoirs, translated into English by Frederick Whyte, p. 209; Waldersee's Diary on the Boxer Rising, translated into Chinese by K. G. Wang, pp. 6-7; Waldersee's Memoirs, pp. 204-5: The Kaiser announced to Waldersee his promotion to Field-Marshal on May 10, 1900. Even on July 29, 1900, Waldersee was patiently waiting for the approval of other Powers; *Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. XVI, No. 4529: Bülow's telegram to the Foreign Office expressing the desire that it would be advantageous for Germany to get the chief commandership for Germany's prestige, dated June 23, 1900, two days after the murder of Baron von Ketteler.

⁹¹ Louis Elking Longmans: *The German Emperor's Speeches* (being a selection from the speeches, edits, telegrams and letters of the Emperor William II, translated into English by Longmans.) 1904, pp. 315-6.

after conferring the baton to Waldersee (see note 91) delivered a brilliant speech saying:

I salute you at the moment of your departure from Fatherland and I congratulate you on having been chosen to take part in the campaign in China as the staff and under the guidance and leadership of our trusted Field-Marshal. Count von Waldersee . . . Dear Waldersee, I congratulate you on the fact that I am able to salute you to-day once more as Commander of the united troops of the civilized world. It is of great significance that your appointment had its origin in the suggestion and by the wish of His Majesty, the Emperor of all Russia, the mighty Monarch whose power is felt in far distant Asiatic countries. It is a great joy to me that upon the suggestion of His Majesty the whole civilized world without distinction spontaneously entrusted to your Excellency the command of their troops. That which was not granted to us that we should accomplish in peace, we may perhaps now win, while we have our weapons in hand.⁹²

Unfortunately the news of the capture of Peking together with the relief of the legations by the forces of the five Powers reached Wilhelmshohe in the afternoon of August 18. What a great disappointment it was to the Emperor! But after Waldersee's persuasion which reads:

After a little reflection, however, it was felt that much still remained to do, and I urged that the Expeditionary Force should be considerably strengthened, which was decided on. It was clear to me in advance that the German troops were the only ones on which I could absolutely rely, and that they would constitute my source of authority, while between the other contingents and me in my capacity as General in supreme command many difficulties might arise. It appeared to me a matter for rejoicing that the Imperial Court had fled. Had they been taken prisoners in Peking there would have been no trouble about making peace. I should have arrived too late and probably we should have been able to play no decisive part in the Peace negotiations.⁹³

⁹² Alfred, Count von Waldersee: *A Field-Marshal's Memoirs*, English translation by Frederick Whyte, p. 209; Waldersee's *Diary on the Boxer Rising* translated into Chinese by K. G. Wang, pp. 6-7.

⁹³ Frederick Whyte's translation: Alfred, Count von Waldersee: *A Field-Marshal's Memoirs*, pp. 209-10; Waldersee's *Diary*, (in Chinese translation) it says the news of the relief of Peking reached Wilhelmshohe on 18, afternoon. This book said that the news of the capture of Peking occurred on August 17, 1900.

the Emperor consented to the dispatch of the Expeditionary force to China again. Thus Waldersee sailed with his staff and marines on August 20, 1900, for China to assume his supreme command of the allied forces.⁹⁴

Before approaching the activities of Waldersee in China after his arrival, it is appropriate to ascertain the attitude and policy of Germany during the Boxer Expedition, of which attitude and policy the Kaiser was the sole author and director. Aside from coöperating with Russia for a time and then England for another,⁹⁵ Germany's policy during the expedition was to seize Chefoo, a Chinese harbor and naval base in Shantung, as well as the province of Shantung,⁹⁶ to expand her sphere of interest to the Yangtze River Valley,⁹⁷ to suggest the international control of the finance of China⁹⁸ and to demand a large amount of indemnity from China,

⁹⁴ U. S. Foreign Relations, 1900, p. 340; Parliamentary Papers, China No. 1, 1901, p. 108, No. 248; Memoirs of Minister Liu, Vol. I, pp. 16, 18; Waldersee's Diary on the Boxer Rising (translated from German into Chinese), p. 3, by K. G. Wang.

⁹⁵ Die Grosse Politik, Vol. XVI, for coöperation and non-coöperation with Russia, see Nos. 4551-3, 4565-7, 4570, 4572, 4601, 4623, 4649, 4727, 4789; for coöperation and non-coöperation with England, see Nos. 4595, 4631, 4651.

⁹⁶ Alfred, Count von Waldersee's Diary on the Boxer Rising (translated from German into Chinese), p. 8; Die Grosse Politik, Vol. XVI, Nos. 4546, dated July 3, 1900; Die Grosse Politik, Vol. XVI, No. 4546: On July 5, Admiral Bendmann reported that due to the insufficient number of forces, he was unable to march to seize Chefoo.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, No. 4546: Bülow's telegram (deciphered) to the Foreign Office, dated July 3, 1900, in which he informed the office that following the news of the murder of Baron von Ketteler, the German Government ordered on July 12 Admiral Bendmann, the German Chief of the East Asiatic Squadron stationed in Tsingtao to seize Chefoo, a harbor and a naval base in Shantung as well as all the Chinese ships in the Yangtze River, which was considered as the English sphere of interest. See also Nos. 4699-4805: All contain the negotiations between Germany and Great Britain which resulted in the Anglo-German Yangtze Treaty signed in October, 1900, in which both parties mutually recognize each other's right and promise each other to notify before one takes any serious action—annexation of the Yangtze Valley.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, No. 4778: Bülow's secret dispatch to the Emperor, dated January 17, 1901. Bülow, as well as Prince Henry, and other authorities in China objected to the seizure of Chefoo, since it was and still is a treaty port and any seizure on the part of Germany would antagonize the other Powers. So the Emperor in his telegrams to Waldersee, dated January 19, 1901, and February 2, informed Waldersee not to seize Chefoo for fear of antagonizing the other Powers—No. 4779; Waldersee's Diary on the Boxer Rising (translated from German into Chinese by K. G. Wang), pp. 81-9, 102, 130-1, 161-4; Waldersee planned to seize Chefoo and a part of Shantung in case negotiations

which would enable Germany to build her fleet.⁹⁹ Waldersee was allowed to read all the documents in the Foreign Office as well as from the private correspondence of the officials in the Foreign Office, the Ministry of War and the Naval Office.¹⁰⁰ Germany's attitude toward the expedition to China was well expressed by the Kaiser's speech to the parting marines of the first battalion. Thus the Emperor eloquently said:

Into the midst of profound peace the fire-brand of war has been hurled—not, alas! unexpected by me. A crime unheard of in its arrogance, horrible in its barbarity, has struck down my trusted representative, and taken him from us. The German flag has been insulted, and the German Empire defied. This calls for condign punishment and revenge. So I send you out to avenge this wrong, and I will never rest till the German flag, together with those of other Powers, floats victoriously above the Chinese standards and planted on the walls of Peking, dictates peace to the Chinese. Open the way for civilization once for all.¹⁰¹

As an act of retaliation and punishment the German Government advocated the prohibition of the sale of ammunitions to China by the nationals of the Powers.¹⁰² Again in order to compell the Chinese Emperor and Empress to yield to and accept the demands of the Powers, Germany proposed to prohibit the viceroys of the Yangtze from furnishing the Court, which fled to Sianfu, Shensi, with food, money and everything, in other words to starve the Court

broke off thus beginning the partition of China. *Ibid*, No. 4632: Telegram of the Acting Secretary of the Foreign Office to the German Minister in Peking Mumm von Schwarzenstein, dated September 5, 1900, in which Richthofen placed seven demands as the bases for negotiation. Among the seven was the proposal for the international control of the Chinese finances as a security for indemnity.

⁹⁹ Waldersee's Diary on the Boxer Rising (translated into Chinese by K. G. Wang), p. 8: Waldersee wrote that William II ordered him to demand the amount and indemnity as high as possible, since the Emperor needed it very badly for the building of the fleet. Also see p. 106.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid*, pp. 3-4; F. Whyte's translation A. C. v. Waldersee: A Field-Marshal's Memoirs, p. 208.

¹⁰¹ Louis Elkind: The German Emperor's Speeches, p. 313.

¹⁰² Die Grosse Politik, Vol. XVI, No. 4659: Telegram of the Secretary of the Foreign Office, Count von Bülow to the German Minister, Mumm von Schwarzenstein, dated October 21, 1900.

to death.¹⁰³ Such was the attitude of Germany toward China during the Boxer Expedition. (The next chapter will be the continuation of this chapter.)

¹⁰³ Die Grosse Politik, Vol. XVI, No. 4682: Bülow's telegram to Count von Hatzfeldt, German Ambassador in London, dated December 8, 1900; No. 4684: Telegram from the latter to the former, dated December 12, 1900, in which reported that England objected very strongly Germany's proposal to starve the Court in Sianfu and suspected Germany's desire to march to Sianfu from the Yangtze, thus intruding the English sphere of interest.

CHAPTER V

GERMANY'S PARTICIPATION IN THE BOXER EXPEDITION (*Continued*)

IN view of the grave consequences of the capture of the Taku Forts by the marines of the Powers, the Chinese Government appointed Li Hung-chang to negotiate for peace.¹ After the relief of the legations by the troops of America, England, France, Japan and Russia separately, Li Hung-chang three times in August 1900, asked the governments of the Powers to appoint representatives for opening negotiations with him.² To this request, the German Government gave a negative reply.³ On the other hand, Germany protested very strongly against the consent of the American and the Russian governments to negotiate with Li Hung-chang on the ground that their consent would endanger the coöperation of the Powers.⁴ Furthermore, the German Emperor planned to capture

¹ H. B. Morse: *The International Relations of the Chinese Empire*, Vol. III, pp. 229, 251; *Memoirs of Minister Liu Hai-kwan* (Liu Hai-kwan was the Chinese Minister in Berlin, Germany, during the Boxer trouble), all four volumes are written in Chinese, Vol. II, p. 2, Li Hung-chang's telegram, June 21, 1900, informing Liu that the Chinese General at Taku fired at the foreign warships without the order from the Chinese Government and asking Liu to explain this incident and request the German Government to stop further fightings against China, while Li was going to Peking to petition the Empress to suppress the Boxer Rising; *Memoirs of Li Hung-chang*, edited by William Francis Mannix (in English), pp. 238-9.

² *British State Papers*, 1900-01, Vol. XCIV, pp. 1210-1, 1208, 1246: On August 15, 19, 21, 1900, Li asked the Powers to appoint a plenipotentiary to negotiate peace with him, after the relief of the legations in Peking and the flight of the Court to Shensi.

³ *Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. XVI, No. 4613: The Kaiser refused to negotiate with Li Hung-chang on the ground that Li did not inspire his confidence, nor was he properly authorized to negotiate with. The Kaiser said: "In the near future, the sword will decide, but not diplomacy." China No. 1, 1901, Inclosures Nos. I and II in No. (document) 224; *Memoirs of Minister Liu Hai-kwan*, Vol. III, pp. 5-7: Conversation between Liu and the Acting Secretary of the German Foreign Office, von Richthofen, June 27, 1900 (this Vol. III contains all Liu's conversations with the officials of the German Foreign Office).

⁴ *Ibid.*, No. 4614.

Li Hung-chang as a valuable hostage⁵ and at the same time persuaded England not to accept his offer for the opening of negotiations.⁶

On August 26, 1900, the Russian Government proposed to Germany before the other Powers the removal of the legations and the troops of the Powers to Tientsin on the ground that such an action would facilitate the restoration of an orderly Chinese Government in Peking, so that negotiations between China and the Powers could be sooner carried out.⁷ Germany on September 1,

⁵ Die Grosse Politik, Vol. XVI, No. 4613-4: Telegram of Count von Metternich to the Foreign Office, August 21, 1900, informing the latter about the Kaiser's view; No. 4615: Telegram of the Kaiser to the Foreign Office, August 21, 1900 (deciphered): "We must attempt by all means to capture Li Hung-chang, as soon as he leaves Shanghai and to secure him as a valuable hostage." No. 4618: Telegram of the Kaiser to Count von Bülow, the Secretary of the Foreign Office, August 23, 1900, saying: "I hope he (Li Hung-chang) will be seized. If the British will capture that dog then the Russians will not be able to negotiate with him." No. 4635: The German Minister opposed very strongly and protested to the Russian Consul in Tientsin about Russia's promise to have a Russian warship to escort Li to Tientsin. The German Admiral, Bendeman, even planned three methods for capturing Li Hung-chang; namely, (1) if Li should travel under Chinese flag without escort or with escort, (2) if Li should travel with foreign escort, (3) if Li should travel under a foreign commercial flag. He commented that the first was the easiest way for him to capture Li, the third with a little force of arms, the second would be a warlike measure for him to seize Li against a foreign escort.

⁶ *Ibid.*, No. 4617: William II's telegram to the Foreign Office, August 22, 1900; No. 4618: William II's telegram to Bülow, the Secretary of the Foreign Office. Bülow was at this time in Norderney, August 23, 1900. During the visit of the English Prince of Wales and the English Ambassador, Sir Frank Lascelles in Wilhelmshöhe on August 22, the Kaiser tried to persuade them that the opening of the negotiation with Li Hung-chang at that time would be premature and detrimental to the interests of England and Germany. The Prince of Wales and the English Ambassador acknowledged that fact that England must refuse the proposal of Li Hung-chang to open negotiations. They stated: "England is ready to continue the fight. They have accepted Waldersee without reservation." Nos. 4619-20.

⁷ *Ibid.* Nos. 4621-6: From August 26-30, 1900, the Russian Government asked Germany to coöperate with her in her proposal for the removal of the legations and the evacuation of the allied troops from Peking to Tientsin. The fact that Russia considered Chili, in which Peking and Tientsin are situated, as under her sphere of interest showed that she was anxious to have the withdrawal of the allied troops, especially those of Germany to Tientsin since Waldersee, the German Field-Marshal and Supreme Commander of the allied troops had started from Germany on August 20 (six days after the relief of the legations by the troops of America, England, France, Japan and Russia individually) for China. Russia was afraid that Germany would intrude into her sphere of interest and she maintained that the legations of the Powers had been relieved and were safe then since August 14, 1900.

in her note to the Russian Ambassador in Berlin agreed to the removal of her legation to Tientsin with the condition that the other Powers would do the same, but she did not agree to the immediate evacuation of her troops from Peking on the ground that:

The Imperial Government considers itself to be unable to assume the responsibility of the consequences of a premature evacuation. These troops are therefore remaining in Peking unless military reasons make their departure absolutely necessary.⁸

The German Government on the other hand instructed her minister at Tientsin, on September 5, 1900, to make seven demands as the bases for future negotiations; namely, (1) the exemplary punishment of all guilty, especially the leaders and the agitators, belonging to the upper class as well as the confiscation of their properties, (2) indemnity, including money compensations to the wounded and those depending upon the dead, as well as payment of all the costs to the German Government, (3) the sending of a Chinese mission in the person of an imperial prince to Berlin for making apology on behalf of the Chinese Emperor, (4) corresponding atonement ceremony in Peking, (5) measures to be taken for an international control of the Chinese finances as security for indemnity, (6) occupation of several places in Shantung until the fulfilment of all the demands, (7) possible imposition of the obligations upon the Governor of Shantung prohibiting him from undertaking any action, such as the movement of the troops, the building of the fortifications, etc., without the approval of Germany. In addition the German Minister was asked to make some suggestions in regard to obtaining certain privileges for the German missionaries. Furthermore, he was ordered to discuss these demands with the German Consul, Knappe, in Shanghai, and the Legation Secretary, von Bülow, and to keep these demands with the strictest secrecy.⁹

⁸ Die Grosse Politik, Vol. XVI, No. 4628: Aide Memoire of Count von Bülow, the Secretary of the German Foreign Office, to the Russian Ambassador, Count von Ostensacken, September 1, 1900.

⁹ *Ibid.*, No. 4632: Telegram of the Acting Secretary of the Foreign Office, Richthofen to the Minister in Peking, Mumm von Schwarzenstein, who was then in Shanghai, September 5, 1900.

Notwithstanding the above instruction, Germany tried to prevent the opening of negotiations with China before the arrival of Waldersee in China as a counter move against Russia's second proposal¹⁰ to Germany for coöperation, by placing a demand for the surrender and the punishment of the ring-leaders such as Prince Tuan, Junglu and General Tung Fu-siang and others before the opening of negotiations. Count von Bülow, the Secretary of the Foreign Office, said:

By the murder of our minister, China has injured us more than any other Power before international law. This special injury of our dignity and honor entitles and obliges us to demand just atonement, which can be affected only by punishment of the guilty. We must make this punishment a *conditio sine qua non* for all further negotiations.⁷¹

On September 17, 1900, Count von Bülow sent to the German legations in London, Paris, Rome, St. Petersburg, Vienna, Tokyo and Washington the following communication:

The Government of His Majesty, the Emperor, considers it a necessary condition for the entering into diplomatic negotiations

¹⁰ Die Grosse Politik, Vol. XVI, Nos. 4634, 4639, 4640, 4642, 4644: From September 7-16, 1900, the Russian Government made a second attempt to persuade Germany to remove her legation and troops from Peking to Tientsin on the ground that it would make possible the return of the Chinese Court to Peking, and the early settlement of the Boxer trouble. In the latter part of September, Russia even made a compromise for agreeing to the retaining of the allied troops in Peking, but asked Germany to consent to open negotiations with China. At the same time the Russian Foreign Minister, Count von Lamsdorff, assured the German Ambassador in St. Petersburg that "he will be glad to welcome Waldersee's arrival in China," which assurance was criticized by the Kaiser in his final remark on the telegram; No. 4642: Dispatch of the German Ambassador, Prince von Radolin, to the Chancellor, Prince von Hohenlohe, September 13, 1900: The Kaiser wrote: "Such stuff can be regarded only with a pitying smile! *Sancta simplicitas.*"

¹¹ *Ibid.*, No. 4636: Telegram of the Acting Secretary of the Foreign Office, Baron von Richthofen to Count von Bülow, the Secretary of the Foreign Office, who was then in Norderney, September 9, 1900. Richthofen reported to Bülow that the seizure or capture of Li Hung-chang by the German generals or admirals in Tientsin might create a serious conflict between Germany and the other Powers. Furthermore, public opinion favored the negotiation with Li Hung-chang. The Kaiser at that time stated that he opposed Li Hung-chang, only temporarily; No. 4623: Deciphered telegram of Secretary, Count von Bülow, to the Kaiser on September 15, 1900, in which he suggested the placing of a condition demanding the surrender and punishment of the guilty among the most important government officers of China.

with the Chinese Government, that such persons as have been ascertained as the first perpetrators of the crimes before the international law, committed in Peking, should be surrendered. Those whose guilt is notorious, must be surrendered and punished. The representatives in Peking will be able to give the names of the guilty. His Majesty's Government hopes it will find the approval of all the cabinets on this point, for indifference toward punishment would be the same as indifference toward the repetition of the crime. We are therefore suggesting to the various cabinets to ask their representatives in Peking to name those leading Chinese personalities, whose guilt is notorious.¹²

To this proposal, America, England, France, Japan and Russia gave a negative reply,¹³ while the other members of the Triple Alliance, Italy and Austria answered in the affirmative.¹⁴

Aiming at the delay of the opening of the negotiations with China by placing the above severe condition, the German Emperor on September 21, 1900, instructed Waldersee saying:

It will be your task to take the military steps necessary to break the Chinese resistance with the aid of the allied troops and to force from the Chinese the atonement which they owe us. You will therefore hasten your arrival at Taku as early as possible and begin the military measures there.¹⁵

¹² Die Grosse Politik, Vol. XVI, No. 4643: Ciphred telegram of Bülow to the Kaiser, September 15, 1900. In this telegram Bülow asked William's permission for sending the instructions to the German diplomatic representatives in England, America, France, Italy, Austria, Japan and Russia, as cited above. In addition to the above quotation (cited in the text) Bülow mentioned three advantages deriving from such a condition for the prevention of the opening of negotiations; namely, (1) Germany's gaining time, since China would not be willing to surrender such important officials, as Prince Tuan, etc., (2) the difficulty of the Powers for refusing Germany's request, (3) the German Government's getting the approval of the public in Germany. For the communications made by the German representatives to the Powers, China No. 1, 1901, Vol. XCI, p. 175, Document No. 364; U. S. Foreign Relations, 1900, pp. 202-3, 341-2.

¹³ China No. 1, 1901, Vol. XCI, p. 104, No. 167, pp. 85-6, No. 137, p. 199, No. 398, pp. 22, No. 35; U. S. Foreign Relations, 1900, p. 203; Die Grosse Politik, Vol. XVI, Nos. 4648-9, 4651.

¹⁴ Die Grosse Politik, Vol. XVI, No. 4649; China No. 1, 1901, Vol. XCI, p. 185, No. 380.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, No. 4650: Ciphred telegram of the Acting Secretary of the Foreign Office, Richthofen to Eulenburg, the Councillor in the Imperial Retinue, including Richthofen's draft of his telegram on behalf of the Emperor, William II to Waldersee, which was signed by the Emperor and sent to Waldersee. In this, Waldersee was also informed of the political situations or the diplomatic relations between Germany and the other Powers regarding their actions in China.

For the first time the Chinese Emperor, Kwang Hsu, at the end of September, 1900, sent a telegram through the Chinese Minister in Berlin to the German Emperor, regretting the unexpected death of the German Minister, Baron von Ketteler, informing him of the offered sacrifice for the deceased, apologizing for the unfortunate incident and asking him to open negotiations with China again.¹⁶ In reply on September 30, the Kaiser demanded emphatically the punishment of the guilty of the murder and the return of the Chinese Emperor to Peking. Furthermore, the Kaiser added, saying:

I, too, long for peace. But for peace which will atone for the guilt, which will make the restoration to the fullest extent and in every regard for the wrong done and which will afford complete security for all foreigners in China in respect of their lives and property, and above all, in free practice of their religion.¹⁷

Having started from Germany on August 20 with 30,000 soldiers, the Field-Marshal, Count von Waldersee, arrived at Shanghai, China, on September 25, where he was welcomed by the forces and marines of the Powers. Waldersee discussed the situations with the new German Minister, Mumm von Schwarzenstein and the German Consul, Herr Knappe in Shanghai and directed the German squadron of the ironclads to proceed to Taku.¹⁸ From Shanghai

¹⁶ Memoirs of Minister Liu Hai-kwan, Vol. III, pp. 13-6: On September 29, the Chinese Minister, Liu Hai-kwan, handed the telegram of the Chinese Emperor to Richthofen, the Acting Secretary of the Foreign Office, expressing regret and asking Germany to negotiate with China soon. In reply Richthofen declared that the German Government had three demands before entering into negotiations with China; namely, (1) punishment of the guilty or the leaders of the Boxer Rising, whose names would be given by the representatives of the Powers in Peking, (2) Germany's desire to know what kind of punishment China would give and (3) Germany's demand of China for an evidence for executing these demands. In addition, the German Government would not allow the Chinese Minister to telegraph in Chinese code and appear in social affairs among the official or diplomatic circles; China No. 5, 1901, Vol. XCI, p. 16, Document No. 24 and its inclosure; Die Grosse Politik, Vol. XVI, No. 4645: Ciphred telegram of Bülow to William II, September 5, 1900, footnote No. 3 to this telegram.

¹⁷ Die Grosse Politik, Vol. XVI, No. 4645; China No. 5, 1901, Vol. XVI, p. 16, Document No. 24 and its inclosure.

¹⁸ Alfred, Count von Waldersee: Memoirs on the Boxer Rising (Chinese), pp. 21-4, 27: Waldersee's report to the Kaiser, September 25, 1900, about his arrival at Shanghai where he was welcomed by the French, Japanese, Indian and German troops; Alfred, Count von Waldersee: A Field-Marshal's Memoirs (translated from German into English by Frederic Whyte), p. 215.

Waldersee sailed, reaching Taku on September 26 and landed, stationing his troops and marines in Tientsin the very next day.¹⁹

Ordered by the Emperor to inflict severe punishment upon the Chinese, the Field-Marshal planned the attack against Shanhaikwan, as soon as he reached Taku. On October 1, after the approach of the allied troops under the command of Waldersee, the Chinese troops retreated, thus allowing the allied forces to occupy it without the shedding of blood.²⁰

Having succeeded in capturing Shanhaikwan and another small fort Chingwangtao, near by, on the coast, the Field-Marshal, Waldersee, prepared for the attack against Paotingfu, the capital of the Chili Province, some distance from Peking. International rivalry played a very important rôle in this plan, as the Russian Minister, von Giers, warned Waldersee of the coming attack upon Paotingfu, for fear that the Court would flee further into the interior, which action would delay the opening of negotiations. The French General, Voyron, asked permission to join the attack, while Waldersee planned with the English General, Gaselee, to seize Paotingfu from two sides, Tientsin and Peking.²¹ Thus on October 12, the Franco-German expeditionary party started

¹⁹ Waldersee: *Memoirs on the Boxer Rising* (translated from German into Chinese by K. G. Wang), pp. 24-6.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 14-6: Telegram of the Kaiser to Waldersee, August 25, 1900, when Waldersee was on his way to China. The Kaiser informed him that he had refused China's request for opening negotiations and he had influenced the Prince of Wales and the English Ambassador, Sir Frank Lascelles, who visited the Kaiser in Berlin, to join Germany in this refusal. The Prince of Wales is the Kaiser's cousin; Waldersee: *A Field-Marshal's Memoirs*, (English), pp. 211-2; Waldersee: *Memoirs on the Boxer Rising* (Chinese), pp. 19-21: The Kaiser's telegram to Waldersee, dated September 21, 1900, which reached Waldersee the next day, while Waldersee was staying in Shanghai. The Kaiser in this telegram ordered Waldersee the use of force in suppressing the Boxer movement in China and compelling China to accept all the demands he made (the punishment of the ringleaders first before the opening of the negotiations), telling Waldersee to go to Taku at once and the German Minister to Tientsin for executing his military orders; *Ibid.*, pp. 22-32: Waldersee first ordered the German troops to occupy the fort Shanhaikwan first, but later the English force reached there first; E. Baron Binder Kriegestin: *Die Kämpfe des Deutschen Expeditionskorps in China und ihre militärischen Lehren*, pp. 1-15; British State Papers, 1901-2, Vol. XCV, pp. 1149-50: Besides the fort of Shanhaikwan, another fort, Chingwangtao was occupied by the German and the Russian troops at that time.

²¹ Waldersee: *Memoirs on the Boxer Rising* (Chinese), pp. 30-1, 39, 44; Waldersee: *A Field-Marshal's Memoirs*, (English), pp. 221-2.

from Peking, while the Anglo-German party set out from Tientsin. The result was that the French occupied Paotingfu on that very day without a battle, owing to the fact that the Chinese troops retreated and the civil officers welcomed them upon their arrival. However, the allied troops exhibited much brutality in slaughtering a great number of the civil officers. This slaughtering of the Chinese civil officers without cause and without China's permission caused Li Hung-chang to bring his written protest to the meeting of the diplomats in Peking. The American, Japanese and the Russian ministers did not express their opinion because their national troops did not participate in this expedition, while the English, French, Italian and German ministers furiously returned the note of protest to Li Hung-chang.²²

On October 17, 1900, Waldersee entered Peking where he was met by the allied troops. After that he stayed in the Winter Palace (the Emperor's Palace) which had been occupied by the Russian General and his troops.²³ Waldersee first made a thorough search for the hidden treasures of the Imperial Palaces; namely, the Summer Palace and the Winter Palace, as well as the Forbidden City, making an inspection with his army officers (Austrian and German) and the diplomatic corps.²⁴ Failing to find the 300,000,000 marks of gold (150,000,000 Chinese silver dollars) valued treasure, that the Imperial Court had hidden, he took the astronomical instruments from the Government Observatory, sending them directly to Germany, in spite of the violent protest of the American General, Chafee, who wrote:

I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that my Government would vehemently denounce any officer of its service, who might enter on spoliation of this sort and it will sincerely

²² Waldersee: *A Field-Marshal's Memoirs* (English), pp. 221-3; Waldersee: *Memoirs on the Boxer Rising* (Chinese), pp. 39, 44-5; *Deutsche-Marine und Kolonialgeschichte im Rahmen einer Geschichte der Seefahrt und des Seekrieges*, pp. 236-7; Morse, cited above, Vol. III, pp. 316-7; *British State Papers*, 1901-02, Vol. XCV, pp. 1190.

²³ Waldersee: *Memoirs on the Boxer Rising* (Chinese), pp. 48, 55-7.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 50-61: Waldersee's report on December 22, 1900, to the Kaiser concerning the looting of the allied troops. After the relief of the legations, three days were allowed for the public looting of the allied troops and generals. The English, French, Japanese and the Italian and the Russian troops and generals had their own method of looting, the American generals prohibited their forces from looting.

regret to learn that any nation with which it coöperated to relieve the besieged legation in Peking authorizes its troops to injure or remove any instruments or other part of the Observatory. As Commander of one of the four coöperating columns [the American, English, Japanese and the Russian forces relieved the legation on August 14, 1900] which relieved the legations on August 14, I make to you my respectful protest in this manner and shall inform my Government of the fact.²⁵

To return to the question of negotiations, it is necessary to mention the fact that the Chinese Minister, Liu Hai-kwan, in Berlin

²⁵ Waldersee: *Memoirs on the Boxer Rising* (Chinese), pp. 50-9: In reply to the American General, Chafee, Waldersee returned the note of protest, saying: "I am not in a position to receive such utterances and I beg, therefore, most humbly to place the enclosed communication again at the disposal of Your Excellency, with etc." Waldersee: *A Field-Marshal's Memoirs* (English), pp. 218, 224: This Forbidden City, encircled by high walls and situated in the heart of Peking, was the former residence of the Emperor and it was agreed by the diplomats and generals after the relief of Peking (August 14, 1900) not to station troops. But Waldersee on October 23, 1900, entered inspecting it for an hour and a half, with the diplomats, his German and Austrian officers and marine battalions; Waldersee: *Memoirs on the Boxer Rising*, pp. 59-60; Waldersee: *A Field-Marshal's Memoirs*, pp. 224-5: The Catholic Bishop, Favier told Waldersee that the Imperial Court or Family had hidden treasures of the value amounting to 300,000,000 marks. This estimate was based on the alleged fact that during the Sino-Japanese War, the Court sought to deposit this amount in the German Eastern Asiatic Bank (Deutsch-Asiatische Bank) and others; *Ibid*, pp. 235-8; Waldersee: *Memoirs on the Boxer Rising*, pp. 96-9: Waldersee said: "These astronomical instruments, a celestial globe of about two meters diameter, a sextant, etc., all of great size and made of bronze, were set up here by Father Verbiest of the Netherlands (Father Verbiest, a Jesuit, mathematician and astronomer, was really a Belgian, born near Courtrai, 1623, died at Peking 1688; see also the first chapter concerning the German Catholic missionaries in China in earlier times), at the end of the seventeenth century during the reign of the Emperor Kang Hsi. For more than two centuries they have stood out in the open air on the eastern city wall and have no value scientifically but immense value from an artist's point of view, as the conception and the execution of the monumental dragon forms supporting the instruments are of great perfection. It was stated on the French side that a portion of the instruments was constructed in France or came to China as a present from Louis XIV; but this could certainly apply to only one of them, for the other two were entirely different in shape and character." Waldersee took the Celestial Globe, sending it to Germany, while he allowed the French colonel, Marchana, to take eight other instruments for France; Mr. Bertrand Russell (footnote on English text, p. 236) made a striking comment on this incident in his: *The Problem of China*. He said: "Until 1900 two of the astronomical instruments constructed by Kublai were still to be seen in the Observatory, but the Germans removed them to Potsdam after the suppression of the Boxers. I understand they have been restored in accordance with one of the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. If so, this was probably the most important benefit which that treaty secured to the world."

had made many attempts to persuade the German Government to consent to the opening of the negotiation with China since the end of September, 1900. But all his attempts were of no avail, since the German Government turned a deaf ear to his pleadings, making all sorts of excuses.²⁶ Finally, sensing the danger of being isolated, the German Foreign Office, seeing that all the Powers recognized Li Hung-chang as the Chinese plenipotentiary, telegraphed to the Emperor for approval in taking a further step as an excuse and a condition for the delaying of the negotiation.²⁷ Thus Count von Bülow, the Secretary of the Foreign Office, in his telegram to the Kaiser on October 9, said:

According to the present situation, Li Hung-chang seems to be the only man who would be able to execute this task, since he has been recognized by the other Powers as the Chinese plenipotentiary. It is time for us to announce our willingness to examine the authorization of Li Hung-chang. Thus we should escape an isolation of Germany and avoid the reproach that we are the only ones who are guilty in the delay of the beginning of the negotiation. This would not contradict our past attitude, since we have already announced before with your permission, that we must reserve the right to ourselves to wait for the examination of the authorization before we decide upon the acceptance of the Chinese negotiator. It is necessary to consider whether the situation will be changed for the future or not, since at the present Prince Ching is the plenipotentiary, while Li Hung-chang accompanies him for the negotiation as a specialist. If you approve the above view, would it be logical for Waldersee to receive Li Hung-chang?²⁸

²⁶ Memoirs of Minister Liu, Vol. III, p. 13-8: Minister Liu recorded his conversation with the Acting Secretary of the Foreign Office, Richthofen, during several visits he paid to the latter in asking the German Government to open the negotiations with China. Germany first placed three demands before the opening of the negotiation (see footnote No. 16, p. 5). The second time demanded the return of the Court as a prerequisite before the opening of the negotiations.

²⁷ Die Grosse Politik, Vol. XVI: Bülow's (Secretary of the Foreign Office) telegram to Mumm von Schwarzenstein, October 21, 1900, in which Bülow informed the latter, the German Minister in China (the new Minister) that the Kaiser did not desire the immediate opening of the negotiation; No. 4655; No. 4659: The Kaiser's remark on this telegram from Bülow, October 9, 1900, proposing the examination of the authority of Li Hung-chang.

²⁸ *Ibid*, Bülow's telegram to the Emperor William II (deciphered) October 9, 1900: No. 4655-6: The Kaiser's remark or proposal at the beginning of the telegram.

On October 20, 1900, Baron von Richthofen, with the consent of the Emperor, telegraphed the German Minister, Mumm von Schwarzenstein, asking him:

To transmit the imperial order to Waldersee to get into touch with Prince Ching and others authorized, so that it might be possible for the Emperor of China to return to Peking. His Majesty takes it for granted that this will include coöperation with the Powers and hopes that the negotiation for peace will take place after the arrival of the Chinese Emperor.²⁹

Thus another condition for the delay of the opening of the negotiation was made by the German Government. Unfortunately, the representatives of the Powers in Peking opposed Germany's demand for the return of the Court to Peking,³⁰ as a condition for the opening of the negotiation. Waldersee, on the other hand, in spite of the

²⁹ Die Grosse Politik, Vol. XVI, No. 4658: Telegram of the Acting Secretary, Baron von Richthofen, to Mumm von Schwarzenstein, who was at that time in Tientsin October 20, 1900. As a means of compelling the Chinese Court to return to Peking, the German Foreign Office telegraphed to its Minister, Mumm von Schwarzenstein, November 6, 1900, ordering him and Waldersee to coöperate with the other Powers to exercise pressure on the viceroys of the Yangtze Valley by prohibiting them from furnishing the Court with money, food and other provisions, thinking that this action would naturally necessitate the earlier return of the Court to Peking; Nos. 4662, 4664: England objected to Germany's proposal.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, No. 4663: Telegram of the German Minister, Mumm von Schwarzenstein, November 5, 1900, from Peking reporting on the results of the diplomatic representatives in Peking. This meeting was held on the same date. The Russian, American, English and French Ministers opposed the German demand for the return of the Court as a condition for the opening of the negotiation. The Japanese Minister asked for a formulation of the wording of the German demand in a milder tone. The Austrian and the Italian Ministers were in favor of this also; Count von Waldersee: A Field-Marshal's Memoirs (English), pp. 226-9: Waldersee's dispatch to the Kaiser, November 3, 1900. Waldersee reported that as long as Peking was occupied by the international troops the Imperial Court would not return. Furthermore, Waldersee said: "In the present condition of both the Imperial Palaces, in the so-called 'Forbidden City' and of the Summer Palace, I also feel that it would scarcely be possible to accomodate the Court here." Thus it showed that Waldersee did not like the return of the Court to Peking, while he was occupying the Winter Palace there.

above instructions, refused to see Li Hung-chang and Prince Ching on several occasions when requested successively by them.³¹

It was not until November 15 that Waldersee received Prince Ching and Li Hung-chang in the Winter Palace. During the conversation, Waldersee declared several times that the allied troops would station in Chili (including Peking and other parts of the province of Chili) through the winter. On the other hand, Li Hung-chang and Prince Ching expressed their earnest desire to open negotiations with the Powers, while in reply Waldersee made an evasive answer. As a threatening measure, Waldersee showed the Chinese plenipotentiaries his plan of attacks against the other parts of Chili Province and Shensi (where the Court was located) after the escape from Peking and asked Li Hung-chang to effect the withdrawal of the Chinese troops from the province of Chili, which request was promised by Li Hung-chang.³²

In Berlin the Chinese Minister, Liu Hai-kwan, called on Baron von Richthofen, the Secretary of the Foreign Office on November 15, 1900, and informed him that the Chinese Court had issued an Imperial edict inflicting on the various high officials and princes severe punishments such as degradation, deposition, life imprisonment and banishment to the frontier, that is, upon those who had participated in the Boxer Rising. However, Richthofen was not satisfied with this action complaining that these punishments were

³¹ Die Grosse Politik, Vol. XVI, No. 4663: In the same telegram Waldersee reported: "During my stay in Tientsin I refrained, in accordance with Your Majesty's command, from granting an interview to Li Hung-chang, who repeatedly asked for one. On his inquiring through an intermediary whether I would receive him now in Peking, adding that he attached the greatest importance to such a reception, I intimated to him that if he requested an audience I would give him one. He allowed a week to pass and then, in conjunction with Prince Ching, came forward with the proposal that I should receive two dignitaries of high rank. I refused. Yesterday Prince Ching, when paying a visit to the Minister, Herr von Mumm, inquired of the latter that as it was a long way for him and Li Hung-chang to go to the Winter Palace to see me, it would not be possible for me to receive them at the legation. Herr von Mumm, in compliance with my desire, replied that there could be no question of this." Waldersee: *Memoirs on the Boxer Rising* (Chinese), pp. 61-76 (translation of the same telegram as quoted in footnote 30): Waldersee contributed the cause of his several refusals to receive Li and Prince Ching to his desire to always use force upon the Chinese. Furthermore, he did refuse, as the diplomatic representatives had not opened negotiations with them then.

³² *Ibid.*, pp. 72-3, 76-8: Waldersee's dispatches to the Kaiser on November 14 and 20, 1900; Waldersee: *A Field-Marshal's Memoirs*, pp. 223, 252, 256.

not severe enough. Then the Chinese Minister called his attention to the fact that the Western nations considered the Chinese penal code too severe in comparison with the Western penal codes as the ground of their introducing the system of consular jurisdiction into China. Again Minister Liu asked Richthofen as to how he (Richthofen) would account for this fact since the punishments inflicted on the princes and high officials were twice severe than those embodied in the Chinese code. In reply to this remark, Baron von Richthofen merely smiled.³³ After three days, Minister Liu transmitted the telegram of the Chinese Emperor (which was dated November 14 and addressed to the German Emperor) to Secretary Richthofen. In this telegram the Chinese Emperor stated:

In consequence of the mistake we made in the choice of our officials, Your Majesty's envoy without his fault fell a victim of the disturbances, which we still regret in the highest degree. It is just that we should punish the guilty dignitaries fittingly and with special severity, so as to afford satisfaction to the laws and the universal feeling of justice. As soon as the peace negotiations have accomplished the desired results, we will at once fix the time of our return.³⁴

The German Government, to delay the opening of negotiations with China, made one excuse after another during the three months since the relief of the legations (August 14, 1900), by presenting severe conditions at different times as preliminary requirements to the actual commencement of diplomatic negotiations between the Powers and China. It was not until October 24, 1900, that the

³³ Memoirs of Minister Liu, Vol. III: This volume contained his note on his conversations with the German Secretary of the Foreign Office, all the four volumes are written in Chinese, pp. 18-21; U. S. Foreign Relations, 1900, pp. 230-1, 296-8: This Imperial decree was issued on November 13, 1900. The Court inflicted doubly severe punishments on these officials in accordance with the Chinese penal code; pp. 212-4: Even on September 28, 1900, an Imperial edict was issued ordering the banishment of Prince Tuan (the chief patron of the Boxer Rising, who exerted most of his influence on the Empress Dowager), imprisonment for two other princes and decapitation of several officers; pp. 220-1, 228-9; State Papers, 1901, pp. 1148-50, 1154-5, 1159: The Court held first to Taiyuan, later to Sianfu, Shensi.

³⁴ Memoirs of Minister Liu, Vol. III, pp. 22-5; Parliamentary Papers, China, No. 1 (1901) p. 106, No. 174 and the inclosure. Dispatch of Sir Frank Lascelles to the Marquis of Lansdowne, dated November 20, 1900, including the telegram of the Chinese Emperor to the German Emperor; State Papers (1901-02), Vol. XCV, p. 1219: Edict of punishment,

German Government instructed its new Minister, Mumm von Schwarzenstein, to discuss the points in the preliminary agreement with the ministers of the Powers in Peking.³⁵ Upon receiving the above instruction, the German Minister promptly called an informal meeting of the diplomatic corps at Peking for an exchange of opinions. The result of this meeting was a unanimous vote for asking their home governments to present an ultimatum demanding from the Chinese Government capital punishment of the persons mentioned in the Chinese Imperial edict of September 25, 1900.³⁶

In the following meetings of the foreign ministers for discussing the demands of the Powers between October 26 and December 24, 1900, the German Minister, Mumm von Schwarzenstein, in obedience to the instructions given him by the Emperor and the German Government, persuaded his colleagues in Peking to oppose the French proposal, which contained six demands; namely, (1) punishment of the chief offenders, whose names were to be given by the diplomatic corps in Peking, (2) prohibition of the importation of weapons into China, (3) demanding equitable indemnities for the state, organizations and the individuals, (4) organization of a permanent guard for the legations in Peking, (5) dismantling of the fortifications of Taku and (6) occupation of two or three points between Peking and Tientsin, for example, between the capital and the sea.³⁷

³⁵ *Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. XVI, No. 4657: Footnote to this number: Baron von Richthofen, the Acting Secretary of the Foreign Office on October 24 sent a telegram (No. 103) authorizing him to begin negotiations with China in coöperation with the diplomatic representatives in Peking.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, Vol. XVI, No. 4661: Telegram of the German Minister in China (deciphered) to the Foreign Office, October 26, 1900 (arrived on October 28, 1900). The Russian Minister arranged the meeting of the diplomatic representatives for Mumm; U. S. Foreign Relations, 1900, pp. 221-4.

³⁷ *Livre Jaunes: Documents Diplomatiques Chine, 1900-1*, pp. 3-6; *Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. XVI, No. 4654, ciphered telegram of Count von Bülow, Secretary of the Foreign Office, to the Emperor, October 5, 1900, containing the French proposal. Bülow considered the French proposal similar to the instructions the Kaiser had given to the new Minister, Mumm von Schwarzenstein on July 22, 1900, at his departure for China. Bülow then suggested that Germany should answer France in a tone which would not bind herself, nor would it allow any one nation to attempt to isolate Germany. The Kaiser's remark to this telegram: "Agreed." Also see No. 4659: Bülow's telegram (No. 95), October 21, 1900, to Mumm von Schwarzenstein in Peking. In this telegram Bülow instructed Mumm, saying: "I wish to remark the following for your orientation: (1) The urging for an immediate beginning of the peace negotiations, which can be seen in the French suggestion corresponds rather to the Russo-American point of view than to that of the other Powers. It

As early as October 15, 1900, China had already submitted a general preliminary treaty containing five articles; namely, (1) China's acknowledgment of the mistake in laying siege to the legations, as an offense against the principles of international law, (2) China's admitting the liability to pay indemnity for the various losses incurred, (3) China's promise to make special regulations regarding future trade and general international relations, (4) China's promise to sign a general treaty with the Powers and a special treaty with each of the Powers regarding the question of indemnity and her request for the withdrawal of the international troops and (5) China's request of the Powers to declare an armistice when the negotiations begin.³⁸

As counter move against the above French proposal, the German Minister brought out his motions. These motions were: (1) a demand that China send a special mission of apology to Berlin of

is not in the interest of Germany that Russia and America should successfully coöperate and become better acquainted (Telegram No. 95). You can also see from Telegram No. 94 (footnote see No. 4658) that precipitate negotiations do not correspond to the interest of the Kaiser. (2) It is not necessary for France to be placed in the foreground by having all representatives submit France's circular; it will be better if the communication to be submitted to the Chinese mediators will summarize the common work of all representatives. The French note can form the basis for this. You should try at first to find out indirectly whether a great part of your colleagues could be won over to the idea that it is better to negotiate with the Chinese first over those points on which the Powers agree, since we might otherwise risk that some of the foreign representatives should take sides with the Chinese. (3) Among the individual points, the question concerning the importation of weapons is of especial interest for German commerce. This question also has the advantage of separating Russia and America. It will be advisable to let America be the first to object, but we may, in support of the American point of view—which is, by the way, England and Japan will be likely to share—summarize our point of view in saying that the prohibition will be likely to create much smuggling if not effectively enforced and that its only result would then be that it would corrupt trade at the expense of honest trade. (Let me add confidentially, that those people here who know China doubt the possibility of effective enforcement.) (4) The punishment of the ringleaders is for us of greatest importance. We must not isolate ourselves on this point any more than the others will, but we must see who will be on our side and to what extent. Among the others, France seems to be very energetic on that point and it is to be expected that the ministers who have gone through the siege will not think as mildly about it as do the ministers of foreign affairs in the various countries. I am expecting your reports concerning the view and groupings of foreign representatives that you have found in Peking. Bülow." No. 4663: Mumm's report to the Foreign Office, November 5, 1900 (received November 9).

³⁸ U. S. Foreign Relations, 1900, pp. 213-7.

an imperial prince who was to express regret over the assassination of the German Minister, Baron von Ketteler, (2) the erection of a monument on the spot of the assassination,³⁹ (3) the immediate return of the Court,⁴⁰ (4) international control of the finances of China,⁴¹ (5) capital punishment of the ringleaders,⁴² (6) presentation of a collective note by the representatives of the Powers in Peking⁴³ and (7) the wording "ultimatum" and "irrevocable" in the note, which was to be sent to China.⁴⁴

The first motion was unanimously carried in the meetings of the diplomatic representatives in Peking, while the second was opposed strongly by most of them; the third and the fourth were changed in nature and wording by the representatives of the Powers. With much persuasion the fifth was accepted by the ministers and the sixth was dropped.⁴⁵

The German Foreign Office, on the other hand, instructed its ambassadors and ministers at the various capitals, especially in

³⁹ Die Grosse Politik, Vol. XVI, No. 4663: Mumm's ciphered telegram to the Foreign Office, November 5, 1900.

⁴⁰ *Ibid*, No. 4662: Acting Secretary, Baron von Richthofen's telegram to Mumm von Schwarzenstein, Minister in Peking, November 5, 1900, in which Richthofen instructed the latter that Germany wished to prohibit the Yangtze viceroys from furnishing the Court with food, money and other things; No. 4663: Mumm's telegram to the Foreign Office, November 6, 1900.

⁴¹ *Ibid*, No. 4663: Mumm's telegram to the Foreign Office, November 5, 1900. Mumm hinted this proposal to the Italian Minister, Salvago, who made a formal motion during the meeting of the diplomatic representatives on November 5, 1900.

⁴² *Ibid*, No. 4661: Mumm's telegram to the Foreign Office, October 26, 1900.

⁴³ *Ibid*, No. 4667: Mumm's dispatch (private letter) to Bülow, who was then promoted to the Chancellorship, November 16, 1900 (arrived January 20, 1901). In this letter, Mumm said that he used all his influence to persuade the other ministers in Peking to present a collective note to the Chinese negotiators, etc.

⁴⁴ *Ibid*, No. 4661: Mumm's telegram to the Foreign Office, October 26, 1900.

⁴⁵ *Ibid*, No. 4663: Mumm's telegram to the Foreign Office, November 5, 1900; No. 4666: Mumm's telegram to the Foreign Office, November 9, 1900; No. 4671: Mumm's telegram to the Foreign Office, November 23, 1900. Nos. 4661, 4663, 4667-70, 4672, 4676-8, 4680, 4682-3, 4692-3, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1900, pp. 229-43.

London, to persuade the cabinet there to coöperate with Germany.⁴⁶ Many times the German Government suggested to England that she take measures for prohibiting the Yangtze viceroys from supplying the Court in Sianfu with food, money and other provisions. But the latter turned a deaf ear to such a suggestion.⁴⁷ Failing to attain this coöperation from England, Germany again asked her to raise a blockade on the Yangtze River as another means of exerting pressure on the Court, so that the demands of the Powers would be accepted soon, but the request was again refused.⁴⁸

Judging that diplomatic persuasion could not obtain the ends at which she was aiming, Germany at the same time ordered Field-

⁴⁶ Die Grosse Politik, Vol. XVI, No. 4665: Telegram of Baron von Richthofen to Count von Hatzfeldt, German Ambassador in London, November 9, 1900; Nos. 4667, 4669, 4670-3: In all these telegrams from the Foreign Office to its ambassadors and ministers and from the latter to the former the German Government tried to persuade England and the other Powers to adopt her proposals. Especially in No. 4673: Telegram of Count von Bülow, who was then promoted to the Chancellorship, to Count von Hatzfeldt in London, November 30, 1900, Bülow said: "Mumm was instructed to sign if the English and the American representatives sign. If England, Germany, and several other Powers are on the same side, then the rest of the Powers will follow. The Chinese Court, too, will be more obliging as soon as they will be convinced that a powerful group is really serious. It is the belief of the German Government that the honor and the intercourse or relations of the majority of the Powers concerned will be protected mutually and with the same means and that both the honor and relations will be equally injured if the people in East Asia should be convinced that the ringleaders to the most horrible offenses of international law can escape easily. This will make it possible that in the future there will always be such ringleaders. I beg you to discuss the above at once and in detail with Lansdowne (British Secretary of Foreign Affairs, then). Bülow." Nos. 4674-92, and 4696: In all these telegrams there is a great wealth of information regarding the methods Germany employed to persuade the cabinets and the ministers of the Powers to adopt her proposals. The result was that the majority of the Powers, for example, America, Russia, France and Japan opposed Germany, while England, because she had a definite policy of utilizing Germany in North China for preventing the expansion of Russia there, sometimes agreed to some of Germany's proposals, and at other times opposed evasively, for fear of Germany's expansion both to the Yangtze area as well as any part of China. Italy and Austria, members of the Triple Alliance, always followed the steps of Germany.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, No. 4665: Telegram of Baron von Richthofen, who was then promoted to the Secretaryship of the Foreign Office, to Count von Hatzfeldt, (November 9, 1900) grumbled at England's rejection of Germany's proposal to prohibit the Yangtze viceroys from supplying the Court with food, money and other provisions, Nos. 4682-3, 4690-1; British State Papers (1901-02), Vol. XCV, pp. 1190, 1198, 1224.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, Nos. 4688, 4690-1: British State Papers, 1901-02, Vol. XCV, pp. 1190, 1224; Waldersee: A Field-Marshal's Memoirs (translated into English), p. 240.

Marshal Waldersee, to take further military measures so as to compel China to yield and accept all the demands upon which the ministers of the Powers had agreed. By the middle of November, 1900, Waldersee instructed General Yorck to capture Changkiakow, a fort near the Great Wall. The fact that the Catholic priest, Jarlin, served as a spy voluntarily with the other Catholic priests in the army under the control of General Yorck during the capture of Changkiakow merits our attention.⁴⁹ Furthermore, Waldersee ordered the French troops to occupy and devastate the Imperial Tomb in Peking, which action was accomplished at the end of November and which threatened the Imperial Court in Sianfu of the Shensi Province.⁵⁰

By the end of the first week in December, 1900, seven more districts south of Tientsin close to the border of Shantung were seized by Waldersee with the allied troops. This not only terrified the Court and the Chinese populace, but also frightened the diplomatic representatives in China as to the motives of these advances of the allied troops, since the Chinese troops always retreated upon the arrival of the allied troops.⁵¹ This made the British representative ask the home government to agree to hasten the negotiations so that the innocent people would not suffer any more and peace could result.⁵²

For two months the ministers and the governments of the Powers were busily communicating with each other and discussing among themselves the contents of the preliminary draft of the joint or collective note. Much effort was exerted by each of them, especially by the Germans. On December 20, 1900, when the draft of the joint

⁴⁹ Waldersee: *Memoirs on the Boxer Rising* (translated into Chinese), pp. 73-84, 103; Franz Max: *Unsere Chinafahrt Feldzugerinnerungen eines deutschen Offiziers*, pp. 169-72; *Memoirs of Minister Liu Hai-kwan* (in Chinese), Vol. III (this volume contains his notes he recorded about his conversation with the Secretary and the Acting Secretary of the German Foreign Office), pp. 25-6. Liu Hai-kwan called on Baron von Richthofen, then the Secretary of the Foreign Office, asking him what purpose Waldersee had in capturing Changkiakow, which is just between the provinces of Chili (where Peking and Tientsin are situated) and Shensi, where the Court had fled. Richthofen declared that Germany had no intention of capturing Shensi and that Germany had not ordered Waldersee to attack.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, *Memoirs on the Boxer Rising* (Chinese), pp. 92-3.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 114; *State Papers, 1901-02*, Vol. XCV, p. 1324.

⁵² *British State Papers, 1901-02*, Vol. XCV, p. 1324.

note was finished and all the diplomatic representatives with the exception of the American Minister, Conger, had signed the note and the German Minister, Mumm von Schwarzenstein also attached his signature on it. During the meeting on December 22, 1900, after Conger had signed, it was decided that the Doyen of the Diplomatic Corps, the Spanish Minister, B. F. deCologan should request Prince Ching and Li Hung-chang to go to the Spanish legation on December 24 morning, when the note was to be presented to them.⁵³

This joint or collective note contained twelve articles and a preamble. Article I contained the demand of an extraordinary mission of apology to Berlin to express the regret of the Chinese Emperor for the murder of the German Minister, Baron von Ketteler and the erection of a monument on the spot of assassination. Article II demanded of China the severest punishment, according to their crimes, of the persons designated in the Imperial Decree of September 25, 1900, and for those the representatives of the Powers shall subsequently designate and of suspension of all official examinations for five years in all the towns where the massacres of foreigners occurred. Honorable reparation to the Japanese Government for the murder of Mr. Sugiyama, the Chancellor of the Japanese legation was mentioned in Article III, while the next demanded the erection of an expiatory monument in each of the foreign cemeteries. The fifth demanded maintenance of the act prohibiting the importation of arms, and of materials used in the manufacture of arms and ammunition. Equitable indemnities were provided for governments, societies, companies and private individuals, as well as for the Chinese who have suffered during the late events in person or in property in consequence of their being in the service of foreigners. Guarantee of the payment of said indemnities and the interest and amortization of the loans was in the sixth article. The seventh provided for the right of each Power to maintain a permanent guard, and the legation quarter was to be

⁵³ Die Grosse Politik, Vol. XVI, No. 4692; Mumm von Schwarzenstein's telegram to Count von Bülow from Peking, December 13, 1900, reporting on the conclusion of the Joint Note in the meetings of the diplomatic representatives in Peking, etc.; Foreign Relations of the United States, 1900, pp. 225-43, 246-7; British State Papers, 1901-02, Vol. XCV, pp. 1205, 1215, 1222-3, 1297, 1300, 1312-3, 1327-8, 1332-3, 1335, 1336-7.

the exclusive residence for foreigners. The eighth demanded the razing of Taku and other forts. The ninth allowed the right of military occupation of certain points, to be determined by an understanding among the Powers, for keeping open communication between the capital and the sea. The tenth demanded of China the publication of an Imperial Decree effective for two years in all subprefectures prohibiting membership in any anti-foreign society, enumerating various punishments for such a case, suspending all official examinations in the towns where the massacres of foreigners occurred, and making all the officials of the local, provincial and national governments responsible for any future anti-foreign disturbances. The eleventh contained the demand for the revision of the then existing treaties of commerce and navigation with the Powers, while the last ordered the reform of the *Tsungli Yamen*, the modification of the court ceremonial concerning the reception of foreign representatives in the manner the Powers would later indicate; and finally the acceptance of the above twelve demands by China as a condition of the general evacuation of Peking and the whole province of Chili by the allied troops.⁵⁴

Being informed by the Doyen of the diplomatic representatives to appear at the Spanish legation with duly authorized credentials, Prince Ching, owing to the illness of Li Hung-chang, his colleague, went there at 10 A.M. on December 24 alone, presenting eleven copies of his own and Li Hung-chang's "full powers" to the ministers of eleven Powers. Dr. G. N. Steiger narrates:

Prince Ching caused some embarrassment by requesting that the foreign representatives reciprocate by displaying their own credentials. With the exception of Baron von Mumm (German Minister) the foreign diplomats had not considered the possibility of such a demand and had failed to bring their commissions with them; the meeting was, therefore, hurriedly adjourned.⁵⁵

In view of this fact, mention must be made that the German Government, aiming at the delay of the opening of the negotiations

⁵⁴ U. S. Foreign Relations, 1900, pp. 243-5.

⁵⁵ George Nye Steiger: *China and the Occident*, pp. 268-9; United States Foreign Relations, 1900, pp. 246-7; State Papers, 1901-2, Vol. XCV, p. 1324.

between China and the Powers, demanded several times the examination of the properly authorized written credentials of the Chinese negotiators before the actual opening of the negotiations, such an excuse, since September 25, 1900.⁵⁶ On the other hand, Prince Ching telegraphed the Joint Note to the Imperial Court at Sianfu in Shensi Province on that very day.

⁵⁶ United States Foreign Relations, pp. 336-7, 340: In the last week of August, Germany refused to negotiate with Li Hung-chang on the ground that his authorization was not clear, although she had not examined it then; *Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. XVI, No. 4655: Ciphred telegram of Count von Bülow to the Emperor, October 9, 1900, informing him that England had decided to be ready to negotiate with Li Hung-chang and asked if Germany was ready, since England was waiting for Germany. The Kaiser's remark at the beginning of the telegram was in the following terms: "Agreed! Also inform them that we are now willing to examine the authority of Li Hung-chang and to work with him as a negotiator, if his authorizations prove to be authentic." No. 4656: Bülow's telegram (ciphred) to the Emperor (telegram No. 194) October 9, 1900, quoted in footnote No. 33 and text on page 10; U. S. Foreign Relations, 1900, pp. 286-7, 339-42, 358, 371, 379: The American Government recognized Li Hung-chang as the Chinese negotiator on August 12, two days before the relief of Peking by the troops of the five Powers, America, England, France, Japan and Russia. Russia agreed to negotiate with Li Hung-chang on August 27. The other Powers, such as France, Japan, Italy, Austria-Hungary, Spain, the Netherlands, one after another agreed in September and the first week of October. Great Britain was the next to the last Power, Germany, in consenting to negotiate with Li Hung-chang; *State Papers, 1900-01*, Vol. XCIV, pp. 1198-9, 1215-6, 1221-2, 1281, 1288, Vol. XCV, pp. 1215: The Nanking Viceroy, Chang Tze-tung was appointed as co-plenipotentiary with Li Hung-chang. Pages 1318-9: On October 3, 1900, Li Hung-chang showed to Sir C. MacDonald the Imperial Edict, which was issued on August 7 and which stated that full powers were bestowed on Li Hung-chang to immediately negotiate by telegram with all the Powers for a preliminary suspension of hostilities and to satisfactorily arrange all matters that required settlement. Again the Imperial Edict issued on August 24, 1900, gave Li Hung-chang discretionary powers for the speedy settlement of all matters. Pages 1327-8: Sir Satow's telegram to Marquis Lansdowne, December 14, 1900, reported that Prince Ching and Li Hung-chang informed Satow that credentials similar to those which the latter was given in order to negotiate with Japan in 1894 had been received from the Throne by Li and Prince Ching by telegraph, authorizing them to act officially. These credentials were to be submitted to the Foreign Ministers for inspection. Satow mentioned that the decrees in Sir MacDonald's dispatch mentioned in the same telegram, were considered insufficient by all the ministers in Peking, with the exception of the Russian Minister. Pages 1350-1: Satow's telegram to Marquis Lansdowne, December 24, 1900 (received on December 26) reporting on the meeting of Prince Ching and the diplomatic representatives at the Spanish legation. Commenting on the eleven sets of full powers empowering Prince Ching and Li to negotiate with each of the ministers of the Powers, Satow considered them quite satisfactory and thought others would take the same view. Satow said: "He then asked foreign representatives to show theirs, and the meeting ended."

Three days later (December 27, 1900) an Imperial edict was issued accepting the principles of the Joint Note by the Court, which ordered the Chinese plenipotentiaries to discuss immediately the details of the twelve points or articles of the Note and to request the cessation of the military expeditions into the interior by the allied troops, pending the withdrawal of the same forces.⁵⁷

Taking advantage of the weakness of the Chinese Government as well as because of China's request for the cessation of the military expeditions of the allied troops into the interior, Germany persuaded the other Powers to let their forces stay in Peking and Chili under the command of Waldersee, so that the latter could use them as a club for compelling China to yield and accept whatever amount of indemnity Germany demanded. Thus the Secretary of the German Foreign Office, Baron von Richthofen wrote:

The fact that the Chinese Court asks for the cessation of military expedition into the interior arouses our suspicion and proves that those expeditions were effective means of pressure on China. It would, therefore, be advisable for the time being to let the Supreme Commander decide how far the wish of the Chinese Court should be complied with. We do not need to take the responsibility which will arise from a diplomatic interference with military affairs. Therefore, the decision of the Supreme Commander shall be authoritative, for example, the maintenance of 12,000 men in Chili and 2,000 in Peking until the conclusion of peace. However, it would be the task of the diplomat to see that this force shall consist of international contingents, including those from Germany, England, Japan and France. For the moment, we may consider the following as *modus procedendi*: (a) that we should first of all come to an agreement with England concerning the retention of 12,000 men in Pechili (Chili) until the conclusion of peace, (b) that the two representatives in Peking should thereupon be commissioned to raise this point in the conference with the addition of as many nationalities as possible represented in

⁵⁷ Die Grosse Politik, Vol. XVI, No. 4694: Mumm's telegram to the Foreign Office, deciphered, No. 422 from Peking December 30, 1900; State Papers, 1901-02, Vol. XCV, p. 1352; U. S. Foreign Relations, 1900, p. 248; Memoirs of Minister Liu, Vol. IV, (all four volumes are written in Chinese by Liu Hai-kwan, Chinese Minister in Berlin during the Boxer Rising), pp. 15-22; Waldersee: Memoirs on the Boxer Rising (Chinese), p. 133.

this force. If this question is raised at the conference in Peking instead of through the direct communication among the cabinets, it will have the advantage that M. Pichon (the new French Minister in Peking) perhaps may be an effective balance against the Russian influence, which will in all probability act in Paris in favor of immediate evacuation.

Then Richthofen asked Count von Bülow (who was formerly the Secretary of the Foreign Office and who was promoted to the Chancellorship in November, 1900):

Shall I instruct our embassy in London in the sense of (a) (b)?

To this request Bülow answered on the telegram:

Yes, if this seems to be the surest way of moving as many Powers as possible to retain their troops in Peking.⁵⁸

In the meantime, Waldersee was insisting upon the stationing of the troops and squadron in the north as well as in the south, for example, Shanghai and the Yangtze River, against the wish of the Kaiser, who needed them for the coming national review of the army

⁵⁸ Die Grosse Politik, Vol. XVI, No. 4695: Mumm's telegram (ciphered) to the Foreign Office, No. 424 from Peking December 31, 1900, reporting that Waldersee was of the opinion in case the Powers should desire the cessation of further military expeditions into the interior at least 12,000 men of the international troops, 2,000 of which should be stationed in Peking, the rest in Tientsin, until the conclusion of peace. Mumm suggested that it would take a very long time for the Powers to withdraw their troops, so as to guarantee the fulfilment of the demands and the safety of the foreigners. For the quotation see No. 4696: Richthofen's dispatch to Bülow, January 1, 1900. No. 4697: Mumm's private letter to Bülow, January 7, 1900 (arrived February 26, 1900): In this letter Mumm said regarding the process of the negotiations: "The political situation to-day is such that the Chinese plenipotentiary (Prince Ching, I suppose since Li Hung-chang was ill at that time) has decided to accept our demands on December 30. A protocol will be sent to them (Chinese plenipotentiaries) to-day. Will they sign? There is a rumor stating that an Imperial edict has been issued which forbade them to sign. In case of such emergency, the Field-Marshal will have the kindness of making a big noise with his sword so that the Chinese will again be compelled to yield after a few expeditions. Then we may begin the fight over the details whereby we must fight our way every step against the cunning Chinese, who have more time than we do, and who will make use of every division (meaning international rivalry). Much will depend upon how well Russia and Japan coöperate with us and that will depend less upon von Giers (Russian Minister in Peking) and Komura (Japanese Minister in Peking) personally than upon the instructions issued in St. Petersburg and Tokyo. Mumm."

and the navy.⁵⁹ However, it was helpless to Waldersee, seeing that the troops of Russia and France refused to fight against the Chinese. Moreover, the Russian troops were gradually evacuating Peking and Tientsin, leaving only a small band in the capital and Tientsin.⁶⁰

The fact that since the end of October, 1900, the governments of the Powers disapproved of carrying any further expeditions into the interior did not discourage Waldersee from taking his military activities in northern China.⁶¹ As soon as China accepted the Joint Note in principle, Waldersee set out making plans for the attacks into the Shensi Province, where the Court was. But the Powers prevented him from directing his expeditions into Shensi, which action was rather a drawback to Waldersee.⁶² However, this action of Waldersee caused the diplomatic representatives in Peking to send a warning to Li Hung-chang on January 23, 1901, demanding the immediate execution of the ringleaders in the Boxer Rising, as a condition for the withdrawing of the allied troops.⁶³

Waiting impatiently for further military expeditions, Waldersee again threatened to seize Shantung and to order the French troops to attack Shensi at the end of February. This put the English

⁵⁹ Waldersee: *Memoirs on the Boxer Rising* (Chinese) pp. 128-9, 145, 151: The German Government through the War Department asked Waldersee whether or not he could let the squadron go back to Germany then in January. Waldersee answered that it was impossible, because he needed it in the Yangtze River near Shanghai so as to watch the steps of England since there were French and Japanese troops there too; Waldersee: *A Field-Marshal's Memoirs*, (English), p. 229.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 110: Waldersee's diary or journal written on December 18 recording his conversation with the American Minister, Conger, who was of the opinion that the negotiations should be hastened, so that the troops of the Powers could be withdrawn from Peking and an orderly Chinese Government established there. Pages 113-5: His report to the Kaiser, December 22, reporting that the French and Russian troops refused to coöperate with him, the Russian troops, upon Waldersee's arrival in Chili, began evacuating, while the French forces refused to fight against the Chinese troops in Tientsin and in Paotingfu upon the retreat of the Chinese forces; also see pp. 128-9.

⁶¹ U. S. Foreign Relations, 1900, pp. 214-5, 248, 298; State Papers, 1901-02, Vol. XCV, pp. 1198, 1200: By the end of October the American Minister in Peking reported to the home government that military expeditions into the interior or any part of China was unnecessary, while the British Government instructed its Minister and General in Peking that it disapproved of any further military expeditions outside of Chili.

⁶² Waldersee: *Memoirs on the Boxer Rising* (Chinese), p. 133.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, pp. 138-9.

general in action and he informed Waldersee that he was not able to participate in any further military expedition outside of Chili without the instructions from home government, while the American, Japanese and Russian Ministers tried to hasten the negotiation.⁶⁴ On February 16, 1901, Waldersee actually ordered the allied troops to be ready for the expedition into Shensi.⁶⁵ His order did not receive any hearty response, instead the British Minister fired a violent protest against his order. In spite of this fact, Waldersee ordered small German divisions of troops consisting of Prussian, Bavarian and Wuttemburg soldiers to march to Shensi. These German divisions captured the mountain fort, Taomakwan leading to Shansi on February 16 and reached the Great Wall four days later.⁶⁶

On March 11, 1901, after receiving definite instructions from the Kaiser, Waldersee's German forces attacked the frontier of the Shansi Province, while a small division entered the province. He did not dare to order his entire force to enter Shansi, on account of the protests and non-coöperation of the Powers and their troops.⁶⁷ According to the report of the United States War Department, forty-six expeditions were sent out by Waldersee from December 12, 1900, to the end of April, 1901. Due to the non-coöperation of the allied troops, thirty-five of the forty-six were undertaken by German forces alone, four by Italian troops and the other seven by mixed forces. Two expeditions, one American and one British, were sent to suppress new troubles. The Japanese took part in a few expeditions, while the Russians did not participate at all. The fact that Germany had about 11,000 men in the Chili Province, mainly in Peking, showed the serious attitude of her government in

⁶⁴ Waldersee: *Memoirs on the Boxer Rising (Chinese)*, p. 146.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 154-6; *Parliamentary Papers*, 1901, Vol. XCI, p. 79, Nos. 107, 110.

⁶⁶ Franz Max: *Unsere Chinafahrt Feldzugerinnerungen eines deutschen Offiziers*, pp. 157-80; *Parliamentary Papers*, 1901, Vol. XCI, p. 85, No. 118: Germany asked England's support in the military expeditions of Waldersee.

⁶⁷ Waldersee: *Memoirs on the Boxer Rising (Chinese)*, pp. 161-7, 208, 212-3; *Parliamentary Papers, China*, No. 5 (1901), Vol. XCI, p. 79: Document Nos. 107, 110; Morse, cited above, Vol. III, pp. 343-4; *U. S. Foreign Relations*, 1900, p. 248.

its participation in the Boxer Expedition.⁶⁸ Morse narrates in *The International Relations of the Chinese Empire*:

American army opinion was that "the German contingent, not having arrived in season to take part in the relief expedition, they were anxious, as most military men are, to engage in active service, and these expeditions afforded the only field for the indulgence of their desires." American popular opinion is fairly expressed by an editorial statement that "it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the greatest single obstacle to peace in China is the intransigent attitude of Germany. . . It is to Germany that the primacy belongs in aggression and mischief-making."⁶⁹

Aside from pursuing all military expeditions into the interior of China, Waldersee was always visualizing the possibility of partitioning China at any moment. Two months after his arrival in China, Waldersee wrote to the Kaiser promising: "as soon as the ice broke, I would take possession of Chefoo!" Then he continued in his diary dated November 20, 1900:

I did this even without telling my Chief of Staff. I had two battalions and a battery ready in Tientsin and the requisite transport vessels always at my disposal, so that the necessary preparations could not take long. History may record that I did, indeed, threaten to seize Chefoo, but it was really my aim to prevent any such exploit, and I attained it by throwing the responsibility on the Kaiser. Thereby, I am convinced, I have rendered a service not only to Germany but to the whole world.⁷⁰

Again, in watching the negotiations between the diplomatic representatives in Peking, Waldersee commented on the question of the demands of indemnities by the Powers in his journal on December 7, attempting to consider seriously the possibility of partitioning China:

All the Powers are reckoning up their shares in the indemnity which China will be called on to pay, and the sum total arrived at is so huge that the so-called "experts" in Chinese affairs

⁶⁸ Morse, cited above, Vol. III, pp. 317-8.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 318-9.

⁷⁰ Waldersee: *A Field-Marshal's Memoirs* (English), pp. 233-4.

assert that the country is not in a position to meet it. Of course there is here no question of paying in ready money but of the mortgaging of tolls and taxes. In this connection the question arises: What is to be done if China does not pay? One reply is: Every Power must indemnify itself and occupy a portion of Chinese territory. That is easily said, and it certainly suits the Russians, who are in unopposed possession of Manchuria and who knew well that insoluble difficulties would present themselves over the division between the other Powers. For us the obvious thing would be to occupy Chefoo and to take part of Shantung. It is not to be supposed, however, that Japan would look favorably on this, and if England, in spite of Weihaiwei, agreed to it, they would do so only in return for a free hand on the Yangtze. France wants to extend her dominions in this direction from Tongking, but comes into collision with England over this. Japan would like to occupy Amoy, which the other Powers would view with disfavor. America seems to desire that nobody shall get anything out of China. My opinion is that whether it be a poor region or a rich one we should do well to content ourselves with Tsingtao and Kiaochow. We should then have a coaling station and a good war harbor, both things to be desired. The acquisition of more territory would create more difficulties and prove ruinous financially. If China revives again we could not wage war with her by ourselves.⁷¹

The above passage shows that Waldersee was in a dilemma, not knowing whether he should start partitioning China or not, since he was carrying on military expeditions into the interior, for example, into the north of China. So he tried to ascertain the attitude of the Kaiser as to whether the latter was enthusiastic enough for the partition of China at that time or not. On February 3, 1901, he wrote his memorandum to the Kaiser stating that it was a golden opportunity for the partition of China, because of her military weakness and the decay of her government. He next thought that Russia would be satisfied with the acquisition of Manchuria, France with the province of Yünnan, Japan with the province of Fukien, while England would grab a part of the Yangtze Valley, and Germany would seize Shantung. In spite of this optimism of the golden chance, Waldersee foresaw the objection of Great Britain against

⁷¹ Waldersee: *A Field-Marshal's Memoirs* (English), pp. 238-40.

France's acquiring Yünnan Province and Japan's getting Fukien Province, the opposition of Japan against Germany's seizing Shantung and that of all the Powers against England's control over the Yangtze Valley. Above all, the United States had early made her declaration against any partition of China whatsoever.

In the same memorandum Waldersee spoke of the Chinese people as having unusual diligence and intelligence coupled with obedience to law. He warned against the general opinion of the Western people in looking down upon the Chinese as a weak race, since the Boxer Rising had shown how at least 100,000 people from the two provinces of Chili and Shantung participated in the anti-foreign movement. He also claimed that their failure was due to the lack of good arms and ammunition. Furthermore, he argued, Shantung was too far away from Germany for her to protect it from China in case she should attempt to take it back by force.⁷²

Seven days later, Waldersee, in order to test the attitude and intentions of the Powers and their diplomatic and military representatives in China, as well as to perform his duty as the representative of the Kaiser, announced upon several occasions that within the month of February, he was going to invade Shantung, while the French force was to attack Shensi, where the Court was located. Immediately he received fiery protest from the American Minister, Mr. Conger, in Peking and the declaration of non-coöperation from the English General, Gaselee.⁷³ These actions were enough to disappoint him. Finally in the beginning of March he was ordered by the Kaiser not to seize Chefoo or any part of Shantung, because of the strong opposition of the Powers.⁷⁴

The cruelty and the atrocities of Waldersee and his troops in slaughtering great numbers of innocent Chinese was violently attacked by the Social-Democrats and notably by the Secretary of

⁷² Waldersee: *Memoirs on the Boxer Rising* (Chinese), pp. 141-5.

⁷³ Waldersee: *A Field-Marshal's Memoirs* (English), p. 251; *Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. XVI, No. 4857: Richthofen's secret telegram (deciphered by Mumm) to Mumm ordering him to inform Waldersee to send expeditions into the interior alone.

⁷⁴ Waldersee: *Memoirs on the Boxer Rising* (Chinese) pp. 161-4: Kaiser's letter to Waldersee, dated January 19, 1901, which arrived at Peking on March 8, 1901; *Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. XVI, No. 4866: England protested and opposed against Waldersee's larger expeditions to Shensi Province.

War in Germany. They based their attacks on the letters of the German soldiers from China. Waldersee maintained that these stories of the atrocities in the letters of the German soldiers were "lies and extravagant exaggerations." On the other hand, he acknowledged in the same journal dated February 13, 1901:

That many Chinese are shot is quite true; they had, however, always deserved their fate, especially in accordance with Chinese ideas.⁷⁵

Waldersee at another occasion wrote in his journal, dated November 25, 1900:

Sunday and All Soul's Day. I was in the city for Divine Service with the 1st Infantry Brigade; a large section of the public remained for the Communion Service. The conditions here are of a kind to turn one's thoughts to serious things, but without any good results, unfortunately, from what I have seen, because the kind of war we are waging is apt to lower men and blunt their better feelings and upset their ideas as the rights of property. It would be a very good thing for the German army if they were not so often called upon to fight against the heathen races. A small expedition is sent out to encircle the region affected and the usual outcome is the shooting of the miscreants. How many men have thus been killed will never be known. Executions make very little impressions upon the Chinese.⁷⁶

For his own atrocities and those of his soldiers, Waldersee was attacked not only by the Social-Democrats, the Secretary of War

⁷⁵ Waldersee: *A Field-Marshal's Memoirs*, pp. 252-3 (English); *Memoirs of Minister Liu Hai-kwan*, Vol. I, p. 25: Minister Liu called the attention of the German Government through its Foreign Office about the cruelties and the atrocities of the troops of Waldersee, inflicted upon the innocent Chinese, asking the German Government to stop Waldersee from sending further expeditions into the interior. But the Secretary of the German Foreign Office, Baron von Richthofen, made an evasive reply saying that the German Government could not prevent Waldersee from sending expeditions into the interior, as Waldersee was the Supreme Commander of the allied troops, meaning that Waldersee's order for sending expeditions was the decision of the Powers, in fact it was the decision of the Kaiser and the Foreign Office.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 234-5; Waldersee: *Memoirs on the Boxer Rising* (Chinese), pp. 114, 152, 170: Waldersee blamed the fact for the brutality of the German soldiers on the German soldiers' having been associated with the bad troops of the other Powers.

and the press in Germany, but also by the press in America, England and Russia, which attacks he considered no more than "the barking of a dog."⁷⁷

His relations with the allied troops and the diplomatic representatives in Peking were not altogether pleasant, for the French force often ignored his orders and acted without his knowledge. Nor did the troops of the other Powers obey the orders of Waldersee, nor tell him about their actual number of soldiers.⁷⁸ The fact that the allied troops participated in only eleven expeditions out of the forty-five attacks, which Waldersee ordered, from December 1900 to the end of April 1901, is convincing.⁷⁹ Equally true were the diplomatic representatives in opposing Waldersee's making threats and sending expeditions, especially the English and the Russian Ministers.⁸⁰

The demand for a large indemnity from China was one of the aims of the Kaiser and the German Government during the Boxer Expedition. It was the desire of the Kaiser to demand the highest amount of indemnity both for paying the expenses of sending the expeditionary corps and squadrons to China and for building a

⁷⁷ Waldersee: *A Field-Marshal's Memoirs* (English), pp. 253-4: Waldersee's journal written on February 25, 1901, in which he criticized the different newspapers of England, America and Russia. The fact that Waldersee's decapitating the civil officers in Paotingfu, who welcomed the arrival of Waldersee and his troops, caused Li Hung-chang to bring complaint to the diplomatic representatives during the process of negotiations. For this fact see U. S. Foreign Relations, 1900, p. 227; *Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. XVI, No. 4663: Ciphred telegram from Mumm von Schwarzenstein, German Minister in Peking to the Foreign Office, November 5, 1900 (arrived November 9, 1900). In this telegram Mumm reported saying: "It has been decided, upon a motion made by the French, Italian and English representatives and myself as plenipotentiaries, that we return in protest a note of Li Hung-chang in which he complains about the behavior of the allied troops in Paotingfu. (Footnote to this telegram: Paotingfu was occupied by the allied troops on October 19, 1900). The American, Japanese and Russian representatives, who have no troops there, will not reply to the note."

⁷⁸ Waldersee: *Memoirs on the Boxer Rising* (Chinese), pp. 35-8, 46, 65-6, 75-6, 113-4, 129-30, 161-2: In the Kaiser's letter (January 19, 1900) which Waldersee received on March 8, 1901, he warned Waldersee not to side with any party in the Anglo-Russian dispute over the control of the Peking-Tientsin Railway, which dispute was very acute between the English and the Russian diplomatic and military representatives; Waldersee: *A Field-Marshal's Memoirs* (English), pp. 226-7, 238.

⁷⁹ Morse, cited above, Vol. III, pp. 317-9.

⁸⁰ Waldersee: *A Field-Marshal's Memoirs* (English), p. 251; Waldersee: *Memoirs on the Boxer Rising* (Chinese), pp. 157-8, 230; *Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. XVI, No. 4867: Bülow's secret telegram to Mumm, February 21, 1901.

large fleet,⁸¹ in Germany. Yet for a long time the Kaiser and his officials did not have any definite sum in mind.⁸² There were several steps taken by Germany in making her demand.

To begin with, Germany instructed her representatives in China as well as in England to find out China's financial capacity to pay the indemnities. Thus Germany suggested the inspection of the administration of the Maritime Customs to England.⁸³ On the other hand, Waldersee sent out his spy to Li Hung-chang to find out Li's own opinion about China's ability to pay the indemnities. Waldersee, in his Memoirs, on January 3, 1901, said:

I had a long conversation with Herr von Mumm regarding the sums which the Chinese would be able to pay. The diplomats are inclined to think that not more than 1.5 milliard marks should be demanded. I maintain that two milliard marks should be forthcoming, and I am supported in this opinion by the fact that people who, by my order, frequent Li's house,

⁸¹ Waldersee: A Field-Marshal's Memoirs (English), p. 254; Waldersee: Memoirs on the Boxer Rising (Chinese), pp. 8, 106, 159.

⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 159: His journal written on March 2, 1901. He was complaining about the slowness of the governments of the Powers as well as that of the diplomats in making out the sums of indemnities. (The same journal is translated in the English text); Waldersee: A Field-Marshal's Memoirs (Chinese), pp. 164-5: His report to the Kaiser, March 9, 1901, requesting the latter to instruct him and Mumm about the amount of the indemnities in the demand for Germany as early as possible.

⁸³ Die Grosse Politik, Vol. XVI, No. 4845: Bülow's telegram to Hatzfeldt, the German Ambassador in London, December 29, 1900; No. 4846: Bülow's telegram to Hatzfeldt (This telegram was marked with the words, "Very confidential"). Both these telegrams instructed Hatzfeldt to discuss the question of indemnities with the English Foreign Secretary, Marquis Lansdowne and to persuade him to agree to Germany's motion that the Powers should then inspect the administration of the Maritime Customs. Same volume, No. 4852: Mumm, the German Minister in Peking in his private letter to Count von Bülow, the Chancellor, January 7, 1901, reported that from his conversation with Sir Robert Hart, an Englishman who served as an officer in the Chinese Maritime Customs for many years and with Tower, the Acting British Minister in China, he learned from Hart that fifty or sixty million pounds was the highest amount that China could pay. Again No. 4909: Footnote to this telegram: On May 1, 1901, a report was made by the Financial Commission which was organized by the Conference of the Diplomatic Representatives for examining the problem of indemnities. The report stated that the total amount of all claims of the Powers was calculated to be about 450,000,000 taels.

assures me that the Viceroy is quite prepared for a demand on this scale.⁸⁴

On another occasion Waldersee noted with satisfaction in the same book, dated May 12, 1901 (in his journal) saying:

The news has just come that the Chinese are ready to pay the war costs to the amount of forty-five million taels, that is 1,350,000,000 marks. That is indeed a step forward.⁸⁵

At the same time, the German Minister, Mumm von Schwarzenstein was instructed by the Secretary of the German Foreign Office, Baron von Richthofen, in a telegram (dated November 23, 1900):

The expenses which we have incurred so far and which we expect to regain in the future, will amount to at least 15,000,000 pounds. You may take this amount as the basis of our claims, if any other country undertakes any steps with regard to settling the question of the war indemnity. Let me add for your personal direction that I have got into touch with the English Government concerning this question and I shall reserve everything else to myself afterwards.⁸⁶

However, Mumm was greatly disturbed after he found out from Sir Robert Hart that China was able to pay about fifty to sixty million pounds. Thus Mumm reported to Bülow, the Chancellor, January 7, 1901:

Sir Hart thinks that fifty to sixty million pounds is the largest amount China can pay. This amount is not sufficient, if I am to demand three hundred million marks, as I was instructed. Hart is afraid that we might kill the goose that laid the golden egg. I shall confer with Hillier, the local president of the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank (British) and report to you in detail by writing and in brief by wire. It is easy for England to talk. She is much wealthier than we are and her commerce

⁸⁴ Waldersee: *A Field-Marshal's Memoirs* (English), p. 247: The same was translated in the Chinese text; Waldersee: *Memoirs on the Boxer Rising*, p. 123-4.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 265: The same was translated in the Chinese text; Waldersee. *Memoirs on the Boxer Rising*, p. 210.

⁸⁶ *Die Grosse Politik* Vol. XVI, No. 4841: Richthofen's telegram to Mumm.

is so much more significant, that she will profit much more from a general improvement of the entire Chinese trade, than we do.⁸⁷

On the other hand, Germany was very anxious to increase the amount of indemnity in her demand, as was shown by Bülow's telegram to Mumm on March 18, 1901, in which he said:

According to accurate calculation, the expenditures of the German Empire in sending the Expeditionary Corps, amount to about 240,000,000 marks, if it is assumed that the expedition will be ended on May 1 of this year. I beg you to report this amount as our demand for indemnity. Our claims will be raised or increased to 7,800,000 marks for every additional month during which our corps should remain in China after May 1, 1901. If the expedition should be withdrawn at such a late date that it would be necessary to send relief for the troops who are to be relieved at the end of September, then the claims must be again raised to 22,000,000 marks, as an addition. If the payment does not take place before July 1 of this year, then the demands will be increased to 600,000 marks for each additional month.⁸⁸

According to this instruction, the German demand for indemnity up to September, 1901, would be 303,200,000 marks, if Germany should not be willing to withdraw her troops from China in May 1901. But the German Minister, Mumm, was not satisfied with the above instruction for increasing the indemnity, so he even attempted to exceed the above instruction by making his own demand of 800,000,000 marks when he learned the actual amounts of the indemnities in the demands of the other Powers.⁸⁹

⁸⁷ *Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. XVI, No. 4852: Mumm's private letter to Bülow, January 7, 1901, arrived February 26.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, No. 4878: Bülow's telegram to Mumm, March 18, 1901; China No. 1, 1902, Vol. CXXX, p. 2, No. 4: Sir Satow's telegram to Lansdowne, April 2, 1901, reporting that the German demand about 12,000,000 pounds up to May 1, 1901.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, No. 4906: Mumm's private letter dispatched to Bülow, April 24, 1901 (arrived on June 7). In this letter Mumm reported that America suggested 40,000,000 pounds as the total of all the demands, which suggestion was very hypocritical, as her demand amounted to 25,000,000 gold dollars, while the Italian demand of 2,000 pounds for each man sent to China, then he said: "If we were to apply the same greed, we might demand 800,000,000 marks. However, they are carefully examining our claims, especially our Anglo-Saxon cousins."

Germany's third step was her proposal to England that the Powers make a loan to China in order to enable her to pay the indemnities and to secure the administration of the Maritime Customs as a security for the loan with the condition of the abolition of the *likin*. Furthermore, Bülow added in the same dispatch (December 29, 1900) instructing the German Ambassador, Count von Hatzfeldt in London:

The foreign Powers will therefore have to look to the administration of the Maritime Customs for the satisfaction of their demands. The present tariff need to be raised twice or thrice as much as from its original amount. However, this raising or increase would not influence or affect considerably those interested in foreign trade, as far as we have been able to ascertain until now. It is necessary to make a loan that will pay the interest and can be liquidated at a yearly rate. It seems to us, therefore, that the corresponding development of the Maritime Customs Office with an expansion of Sir Hart's authority and an increase of his staff is the best means for solving the financial question. At the same time it will be advantageous to deliver the amounts of indemnity raised by the Maritime Customs to the European staff directly, instead of through the Chinese. The execution of the reform may be left up to Sir Hart. A council consisting of the diplomatic representatives in Peking should be organized, not to limit the authority of Sir Hart, but to facilitate the conditions of the loan. The Imperial Government is therefore calling England's attention with the hope that it will be easy for the latter to agree to the principles developed above, so that we can negotiate with the other Powers basing on that principle, which needs to be examined and further developed. It seems advisable to attack the financial problem speedily, otherwise the Powers may take the initiative and lead this matter into the channels that are not desirable to us. We are looking for a speedy remark from the English Government concerning the above suggestion. You are authorized to let Lansdowne keep "a very confidential aide Memoire," containing the contents of our suggestion.⁹⁰

Although England had expressed her opposition to the increase of the Maritime Customs or import duties of China informally

⁹⁰ Die Grosse Politik, Vol. XVI, No. 4846: Bülow's very confidential dispatch to Hatzfeldt, December 29, 1900.

since January, 1901,⁹¹ the one-sided Germanic gentleman was still courting his Anglo-Saxon cousin (England) to consent to his proposal for the next three months.⁹² During the first week of January, the American President through his Minister, Mr. Conger, in Peking proposed to the Powers that Washington be chosen as the place of the Conference for further negotiations on the ground that China had accepted the demands of the Joint Note, with the exception of Articles II and VI, concerning the question of indemnities and revision of the existing treaties of commerce. Furthermore, Mr. Conger stated that this transfer of the place of conference from Peking to Washington would enable China to execute the provisions

⁹¹ Die Grosse Politik, Vol. XVI, No. 4847: Telegram of Hatzfeldt to the Foreign Office, January 2, 1901; No. 4848: Telegram of Richthofen, Secretary of the Foreign Office, to Hatzfeldt, the German Ambassador in London, January 2, 1901; China No. 6 (1901), Vol. XCI, p. 6, No. 17: Lascelles' telegram to Lansdowne, January 2, 1901; p. 80, No. 111: Lansdowne, the British Foreign Secretary, to Sir Lascelles, the British Ambassador in Berlin, February 19, 1901.

⁹² *Ibid.*, No. 4845: Bülow's telegram to Hatzfeldt, December 29, 1901; No. 4848: Richthofen's (Secretary of the Foreign Office) telegram to Hatzfeldt, German Ambassador in London, January 2, 1901; No. 4859: Bülow's telegram to Mumm, January 29, 1901, giving Mumm three methods to be suggested to the representatives of the Powers in Peking in order to assist China in paying the indemnities; namely, (1) a yearly payment or payments on instalment ("jährliche Abschlagszahlungen"), (2) the acceptance of a loan by China guaranteed by the Powers with the conversion of the loan, (3) the acceptance of a new loan by China whereby several safe sources of revenue would be used as security. Bülow thought the last was the best: "All that remains is that China should accept a loan, whereby several safe sources of revenue will be used as security. According to our view the most suitable revenue would be the raising of the import duties to 10% in gold. These duties which amount to about three per cent and which in the years 1896 to 1898 amounted to about seven and a half million taels, average, would thus be raised to twenty-five million Haikwan taels yearly. If we subtract the amount of seven and a half million Haikwan taels, which amount is now demanded yearly for the old loans, then seventeen and a half million taels (fifty million marks), remain which could serve to supply four and a half per cent interest and one half per cent liquidation upon a new loan of milliard marks. It does not seem advisable to call upon the land tax, the monopoly upon salt, and the likin, to cover the loans, since no suitable personnel exists for that purpose and since such an interference into the internal administration would be more than is justified by a sphere of power of a foreign nation and could easily lead to dissatisfaction in Chinese circles which may have serious consequences. The moment is not suitable for the annulment or change of the likin. The expenses of our expedition had been judged at 400 million marks so far. A detailed instruction will follow." No. 4864: Richthofen's telegram to Hatzfeldt, February 17, 1901; No. 4876: Mumm's telegram to the Foreign Office, March 11, 1901, asking the latter to come to terms with England regarding the demands of indemnities of the Powers first.

that she had accepted.⁹³ Not only did Germany reject this American offer politely, but also persuaded England to oppose.⁹⁴ At the same time, the German Chancellor, Bülow, sent a secret telegram to the German Minister, Mumm, in Peking instructing him to persuade Waldersee to be patient and stay in China to protect the interests of the Kaiser and of Germany:

Decipher this telegram yourself and burn it immediately after you have read it. Let me remark for your exclusive information that a premature return of the Field-Marshal would injure the interests of His Majesty and of our country. Try to prevent it without arousing suspicion and continue to inform me of Waldersee's intentions.⁹⁵

Knowing that Waldersee was getting homesick and desired to return to Germany,⁹⁶ and that America was attempting to cause the other Powers to evacuate Peking,⁹⁷ the German Government and its Minister in Peking became terrified,⁹⁸ so Waldersee was given full power to send military expeditions into the interior of China.⁹⁹ At the same time, Germany requested England to support Waldersee in his further military expeditions in order to hasten the negotiations by threatening the Chinese Government.¹⁰⁰

Waiting for England's approval for her proposal to increase the import duties of China for three months, Germany became so impatient and she sent her expert on the Chinese affairs, Dr. Stubel, to London on March 25 to persuade England to agree to her proposal. The Kaiser was so angered at England's delay that he declared:

⁹³ *Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. XVI, No. 4850; China No. 6, 1901, Vol. XCI, p. 6; No. 17, p. 10; No. 25.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.* Nos. 4850-1, 4853: England rejected the American offer, too, but preferred Rome as the next to Peking.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.* No. 4854: Bülow's telegram, marked with "very secret" to Mumm, January 6, 1901.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.* same telegram as cited in footnote No. 95; Nos. 4857-8, 4907, 4917.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.* Nos. 4853, 4856.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.* Nos. 4857-8.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.* Nos. 4857, 4836.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.* Nos. 4866-70, 4831.

If the Chinese or the Powers should play tricks, Germany, whose Minister alone had been killed, might enforce upon China her demand of indemnities, by seizing the Maritime Customs.¹⁰¹

Unfortunately, this mission of Dr. Stubel to London turned to be a failure, as England was persistent in refusing to accept the German proposal for the increase of the import duties to 10% gold from 2½% in silver.¹⁰² The refusal of England was a great disappointment to Germany. However, upon receiving the news of the burning of the Winter Palace in which Waldersee had lived since his arrival at Peking, and from which he barely escaped, the Kaiser telegraphed to Bülow, the Chancellor, on April 18, 1901:

I have just learned that the entire palace of the Empire including the apartment of Waldersee has been burned down. The Field-Marshal was barely saved. General von Schwarzhoff is missing. Arson suspected. I beg you to proceed at once to present an ultimatum to the Chinese Government, demanding the payment of compensation at the height at which I determined before, under the threat of using military pressure. It is suspected that the Russians have provoked the Chinese. William I. R.¹⁰³

Bülow, however, advised the Kaiser to wait until the arrival of the report from Waldersee, who was instructed to make an investigation into the causes of the fire, before sending the ultimatum to China, for fear of interrupting the negotiations. Furthermore, Bülow opposed the suggestion of the Kaiser for taking military action against China in order to compel her to pay a larger

¹⁰¹ Die Grosse Politik, Vol. XVI, No. 4882: Bülow's telegram to the Kaiser for getting permission to send Dr. Stubel to London. The Kaiser's remark on the telegram: "Agreed." March 24, 1901; No. 4883: Bülow's note recording the Kaiser's opinion and what the Kaiser said, March 25, 1901.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, Nos. 4884: Stubel's report by telegram, March 27, 1901; Nos. 4885, 4889: Originally it was 5%, but owing to the fall of the silver in value, China collected 2½% in silver value with the abolition of likin; China No. 6, 1901, Vol. XCI, pp. 80, 146, Documents Nos. 111, 226.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, No. 4897: Telegram of the Kaiser to Bülow.

indemnity to Germany, since he felt that China was not able to pay any amount.¹⁰⁴

Owing to the desire of the Kaiser to summon the German squadrons and troops back from China so as to have them participate in the maneuvers near Danzig at the beginning of May,¹⁰⁵ and because of the pressure exerted by America, England and Russia in making their proposals for the demands of the indemnities of the Powers,¹⁰⁶ the German Government was forced to make a compromise for the sake of hastening the negotiations.¹⁰⁷ On the other hand, China was forced to recognize and promise to pay the special claim of Germany's, amounting to 90,000,000 taels (out of a total indemnity of 450,000,000 taels to the Powers). The Chinese plenipotentiaries were compelled by the numerous expeditions of Waldersee to send a secret note of recognition of Germany's claim to the German Minister and were prompted by the desire for the immediate withdrawal of the allied troops under the command of Waldersee.¹⁰⁸ So on August 16, 1901, all the Ministers in Peking agreed upon the question of indemnity in its chief points.¹⁰⁹ On August 20, 1901, the legations published the final protocol. Li Hung-chang and Prince Ching, being threatened by the Ministers of the Powers that the allied troops were going to invade the province of Shensi, where the Court was, signed the Boxer Protocol on September 7, 1901.¹¹⁰ By signing this

¹⁰⁴ *Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. XVI, No. 4898: Bülow's telegram to the Kaiser, April 18, 1901; Waldersee: A Field-Marshal's Memoirs, pp. 263-4; Waldersee: Memoirs on the Boxer Rising, pp. 198-202: Waldersee's report on April 20, 1901, stated that the Chinese did not start the fire, but it was due to the iron stove in the pentry which caught fire.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, Nos. 4911-2, 4917, 4922, 4924.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, Nos. 4899, 4900, 4902-6, 4908, 4915, 4917, 4927-9, 4932, 4934-5, 4938, 4941.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, Nos. 4903, 4910, 4913, 4921-2, 4925, 4929-30, 4932.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, Nos. 4916, 4918, 4926, 4931.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, Nos. 4930, 4941 (footnote to this telegram.)

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, No. 4941: Nuhlberg's telegram to Bülow, August 16, 1901, including the telegram from Mumm and the footnote to the first telegram; Memoirs of Li Hung-chang (written in Chinese), Vol. XXC, pp. 69-70: Li's report on signing of the protocol under threat; Waldersee: Memoirs on the Boxer Rising, pp. 203-5: Waldersee's journals on April 19, and 25, 1901, recorded the attack on Shensi Province, the German and the French troops reached the border of Shensi, which attack terrified Li Hung-chang and Prince Ching, who begged Waldersee to desist, but Waldersee did not do so until the French troops refused to fight and enter Shensi.

protocol Germany received a 20% of the total amount of the indemnity from China; namely, 90,070,515 taels, this amount being the second highest paid to any Power.¹¹¹

The final protocol consisted of twelve articles just as had the Joint Note, only more in detail. Article I provided for the appointment of Prince Chun (Tsai Feng) as Chinese Ambassador, who was to lead the mission of apology to Germany and express the regret of the Chinese Emperor at the assassination of the German Minister, Baron von Ketteler; it also provided for the erection (at China's expense) of a monument on the spot of assassination. Article II stated the names and the manner of punishment of those officials who had encouraged the Boxer trouble and provided for the suspension of the official examinations for five years in all the cities where massacres or cruel treatment of foreigners had occurred. The appointment of Na Tung as Envoy Extraordinary to Japan was provided in Article III, to convey the regret of the Chinese Emperor for the assassination of Mr. Sugiyama, the Councillor of the Japanese legation. In Article IV China promised to erect an expiatory monument in each of the foreign or international cemeteries which had been desecrated and in which the tombs had been destroyed. Article V prohibited the importation of arms and ammunition as well as materials exclusively used for their manufacture into China for two years, beginning August, 1901. Next, the Chinese Emperor agreed to pay an indemnity of 450,000,000 taels as a gold debt on the basis of an amortization beginning January, 1902, with the balance of the revenues of the (1) Imperial Maritime Customs, (2) the revenues of the native customs administered in the open ports by the Imperial Maritime Customs, and the total revenues of the salt gabelle, exclusive of the fraction previously set aside for other foreign loans. Article VII defines the limit of the legation quarters as one specially reserved for the use and under the exclusive control of the legations, "in which Chinese shall not have the right to reside." Furthermore, "China recognized the right of each Power to maintain a permanent guard in the said quarter for the defense of its legation." The razing of the forts of Taku and other forts between Peking

¹¹¹ Steiger, cited above, p. 315.

and the sea was stipulated in Article VIII. In the next Article the Chinese Government conceded the right to the Powers to occupy twelve points which were between Peking, the capital and the sea. By Article X the Chinese Government agreed to post and publish edicts in all district cities: (a) forever prohibiting membership in any anti-foreign society "under pain of death," (b) enumerating the punishments on the guilty, (c) prohibiting examinations in all cities where the massacre or cruel treatment of foreigners had occurred and (d) declaring all the local and provincial officials responsible for order and for any new case of anti-foreign troubles under pain of punishment. Article XI provided that "the Chinese Government has agreed to negotiate amendments deemed necessary by the foreign government to the treaties of commerce and navigation and other subjects concerning commercial relations, with the object of facilitating them. By Article XII China promised to reform the Office of Foreign Affairs (*Tsungli Yamen*) "on the lines indicated by the Powers, that is to say, transformed it into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (*Wai Wu Pu*), which takes precedence over the other six Ministries of the State." Furthermore, the French text remained authoritative, while the foreign plenipotentiaries declared for the complete evacuation of Peking and Chili in September of that year (1901), with the exception of the guards in the legation quarter.¹¹²

Tsai Feng, the Prince of Chun (the brother of the Emperor, Kwang Hsu), was appointed the ambassador by the Imperial edict issued on June 9, 1901, to head the mission of apology to Germany.¹¹³ The question of the diplomatic formalities of receiving Prince Chun by Germany occupied the minds of the Chinese Minister, Liu Hai-kwan, in Berlin and the officials and Prince Chun in China. The German Emperor, desiring to humiliate the representative of the Chinese Emperor, as well as the Chinese nation, demanded that Prince Chun and his councillors or attachés should bow and kneel down while he himself (the Kaiser) would sit and receive the credentials.¹¹⁴ With much effort the Chinese Minister, Liu

¹¹² MacMurray, cited above, Vol. I, pp. 278-84.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 279.

¹¹⁴ Memoirs of Minister Liu Hai-kwan, Vol. II, pp. 54-65; Vol. I, pp. 38-48; Vol. III, pp. 33-4, 68-76; Vol. IV, pp. 29-30.

Hai-kwan, succeeded in persuading the German Emperor to consent to the modification of the demand. As a result the German Emperor sat down, while Prince Chun bowed three times with his interpreter, Yin Tsang, presenting his credentials to the Kaiser.¹¹⁵ This act of the Kaiser in sitting for receiving the bows of a diplomatic representative was contrary to the diplomatic usage for receiving an envoy of a sovereign state.

The matter of evacuation of the allied troops from Peking, the other parts of the Chili Province, and from Shanghai revealed much international rivalry and jealousy. The fact that the German Emperor and his government intended to exert military pressure during the negotiations so as to enable Germany to get the largest amount of indemnity, gave Waldersee and his Expeditionary Corps a pretext to stay in China, even though the other Powers were ready and even desirous of withdrawing their troops from China at the end of 1900. However, Waldersee became very homesick after being stationed another four months in China. On many occasions he wrote requests to the Kaiser and the Minister of War in Germany to let him and his troops withdraw from China.¹¹⁶ But it was not until the middle of May, 1901, that this was permitted by the Kaiser.¹¹⁷ On June 3, 1901, Waldersee with a part of his troops left Peking for Tientsin, after he had telegraphed to the Russian Czar and the Emperors of Austria, England, Italy and Japan, resigning as the Chief Commander of the allied troops.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁵ Memoirs of Minister Liu Hai-kwan, Vol. I, pp. 39-48: Prince Chun arrived in Berlin by the middle of August, 1901, and stayed in one of the imperial palaces. Prior to his arrival, the Kaiser did not plan to let him stay in his palace, but intended to treat him as an ordinary traveller.

¹¹⁶ Waldersee: Memoirs on the Boxer Rising, pp. 151, 161-2, 180-6, 192, 206-8: From March 28, 1901, Waldersee continued writing to the Kaiser and Count von Schlieffen, Minister of War, requesting them to allow him and his troops to withdraw from China, with the threat that if the German troops should stay in China during the summer months, most of them would die of many kinds of contagious diseases. He added that the American troops had already evacuated on May 5, 1901.

¹¹⁷ See footnote No. 105; Waldersee: Memoirs on the Boxer Rising, pp. 212, 216-8, 220-2: The Kaiser telegraphed Waldersee on May 15 and 25 permitting Waldersee to withdraw with his 17,000 troops to Germany, leaving 3,000 in Peking.

¹¹⁸ Waldersee: Memoirs on the Boxer Rising, pp. 228-38.

On the other hand, the diplomatic representatives of the Powers, in signing the Boxer Protocol on September 7, 1901, promised to evacuate Peking and other parts of the Chili Province with the exception of the legation guards, by September 22 of the same year.¹¹⁹ The army of Yuan Shih-kai was transferred from the province of Shantung to Peking to prevent chaos during the evacuation of the allied troops, who looted and killed many in Peking.¹²⁰

The question of evacuation of the allied troops from Shanghai involved bitter rivalry and jealousy between England on the one side and the other Powers, especially Germany, on the other.¹²¹ Upon the request of the Yangtze Viceroy, Liu Kun-yi, and the other Chinese officials, asking the Powers to evacuate Shanghai, the English Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Marquis of Lansdowne, suggested that Germany withdraw her troops, as England was able to withdraw hers immediately (August 9, 1901).¹²² In response Germany ordered her representatives to find out the attitude of the Powers, as well as to suggest to the Powers a plan for the international control of the Yangtze District¹²³ (Shanghai and the other cities on the Yangtze River). Another of Germany's attempts to acquire land in Shanghai permanently turned out to be a failure.¹²⁴

Seeing that it would be useless to oppose the joint evacuation of the allied troops from Shanghai by the Powers, Germany following the footsteps of France, promised that the German troops and garrisons would withdraw simultaneously with those of the Powers provided that:

China would promise formally not to grant special privileges of a political, military, or maritime nature on the Yangtze

¹¹⁹ MacMurray, cited above, Vol. I, pp. 278-84.

¹²⁰ Memoirs of Li Hung-chang (Chinese text), Vol. XXC, pp. 32-3, 84.

¹²¹ Die Grosse Politik, Vol. XVI, No. 4942: Mumm's ciphered telegram to the Foreign Office, June 15, 1901, reporting that the erection of an armory by the German garrison in Shanghai made the English very uneasy.

¹²² *Ibid.*, Nos. 4943-4: Mumm's telegram to Bülow, July 9, 1901, and Muhlberg's (Acting Secretary of the Foreign Office) to Mumm, August 9, 1901.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, No. 4948: Bülow's secret dispatch to the Kaiser, February 13, 1902. Bülow asked the Kaiser's permission for making this proposal to America first. The Kaiser allowed and urged Bülow to do it at once.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, No. 4949.

to any Power, either now or later, and especially that they would not grant the occupation of any strategic points either at the mouth or on the Yangtze River.¹²⁵

On the other hand, the German Government attempted to obtain a definite statement from each of the Powers, England, France and Japan whose troops and garrisons were stationed in Shanghai, that they would not demand any special privilege of any kind from China for the evacuation of their troops of Shanghai.¹²⁶ China, in reply, not only accepted the German condition for evacuation of the troops of the four Powers, but also declared that she would apply this condition to all of her territories.¹²⁷ To all the above provisions England strongly opposed, on the ground that it was unnecessary for China to make such a declaration. At the same time the English Government sent its representative, Mr. MacKay, in an attempt to get permission for England to occupy the Kiangyin forts and station warships in the harbor of Chingkiang (all these places are on the Yangtze) from the Viceroy, Chang Chi-tung.¹²⁸

It was not until November 23, 1902, that the German Government declared herself ready to evacuate Shanghai, provided that the other Powers would do so, too.¹²⁹ On December 2, the German Emperor telegraphed to the German Commander in Shanghai instructing:

If this will not interfere with the preparation for the celebration of Christmas, the German troops shall evacuate on the same day as the English. If the preparation for Christmas has already been made, then the evacuation shall take place in the first week of January.¹³⁰

¹²⁵ Die Grosse Politik, Vol. XVI, Nos. 4950-2: France informed England on August 13, 1902, that she would withdraw her troops completely and simultaneously with those forces of the Powers, but she reserved for herself the right of stationing troops in Shanghai again, if the other Powers should do so. The quotation is from the same No. 4952. See also Nos. 4954, 4957-9, 4962.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, Nos. 4962, 4964.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, Nos. 4966-7: In October 1902, China made known her declaration; No. 4967.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, No. 4962.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, Nos. 4967, 4970, 4973; Parliamentary Papers, China No. 3 (1902), pp. 2-3, 6-15; Nos. (Documents' numbers) 4, 8, 10, 22, 26, 28, 31, 36, 39, 40, 44, 47, 48.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, No. 4975.

In spite of this guarded jealousy between England and Germany, the German troops did embark on December 20, 1902, the British evacuated from Shanghai two days later, while the French withdrew on December 26.¹³¹

The Chinese Court returned to Peking on January 7, 1902, upon the request of Li Hung-chang, Yuan Shih-kai and the Yangtze viceroys, who petitioned the Emperor and the Empress Dowager to return early, in order to preserve the dynasty. On August 16, 1902, the Tientsin administration was restored to the Chinese Government by the diplomatic corps through Yuan Shih-kai, although the German Government strongly opposed the restoration.¹³²

Even before the relief of the legation and the appointment of Waldersee to the Chief Commander of the allied troops for the Boxer Expedition, the German Government had suggested to the English Government to seize the Chinese ships in the Yangtze River and had proposed to the Powers that each of them should station their warships in the Yangtze River.¹³³ As an act of illustrating her intention, Germany sent four liners to Woosung, the mouth of the Yangtze River on August 16, 1900.¹³⁴ Without receiving a positive reply from England regarding her proposal for the seizure of the Chinese ships in the Yangtze River, Germany took a third step in suggesting to England to keep the Yangtze free. In notifying the Foreign Office of his conversation with the Prince of Wales and the English Ambassador, Sir Frank Lascelles, the Kaiser telegraphed on August 22, 1900:

I have spoken to Prince of Wales and Lascelles to-day concerning the Chinese affairs and have emphasized that we are

¹³¹ *Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. XVI, No. 4976.

¹³² Morse, cited above, Vol. III, pp. 362-5.

¹³³ *Ibid.* Nos. 4701-6, 4709-10: The German proposal to seize all the Chinese ships in the Yangtze was rejected by England, as the latter wanted to reserve all the naval operations in the Yangtze River alone. By August 20, 1900, all the Powers stationed their warships in the Yangtze River.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.* No. 4709: Secret telegram (deciphered) of Count von Metternich, the Councillor in the Imperial retinue, to the Foreign Office, August 10, 1900, and postscript to this telegram. The Kaiser ordered four liners to rush to Woosung, in spite of the doubts and hesitation of the Cabinet members.

merely striving for equal rights in the commerce on the Yangtze (meaning the Yangtze Valley—Shanghai and Chingkiang, etc.) It is a political necessity, for England as well as for us (Germany) to keep open the Yangtze under equal conditions for all. This imposes upon both of us and upon all those who hold the same principle with regard to the Open Door Policy. It is our duty to guard against any Power who should settle in the Yangtze district to the detriment of the other Powers. The Prince of Wales and Lascelles recognized the correctness of these leading views. I have told Lascelles since he wished to wire the summary of our conversation to London—that I expect a frank, clear and brief statement from Salisbury to the effect that he will maintain the Open Door Policy at any costs. Should he agree to my view, he will find my government to be gladly willing to help in the affairs on the Yangtze.

William I. R.¹³⁵

After that (September and October, 1900) the German Ambassador, Count von Hatzfeldt, was constantly instructed to try to negotiate an Anglo-German agreement with England.¹³⁶ On the other hand, the German Emperor ordered 500 marines of the East-Asiatic Expedition to Shanghai on September 4, causing England to send first a battalion and later a brigade; and France, a detachment to Shanghai, although the English Government had been verbally notified by the German Ambassador, Count von Hatzfeldt, that:

This is not an anti-English measure, but merely the attempt to support the English endeavors to maintain law and order.¹³⁷

Germany's purpose in negotiating the Anglo-German Agreement was threefold; namely, (1) to prevent an Anglo-Russian understanding for the partition of China, according to which England would take the whole Yangtze Valley that consists of six large

¹³⁵ Die Grosse Politik, Vol. XVI, No. 4712: The Kaiser's ciphered telegram to the Foreign Office, August 22, 1900.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, Nos. 4713-4, 4716-44: The German Ambassador, Count von Hatzfeldt, began his suggestions for the negotiation of the agreement with the members of the British Cabinet on August 27, 1900. The German Foreign Office and the Chancellor, Count von Bülow, and the Kaiser opened the question as early as August 22, 1900.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, No. 4717.

provinces and Russia would obtain the whole of Manchuria, (2) to extend the German sphere of interest from the province of Shantung to the Yangtze Valley and (3) to check the British naval supremacy in the Yangtze region.¹³⁸ In short, Germany's purpose was to get the lion's share in the richest region of China before the lion reached out her claws.

The points in the German proposal to England for the Anglo-German agreement were: (1) both England and Germany promise each other to draw no territorial acquisitions from the present confusion in China, (2) both promise to insist together upon the policy of "Open Door" in the Yangtze, and (3) England promises to place her troops under the supreme command of Waldersee until the establishment of a regular government in Peking and the settlement of the trouble.¹³⁹ In case England should reject this proposal, Germany was ready to negotiate these points with the other interested Powers.¹⁴⁰

On September 25, 1900, the German Ambassador in London, Count von Hatzfeldt formally delivered to the English Government the German proposal, which consisted of a preamble and four articles:

The German and the British Governments agree to observe the following principles in their common policy with regard to China. (1) It is in correspondence with a common and lasting international interest that the Yangtze, its tributaries and the territory of the river, be free and open for trade and other permissible economic activities to all nations without distinction. This joint and permanent interest must also be protected in common and permanently.

¹³⁸ Die Grosse Politik, Nos. 4701: Telegram of von Derenthall, the Acting Secretary of the Foreign Office, July 27, 1900, to Count von Bülow, the Secretary of the Foreign Office, saying: "Since we cannot expect to monopolize the Yangtze at least within a reasonable space of time, it should be our task to prevent England at least from monopolizing it." Nos. 4699, 4727, 4736, 4741.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, Nos. 4716, 4718-9.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, Nos. 4719-20: The German Government intended to request America, France, and Japan to join this agreement, since Russia was indifferent toward it, but the English Government or rather Lord Salisbury, the English Premier, suggested to invite France, Japan and Russia to enter into it.

(2) Her Britannic Majesty's Government and the Imperial German Government will not utilize the present difficulties so as to obtain any territorial privileges upon the Chinese soil.

(3) Should another Power undertake such territorial acquisitions of any form and should the German and the British Governments as a consequence consider it necessary to do likewise, they will inform each other of it beforehand.

(4) The other Powers interested in China, especially France, Russia, the United States of America and Japan are to be invited as soon as possible to accept on their part Nos. (1) and (2).¹⁴¹

With several modifications the British and the German Governments arrived at a conclusion and on October 16, 1900, signed the Anglo-German Yangtze Treaty which consisted of the following preamble and articles:

Her Britannic Majesty's Government and the Imperial German Government, being desirous to maintain their interest in China and their rights under existing Treaties, have agreed to observe the following principles in regard to their mutual policy in China:

(1) It is a matter of joint and permanent international interest that the ports on the rivers and littoral of China should remain free and open to trade and to every other legitimate form of economic activity for the nationals of all countries without distinction; and the two Governments agree on their part to uphold the same for all Chinese territory as far as they can exercise influence.

(2) Her Britannic Majesty's Government and the Imperial German Government will not on their part, make use of the present complication to obtain for themselves any territorial advantages in Chinese dominions, and will direct their policy towards maintaining undiminished the territorial condition of the Chinese Empire.

(3) In case of another Power making use of the complications in China in order to obtain under any form whatever such territorial advantages, the two Contracting Parties

¹⁴¹ Die Grosse Politik, Vol. XVI, No. 4721: Telegram of Baron von Richthofen, the Acting Secretary of the Foreign Office, containing the proposal, to Count von Hatzfeldt, the German Ambassador in London, September 22, 1900; No. 4722: Ciphered telegram from the latter to the former, September 25, 1900

reserve to themselves to come to a preliminary understanding as to the eventual steps to be taken for the protection of their own interests in China.

(4) The two Governments will communicate this Agreement to the other Powers interested, and especially to Austria-Hungary, France, Italy, Japan, Russia and the United States of America and will invite them to accept the principles recorded in it.¹⁴²

Thus by signing this agreement under the pretext of upholding the Open Door Policy in the Yangtze region as well as in the other parts of China, Germany unquestionably achieved her threefold purpose¹⁴³ and also played "a horrible joke on England."¹⁴⁴ In addition, Germany succeeded in assuring herself her share in the impending partition of China. The fact that Germany also extended her concession into the Chinese territory of Tientsin in 1901 during the general "grab" under the leadership of Russia,¹⁴⁵ showed the validity of this assurance.

The effects of the Boxer trouble and the Boxer Expedition on China and Germany were detrimental and overwhelming. Aside from suffering a deep humiliation, China's sources of finance have been drained, her chances of progress have been hindered, her sovereignty has been impaired and finally, the Manchu Dynasty was overthrown. Although Germany obtained the spoils of victory by means of a large amount of indemnity from China together with other privileges provided in the Boxer Protocol, as well as the assurance of her share in the future partition of the Celestial Empire, she certainly sowed the seed of her future downfall and

¹⁴² Die Grosse Politik, Vol. XVI, Nos. 4722-38, 4743: Most of the modifications were made by England, 4743; MacMurray, Vol. I, pp. 263-6: The members of the Triple Alliance, Italy, Austria-Hungary adhered to the Yangtze Treaty unconditionally; France and Russia did adhere with conditions that would allow taking necessary measures of protecting their interests if circumstances warranted. Japan adhered with the assertion that she would be entitled to all the privileges of a signatory member. She was assured by both England and Germany, while the U.S. adhered to the 1st and 2nd articles concerning the Open Door on the Yangtze, leaving the 3rd untouched on the ground that this article concerned England and Germany only; for American reply see U. S. Foreign Relations, 1900, p. 355.

¹⁴³ See footnote No. 138.

¹⁴⁴ William Roscoe Thayer: The Life and Letters of John Hay, Vol. II, pp. 248-9.

¹⁴⁵ Morse, cited above, Vol. III, pp. 325-6.

humiliation in checking the British naval supremacy in the Yangtze region by trapping England to sign the Anglo-German Yangtze Agreement.¹⁴⁶ The Great War and the downfall of the German Empire are the evidences of the naval rivalry between Great Britain and the Imperial German Government

¹⁴⁶ Alfred L. P. Dennis: *Adventures in American Diplomacy*, p. 237.

CHAPTER VI

CHINA, GERMANY AND THE WORLD WAR

THE ruthlessness of Germany's mailed fist policy in China during the historical episodes of the occupation of Kiaochow and the Boxer Expedition was lamented by the civilized world, and even by her own people.¹ But the whirligig of time brings its own revenge. In 1917, just a score of years after the landing of the German East Asiatic Squadron on the Shantung Peninsula, China declared war upon Germany. The period between 1917 and 1918 during the progress of the war is comparatively less eventful than the periods which preceded and followed the war except for some of the decided changes in the treaty rights and obligations of the two countries.

The *ante-bellum* period is one of commercial expansion and amicable relations. The establishment of schools in the leased area, the employment of German officers to train the Chinese armies and the winning personality of the German merchants throughout China afforded an excellent opportunity for a mutual understanding and appreciation between the two peoples.² Thus the Germans were quick to mend the wound which they had ignorantly and regrettably inflicted upon China by means of commercial goodwill and cultural development.

¹ "The unfortunate year, 1900, with its Boxer craze, caused a regrettable entanglement of Germany, unfortunately at the head of the Occident, which had been insulted not without their own fault. If this event did not influence the Chinese favorably, it was due chiefly to Germany's ignorance of the Chinese cultural and economic considerations and of her recent political development. The errors which Germany committed were due to the fact that she was more ignorant of these things than were the other Powers." See Otto Franke: *Deutschland und China vor, in und nach dem Kriege*, pp. 9-10. (Writer's own translation from German into English.) See also Wolf von Dewall: *Die Wirtschaftlichen Aufgaben Deutschlands in China*, p. 57.

² Payson Jackson Treat: *The Far East*, p. 445. Franke, cited above, pp. 14-6: "Kiaochow had thus become what it had been intended; namely, a peaceful fulcrum for trade, a gate through which German culture could enter, not for conquest, but for friendly approach to the Chinese people," p. 16.

Politically, Germany made a similar move in changing her aggressive policy into one of friendliness to China. This was due partly to her realization of her ignorance and misconduct in the past and partly to her dread of other Powers, particularly, England and Japan. She began to realize that sheer force alone could not win her a permanent footing in the Far East. Beginning with the year 1905, Germany made definite indications of her changed policy: the withdrawal of troops along the Shantung railway, the relinquishment of German post offices in China, and the agreement allowing the Chinese Customs administration to function at Tsingtao with the special provision that twenty per cent of the duties collected be contributed toward the expenses of the local Tsingtao administration.³

In 1910, when the brother of the Chinese regent, Prince Tsai Tao, visited Germany, William II assured him of Germany's willingness to assist the industrial and economic development in China.⁴ In 1913, Germany, by the agreement of December 31,⁵ obtained from China the right to build two railways running west and southwest to join with the railway systems already built. In return for this, Germany declared that she surrendered all rights of railway construction granted in the Convention of 1898, as well as certain other railway construction options which she had in other parts of China. The terms of the agreement were more favorable to the Chinese than those granted by the original Convention. Thus Germany made it appear that she now favored commercial and economic coöperation rather than an actively aggressive policy.⁶

³ John V. A. MacMurray: *Treaties and Agreements with and Concerning China, 1894-1919*, pp. 118, 192, 194, 594.

⁴ See Bernhard Schwertfeger: *Die Diplomatischen Akten des Auswärtigen Amtes, 1871-1914*, p. 124.

⁵ MacMurray, cited above, p. 1094 ff.

⁶ Thus writes Hornbeck, a well-informed writer on the Far East, in his *Contemporary Politics in the Far East*, on page 299: "There was in the later years of German presence in Shantung little of which, from the point of view of the open door policy, complaint could be made. For ten years past the Germans had done practically nothing calculated to complicate the politics of the Far East, and except commercially, they disturbed no peace in the Far East but the peace of mind of Japanese expansionists. Judged upon the basis of substantial accomplishment, successful and just administration, and real contribution to the economic and social welfare of the people who fell within the range of their influence, none of the Powers holding bases on the China Coast can offer better justification for its presence than could the Germans."

In her relation with other Powers, Germany had adopted a confessedly different policy in matters regarding China. When the Russo-Japanese War broke out, Germany joined with the United States in the matter of Chinese neutrality in order to save her from entanglement.⁷ Following the spread of the news in the summer of 1907 that a quadruple entente, composed of England, Russia, France and Japan was gaining headway, Germany, after presenting its objection to such a coalition,⁸ started a move to bring about a German-American-Chinese Alliance for the purpose of maintaining the balance of power in the Far East.⁹ The proposed alliance was designed more to defend German interests in China than for the active assistance of the declining Oriental Empire, and consequently it did not create much interest either at Peking or in Washington.¹⁰

⁷ See Schwertfeger, above, p. 13. "A letter of the American Ambassador in Berlin, Charlemagne Tower, on February 16, 1904, proves that America and Germany shoved or pushed the first step in the matter of the Chinese Neutrality and therein a Noble Initiative of the German Emperor is perceived. Also in a conversation with the Chinese Minister Ying Chang in Berlin the German Emperor had referred to the greatest advantage which the neutralization offers to China."

⁸ Die Grosse Politik, Vol. XXV, No. 8542: The Acting Secretary of Foreign Office, Muhlberg to the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg, Berlin, June 2, 1907. The emphasis and the seriousness of the objection can be illustrated by the following expression: "You may make it clear to Iswolsky that we object to this, and would consider Russia among her enemies if she joins in this coalition."

⁹ The move was started by the German Minister at Peking, A. Rex, who originally proposed to bring about an understanding with Russia and the United States and Germany concerning China. See Die Grosse Politik, Vol. XXV, No. 8547: To Bülow, Dispatch No. A. 145, Peking, July 4, 1907. In the message from the German Foreign Office to the German Ambassador at Washington, inquiring about the latter's opinion, (Die Grosse Politik, No. 8549, September 15, 1907) it is said: "... there still may be a way in which our similar economic interests in China may be balanced against the supremacy of three Powers of the Entente."

¹⁰ Germany first negotiated with the United States, pretending that the proposal was advanced from the side of China, while attempt was made to induce the Chinese Government to approach Germany for this project. The reasons given for this proposal were the impending great revolution which might result in the action of the other Powers to partition China and China's need of protection on the frontiers or boundaries. But President Roosevelt replied the German Minister at Washington that there was "lack of a sufficient cause." He was also of opinion that "a public declaration concerning the chaining together of Germany and the United States for the maintenance of the integrity of China would only create envy and could injure the already established Open Door doctrine." The President also pointed out in the conversation with the German Ambassador that the Chinese Minister at

At the outbreak of the Chinese revolution in 1911, Germany was more sympathetic with the monarchy than with the republicans. On October 17, 1911, German marines were engaged in "hot combats" with the revolutionists.¹¹ The foreign press was spreading the news that Germany was contemplating intervention.¹² Indeed, Germany did not deny that she supplied arms and munitions, although "German support of Chinese Imperialism" was refuted.¹³ She also did not deny that she would participate in the intervention if other Powers did.¹⁴ But in February, 1912, she and the United States published their exchange of notes concerning non-intervention in Chinese affairs.¹⁵ Germany was no later than other Powers in winning the favor of the republicans by a formal recognition of their regime in October, 1913.¹⁶

Such had been the general state of affairs between China and Germany before the outbreak of the Great War in Europe. When

Washington, Wu Ting-fang, did not express the existence of the idea that China had approached the Government of the United States and Germany for such an alliance. On the side of China, the German Minister at Peking also failed to obtain a definite answer from Yuan Shih-kai. Thus in spite of the cries of William II for the speedy conclusion of such an agreement, the matter failed of consummation. See *Die Grosse Politik*, Nos. 8547, 8549, 8553-8, 8560-4. In No. 8556, are found the following remarks of the German Emperor: "To enter into the agreement at once without the loss of time!" "We must accomplish under all circumstances!" "At once!" etc.

¹¹ At the outbreak of the revolution, Germany, like other Powers, on the ground of protecting their nationals, sent the gunboat "Toger" and the river cannonboats "Vaterland" and "Otter" to Hankow, on October 12, 1911. Their crew was entangled in "hot combat" with the revolutionists on October 17, 1911. See *Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. XXXII, Chapter CCLVII, No. 11806: 1st footnote. Schwertfeger, cited above, p. 126.

¹² The Japanese press raised violent attacks on the German action and spread the news of the mobilization of German troops in Kiaochow, which was "just as untenable and stupid as its foundation," said the German Chargé d'Affaires at Tokyo. The "Echo de Chine" in Shanghai also reported that "the Germans had supplied the Imperial troops with weapons, ammunitions and 70 officers." The same paper also told of the interview with one of the revolutionary leaders that "the success of the Imperial troops may be ascribed to the fact that they are being led by 100 Germans . . ." *Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. XXXII, Nos. 11806-8, 11811.

¹³ *Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. XXXII, No. 11811: From the German Minister at Peking to the German Foreign Office, Dec. 14, 1911; No. 11833.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, No. 11810: German Foreign Office to German Minister at Washington, Dec. 26, 1911.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, Nos. 11819-26.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, No. 11867 (Berlin, Oct. 8, 1913): There was even evidence of German attempt to proceed independently from the stand of the other Powers in the question of recognition. See No. 11847 (April 25, 1913).

the Balkan whirlwind started to craze all Europe, China was in the throes of her own domestic troubles, which, together with her admiration for, and fear of Teutonic militarism, Germany's mild policy in the Far East during the preceding decade, and the cultural contact and commercial goodwill made possible by the Germans in China, constituted manifest reasons for China to remain neutral. Thus, on August 6, 1914, there was promulgated the "Decree of the President of China Relative to the Observance of Neutrality During the European War,"¹⁷ which reads in part as follows:

. . . And whereas we, being desirous of maintaining the peace of the Far East and of preserving to our citizens the blessings of peace, which now they happily enjoy, are firmly purposed and determined to maintain a strict and impartial neutrality in the aforesaid state of war unhappily existing between the aforesaid Powers:

I, the President, therefore, specially issue the enjoined regulations for the strict observance of neutrality by all our citizens, in accordance with the existing laws and statutes, and the laws of nations in relation thereto.

Attached thereto are twenty-four Precepts of Neutrality laid down in international law, which "the Field-M Marshals and Governors-General of all the provinces are hereby ordered to instruct their subordinates diligently and faithfully to follow."

Germany, on her part, in order to obtain the goodwill of the Chinese and to avoid complications in the Far East, had offered to return to China complete authority over the German leased area of Kiaochow.¹⁸ But events were succeeding one after another with electric speed, and the plan failed of consummation, when Japan in quick succession dispatched her ultimatum to Germany, notified the unprepared Chinese Government of her plans about Tsingtao on August 20, started operations at Lungkow

¹⁷ Great Britain State Papers, 1914 (Part II), Vol. CVIII, p. 807.

¹⁸ H. W. V. Temperley: *A History of the Peace of Paris*, Vol. VI, Chap. IV, Part II, p. 371; B. L. Putnam Weale: *The Fight for the Republic in China*, p. 309; Gilbert Reid: *China Captive or Free*, pp. 38-9.

the day after, and completed her capture of Tsingtao on November 7, after a bloody combat with the defending German garrison.¹⁹ The popular belief is, however, that Yuan Shih-kai, then the President of China, made a gesture to join the side of the Entente at the time of the Anglo-Japanese attack on Tsingtao, but that Japan practically "vetoed" this attempted move, while the Western Powers were too much preoccupied in Europe to consider Yuan's proposal.²⁰ However, such a move can not be construed as a sign of popular feeling of hostility against Germany at that time, but merely as a defensive measure to prevent what actually happened a few days later, the capture of Tsingtao by the Japanese.

So, the general attitude of the Chinese during the beginning of the War was, if anything, mildly pro-German.²¹ Their resentment toward Japan since the capture of Tsingtao, the indifference of the Allies, the propaganda of the German residents, and the accounts of the victories won by Germany during that time were the causes chiefly responsible for the so-called sympathy with

¹⁹ This action of the Japanese had caused an active discussion on the justification of the attack. There can be no escaping from the criticism that if the Anglo-Japanese Alliance only necessitated Japanese action when British possessions in the Far East were attacked by the Germans, the Japanese attack on Tsingtao was clearly an aggressive step merely at the expense of China. Compare, however, Treat, cited above, p. 444: "China had no treaty obligation to enter the war as did Japan." "Japan's seizure of the entire Tsinan-Tsingtao Railway was not a necessary measure, as was pretended but was a political move." Thomas F. Millard: *Our Eastern Question*, p. 113. As to China's obligation as neutral to keep her possessions intact, Hall's International Law has been cited to condemn the indolence of the Chinese during the Japanese attack; "A neutral state which overlooks such violations of its neutrality as it can rightly be expected to prevent, or which neglects to demand reparation in the appropriate cases, becomes itself an active offender." But there are just opinions which includes that of Gilbert Reid, who, in his *China, Captive or Free*, writes on page 62: "Considering all the circumstances, however, China's failure to resist must be judged with a degree of palliation and not with condemnation."

²⁰ Harold Monk Vinacke: *A History of the Far East in Modern Times*, p. 387; Putnam Weale, cited above, p. 309. Cf. Treat, cited above, p. 445: "If, as has been alleged, Yuan Shih-kai offered to join the British and Japanese against Tsingtao in August, 1914, the official record is not available nor would such a move on his part have reflected the general sentiment in Peking."

²¹ K. S. Latourette: *China, the United States and the War*, Vol. II, p. 182; Treat, cited above, pp. 414-5: "In the early days of the war there is little doubt that the bulk of the informed Chinese were more sympathetic with Germany than with her foes. This was very natural. The first three allies had done little to win China's affection, and when Japan joined them, this only alienated the Chinese the more."

Germany.²² Be this as it may, it was scarcely conceivable that such a vast country, with such vast resources in men and raw materials, would remain permanently quiescent in a world-wide hurricane. In November, 1915, Yuan Shih-kai initiated negotiations for a war loan to be based upon a war-partnership with the signatories of the Pact of London, but this was again frustrated by Japan.²³ The popular consciousness of China's weakness and her lack of an equal international standing, however, still remained to induce her in favor of war.

A rapid progress of events followed the peace inquiry of President Wilson of December 19, 1916. This aroused great interest in the Chinese Government and revived the old hopes that it would be somehow possible for China to gain entry into the Peace Conference, and thus settle beyond doubt the question of the disposal of Kiaochow and the whole of the German interests in Shantung Province. To this Wilson Note, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Peking replied in words of profound political interest. It was handed to the American legation at Peking on January 8, 1917, and reads in part:²⁴

22 "After the fall of Tsingtao and the subsequent complications with Japan, which so greatly served to increase the complexities of a nebulous situation, certain lines of thought insensibly developed. That the influential classes in China should have desired that Germany should by some means rehabilitate herself in Europe and so be placed in a position to chastise a nation that for twenty years had brought nothing but sorrow to them was perhaps only natural; and it is primarily to this one cause that so-called sympathy with Germany during the first part of the war has been due," Putnam Weale: *The Fight for the Republic in China*, p. 310; "Hence the prevalence of pro-German feeling—with some it was one of dread, with others of partiality, thanks to German propaganda," Tyau: *China Awakened*, p. 289; Some of the German propaganda even went so far as to propose that China should join with the Central Powers, and be prepared herself for war on two fronts: Russia and Japan. Promises were made to China to restore her to become an independent nation internally and externally through the help of Germany, should the latter win the war. See *Kontinentalpolitik*, by "A Rhenish Capitalist" appearing as Heft 4 of 'Deutsche Kriegsschriften,' published by A. Markus und E. Webers Verlag in Bonn; Franke, cited above, pp. 20-3.

23 This move of Yuan Shih-kai, as is sometimes believed, is colored by his selfish motives, besides its indication of China's struggle for an international standing. Putnam Weale, cited above, p. 311: "But when the proposal was taken to Tokyo, Japan rightly saw that its main purpose was simply to secure an indirect foreign endorsement of Yuan Shih-kai's candidature as Emperor; and for that reason she threw cold-water on the whole project.

24 The whole of the authorized translation of the document is reproduced in Wheeler: *China and the World War*, pp. 65-6 and Putnam Weale, cited above, pp. 313-4.

All countries are interested in seeing wars becoming as rare as possible. Consequently China cannot but show satisfaction with the views of the Government and people of the United States of America who declare themselves ready, and even eager, to coöperate when the war is over, by all proper means to assure the respect of the principle of the equality of nations, whatever their power may be, and to relieve them of the peril of wrong and violence. China is ready to join her efforts with theirs for the attainment of such results which can only be obtained through the help of all.

Thus China was ready to act when Germany threw down the challenge to the civilized world by its declaration of unlimited submarine warfare in a note dated January 31, addressed to the Chinese Minister at Berlin, who immediately transmitted the same to the Chinese Government at Peking.²⁵ In the meantime the United States, on February 4, formally communicated with China on the subject of the threatened German submarine warfare against neutral shipping, and invited her to associate herself with the United States in breaking off diplomatic relations with Germany.²⁶ Accordingly, on February 9, the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Wu Ting-fang, addressed to the German Minister at Peking a note and afterwards transmitted to Berlin. This note protested against the new measures of submarine warfare inaugurated by Germany, and concludes with the following words:²⁷

²⁵ The Note states to the effect that the German Government was obliged to do away with restrictions upon naval warfare and hoped that Chinese Government would warn Chinese vessels and citizens of danger in entering the forbidden zones. See China Ministry of Foreign Affairs: *China War Documents*, No. 1, pp. 1-3.

²⁶ China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, cited above, No. 2, p. 5. It is popularly believed that China's entry into the War was largely due to the personal influence of the American Minister at Peking. See Treat: *The Far East in the World War*, p. 446; Vinacke: *A History of the Far East in Modern Times*, p. 388; Latourette: *China, the United States and the War*, p. 182; Wheeler: *China and the World War*, p. 79; Gilbert Reid in his *China, Captive or Free*, p. 62, attributed China's participation in the War to the influence of the United States, as a "Wilson-Lansing-Reinch Intrigue."

²⁷ China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No. 3, pp. 5-6. Commenting on China's protest of February 9, 1917, threatening to sever diplomatic relations if its remonstrance proved ineffectual, the *Vossische Zeitung* tearfully remarked that even so weak a state as China dared to look defiantly at the German nation!

In case, contrary to its expectations, its protest be ineffectual, the Government of the Chinese Republic will be constrained, to its profound regret, to sever diplomatic relations at present existing between the two countries. It is unnecessary to add that the attitude of the Chinese Government has been dictated purely by the desire to further the cause of the world's peace and by the maintenance of the sanctity of international law.

On the same day, a note was addressed to Dr. Reinch, American Minister to Peking, informing him that the Chinese Government "has taken similar action by protesting energetically to the German Government against the new measures of blockade."²⁸

This move stirred up a great deal of confusion in Chinese officialdom. The internal politics of the time is too complicated to be fully narrated, but it will suffice our purpose to summarize by saying that the whole confusion was caused by a breach between the President, Li Yuan-hung and the Premier, Tuan Chi-jui. The latter had the support of the military leaders, and saw that a positive and strong foreign policy would greatly enhance his power and prestige. But the President insisted that the assent of the Parliament should be given to all steps taken. Thus, on March 10, the question was sent to the Lower House for decision. It upheld the policy of the Government by a vote of 331 to 87. The next day, the Senate did the same by a majority of 150 votes. On the day the Lower House voted, came the German reply, the mildness of which failed to have any effect upon the House decision since it was delivered at 9.30 P.M., after the vote had been taken. The note begins by expressing surprise that the Chinese protest was accompanied by a threat, and concludes as follows: "The reason which has prompted the Imperial Government to adopt this conciliatory policy is the knowledge that, once diplomatic relations are severed with Germany, China will not only lose a truly good friend, but will also be entangled in unthinkable difficulties."²⁹

²⁸ China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, cited above, No. 4, pp. 6-7.

²⁹ For the full text of the German reply, see China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, cited above, No. 5, pp. 7-8. While the matter is of mere academic interest, it is amusing to notice the inconsistency between the German note of January 31, 1917, and the German reply of March 10, 1917. In the former,

With a Parliamentary endorsement behind it, the Chinese Government had nothing to fear in taking the vital step of severing diplomatic relations. On March 12, instruction was sent to the Chinese Minister at Berlin, Dr. W. W. Yen, to make arrangements to have the Danish Government take care of Chinese interests in Germany.³⁰ On March 13, instructions were given out by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Commissioners of Foreign Affairs for the various provinces to issue passports to German consuls and their staffs as soon as diplomatic relations would be declared at an end.³¹ On March 14, at 12 o'clock, a Presidential Proclamation for the severance of diplomatic relations with Germany was issued,³² the German Minister at Peking and his staff were handed their passports,³³ and the diplomatic representatives of the Allied and Neutral states at Peking were informed by the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs of China's rupture with Germany.³⁴ On the same day there was issued a Presidential Mandate, to formulate plans, in accordance with international law, for the protection of German residents in China, and regulations governing the disposition of their property. These provisions were subsequently drafted and adopted.³⁵

the German Foreign Minister said: "... the Imperial Government begs to express its hope that the Chinese Government will warn Chinese vessels of the danger which they run in entering the forbidden zones described in the annex as well as warn Chinese citizens against entrusting passengers or goods to ships frequenting the ports of the forbidden zones." And yet in the reply to the Chinese protest, he said: "... The surprise is doubly great, because of the fact that, as China has no shipping interests in the seas of the blockaded zones, she will not suffer thereby."

³⁰ China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, cited above, No. 20, p. 21.

³¹ *Ibid.*, No. 50, p. 39.

³² *Ibid.*, No. 6, pp. 8-9, reproduced in Great Britain State Papers, 1917-18, Vol. CXI, pp. 679-80. The Proclamation begins with a brief narration of China's position from the beginning of the war as a neutral, Germany's inauguration of unlimited submarine warfare, China's protest, and Germany's refusal to abandon her blockade policy. It concludes: "... In the cause of international law and in the interests of the protection of the lives and property of our people, diplomatic relations with Germany are hereby severed."

³³ *Ibid.*, No. 8, p. 10.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, No. 9, p. 11.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, No. 7, pp. 9-10. In No. 122 (March 15) are contained in the Regulations Respecting the Protection of German Residents in China adopted by the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of War; In No. 123 (March 15) are contained the Regulations for the Protection of German Merchants and Missionaries in China, adopted by the same authorities as the preceding regulations. In No. 112 (March 22) and No. 113 (April 10) are contained the Regulations governing postal service, viz., rules of procedure respecting the delivery of German mail bags, etc.

As to German interests in China, the Netherlands Minister at Peking was to assume control.³⁶ At important places where there were German consulates but no Netherlands consulates, one German subordinate official was retained to look after the archives of the German consulate, to keep in touch with, and give advice to, the German residents, and also to make reports on the situation to the Netherlands Minister at Peking.³⁷

The German Minister Admiral von Hintze left Peking on March 25 and arrived at Shanghai two days later, to take a Dutch steamer for his home country by way of the United States of America.³⁸ German consuls left China in three parties in April, May and July respectively.³⁹ There is ample evidence that the Chinese authorities took adequate care for their security both upon their departure and on the way.⁴⁰

But the consideration shown to the German Minister and Consuls for their departure from China was not paralleled by the treatment accorded to the Chinese Ministers and residents, departing from Germany. The German Government under the pretext that the time limit was too short,⁴¹ instructed the Netherlands

³⁶ China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, cited above, Nos. 10, 11, pp. 12-13. The Netherlands Minister at Peking notified the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs of his being instructed by home government to take charge of all German interests in China at the request of the German Government, and the Foreign Ministry acknowledged the receipt of the Netherlands Minister's note.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, Nos. 51, 60.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, Nos. 59, 66.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, Nos. 70, 86-7.

⁴⁰ In reply to the Netherlands Minister at Peking, the Minister of Foreign Affairs stated in a note to the former (China War Documents, No. 63) that instructions have been sent on many occasions to Commissioners of Foreign Affairs to give assistance to departing German consuls and denied that the latter had been pressed to pass through hostile territories. In China War Documents No. 66, was included an acknowledgment of thanks signed by the German Minister for the "proper courtesy and thoughtfulness" of the authorities who saw his departure. In No. 70, 87 were included similar evidences from the consular parties leaving China. In Nos. 81, 86 were contained reports of the Chinese Minister at Washington about the passing of the German Minister and consuls on their way to Europe and the conveniences afforded to them.

⁴¹ This was not due to China's failure to accord the German Minister with courtesy and convenience for the matter lied with the consent of the Allied Governments. The German Minister, however, went on the journey with the time limit, but he had more time than enough to go back to his home country as stated in Minister Koo's report in China War Documents No. 81.

Minister at Peking to announce to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs that, unless a safe-conduct without time limit was given to the German Minister to China and his party, Minister W. W. Yen would not be allowed to leave Germany.⁴² Thereupon, the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs on April 13 instructed the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires at Copenhagen to request the assistance of the Danish Foreign Office to lodge an emphatic protest.⁴³ It was only after China succeeded in negotiating with the Allies to cancel the time limit that Minister Yen was allowed to leave Berlin for Copenhagen.⁴⁴

With China, a perplexing problem still remained. Germany did not modify her policy as a result of the severance of relations with her on the part of the United States, China, and the other states which followed the American lead. As a preliminary to the final step, that of a declaration of war, the Chinese Government asked the Allies for "three rather modest concessions;" namely, the cancellation of the German and Austrian portions of the Boxer indemnity and the suspension for ten years of the amounts due thereunder to the Allies, withdrawal of foreign troops in China under the Boxer Protocol, and an increase in tariff rates.⁴⁵ In return for this, China agreed to supply food stuffs, raw materials,

⁴² China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, cited above, Nos. 26, 72, 78.

⁴³ In Dr. Wu Ting-fang's second protest in a note addressed to the Netherlands Minister at Peking, dated April 18, 1917 (China War Documents, No. 78), the following words were employed: "... According to international usage, a minister, being representative of a state, would at all times be accorded appropriate courtesies by the Government to which he is accredited, without being subjected to any vexation whatever. Thus the Chinese Government has delivered to the former German Minister passports in accordance with the prevailing usage, and accorded him due protection upon his taking his departure for Germany. But the German Government, under the pretext that the time limit of the safe-conduct issued to the former German Minister is too short, refuses to issue passports to Mr. Yen, the Chinese Minister at Berlin, for his departure. Such a measure amounts to the detaining the Chinese Minister as a hostage, and is contrary to the law of nations—a measure not resorted to by any civilized nation. I, therefore, protested against this action and beg to request that Your Excellency will transmit the same by telegraph to the German Government, requesting that passports be immediately issued to Minister Yen and protection be accorded for his departure."

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, Nos. 28, 73-5, 77-8.

⁴⁵ Treat: *The Far East in the World War*, p. 446; Vinacke: *A History of Far East in Modern Times*, pp. 388-389; Tyau: *China Awakened*, p. 293; Putnam Weale: *The Fight for the Republic in China*, p. 337.

and labor, but the Allies' reply was non-committal. They suggested that China declare war first, and then negotiate for the concessions she wanted. Thus writes Dr. Tyau, in his *China Awakened*:⁴⁶ "Consequently, China's action all the way through was entirely independent, one solely dictated by the desire to obtain a *locus standi* in the *post-bellum* peace conference and so the better to advance her claims in respect of Kiaochow and Shantung."

Driven to the edge of a precipitous cliff, with the war-partnership negotiations coming to a deadlock, China was left to work out her own destiny. A special commission on Diplomatic Affairs was formed to debate upon the procedure to be followed. Opinion was sharply divided between two schools. Memoranda were submitted to the Government on the question of a formal declaration of war,⁴⁷ while the dramatic whirligig of political events was rapidly spinning. They tallowed in rapid succession, the Conference of Tuchuns in April, the dismissal of the Premier, Tuan Chi-jui in May, the dissolution of Parliament on June 12, the restoration of the Manchu Dynasty on July 1 and the return of Tuan Chi-jui.⁴⁸ Such was the series of kaleidoscopic events which

⁴⁶ Tyau: *China Awakened*, p. 293.

⁴⁷ The most notable memoranda submitted were those of Liang Chi-chiao and Kang Yu-wei, for and against the declaration of war respectively. See the English texts of the same in Putnam Weale: *The Fight for the Republic in China*, pp. 329-336. A summary of the opinions during that time for and against the declaration of war in Wheeler's *China and the World War*, pp. 77-83. Briefly stated, Mr. Wheeler's summary is like the following: For the War, (1) The Chinese sympathized deeply with the cause of the Allies, (2) China desired a place in the Peace Conference, particularly for her Shantung question, (3) China considered the United States as an intimate friend, and she was ready to follow the American example, (4) To join the Allies would strengthen the party in power. Against the war, (1) Fear of Japan, (2) Fear of Germany, (3) The German propaganda, (4) Fear of the reigning power to follow the footsteps of Yuan Shih-kai. An interesting account of events in Peking preceding the declaration of war is given in an article by Dr. Carson Chang, China's constitutional lawyer, entitled "The Inside History of China's Declaration of War," *Millard's Review*, August 17, 1918.

⁴⁸ Amid the storm of events in Peking came a friendly warning from the United States in the Note delivered to the Chinese Government on June 5. It signifies the regret of the American Government for the dissension in China and expresses the hope that "China, in her own interest and in that of the world, will immediately set aside her factional political disputes, and that all parties and persons will work for the reestablishment of a coordinate Government and the assumption of that place among the Powers of the world to which China is so justly entitled, but the full attainment of which is impossible in the midst of internal discord."

culminated in the declaration of war upon the accession of Tuan Chi-jui, whose breach with President Li Yuan-hung on the question of severance of relations with Germany has been mentioned in a previous paragraph. The leaders who had always favored a positive foreign policy have come into power. A declaration of war was made by a Presidential Proclamation of Feng Kuo-chang on August 14, 1917,⁴⁹ just five months after the severance of diplomatic relations between the two countries. The proclamation recited the consequences of such a declaration, viz., that all treaties, agreements and conventions concluded between China and Germany, as well as such parts of the international protocols and international agreements as concerned only the relations between the two countries, were thereby abrogated. The President, at the conclusion of the Proclamation, pleaded that international law be respected.

I cannot bear to think that through us the dignity of international law should be impaired, or our position in the family of nations should be undermined or the restoration of the peace and happiness of the world should be retarded. Let the people of this entire nation do their utmost in this hour of trial and hardship in order to safeguard and develop the national existence of the Chung Hua Republic, so that we may establish ourselves amidst the family of nations and share with all mankind the prosperity and blessings drawn from our common association. Let this Proclamation be published in order that it may be generally known.

On the same day, the Netherlands Minister at Peking was requested to inform the German Government that China had declared war against Germany, and that China would conform to the provisions of the Hague Conventions and other international agreements respecting the humane conduct of war.⁵⁰ The diplomatic

⁴⁹ China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, cited above, No. 12, pp. 13-15, reproduced in Great Britain State Papers, 1917-1918, Vol. CXI, pp. 680-82. This Presidential Proclamation without Parliamentary endorsement (for then Parliament had already been dissolved by the fateful Mandate of June 13) was a usurpation of Presidential Powers. But externally, from the point of view of the consequences, that is, the existence of a state of war, its legality was unquestioned.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, No. 14, pp. 16-17.

representatives of the Allied and neutral states at Peking were similarly notified.⁵¹ In return, cordial telegrams were received from the Entente and the Associated Powers, among them being one from the British Chargé d'Affaires at Peking, Sir B. Alston, which declared: "His Majesty's Government will do all that rests with them to ensure that China shall enjoy in her international relations the position and regard due to a great country."⁵²

On the day of the proclamation, a Presidential Mandate was issued ordering the various departments of the Government concerned, promptly and effectively to take necessary steps as sanctioned by the existing international law, in view of the declaration of war.⁵³ Some measures in relation thereto had already been mildly applied after the severance of diplomatic relations; and others were instantly or subsequently adopted. These provided, *inter alia*, for the inspection and disposition of German property,⁵⁴ the administration of former German concessions and settlements,⁵⁵ the taking over of the right of territorial jurisdiction,⁵⁶ the internment of German vessels in Chinese waters,⁵⁷ the disarmament of German subjects bearing arms, except for self-protection,⁵⁸ the censorship of mail matter,⁵⁹ the maintenance of vigilant watch over German residents,⁶⁰ the taking over of former

⁵¹ China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, cited above, No. 16, p. 18.

⁵² *Ibid.*, No. 17, p. 19: The courtesy of the Entente and the Associated Powers was also illustrated by their agreement to postpone the payment of the Boxer indemnity for a period of five years commencing from January 1, 1918; (Russia consented to the suspension of only one-third of its annual share.) to revise the customs tariff by an international conference; to cancel the German and Austrian shares of the Boxer indemnity. See Tyau, cited above, pp. 303-4; Vinacke, cited above, p. 391.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, No. 13, p. 15.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, No. 124, pp. 114-6; No. 127, pp. 118-20.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, No. 125, pp. 116-7; No. 126, pp. 117-8; No. 128, pp. 120-2; No. 132, pp. 126-7.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, No. 134, pp. 128-30; No. 138, pp. 133-4; No. 144, pp. 139-40; No. 155, pp. 152-4; No. 159, pp. 167-8; No. 163, pp. 171-2; No. 164, pp. 172-3; No. 170, pp. 176-7; No. 171, 178; No. 176, pp. 181-2; No. 188, pp. 192-3.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, No. 129, pp. 122-3; No. 131, pp. 125-6; No. 139, pp. 134-5; No. 177, pp. 183-4.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, No. 142, pp. 137-8; No. 143, pp. 138-9.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, No. 114, pp. 92-3.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, No. 158, pp. 162-6; No. 161, p. 170; No. 166, p. 174.

German barracks at Peitaiho and Tangku,⁶¹ the liquidation of German banks,⁶² the establishment of prize courts and the promulgation of regulations governing captures at sea, the safe-keeping of captured property in the naval warehouse, and punishment for the prisoners of war.⁶³ Some of these are of such vital importance in the history of diplomatic relations between the two countries that they deserve a separate consideration in a later part of this chapter.

Within the country, China guarded her peace and interests against any enemy influence. Upon the communication of the Russian Minister in Peking relative to certain plots of enemy agents in China, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, on August 19, 1917, instructed the Commissioners of Foreign Affairs for the various provinces to consult the military and civil governors in order to take precautionary measures,⁶⁴ and subsequently coöperation was secured from the Ministry of Interior for such measures.⁶⁵ Outside of the country, the thousands of laborers sent out from China were rendering active and distinguished services. The heroism, assiduity and perseverance of these representatives of the far eastern republic far outweighed the accusations of the Allied Powers, as made in their Memorandum of October 30, 1918, relating to so-called "China's twelve omissions and commissions." The tracking down of the elusive German raider Emden in the South Pacific and the American reoccupation of Bazoches in September, 1918, are associated with the Chinese aid.⁶⁶ If the Chinese officials had been lukewarm in

⁶¹ China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, cited above, No. 172, pp. 178-9; No. 173, p. 179.

⁶² *Ibid.*, No. 160, p. 169; No. 168, pp. 175-6; No. 174, pp. 179-80; No. 181, pp. 186-7.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, No. 115, p. 93; No. 116, pp. 94-9; No. 117, p. 99; No. 118, pp. 100-8; No. 119, pp. 108-9; No. 120, p. 109; No. 121, pp. 109-10.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, China War Documents, No. 161, p. 170.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, No. 166, p. 174.

⁶⁶ An interesting account of the participation of the Chinese laborers and students in the war is given in Tyau: *China Awakened*, p. 309 et. seq. It is said there too that when the German raider Emden had landed a party to dismantle the wireless station and a Chinese farmer on the south sea island was taken to conduct the invaders to the place, another Chinese passed by. The former told the latter to warn the authorities and this enabled the British to capture their prey, and the mischievous raider cornered and put out of commission. As to the reoccupation of Baroches in September, 1918, the hero of the story was Sing Kee, a Chinese laborer, who took charge of a message station, where he remained after the defending Americans evacuated. He remained there all alone to take care of the message to be sent to the headquarters, until the American troops reentered the village the next morning.

their prosecution of the war, the active services of the Chinese laborers abroad and the moral support of one-fourth of the world's entire population are things not to be too easily underrated.

As the battle was waging in distant lands, little can be written of anything at home except the complications with Japan.⁶⁷ Very naturally, on the eve of the Armistice, China anticipated more diplomatic storms from the Allies, particularly Japan, and not from Germany. The outstanding question in this connection was the claim for Shantung. While in the Treaty of Versailles, China practically lost her rights over Shantung to Japan,⁶⁸ China

⁶⁷ Throughout the whole period since 1914, China was more in trouble with Japan than with Germany. Japan violated her neutrality in September, 1914, and her protests were lodged without result. (See the two protests from the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sun Pao-chi, dated September 27 and September 29 respectively, and the Japanese reply of October 2, 1914. Tyau: *China Awakened*, Appendix B, pp. 412-416). Thus the Twenty-one Demands was an episode in itself, by which China would be brought under the complete sway of the Island Empire, and which stirred up so much resentment and rage among the intellectual class that the peace of mind of the Chinese was more disturbed by them than by the raging of war storms in Belgium. Japan attempted several times to grasp the leadership in the move to dictate China's international attitude. She also took advantage of every American slip in policy, such as the Lansing-Ishii Agreement to bring about the illusion that Japan's supremacy in the Far East was recognized by the Western nations and to bring home to the Chinese the apparent emptiness of American professions. Again the war loan or the arms contract was a transaction reminiscent of the "Fifth Group" of the Twenty-one Demands, binding the Republic to buy from Japan at least fifty per cent of the war materials.

⁶⁸ The occupation of Shantung by Japan at the beginning of the war presented an unusually complicated situation in the Far East. The German holdings in Shantung Province derived their justification from the Kiaochow Convention of March 6, 1898, which gave them no title and expressly reserved to China sovereignty over the entire leased area. Again one of the limitations of the leased contract was that it should not be transferred to any other Power by Germany. In other words the maintenance of the lease depended upon its continuation in the hands of the original lessee. Consequently the Japanese right of succession to Germany, because of her reduction of the territory by force, was an arbitrary invention. But the Agreements of 1915 worked out a different situation, as far as the recognition of the Entente Powers is concerned. Such recognition cannot be based upon international law, but from considerations of expediency, to "preserve the peace of the Far East." But in the peace conference, Japan worked out a tricky program to win the Shantung point. She asked for racial equality, touching upon the U. S. Immigration laws, which President Wilson could not agree. Then she pressed hard on the Shantung question, giving as her reasons the sacrifice of men and money, and also expressed the willingness to restore Shantung to China conditionally. Thus by trick and by threat to leave the conference, China's stand was weakened. In the Treaty of Peace of Versailles, June 28, 1919, the three articles, 156-158, respecting Shantung

was decidedly a gainer as far as her case with Germany was concerned. In Articles 128-34 of the Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany⁶⁹ signed at Versailles, Germany renounced all benefits and privileges resulting from the provisions of the final Boxer Protocol, her control of the concessions at Tientsin and Hankow, her claim for repossession of the public properties of the German Governments in China, except those of a diplomatic and consular character, and her claim arising from the internment of German nationals and ships during the war. But to this instrument, the Chinese delegates did not attach their signature, on account of the unjustifiable arrangement respecting Shantung (though Japan promised to restore Shantung at a future time) and the refusal of the conference officers to allow them to make a reservation respecting the Shantung clauses.⁷⁰

With this delicate question unsettled, another series of problems relating to the reestablishment of normal relations between China and Germany arose. By a Presidential Mandate of September 15, 1919, the war between China and Germany was declared ended, and German consular and diplomatic representation was renewed. Negotiations were then undertaken which resulted in the conclusion of the new treaty of May 20, 1921, which was ratified by the Chinese President on June 28. Before discussing the nature and contents of this new treaty, it is necessary to go back to those incidents which arose as an outcome of the severance of diplomatic relations and of the declaration of war, and relative to which there was considerable dispute over the justification of the Chinese actions. The more recent agreement of 1921 settled these differences.

were completely favorable to the Japanese claim, and Shantung was restored to Japan as if by conquest. The Chinese delegation in the peace conference, after a desperate fight against the decision of the Council, and after being refused to make any reservation for their signatures, refrained from signing for the whole instrument, which contained also articles in favor of China at the expense of Germany.

⁶⁹ The Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany signed at Versailles, July 28, 1919. Published by His Majesty's Stationery Office.

⁷⁰ The Shantung question was afterwards solved in the Washington Conference in 1921-22, and the articles 128-134 were afterwards accepted by a German Declaration, simultaneously with the conclusion of the new treaty between China and Germany in 1921.

We may recall that upon the proclamation of the severance of diplomatic relations on March 14, 1917, and upon the proclamation declaring the existence of a state of war on August 14, 1917, the President of China instructed the authorities concerned to formulate plans and to take necessary steps, in conformity with International Law, as consequences of such Proclamations.⁷¹ This the authorities did, to the continued remonstrances of the Netherlands Minister at Peking, who was then taking charge of the German interests in China. More emphatic protestation arose out of China's promulgating special regulations, after the severance of diplomatic relations, but before the declaration of war. Thus in the note of the Netherlands Minister of May 29, 1917, to the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, there is contained the following statement:⁷²

What is known as the common usage is that after the severance of diplomatic relations, the nationals of the two states are left unmolested by the state in which they reside and enjoy the same protection as is accorded to the resident nationals of other countries. Any arrangement other than this would be contrary to the principle of International Law now in practice.

In reply to this protest, the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs addressed to the Netherlands Minister the note of June 26, 1917, saying:⁷³

Since the condition of affairs in China is different from that obtaining in other countries, therefore we were compelled to formulate these regulations carefully in order to suit the circumstances.

The following discussion will serve to bring out briefly the facts respecting the various phases of the situation which had necessitated the Chinese Government's formulating the plans and taking the steps which caused so much protest. The special privileges given to Germany in the preëxisting Sino-German treaties, a condition of affairs "different from that obtaining in other countries," had rendered the severance of diplomatic relations between the two countries a very different proposition. The more important of these

⁷¹ China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, cited above, No. 7, pp. 9-10; No. 13, p. 15.

⁷² *Ibid.*, No. 149, pp. 144-6.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, No. 151, p. 147.

facts which have a significant bearing upon the history of diplomatic relations between the two countries, owing to the decided changes which they brought about, include (1) the return of the German Concessions in Hankow and Tientsin, (2) the relinquishment of consular jurisdiction, and (3) the control over German residents and property in China.

The agreement for the lease of Concessions in Hankow and Tientsin were concluded, "with a view to the development of German commerce," on October 3, 1895, and October 30, 1895, respectively.⁷⁴ According to the agreement, the German Consuls charged with the powers of administration within these respective areas,⁷⁵ were given exclusive authority, especially in matters of leasing land to non-German foreigners. Thus Article IV of the Convention of October 3, 1895⁷⁶ reads:

It may happen that after the conclusion of this treaty of lease a non-German foreigner desires to acquire a lease of land in the German Concession. This, however, shall only be possible if the German Consul gives his sanction thereto, after and because the area of the Concession has, by this treaty of lease, been transferred to the German Government in perpetuity. It is the German Consul alone who is entitled, if such a case arises, to apply to the Chinese authorities for the issue of a title-deed.

Under these agreements the Germans held their concessions in Hankow and Tientsin until March, 1917, when, by virtue of the severance of diplomatic relations between China and Germany, the Chinese authorities took steps to return the German Concessions

⁷⁴ MacMurray, cited above, 1894-1919, pp. 42, 46. A précis of the "Memorandum Submitted to the Reichstag on the subject of the Establishment of German Settlements at Tientsin and Hankow," Inclosure in Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of China, No. 4, Great Britain, Parliamentary Paper, 1899, Vol. CIX, China No. 1 (1899). ". . . In some settlements, e. g., Shanghai, the Germans have been admitted to fair and equal participation in the rights acquired by the English or Americans, but that in the case of Hankow, for instance, the English only admitted the English flag to the privileges of the quays, thus excluding the Germans. It has been, therefore, decided to establish German Settlements at Tientsin and Hankow, where the interests of the Germans were most considerable, next to Shanghai. . . . Statutes for their governments are to be drawn, in which every care will be taken to secure the predominance of the German element."

⁷⁵ MacMurray, cited above, p. 43, under Article II: "The German Concession will be administered by the German Consul in accordance with this agreement of lease and with exclusive orders to be issued in this connection."

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 44.

in Hankow and Tientsin.⁷⁷ At Hankow, the return was quietly and peaceably done in the afternoon of March 15 with only verbal protest from the German Consul, Dr. Voretzsch.⁷⁸ No disturbance was created against the German residents,⁷⁹ but, on the contrary, freedom and effective protection of German persons and property were guaranteed.⁸⁰ German police powers in the Concession were transferred to the Chinese Police Chief; no changes in matters of administration were introduced; while the Special Commissioner of Foreign Affairs for Hupeh, Mr. Wu Chung-lien, acted in the stead of the German Consul-General.⁸¹

At Tientsin, the return of the German Concession to China was done in the afternoon of March 16, 1917, without protest from the German Consul, indeed, with his assistance.⁸² The Concession police was in the meantime handed over to Chinese control.⁸³ The Chinese authorities also took over the German barracks there, together with the arms and ammunitions therein, which were, at the time, taken charge of by a special delegate of the Netherlands Minister.⁸⁴ On the whole, there was no sign of hostility throughout the transactions.

⁷⁷ China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, cited above, No. 126, pp. 117-8: The report of the Military Governor of Hupeh to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; No. 28, pp. 120-2: The report of the Special Commissioner of Foreign Affairs for Hupeh to the Minister of Foreign Affairs; No. 125, pp. 116-7: The report of the Special Commissioner of Foreign Affairs to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

⁷⁸ The German Consul in the meantime declared that he reserved all the rights and claims which might arise out of the situation. See China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, cited above, No. 128.

⁷⁹ As indicated in the report of the Military Governor of Hupeh, No. 126, there was a German employee in the Hanyang Iron Works, for whom the authorities were instructed to accord precaution and protection. A German teacher in the Hupeh Foreign Language School was accorded the same and his contract continued to be in effect, according to telegraphic instruction from the Ministry of Education.

⁸⁰ The populace was instructed to refrain from any manifestation of hostility toward the German residents and declaration was made to the effect that "the security, freedom and protection of the lives and property of the Germans in the Concession will be guaranteed in equal measures as it has hitherto been in the German Concession. . . ." See No. 126 and No. 128.

⁸¹ In the report of the Special Commissioner of Foreign Affairs, Wu Chung-lien, No. 128, he declared that "In regard to the internal administration of the concession which is in the hands of the Municipal Board no changes will be introduced."

⁸² China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, cited above, No. 125, pp. 116-7

⁸³ *Ibid.*

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

Towards the end of March 1917, new Rules of Procedure for the Assumption of Control of German Concessions were adopted by the Ministry of the Interior,⁸⁵ according to which, the former German Concessions were reorganized as Special Areas. There were established Bureaux for the Provisional Administration of Special Areas at Tientsin and Hankow. In each, the Chief of the Bureau was charged with the control of the police, with other administrative duties, and with foreign affairs in conjunction with the Commissioner of Foreign Affairs of the Province. There was also the provision:⁸⁶

All the existing rules and regulations governing the administration of the said Areas as well as the police regulations and the rules of taxation shall be temporarily enforced as formerly except those which are in conflict with laws, rules and regulations at present in force in China, and those which are unsuitable to the treatment of residents within the Areas. These conflicting rules shall be nullified and rules which under certain circumstances are considered necessary shall be amended, as each case may require.

All laws, rules, and regulations enacted by China may also be enforced within the said Areas according to circumstances.

When China declared war on Germany, on August 14, 1917, the word "Provisional" was stricken out, and the controlling organ of such area was henceforth called "Bureau for the Municipal Administration of the Special Area."⁸⁷

Considering the justification of the Chinese action in reducing the German concessions after the rupture, but before the declaration of war, we have to keep in mind that the special privilege was not conferred without restriction. The exclusive power given to the German Consuls, such as in the case of sanctioning the grant of leases to non-German foreigners, could not be intended to permit

⁸⁵ China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, cited above, No. 132, pp. 126-7. The adopted Rules were grouped into three sections: (1) The Powers of the Chief of Bureau, (2) The Control of the Chief of Bureau over the original Municipal Council and the resolutions of the rate-payers of the municipality, (3) Application of the already existing rules and regulations governing the administration of the special areas and the rules and regulations enacted by China.

⁸⁶ Group (3) of the said Rules of Procedure Governing the Assumption of Control of German Concessions. In China War Doc. No. 132.

⁸⁷ China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, cited above, No. 154, pp. 150-2.

delegation of the same power to a consul of another foreign country, in view of the explicit language used in the agreement.⁸⁸ When the German Consuls left in March, 1917, the powers of administration and those incidental thereto went back with him. The Concessions could not be left anarchical. The Netherlands Consuls were to take charge of the German interests, in the sense of defensive protection of German nationals and continuance of the routine. They were in no sense considered as having stepped into the shoes of the German Consuls to enforce the special privileges, which had been granted to Germany alone. Any such arrangement would be in direct contradiction with the terms of the treaty. Naturally, China, on whose territory the Concessions were, and in whom the sovereignty over the Concessions lay, would take the steps necessary to meet this singular condition of affairs. This she did with full consideration of justice.

Another principle of international law may be here cited to justify the Chinese assumption of control of the German Concession; viz., "In order to save itself and its nationals from being subjected to treatment deemed subversive of international law, as well as to compel the abandonment of reprehensible conduct, a state may suspend all commercial intercourse with that other whose acts are the source of complaint."⁸⁹ It is permissible for a nation to take non-amicable measure short of war. As the lease agreements were concluded "with a view to the development of German commerce," China was neither bound to keep up her commercial relations with Germany, nor to continue the special privileges granted to the latter for the purpose of commercial expansion at a time when Germany was threatening the world with her unrestricted submarine policy and ignoring the plea for humanity from the far eastern republic.

⁸⁸ The Lease Conventions of 1895 provided for the power of administration of the concessions by the German Consuls and the exclusive power of the German Consuls to sanction the grant of lease to non-German foreigners, etc. See Articles II and IV., MacMurray: *Treaties and Agreements, etc.*, pp. 43-4.

⁸⁹ Hyde: *International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United States*, pp. 185-6. "An Act to suspend the commercial intercourse between the United States and France, and the dependencies thereof," June 13, 1788, 1 Stat. 565; "An Act to suspend the commercial intercourse between the United States and certain parts of the island of St. Domingo, Feb. 28, 1806, 2 Stat. 351, etc.

The ease with which the authorities handled the matter, the protection afforded to the German residents and property within the Concessions, the gradual steps taken by the authorities in altering the ways of internal administration and her respect for international law, all serve to indicate how considerably China handled the case. Thus the German Concessions, which, like all others, were granted more for the interest of the grantee than for that of the grantor, had been eradicated from the territory of China.

(2) Relinquishment of Consular Jurisdiction.

The German right of consular jurisdiction was based upon the Treaty of Tientsin, September 2, 1861.⁹⁰ Such a special privilege, to be sure, was given to the Germans, and the authority lay in the hands of the German Consuls alone to repress crimes and settle differences among the German subjects in China, as Article XXXVIII and XXXIX of that instrument of friendship indicated. After the severance of diplomatic relations, the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, on March 31, 1917, sent to the Netherlands Minister at Peking a note, saying:

... The Chinese Government in the interest of the better treatment of German subjects residing in China, has decided that, in spite of the principle of International Law which does not permit the delegation to another state of the right of consular jurisdiction growing out of the Sino-German treaties, all cases concerning German subjects, civil or criminal, which have in the past been tried and adjudicated by the German Consuls functioning in China, with the exception, however, of those criminal cases provided for in the Chinese Criminal Code, which shall be tried and adjudicated by the Chinese tribunals, may now be tried and adjudicated by the Netherlands Consuls in China.⁹¹

With this note was enclosed a copy of the Provisional Regulations Governing the Trial of Germans in Criminal Cases, which were grouped into three main articles. The first recited the offenses which constituted the exceptions as mentioned in the note, to be tried and adjudicated by the Chinese tribunals. The second

⁹⁰ Hertslet's China Treaties, Vol. I, 331. China, The Maritime Customs, Treaties, Conventions, etc., Between China and the Foreign States, Vol. II, 115.

⁹¹ China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, cited above, No. 134.

provided for the jurisdiction of the courts in those exceptional criminal cases. The third provided for the detention, execution of judgment and prison.⁹²

To this attempted enforcement of the said regulations the Netherlands Minister protested, insisting that the treaty rights were unaffected by the severance of diplomatic relations.⁹³ On April 30, the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Wu Ting-fang, in his reply to the protest, reiterated as a principle of international law that there should be no delegation of judicial power to another state, and explained that China's allowing the Netherlands Consuls in China to try and adjudicate cases concerning the Germans as defendants, with the exception of only a few criminal cases was fair and equitable.⁹⁴ Such an arrangement, it could be added, was both a diplomatic courtesy and the necessary result of the situation.⁹⁵ The danger was well conceivable, when the thousands of would-be enemies were left uncontrolled in China except for the few Netherlands Consuls, who would certainly tend to make the judicial machinery stale and ineffectual. To the protest against China's enactment of the so-called special regulations the reply of Dr. Wu Ting-fang to the effect that "the condition of affairs in China is different from that obtaining in other countries"⁹⁶ seems eminently reasonable. From the point of view of logic, China could have abolished, in conformity with the rule of international law which does not permit the delegation of consular jurisdiction, the extra-territorial rights of the German resident in China. In not doing so, China had shown more grace than she should. From the point of view of expediency, this partial relinquishment of criminal jurisdiction to the Chinese authorities as necessitated by the peculiar circumstances then existing was far from being a flagrant violation of international law or even treaty provisions.

⁹² China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, cited above, and Inclosure.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, No. 138 (April 11, 1917).

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, No. 144.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.* The exceptional cases where the Germans must submit to Chinese jurisdiction concerned with crimes against the existing Government of China, viz., Riot, Attempt to Overthrow the Government, Treason and such other offenses as Arson Use of Dangerous Explosives, Murder, etc.

⁹⁶ China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, cited above, No. 151.

After the declaration of war, the Chinese Government enacted Provisional Regulations Governing the Trial of Enemy Subjects in Civil and Criminal Cases, according to which "all civil and criminal cases in which enemy subjects were concerned should be tried by the Chinese Courts of Justice."⁹⁷ The mistake of the protest of the Netherlands Minister to these Provisional Regulations is manifest from the following passage in his note of August 18, 1917:⁹⁸

But the said abrogation would not go so far as to interfere with the position in the realm of law, which belongs to the residents of the said two countries in China . . . the said Provisional Regulations do interfere with their legal position. Your Excellency will understand that according to international law, war is a legal action against the enemy government and its organizations, but not against the individual status of enemy persons. . . .

He seemed to assume that when Germany signed the treaty and acquired the benefit therefrom which affected the rights of the Germans, they became inalienable rights notwithstanding the abrogation of treaties.⁹⁹ His reference to the "realm of law" is beside

⁹⁷ China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, cited above, No. 155, and Inclosure.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, China War Documents, No. 159.

⁹⁹ "It was at one time an international custom that the belligerents should at the breaking out of war, make public and solemn proclamation that the obligations of treaties between them had ceased. That custom has become obsolete. In the place of it has arisen the general maxim that war, *ipso facto*, abrogates treaties between the belligerents," Philimore, Commentaries upon International Law, Third Edition, Vol. III, p. 793. In the Chinese declaration, the abrogation of the treaties, etc. was expressly stipulated and contemplated. This is a clearer case. Even if it is argued basing upon the authorities like Moore and Dana that effect of war upon treaties depends upon their "intrinsic character" and that "test of survival is to be found in the nature of the provisions concerned, and not in the origin of the war." See Hyde, International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United States, Vol. II, Section 547. Still it is to be seen that such interpretation is used when there is no unequivocal declaration of the abrogation. Again, for the sake of arguments, if it be admitted that with or without declared abrogation, the intrinsic nature of the provisions are to be considered, we can hardly doubt that such unilateral and unjust arrangement like consular jurisdiction could then be still maintained unaffected by the vital change of circumstances.

the point. After that, there was a continued exchange of notes which yielded no result satisfactory to the Netherlands Minister.¹⁰⁰

(3) Control over German Residents and Properties in China.¹⁰¹

In the Treaty of Tientsin, September 2, 1861, "full and entire protection for their persons and property" was guaranteed to the subject of both China and Germany.¹⁰² After the severance of diplomatic relations, pursuant to the Mandates of the President, the Chinese Government on March, 15, 1917, notified the military and civil governors of the provinces of the adoption of the Regulations Respecting the Protection of German Residents in China,¹⁰³ and of the Regulations for the Protection of German Marchants and Missionaries in China.¹⁰⁴ The former provided for the safe protection of the Germans leaving China, the latter for the conditions for their continuance of residence in China, the inspection of the resident Germans equipped with implements of war, and the exclusion of those whose conduct was detrimental to the interests of China.¹⁰⁵ On April 2, all the German officers and soldiers were conveyed to the interment camps near Peking, where they were well-treated.¹⁰⁶ This was also a step necessitated by the presence of foreign troops. If nothing had been done to prevent unforeseen happenings, the republic would have been in constant danger.

Thus special protection to the residents was provided, and necessary steps to prevent trouble were taken. The Netherlands Minister, on April 7, 1917, requested of the Chinese Government the good treatment of the German subjects in China.¹⁰⁷ On April 13, in the reply of the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, such treatment was

¹⁰⁰ China War Doc. No. 164, China's reply to the protest; No. 170, further protest; No. 176, China's further explanation; No. 179, China's explanation that enemy subjects might be permitted to practise in special law courts, but not in the regular law courts; No. 183, protest for the Siegel case; No. 188, China's explanation and promise of due protection.

¹⁰¹ The subject will be treated under 2 headings: (1) Of German residents in China, (2) Of the German Public and Private Properties.

¹⁰² Hertslet's China Treaties, Vol. I, 331. China, the Maritime Customs, Treaties, Conventions, etc., Between China and the Foreign States, Vol. II, 115.

¹⁰³ China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, cited above, No. 122, pp. 111-2.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, No. 123, pp. 112-3.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, Nos. 122-3.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, No. 133, pp. 127-8.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, No. 136, p. 131.

guaranteed, but a protest was made against Germany's treating Chinese students in Germany as "virtual hostages."¹⁰⁸ On May 12, the Netherlands Minister again requested the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs to make a special statement that the Chinese Government had no intention of expelling German subjects in China or of interning them.¹⁰⁹ On May 19, the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs replied that the treatment would be in conformity with international law, and renewed protest was made against the detention of Chinese students in Germany.¹¹⁰

After the declaration of war, a different state of affairs developed. Measures were at once adopted for the disposal of enemy subjects, the regulations of their continuance in business in China, and the maintenance of a vigilant watch over them.¹¹¹ Precautionary measures were taken to safeguard Chinese interests against enemy influence.¹¹²

The control of German property was almost commensurate with that of resident Germans with the exception of a few cases growing out of the internment of steamers and the liquidation of the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank. After the severance of diplomatic relations, the Chinese authorities proceeded to inspect residences, baggage and things subject to confiscation but returnable after the restoration of normal conditions, and to dispose of those properties convertible to military use.¹¹³ The Chinese Government also issued Rules of Procedure for the Disposition of German Properties in China, which applied to all classes of property except those which were used in connection with military affairs, railways and steamers, and those for which regulations had already been adopted.¹¹⁴ After the declaration of war, the German barracks at Pehtaiho and Tanku were, on September 12, 1917, taken over from the Netherlands consular officials.

¹⁰⁸ China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, cited above, No. 141.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, No. 141.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, No. 147.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, No. 158.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, Nos. 161, 166.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, No. 124.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, No. 127.

More complicated were the cases in regard to the internment of German ships in Chinese waters and the closing of the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank. On the day of the severance of diplomatic relations, March 14, 1917, the German vessels, "Albenga," "Sikiang," "Deike Rickman," "Mei Dah," and "Mei Lee," purporting to be privately owned, were interned in the harbor of Shanghai, under protest from the German Consul-General there.¹¹⁵ Similarly, in the same month, German ships were interned in Kwangtung and Fukien, and their effects were disposed of in accordance with the Regulations Governing the Safe-keeping of Captured Property in the Naval Warehouses.¹¹⁶

On September 17, after the declaration of war, the Netherlands Minister at Peking addressed a note to the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, requesting that the seizure of German vessels be repudiated, and that the Chinese Government be responsible for all the damages in consequence of such illegal seizure.¹¹⁷

As to the liquidation of the main and branch offices of the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank, the Netherlands Minister also protested on August 18, after the declaration of war, on the ground that the bank was private property having no connection with the German Government. On August 28, 1917, the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs replied:¹¹⁸

It is unnecessary to consider whether or not the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank is a purely private financial concern. The action of the Chinese Government is in conformity with the precedents set by other countries. Neither is it contrary to the provisions of the Hague provisions.

On September 10, 1917, the Netherlands Minister again protested:¹¹⁹

Whether or not the various countries, after the declaration of war against Germany, have either confiscated or sequestered the German Banks, I am not informed in detail. I am of the

¹¹⁵ China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, cited above, No. 139: The report of the Commissioner of Foreign Affairs at Shanghai.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, Nos. 129, 131: The German vessel, Keong Wai, was interned in Fukien and the German vessel, Tsingtao, was taken over in Kwangtung.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, No. 177.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, No. 168.

¹¹⁹ Full text, *Ibid.*, No. 174.

opinion that it is not the same with all countries. Assuming that all the countries have taken the same action, such action, being illegal, cannot be followed as legal. . . .

On September 25, the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs again replied:¹²⁰

It is necessary to suspend the business of all enemy banks, and to have them taken into custody of officials authorized by the Government. . . . There is an additional reason in the fact that the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank has been implicated in certain secret plots. The wide-spread complaints and public discussions concerning these conspiracies are not without cause.

Following this, there was once more a meager protest, with the demand that the Chinese Government should be responsible for all the damages and losses that the Bank might suffer.¹²¹

It may be noted in passing that, in view of the peculiar condition of affairs in China, the presence of German troops, which had, before the severance of diplomatic relations, been accorded the privileged treatment the Germans along with the foreigners of other nationalities, and the reasonable apprehension that the German resident in China might conduct themselves to the detriment of the Chinese Republic,¹²² the measures taken by the Chinese Government

¹²⁰ Full text, China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, cited above, No. 181.

¹²¹ *Ibid*, See China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, cited above, No. 190. (November 6, 1917) No. 191 (Nov. 26, 1917). The Netherlands Minister also protested against the non-payment on the part of the Chinese Government of the interest to Deutsch-Asiatische Bank in accordance with various loan agreements made with said Bank. See China War Doc. No. 182 (Oct. 3, 1917). The Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs replied that since the declaration of war between China and Germany all former agreements and treaties which China has entered into with the enemy country have become of no effect; therefore China should stop payment of all interests accrued on various loans due to enemy banks. See China War Doc. No. 185 (October 24, 1917). The Netherlands Minister continued to protest against China's non-payment of interest. See China War Doc. No. 189 (November 2, 1917).

¹²² The Chinese Government did receive a communication from the Russian Minister relative to the plots of enemy agents in China, See China War Doc. No. 161. "There is an additional reason in the fact that the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank has been implicated in certain secret plots. The wide-spread complaints and public discussions concerning these conspiracies are not without cause," Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs replied to the Netherlands Minister in No. 181. When private persons, natural or artificial, are engaged in affording aid to the enemy Government, such private persons would be subject to restraint. See Hyde: International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United States, Vol. II, p. 226, citing Rules of Land Warfare, U. S. Army, No. 25. James W. Garner: "Treatment of Enemy Aliens," Am. J., XII, 27 and 744, XIII, 22.

after the severance of diplomatic relations can in no sense be considered to be a flagrant violation of international law. Moreover, the measures were all defensive in character, and in a majority of cases, the Germans received greater protection after the promulgation of the so-called special regulations than before.¹²³ The liabilities imposed upon the officers in charge of the German properties, guarded or kept by them according to the regulations¹²⁴ and the repeated promises of the Chinese Government to afford equitable treatment of German subjects and properties¹²⁵ were enough to show that China was "compelled to formulate these regulations carefully in order to suit the circumstances."¹²⁶

The writer is not unaware of the fact that there were two stages of development in the whole transaction: the period from the severance of diplomatic relations to the declaration of war, and the period after the declaration till the conclusion of peace. It is in the former period that the actions of the Chinese Government received the most energetic protest from the Netherlands Minister at Peking. But enough has been said concerning the fact that the different condition of affairs had necessitated a different course of action. The Netherlands Minister claimed:

. . . after the severance of diplomatic relations the nationals of the two States are left unmolested by the State in which they reside and enjoy the same protection as is accorded to the resident nationals of other countries.¹²⁷

We have a very perplexing question. Since different countries have different special privileges to the standard of which country was the protection to conform. For the purpose of adjusting the already abnormal and confused state of affairs caused by the German

¹²³ China War Doc. No. 122, No. 126.

¹²⁴ "Except by Act of God or through force majeure or for reasons which do not arise out of neglect, the official concerned shall be held entirely responsible for any damage done to the properties which are guarded, sealed, or kept according to the above regulations. . . ." China War Doc. No. 127.

¹²⁵ The assurances that China would treat the German subjects and properties in China strictly according to international law, China War Doc. Nos. 141, 147, 151.

¹²⁶ The words of Dr. Wu Ting-fang, the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, see China War Doc. No. 151.

¹²⁷ China War Doc. No. 149.

threats during the past few decades, while at the same time permitting the resident Germans to pursue their peaceful callings by affording them reasonable protection, China had met this dilemma by promulgating special regulations. Thus vengeance was superseded by gradual and peaceful adjustment; and the ruthlessness of the German marines and soldiers during the years 1897-1902 were repaid by protection. Putting aside the question of law, it may be questioned if any other people, similarly confronted with such a peculiar state of affairs growing out of the special privileges previously enjoyed by the Germans in China, could have done anything more reasonable than the traditionally peaceful Chinese, especially when we consider the animosities, remaining since the occupation of Kiaochow and the Boxer Expedition, and easily enkindled by the blaze of war-cries which had already brought about a universal conflagration in other parts of the world. The long interval between the rupture and the declaration of war affords a stronger reason for the enactment of special regulations. Partly due to the fact that China was waiting for Germany's repentance, and partly due to her internal troubles, China allowed affairs to drift for five months. If nothing was done, the national feeling caused by the strained relations would be at variance with the exact status of the situation, as no state of war existed. This apprehension was aggravated by the fact that at some places in China there had been German consuls, but no Netherlands consuls.¹²⁸ Although subordinate German consular officers were appointed to remain there, after the rupture of diplomatic relations, their protection of the German interests at such a time of national indignation would be inefficient and inexpedient.

The writer does not intend to make out a perfect case, free from all blame. One thing is certainly regrettable. That is the non-payment of interest on the part of the Chinese Government to the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank in accordance with various loan agreements made with the Bank.¹²⁹ Nevertheless, the bank did possess a semi-official character, as will be seen in the next chapter in

¹²⁸ China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, cited above, Nos. 51, 60.

¹²⁹ *Ibid*, No. 182.

dealing with German banking interests in China. The argument of the Chinese Government that irrespective of the private or public character of the Bank, the war put to an end all former agreements and treaties which China had entered into with the enemy country is far from being tenable, and against the principle of international law.¹³⁰ However unsound the argument was, the Chinese Government made satisfactory reparations after the war, as will be seen at the end of this chapter.

Happily, the Sino-German differences arising out of the war were settled by the treaty of May 20, 1921, which was ratified by the Chinese President on June 28.¹³¹ The most important provisions of the agreement were those embodied in Articles III and IV, by which Germany permanently waived consular jurisdiction over her nationals in China, placing them entirely under the authority of China's law and her courts, and by which tariff autonomy,¹³² so far as German imports and exports were concerned, was conceded.

The text of the third article relating to the abrogation of extraterritorial rights reads as follows:

The citizens of either Republic, residing in the territory of the other, shall in conformity with the laws and regulations of the country have the right to travel, to settle down, and to carry on commerce or industry in all places where the citizens of another nation are allowed to do so.

¹³⁰ "By the testimony of publicists and the practice of nations, the principle is established that the obligation of a State for the payment of its debts is not affected by war even though such debts be held by citizens or subjects of the enemy. . . . The act of the King of Prussia, in 1752, in stopping, as an act of reprisal, the payment of interest due by him to English creditors on the Silesian loan is conspicuous no more by reason of its own solitariness than by reason of the unanimity with which publicists have disapproved it," Moore: Digests, VII, 306, 307, see also Opinion of Mr. Stanbery, Attorney-General, Oct. 15, 1866, 12 Ops. Attys-Gen., 72, 74.

¹³¹ China Treaties, etc., 1921, *L'Accord Sino-Allemand et Les Documents Annexes*.

¹³² In a later agreement signed on August 17, 1928, supplementing the Treaty of 1921, it was provided that the nationals of each in the other country should be accorded equal treatment with nationals of other countries in matter of, and respecting to, tariff, and that the two countries should forthwith negotiate for the conclusion of a treaty of commerce and navigation based on the principle of equality. Page 48, General Political Report, Central Political Council, published March 15, 1929.

They are placed, both their persons and property, under the jurisdiction of the local courts; they shall respect the laws of the country wherein they reside. They shall not pay higher imposts, taxes or contributions than the nationals of the country.

In his note sent in reply to certain questions raised by the German representative, respecting the *post-bellum* arrangement, the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs made the following statements:¹³³

The payment of Indemnity. The statement in the German Declaration that Germany is prepared to reimburse the Chinese Government the expenses of the internment of German militaries in various camps of internment in China, is understood to mean that Germany in addition to indemnifying China for her losses according to the principles of the Versailles Treaty, is also willing to refund to China the internment expenses.

As to the indemnity for war losses, Germany undertakes to pay in advance a portion thereof in a lump sum, which represents the equivalent of one half of the proceeds from the liquidated German property and one half of the values of the sequestered but not yet liquidated German property, which amount will eventually be agreed upon and which will consist of \$4,000,000 in cash and the balance in Tsing-Pu and Hu-Kuang Railway bonds.

Chinese property in Germany. The movable and immovable properties of Chinese residents in Germany will be returned at the ratification of the Agreement.

The Liquidation of Sino-German Indebtedness. The Chinese Government . . . agrees to return to German owners all the proceeds from the liquidation of German property and all the German property still under sequestration.

As to the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank and the Ching-Hsin Mining Corporation, the Chinese authorities concerned will discuss methods of settlement with the Bank and the Corporation themselves; the unliquidated premises of the said Bank in Peking and Hankow will, however, be returned to the original owner in accordance with the procedure stated above.

¹³³ Dated May 20, 1921, China Treaties, etc., 1921, L'Accord Sino-Allemand et Les Documents Annexes (1921).

A simultaneous German Declaration accepted the validity of Articles 128–34 of the Versailles Treaty, by which Germany renounced in favor of China all her special privileges acquired before the war, as mentioned in a previous paragraph.

On July 14, 1924, there were published the two letters from the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Wellington V. K. Koo, addressed to the German Minister at Peking, concerning the settlement of the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank.¹³⁴ According to the first letter, dated June 6, 1924, the Chinese Government agreed to release all books of the bank seized in 1917, to return to the bank its immovable properties in Peking and Hankow, and to pay to the bank, as compensation for the bank's immovable properties in other parts of China, Mex. \$1,950,000 in Tientsin-Pukow and Hu-Kuang Railway bonds, which the Chinese Government promised to take all steps necessary to make negotiable. China also promised to reinstate the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank to its pre-war status. In the second letter, dated June 7, the Chinese Government promised to release the whole of the outstanding balance of the German private property still withheld by China, and the value of the property so released together with the property released since 1921 was agreed between the Chinese and German Governments to be from 69 to 70 million Mexican dollars. Germany was to pay to China the advance portion of the indemnity, being equivalent to one half of the value of the released private property, and the mode of payment was prescribed at the end of the letter.¹³⁵

It is also of importance to mention the Agreement between the British and German Governments Relating to German Debts and Property in China, which was signed at London, April 5, 1923.¹³⁶ According to this Agreement, China, as the custodian

¹³⁴ Peking Daily News, July 14, 1924.

¹³⁵ This payment is being made in the following way:

- (a) Cash paid in 1921 Mex. \$4,000,000
- (b) 15,000,000 Mexican dollars in railway bonds: Bonds of the 1908 Tientsin-Pukow Railway Loan of 400,000 pounds nominal at 68 equal to 952,000 pounds in market value at 8.421 Mexican dollars per pound Sterling equal to 8,016,792 (Mexican dollars). Bonds of the 1910 Tientsin-Pukow Railway Loan 950,000 nominal at 66 equal to 627,000 pounds in market value at 8.421 Mexican dollars per pound Sterling equal to 5,279,967 (Mex. dollars).

¹³⁶ Gr. Brit. Parl. Papers, 1923, Vol. XXIII, Treaty Series, No. 8, (1923).

of the German assets, was to pay the German indebtedness to the British creditors, from the proceeds of the property or cash assets belonging to the debtor in the hands of the Chinese Custodian. The following is the essential point of the agreement:

The Chinese Custodian will notify claims by British nationals under this arrangement to an office to be established by the German Government, separate from the Clearing Office established under the Treaty of Versailles, and the German office will inform the British representative in Berlin, within two months from the date of notification, whether is admitted or contested by the German debtor. . . .

Where, however, the debtor is known to be now resident in China or elsewhere out of Europe, the matter will be dealt with directly between the Custodian and the representative in Shanghai of the German office. . . .

Claims not admitted may be submitted by the creditor to the Anglo-German Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, and any sum found due by the Tribunal shall . . . be payable by the Chinese Custodian. . . .

Any sum admitted by the debtor or found due by a competent Tribunal will be paid by the Custodian from any funds in his hands belonging to German nationals. . . .

Thus, after the war, amicable relations between China and Germany were satisfactorily reestablished. Former animosities have been forgotten, and the two countries are fast entering into a new period of mutual appreciation of each other's culture and coöperation in commerce and industries, as will be seen in the next chapter. During the Shameen Affair of June 23, 1925, the German consul at Canton acted as one of the mediators, and, through his good offices, negotiations were carried on between the British and the Chinese authorities to reduce the tension of the strained relations existing at that time.¹³⁷ In July, 1929, when the Soviet Russia severed diplomatic relations with China owing to a dispute over the Chinese Eastern Railway, the German diplomatic representatives in China were entrusted to take charge of the Russian interests in China.

¹³⁷ Gr. Brit. Parl. Papers, 1926, Vol. XXX, China No. 1 (1926), pp. 7-8: The British gunboats at Shameen fired at the Chinese paraders who were staging demonstrations to show their sympathy for the Shanghai Incident of May 30, 1925. This aroused increased animosities among the Chinese against the British.

CHAPTER VII

GERMAN CULTURAL, COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES IN CHINA

IN spite of the military seizure of Kiaochow by Germany in 1898 and her participation in the Boxer Expedition in 1900, which intensified the hatred of the Chinese against Germany, the achievement of the Germans in China, from the point of view of their cultural, commercial and industrial enterprises, should not be underrated. Their pioneer and academic spirit, their methods of conducting business by personal approach, their efficient organization, their keen interest in opening up natural resources, and their assiduity in standing against bitter and powerful competition are worthy of admiration. The present chapter will be devoted to a discussion of, (1) their cultural agencies in China which will include chiefly the missionaries, schools, hospitals and other works; (2) their commercial development along the lines of trade with China, navigation and banking activities; (3) their industrial enterprises in railways, mining, forestation and forestry, and other minor industries.

The beginnings of German missionary activities in China have been briefly touched upon in the first chapter. For the sake of a systematic treatment, their work may be divided into the following three periods: (1) the period before the first Sino-German Treaty of 1861, (2) the period between 1861 and the Kiaochow Convention of 1898, and (3) the period after the Kiaochow Convention to the present.

During the first period, most of the work of German missionaries was done in South China, except for their temporary influence upon the Court during the beginning of the Manchu Dynasty, the construction of the astronomical apparatus in Peking by Schall and Rho, and the activities of Gutzlaff among the Council of Scholars, the

Hanlin.¹ This was due partly to the convenience of communication with Europe by waterways, and partly to the presence of Hongkong, a Europeanized port, as a convenient center and starting point for their activities.² A most important and interesting account of the German missionary work during this period is to be found in the person of Gutzlaff. He was sent out in 1827 by the Rotterdamer Missionsgesellschaft. After 1831, he worked as an independent missionary among the poor and sick. In Macao, he organized the first medical missionary society in 1834, and there he opened a school for Chinese children. In 1844, he founded the "Christlichen Verein zur Ausbreitung des Evangeliums" into which he gathered a group of Chinese Christians who worked

¹ Georg Franzius: *Kiautschou, Deutschlands Erwerbung in Ostasien*, p. 121: The personal influence of the first Jesuits in China, Schaal and Verbiest, upon the Manchu Court has been mentioned in the first two pages of Chapter I. The astronomical apparatus in Peking was erected for the Emperor of China who was then interested in astronomy and mathematics. Schall also wrote many books on astronomy; G. E. Burkhardt: *Kleine Missions-Bibliothek*, Vol. III, Asia, "Die Evangelische Mission in China und Japan," pp. 165, 167, 170, 171, 181, 182; D. Julius Richter: *Das Werden der Christlichen Kirche in China*, pp. 324, 325, Gutzlaff was the first German protestant missionary to succeed in penetrating into North China. He made acquaintance with the Hanlin, to which he submitted several scientific works; for example his works on geography. He was highly respected. For a time, during and after 1838, he served in the English legation at Macao, while he still utilized his leisure hours in missionary work. After the Opium War, he assisted in interpretation and secretarial work for the English during the negotiations for the Treaty of Nanking, 1842. He even held political position on behalf of the English in Ningpo, where he still was actively engaged in missionary work. His translation of the New Testament, upon the recommendation of the Governor-General of Kwangtung, won the Imperial approval of the Emperor Tao Kwang. He was the most active among the German missionaries whose work at that time did not have treaty sanction.

² Burkhardt, cited above, p. 205: The pioneer work of the German missionaries, among a people totally divergent in beliefs and customs, without treaty sanction at that time, certainly demanded a convenient and safe main station. Of course they could not find, since 1842, a better place for such a purpose in view than the British Hongkong. "Among the six chief seats of missions, Hongkong and surroundings, Canton, Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo and Shanghai, German missions were to be found in 1855 only in Hongkong and surroundings." Richter, cited above, p. 329: Hongkong became important as a "point of departure" for the German missions; Wilhelm Knappe: *Deutsche Kulturbestrebungen in China*, p. 19; Georg Beyer: *China Als Missionsfeld*, p. 118, German missionary activities were confined in the southern part of China.

under him as missionaries.³ He wrote sixty-one books in German, English, Chinese, Dutch, Japanese and Siamese. He knew the Wenli dialect and made an excellent translation of the Bible into Chinese which won the approval and admiration of the Chinese Emperor.⁴

The success of his work attracted the other German missions.⁵ Thus in 1846, the "Chinesische Stiftung" (Chinese Endowment) was established by the Evangelische Missionsverein in Kurhessen. Its purpose was to collect donations for missionary work in China. In the same year, the Rhenish and the Basel Missions, and in 1850, the Berliner Hauptverein and the Kasseler Missionsverein sent their representatives to China, following Gutzlaff's lead of penetrating into the interior, and experiencing many difficulties in the course of their work.⁶ At the time of the Treaty of Tientsin, 1861, there was already a number of missionary stations and seminaries for catechists.⁷

The legal justification for the presence of these missionaries came from the Treaty of Tientsin, September 2, 1861.⁸ Article X of that

³ Burkhardt, cited above, pp. 184, 199, 200, also Richter, cited above, p. 327: It is said that Gutzlaff's Chinese assistants knew very little Christianity. They confused the heathen practices with those of Christian worship. After the death of Gutzlaff, they were dismissed by Newmann, who was sent to China by the Hauptverein. So the work of Gutzlaff was not considered successful; Georg Beyer, cited above, p. 131.

⁴ The improved edition of the Chinese Bible was done by Gutzlaff, Bridgeman and Morrison. Among other literary works, Gutzlaff wrote a description of the world, so as to show to the proud Chinese that there were other continents and countries besides the Middle Kingdom. By means of these literary works, Gutzlaff tried to win the acquaintance of the educated Chinese and the official class.

⁵ Footnote 3: Whether Gutzlaff's work was successful or not was much questioned by later missionaries.

⁶ In November, 1847, the Basel Mission decided to make Tamshui their seat, they were driven back by bandits whom they met on the way. They were forced to return to Hongkong to do their work in the hospital. For the many other difficulties they encountered, see Richter, cited above, p. 328.

⁷ Burkhardt, cited above: There were in South China at that time 10 German missionaries, 3 from each of the Basel Mission, the Rhenish Mission and Berliner Hauptverein, and 1 from the Kasseler Missionsverein. There were 175 members and 2 schools for the Basel Mission, 85 members and 2 schools for the Rhenish Mission. There was also a children's foundling home, established by Mrs. Newmann. There were several missionary hospitals belonging to the Germans.

⁸ China, the Maritime Customs: Treaties, Conventions, etc. Between China and the Foreign States, Vol. II, p. 115 et seq; Hertslet's China Treaties, Vol. I, p. 331 et seq.

Treaty provided for the freedom of the Christian religion and the protection of German missionaries. While South China remained a rich field for their work, they gradually invaded the rest of the country and German missions in China grew numerous. Besides the Basel, the Armer and the Berliner Missions, the German branches of the China Inland Mission were actively at work in the Central provinces.⁹

An important figure in this period is J. B. Anzer. He was sent to China in 1879 by the "Gesellschaft des Gottlichen Wortes."¹⁰ He started to work in Pouli, in the province of Shantung. In less than four years, he succeeded in establishing 150 Christian communities. As a result of this, he was given the title of the Bishop of Telepte in 1886. The seat of his curacy had been in Pouli until 1895 when he moved to the larger city of Tsiningchow on the Grand Canal. In 1897 it was estimated that in the curacy of South Shantung, there were three churches, 58 chapels, 214 houses of worship, one seminary for priests, 121 elementary schools, six higher schools, four orphanages and three asylums, with 9,000 baptized Catholics.¹¹

Not only did Bishop Anzer succeed in his missionary work, but also he won a rare distinction which only a few foreign missionaries attained, being given the button of the third rank by the Emperor of China and being assured that he would be given that of the second rank a few years later.¹² This gave him prestige which

⁹ Beyer, cited above, p. 113: Among German missions, there were in 1882, the Basel, the Barmer, and the Berliner Missions. German branches of the China Inland Mission were established, working chiefly in the central provinces: The China-Allianz-Mission in 1890, the Kieler China Inland Mission in 1897. In 1895, the German-Swiss Institute Chrischona began activities with 5 stations. The Hildesheimer Blindenmission also began activities in Hongkong in 1897. The Morgenlandische Frauenverein sent one woman and the Frauen-Missionsgebetsbund and the Diaconess-motherhouse also sent some women missionaries to China.

¹⁰ M. von Brandt: *Dreundreissig Jahre in Ostasien*, Vol. III, pp. 76, 77; Georg Franzius, p. 124: Although freedom of worship and protection of missionaries were provided for in the Treaty of Tientsin, 1861, the *Tsungli Yamen* published a memorandum in February, 1871, containing eight points given as advice to missionaries, in reality imposing restrictions. But France had obtained a special agreement with the *Tsungli Yamen* in regard to their own Catholic missionaries. When Anzer first came, he worked under French protection. But in 1890, he succeeded in placing the German missions under the protection of the German Empire. This was largely due to the diplomatic negotiations of the German Minister at Peking, M. von Brandt.

¹¹ These figures are taken from Georg Franzius, cited above, p. 128.

¹² Brandt, cited above, p. 78.

greatly enhanced his work and gave him status among the Chinese officials.¹³ Mention must be made, however, that he was the one who started to use political influence to further his missionary work. He heartily approved Germany's design to capture Kiaochow.¹⁴ This did aid the progress of missionary work for a time, but time only tells that it was not force alone which could help as far as the lasting effect of missionary activities was concerned.¹⁵

The retired German Minister to Peking, M. von Brandt, wrote in 1901, after relating the many missionary troubles since 1891,¹⁶ that he considered the activities of the Christian missions in China to be the greatest danger to peace, not only in that Empire, but also all over the world.¹⁷ "The more stations are being established, the more does the danger to their security grow, and with it the renewal of a conflict between the foreigners and China, in which the former are in reality taking the part of the aggressor."¹⁸ He realized that too hasty actions of missionary activities in China,

¹³ British and Foreign State Papers, 1899-1900, No. 92, p. 173, et seq: On March 15, 1899, the *Tsungli Yamen* prepared a memorial as to "Official Interchange between Chinese Local Authorities and Roman Catholic Missionaries" which was approved by the Emperor on the same day. It provides for the formalities in the reception of missionaries by local officials. Accordingly, the bishops ranked with the Governors-General and Governors.

¹⁴ For this, see Chapter II.

¹⁵ Beyer, cited above, p. 124: The aggressiveness with which the foreign missionaries worked in China was the seed of their own ruin. With political influence behind them, they could not convert the faith of the Chinese, except for the fact they might succeed in turning out a considerable number of the so-called "rice Christians." Thus the less power Germany has politically, the more welcome are her messengers in China.

¹⁶ Burkhardt, cited above, p. 226: Missionary troubles were many before 1891, to say nothing of the minor difficulties they had encountered. In the "ghost powder" incidents at Sheklung and Tungkun in 1871, missionary stations were destroyed, but the Chinese Government soon indemnified them, and the Tungkun station was immediately re-established; Brandt, cited above, pp. 79, 84, 87, 90: In 1891, there were uprisings in the Yangtze Valley. In 1892, there was a spread of literature hostile to Christianity and in the same year renewed unrest broke out in Jehol; Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, 1899, Vol. CIX, China No. 1 (1899), Correspondence No. 183, Inclosure, pp. 120, 121: In 1897, in the same year as the murder of the two German missionaries occurred in Shantung an action which led to the occupation of Kiaochow, a German missionary was attacked in the Shihhsing district, Kwangtung. The case was afterwards settled between the viceroy and the German Consul, whereby, the viceroy, instructed by the *Tsungli Yamen*, yielded to the six demands of the German consul.

¹⁷ Brandt, cited above, p. 90.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 93.

particularly in Shantung, the birthplace of Confucius and Mencius, would lead to unpleasant provocations, because of the totally different customs and beliefs of the Chinese people from those of the Westerners.¹⁹

The occupation of Kiaochow marked the beginning of an eventful period of German missionary activities.²⁰ With a German-leased territory, affording perfect and ready protection there was even a proposal to withdraw all German missionaries in the various parts of China to settle in the newly acquired German-leased area.²¹ Such a proposal, of course, could not meet the approval of the missions. However, the gradual expansion of their influence in North China, making Kiaochow their center of activities, was by no means unnoticed. Immediately after the occupation, the Berlin Mission established itself in Tsingtao, with a number of preaching stations in the surrounding villages. In 1901 Tsimo, and in 1909 Kiaochow became fertile fields for their activities.²² In Southern China, their influence remained as before, while they penetrated still further into the central provinces of Hunan, Kweichow, Kiangsi, and Szechwan.²³

The work of the German missionaries in China met with a great catastrophe when the war broke out in 1914.²⁴ The main mis-

¹⁹ p. 92. Among others, Brandt says: "The worst thing about the matter, however, is that the missionary is forced to attack the most holy thing of the Chinese, that is, the family and ancestor worship."

²⁰ Georg Beyer, cited above, p. 132; D. Julius Richter, cited above, p. 398.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 132.

²² Knappe, cited above, pp. 19, 20: In 1906, it is estimated that throughout China there were 32 missionaries for the Basel, 120 missionaries for the Rhenish, 120 missionaries for the Berliner, 14 missionaries for Deutsche China-Allianz-Mission of Barmen, 5 missionaries for the Liebenzeller Deutsche China-Inland-Mission, and 1 missionary for Kieler Mission; Beyer, cited above, pp. 139, 140: In Tsingtao, Tsimo and Kiaochow, a considerable number of missionary stations were established, with schools, seminaries, etc.; Richter, cited above, p. 398: At Tsingtao, in parallel with the Berlin Mission, the Allgemeine Evangelisch Protestantische Missionsverein (afterwards called the Ostasien-Mission) also settled immediately after the German occupation.

²³ Richter, cited above, pp. 429-78: In Hunan, the Liebenzeller Mission began the work in 1902. In Kweichow, the work was mostly in the hands of the China Inland Mission, except the eastern part, near Hunan, where the Liebenzeller extended their field. The Deutsche Allianz-China Mission worked in Kiangsi beginning with 1899; the Deutsche Frauen-Missionsgebetsbund worked in Szechwan since 1896.

²⁴ Beyer, cited above, p. 121, et seq.: The German missionary Voskamp gives a detailed description of the sufferings of the German missionaries during that period in his diary.

sionary station, Kiaochow, became a war zone. The younger missionaries in the South were called upon to defend Tsingtao. After the crisis was over, many of them were taken captives by the Japanese, and the rest could, only with difficulties, return to their activities, due partly to the changed conditions and partly to their lack of funds. However, the Swiss and the Americans supplied a considerable amount of money to keep the German missionaries at work.²⁵ When China declared war upon Germany in 1917, England made some gestures to oust the Germans in China, but the Chinese Government did not do it. Throughout, the German missionaries were left unmolested.

The work of the German missionaries in China is quantitatively infinitesimal, as compared with that done by the English and American missionaries.²⁶ The German missions were also impoverished and broken up into many small organizations. Generally speaking, there are three types of German Christianity in China: The fundamentalist which includes the Basel, the Barmer and the Berliner missions; the German branches of the China Inland Mission; and the liberal church, represented by the Allgemeine Evangelisch Protestantische Missionsverein (German Evangelistic Protestant Mission Unions). The Basel Mission is most concerned with educational work, the Barmer Mission, with medical work, and the Berlin, with evangelistical work and the establishment of congregations. The German branches of the China Inland Mission are chiefly concerned with conversion, while the Protestantische Missionsverein (Protestant Mission Unions) is engaged in educational, medical and literary activities.²⁷

With the help of the German missionaries, schools and hospitals grew numerous within this period, especially in the leased territory

²⁵ Beyer, cited above, pp. 124, 152, 154, 155: The Swiss gave help to the Basel Mission and the Protestantische Missionsverein, the Americans, the Rhenish, the Berliner, and the China Inland Missions. There was also, in 1921, the raising of fund by "visitation." There remains the question now whether the German missions are to be independent or are to form a branch of the Anglo-American missions.

²⁶ According to Beyer, cited above, p. 124: 93% of all missionary work in China is done by the Anglo-Saxons, and 7% by the continental Europeans.

²⁷ Beyer, cited above, p. 114.

of Kiaochow.²⁸ Outside the leased territory, the German missionaries were also active in educational work.²⁹ The medical school in Shanghai supported by the German missionaries, made remarkable progress.³⁰ The work of the missionary schools was at first very slow and difficult, because the system and the subjects taught were very much at variance with those to which the Chinese were accustomed. But the Chinese school reform movement, started in 1902, greatly enhanced the work of the missionary schools in China.³¹

Besides the missionary schools, the German authorities in the leased area were also actively at work along educational lines. Thus, in 1898, the German Public School was established in Tsingtao. In 1902, the name was changed to the Government School. It had the aspects of a vocational school.³² The German-Chinese College was founded in 1909 by the German and Chinese Governments, the

²⁸ Knappe, cited above, p. 9: Before the acquisition of Kiaochow, there had already been established a number of schools and seminaries in China, particularly in the southern part, by the German missionaries. In North China, Bishop Anzer had established two higher educational institutions for the Chinese, one in Yenchowfu and the other in Tsining. The governor of Shantung gave a considerable amount of money for their maintenance. The work was considered a great success; China Maritime Customs Decennial Reports on the Trade, Navigation, Industries, etc. of the Ports Open to Foreign Commerce in China, and on the Condition and Development of the Treaty Port Provinces, 1902-11, p. 257: In 1911, it is estimated that there were, in Tsingtao alone, the following German mission schools for Chinese: 16 elementary schools, one middle school, two girls' schools, one girls' high school, two German-Chinese seminaries, one ladies' teacher, one kindergarten, and one lace-making school; F. W. Mohr: Handbuch für das Schutzgebiet Kiautschou, pp. 450-1: See for the missionary schools in Tsingtao and other parts of the leased territory, and the names of the missions which supported these schools. The Berlin Mission maintained schools and seminaries in Tsimo and Kiaochow, and there was a hospital at Tsimo, also maintained by the Berlin Mission; Beyer, cited above, p. 140: For the educational work of the Allgemeine Evangelisch-Protestantische Missionsverien in Tsingtao and Kaumi; Count von Bülow, Denkschrift, Concerning the Development of the Domain of Kiaochow During the Period of October 1901 to October 1902, No. 832, Reichstag, 10th Legislative Period, p. 28.

²⁹ Beyer, cited above, pp. 147-49: Educational work of the Berliner Mission in South China.

³⁰ Knappe, cited above, pp. 23-4: The success of this medical school in Shanghai had induced the suggestion of the establishment of a number of German missionary schools in Shanghai.

³¹ Beyer, cited above, pp. 146-7.

³² Official Report of Shantung Rehabilitation Committee ("Tsingtao") p. 314.

latter subsidizing 40,000 marks annually towards its maintenance.³³ The Director, and all professors and teachers were appointed by the German Government, while the Chinese Inspector, who supervised Chinese studies, was appointed by the Chinese Government. The school had two divisions, a preparatory division of five years, and the college, which consisted of four faculties: Law and political economy, natural sciences and engineering, agriculture and forestry, and medicine. Final examinations were held in the presence of a Chinese Government Commissioner. Good scholars were admitted to the Chinese Government service. In 1913, the enrollment exceeded four hundred and the equipment of the College was excellent. Unfortunately the Japanese occupation in 1914 brought its work to an end. The fine equipment disappeared and the buildings are now used by the ministry of railways.³⁴ In addition to this, there was a number of public elementary schools for Chinese.³⁵

German hospitals in China enjoyed, as they still do, a most remarkable reputation among the Chinese. The Paulum Hospital in Shanghai, named after the founder, a German physician, has had about thirty years' distinguished service, and is now still occupying an important place among the Shanghai hospitals.³⁶ In the German-leased territory, there was the Faber Hospital, which proved to be a blessing during the epidemic of 1902.³⁷ It had branches in Kaumi and Taitungchen. Since 1925, the hospital work has been

³³ Official Report of Shantung Rehabilitation Committee ("Tsingtao") p. 314: The College was founded with a view to induce Chinese students to go to Germany. The initial expenses amounted to 640,000 marks. According to the budget of 1910, the annual expenses figured at 460,985 marks.

³⁴ Official Report of Shantung Rehabilitation Committee, pp. 314-5; China Maritime Customs, Decennial Reports on the Trade, etc., 1902-11, p. 252, et seq.; Kaiser-Wilhelm-Dank: Deutschland Als Kolonialmacht, p. 255, Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, China No. 3 (1913) correspondence No. 3, inclosure; *Ibid.*: China No. 1 (1914) correspondence No. 16, inclosure, for more information about this German-Chinese College.

³⁵ Mohr, cited above, p. 450: In 1911, it was estimated that there were twelve government elementary schools in the principal villages of the leased territory; Kaiser-Wilhelm-Dank, cited above, p. 255: In 1914, the number grew to sixteen; Official Report of Shantung Rehabilitation Committee, p. 315: The number of these public elementary schools was twenty-six.

³⁶ Knappe, cited above, p. 24. When this hospital was first established by Dr. Paulum, the expenditures were met by collections among German firms and their Chinese employees. Now it is almost independent.

³⁷ Bülow, cited above, p. 28.

transferred to Tsiningchow. There was another hospital in Tsimo, established by Frau Luschewitz of the Berliner Mission.³⁸ Due to the lack of funds, this hospital was taken over by the United Lutheran Church of America in 1924. Smaller hospitals were numerous. As most missionaries of the Berliner Mission have done medical work along simpler lines, they are able to help those suffering from less serious diseases.³⁹ They have proved to be very beneficial to the people in the interior where medical care is difficult to obtain.

The Germans had also established many other institutions of learning.⁴⁰ In Tsingtao, there was a meteorologic-astronomic station. They also carried on scientific works, including bacteriological experiments, testing of foods, and anatomical study in connection with the slaughter house. At Kiaochow, there was the botanical study begun by the missionary Faber and there had been compiled a survey of all important plants in Shantung, of medical herbs and drugs. In more ways than one the Germans had shown their friendliness to China.⁴¹ In 1906, China sent out a commission which visited Germany and this aroused much discussion about the possibility of a *Deutsch-Asiatische Gesellschaft* for the spread of

³⁸ Beyer, cited above, p. 149: "The women were often of great help to the medical work. It was through the activity of Frau Luschewitz that the hospital in Tsimo was established."

³⁹ Beyer, cited above, p. 149: "Most missionaries of the Berliner Mission have done medical work of the simplest kind. They are usually instructed in the mission home by a physician or they have taken a course in the Tübinger Institut für ärztliche Mission and are provided with a medical chest. Although they are unable to attack such severe illnesses as consumption, tuberculosis, cholera, leprosy, beriberi, and smallpox, they often aid those suffering from malaria, dysentery, toothaches, and helped in the dressing of wounds. Leuschner also began the care of lepers and the instruction of the blind. . . ."

⁴⁰ Bülow, cited above, p. 27.

⁴¹ China Maritime Customs, *Decennial Reports on the Trade, etc.* 1912-21, p. 164: In 1881, the German Government presented a big bell to the Chinese Government as a token of good friendship. Li Hung-chang was ordered to set it in a proper place. It was hung in the Hai Kwong Sze Temple at Tientsin. During the Boxer Rising, the Japanese soldiers, then in possession of the Temple, gave the bell to the British Municipal Council, who in 1921 restored it to the Temple; Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers, China No. 1* (1899) p. 96, correspondence No. 133: In May 1898, Prince Henry of Prussia made the presentation of the Order of the Black Eagle from the German Emperor to the Chinese Emperor.

German culture in China through education.⁴² Following this, the German Chinese College was established in Tsingtao and a similar one in Shanghai, both in 1909.⁴³

Viewing the situation as a whole, one may look upon the cultural enterprises of Germany in China with more pride than those of other foreign nations, if he compares the amount of work done to the meager financial support they received. But the German missionaries have occupied only an insignificant place among all the foreign missionaries in China.⁴⁴ However, the German Government had been spending rather lavishly in the orient, the total 199,000,000 marks went towards the building and the maintenance of Tsingtao.⁴⁵ The quiet attitude of the Chinese towards the Germans during the war, and even after China's declaration of war in 1917, reflected the feeling of the Chinese towards their Teutonic friends. Like some other powers, Germany had been to some extent "guilty of employing the missionaries as tools for political ambitions and as the carriers of political influence."⁴⁶ But after the Boxer Rising, however unintelligent it was politically, the German missionaries had been most faithfully devoted to their work of conversion, medicine and education. So it is very correctly remarked that "the less power Germany has politically, the more welcome are her messengers in China."⁴⁷ The German Government

⁴² Knappe, cited above, p. 240, for the proposal of forming the Deutsch-Asiatische Gesellschaft: Prior to that time much had been said that the spread of German culture in China was an immediate necessity. Dr. Otto Franke, in his article of "Japan's Activities and Aims in Asia," in the *Deutsche Rundschau*, August, 1903, had pointed out the danger of the Western Powers, due to the lack of such agencies. The *Ostasiatische Lloyd*, the German paper in Shanghai, had also taken this question very seriously. The assumption, justified was that something must be done in order to enable the Germans to secure a status in China, both economically and culturally.

⁴³ Richter, cited above, p. 23, et seq.

⁴⁴ Beyer, cited above, pp. 118, 124: According to him, 93% of all missionary work in China is done by the Anglo-Saxons and 7% by the continental Europeans; Knappe, cited above, p. 14.

⁴⁵ China Maritime Customs, Decennial Report on the Trade, etc., 1912-21, p. 209.

⁴⁶ Otto Franke: *Ostasiatische Neubildungen*, p. 175, quoted.

⁴⁷ Beyer, cited above, p. 124: The Germans themselves have realized, especially at the time of the World War, that the seizure of Kiaochow in 1897 was a grave error, which justified the distrust of the Chinese in the Germans during the years following that incident; Otto Franke: *Deutschland und China vor, in und nach dem Kriege*, pp. 9-10; Wolf von Dewall: "Die Wirtschaftlichen Aufgaben Deutschlands in China," in *Deutschland und China nach dem Kriege* by Paul Rohrbach, p. 57. In the latter, much regret was expressed for the neglect of the Germans to spread their culture among the Chinese.

is also to be credited for the educational work in the former leased territory. It may be safely concluded that culturally Germany had made a very favorable impression upon the Chinese mind.

Aside from the work of the German missionaries in China and of the German authorities in the leased territory of Kiaochow before the World War, mention must be made of the Sino-German cultural societies, among which are the Deutschland Institut in Peiping and the Sino-German Cultural Association in Nanking. The latter, sponsored by German returned students in Nanking, was formally inaugurated May 12, 1935. Hope was expressed that both the Chinese and the German people should endeavor to assimilate the best in each other's civilization. In Germany, likewise, there is a China Institut in the University of Frankfurt. It has its quarterly publication, called *Sinica*. The German Far Eastern Association (*Verband für den Fernen Osten*) in Berlin is another cultural link between China and Germany.

The commercial enterprises of the Germans in China including also navigation and banking affairs, may be treated under four periods: (1) before 1861, the Treaty of Tientsin, (2) between 1861 and 1898, the Kiaochow Convention, (3) between 1898 and the World War (1914), and (4) from the World War to the present. The division lines are arbitrary, but are made for reasons of convenience in handling the abundance of materials systematically.

The earliest commercial relations between the Germans and the Chinese dates back to the close of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century, when the Prussian ships came to China to trade at Canton.⁴⁸ During the twenties and thirties of the eighteenth century, there was an overland route in the north through Siberia and Russia to Kiachta, where the Silesian and Saxon cloth was exchanged for tea and silk.⁴⁹ With the introduction of a transit tariff by the Russian Government in 1836, the Sino-German barter at Kiachta suffered a relapse. The trade had been in-

⁴⁸ Brandt, cited above, *China und seine Handelsbeziehungen zum Auslande*, mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der deutschen, p. 34: These German ships first came to China under Dutch protection. Between 1822 and 1842, six ships of the small merchant marine of the Royal Seehandlungs-Societat had visited Canton.

⁴⁹ Brandt, cited above, p. 35: The "Russian cloth," with which most Chinese are familiar is indeed a misnomer. It is in reality a German product.

significant from then until the middle of the eighteenth century, when it became gradually felt that the growing volume of German trade in China would necessitate the establishment of formal diplomatic relations.⁵⁰ In 1859, Friedrich zu Eulenburg and his party left for the Far East, passing through Singapore and Japan, and finally arriving at Tientsin by way of Shanghai in 1861. After prolonged and difficult negotiations, a treaty was signed on September 2, 1861.⁵¹ It resembled the Sino-British and Sino-French treaties of 1858 and 1860, and its important provisions have been mentioned in the beginning of Chapter I.⁵² Article VI provided for the ports open to German subjects, for their residence, trade and navigation.⁵³ A tariff was annexed to the treaty for the import and export duties on the merchandise coming into and going out from these treaty ports.

Thus German commerce in China was given the treaty sanction, but the transit due, or likin tax, imposed upon the goods going from the ports to the interior, was considered an impetus to a healthy development of foreign trade. Beginning with 1869, the German merchants familiar with the Chinese trade were asked to consider

⁵⁰ Brandt, cited above, pp. 36-7: The imposition of transit tax by Russia and the Treaty of Nanking with England in 1842 gave rise to the suggestion in Prussia in 1843 for the establishment of a large commercial organization, with its seat in Singapore, to extend its trade into China. It was also suggested at the same time that negotiations for diplomatic relations with China be started. However, German trade with China at that time did not warrant the execution of such plans. In 1844 only one Prussian, one Hamburg and one Bremen ship arrived in Whampoo. In 1845, Bremen ships participated in the Ningpo trade to the value of \$16,000 out of the total value of the trade of Ningpo, \$106,500. In 1846, only one ship from Bremen and one from Hamburg arrived at Shanghai. Their cargo was from Liverpool and Hongkong. Trade increased after 1848 and it finally was felt necessary that consuls and commercial agents be settled in China, although the Chinese in no way interfered with German trade. On August 15, 1859, preparations for sending Eulenburg and his party to China were completed and approved by the Imperial cabinet.

⁵¹ China, Maritime Customs, Treaties, Conventions, etc. Between China and the Foreign States, Vol. II, p. 115, et seq.; Hertslet's China Treaties, Vol. I, p. 331, et seq.

⁵² This Treaty also provided for the issuance of passports (Article 8), freedom of Christian religion (Article 10), consular jurisdiction (Article 39). A number of other Articles related to the form of trading and navigation in Chinese waters.

⁵³ These ports are: Canton, Swatow, Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo, Shanghai, Chefoo, Tientsin, Newchwang, Chinkiang, Kiukiang, Hankow, Kyongchow (alias Hainan Islands), Formosa and Dansui.

the desirability of abolishing the likin taxes by fixing a general duty of $2\frac{1}{2}\%$ on all imports, in addition to that which was provided for in the tariff.⁵⁴ The Envoy of the North German Confederation at Peking, Baron von Rehfues, was instructed to negotiate, in conjunction with the diplomatic representatives of other Powers at Peking, with the Chinese Government, but no satisfactory solution resulted.⁵⁵ When the Supplementary Convention was signed on

⁵⁴ Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, 1871, Vol. LXX, China No. 5, Correspondence No. 97, p. 314: The likin tax was provided in Article VII of the Supplementary Treaty for the Regulation of Commerce (Handels-Bestimmungen) of the same date appended to the original treaty of 1861. But, due to language difficulties, it was claimed that no such transit due had been stipulated in the treaty and consequently the levy of such was illegal. In the correspondence of Bernstorff to the Earl of Clarendon, the levy of such duties was termed "contrary to treaty." The Memorial of *Tsungli Yamen*, dated the 12th day of the fifth moon, 3rd year of Kwang Hsu (1877) (Taken from the manuscripts now kept by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs): In the negotiations between M. von Brandt and the *Tsungli Yamen*, the former insisted, notwithstanding the latter's explanation, that no such levy was provided for in the treaty. Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, 1871, Vol. LXX, China No. 5, correspondence No. 97 and inclosure No. 3: The suggestion for the abolition of likin in exchange for raising the tariff gave rise to diverse scruples. It was feared that the abolition of likin would be too dearly bought. Furthermore, it was questionable whether it was conjectured that the mandarins might still levy duties on such goods, perhaps in another shape. The inclosure contains the remarks of the German merchants on the revision of the Treaty of Tientsin.

⁵⁵ Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, 1871, Vol. LXX, China No. 5, Correspondence Nos. 97, 121: The fight for the abolition of likin was most strenuously done by the German and British representatives, Baron von Rehfues and Sir R. Alcock; A Conversation took place between Li Hung-chang and Brandt, dated the 11th day of the 5th moon of the 3rd year of Kwang Hsu (1877) (Taken from the manuscripts now kept by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs): Afterwards, M. von Brandt, the successor of Rehfues, even threatened to leave Peking, and eventually he did by going to Tientsin, on the ground that no result reached after half year's negotiation. The Chinese Government was at first very much perplexed, but they afterwards appointed Li Hung-chang, then Governor-General of Chili, to continue the negotiation with him at Tientsin. The work was tactfully handled by Li Hung-chang, and Brandt at once became less stringent and asked in return, the opening of Daikusan as a commercial port. But Li Hung-chang advised him that Daikusan was far removed from populated cities and therefore not fitted for commercial exploitation. Brandt replied that he had learned from some source that Chinese troops were being dispatched there and that the mountains nearby yielded a considerable amount of timber. Li Hung-chang replied the troops were sent there to deter the disorderly elements, and that the timber was of inferior quality and not fitted for the use of the Germans, so the matter was dropped.

March 31, 1880 by M. von Brandt for the German Empire, the question was stipulated as a subject for future negotiation.⁵⁶

However, in this period between 1861 and 1898, German commerce in China grew considerably. The chief German imports into China consisted of needles, matches, broadcloth, woolen and cotton goods, aniline dyes, iron and steel, lamps, clocks and watches, glassware, wine, beer, and alcoholic drinks, and other goods of diverse varieties.⁵⁷ The German merchants possessed an unexcelled capacity for competing in business by studying the tastes of the Chinese buyers and by putting the prices of their goods at a lower level than the goods from other foreign countries.⁵⁸ The British who were the pioneers in trade with the Far East as they were elsewhere, were kept wide awake by the ascendancy of German competition, and in some instances they frankly admitted that they appeared

⁵⁶ China Maritime Customs, Treaties, Conventions, etc. Between China and the Foreign States, Vol. II, p. 194, et seq; Hertslet's China Treaties, Vol. I, p. 342, et seq. The reservation of the question of likin duties for future special negotiation is to be found in Article 8.

⁵⁷ Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, 1866, Vol. LXXI, Commercial Reports from Her Majesty's Consuls in China, p. 1: "There is a large importation of lucifer matches and needles into Tientsin, nearly all the matches and the greater part of the needles being of German manufacture." Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, 1884-85, Vol. LXXX, China No. 4 (1885), p. 230: In the same volume, on page 82 was reported the rapidity of the growth in imports of broadcloth to Shanghai from Germany. "With regard to the German trade at this port (Shanghai), which is very considerable, the chief imports are 72/74 woolen and woolen cotton cloths, fancy cottons, flannels, woolen braids, aniline dyes, needles, matches, brass buttons, window glass, bar iron, bar steel, nail-rod iron, old iron, lamps and lamp shades, etc. The chief ports of shipment are Hamburgh and Antwerp . . ." Brandt, cited above, pp. 86-9 and Table X on pp. 137-8 *Ausfuhr nach China von Hamburg, 1897: for the German imports to China.*

⁵⁸ Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, 1884-85, Vol. LXXX, China No. 4 (1885), p. 31: ". . . German needles, though inferior to the English, are preferred on account of their being sold retail in cases with pictures and photographs on them, which please the taste of native women." Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, 1884-85, Vol. LXXX, China No. 4 (1885) p. 230: "Judging from past experience, it is said that such goods as above enumerated (the chief imports of the Germans, that is, woolen cloth, needles, etc.) can almost always be obtained from the Continent on cheaper terms than from England. However, the German trade was made by their manufacturers trying the Chinese markets with small shipments at first, finding out by process the articles suitable to the wants of the people, and supplying them at low prices. The further development of our own trade will no doubt be affected by similar means."

unable to compete successfully with the Germans.⁵⁹ The chief exports from China to Germany were: Cassia oil, Cassia lignea, stellated anise, Gall apples, ginger, chair casters, sticks, mattings, explosives, feathers, wood oil, camphor, silk, skins and horns of buffaloes, straw braids, bristles, furs, and tobacco.⁶⁰ The volume of German trade in China held a significant place among all foreign countries trading with China, always ranking second or sometimes third place, next only to Great Britain and sometimes the United States of America or Japan.⁶¹

⁵⁹ Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, 1884-85, Vol. LXXX, China No. 4 (1885), p. 230: "In majority of the articles above mentioned English manufacturers do not appear to be able to compete with Germans and Belgians . . ." China Imperial Maritime Customs, Decennial Reports on the Trade, etc., 1892-1901, Vol. I, p. 228: It is interesting to note the competition of the Germans and the English in the trade of silk and cotton lace. "British manufacturers are now competing with those of Germany in this line, 'Made in Britain' and 'Made in Germany' both appearing on the cards the lace is wrapped in . . ." Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, 1884-85, Vol. LXXX, China No. 4, pp. 31, 230, 292, 314, et seq.; *Ibid.*, 1886, Vol. LXVI, China No. 2 (1886), pp. 15, 51, 98: for further information on the German-English competition in import trade.

⁶⁰ Brandt, cited above, p. 85 and Table VI on p. 132, Einfuhr von China nach Hamburg in 1897.

⁶¹ Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Accounts and Papers, 1867, Vol. LXXIX, p. 161: Table showing the value of the import and export trade and the trade coastwise, carried on under foreign flags at all the treaty ports in China for the year 1866:

Country	Value of Foreign Import and Export Trade
Britain	Tls. 96,803,900
America	21,471,300
North Germany	9,140,250
French	1,764,600
Siam	1,071,450
Holland	783,700
Denmark	736,700
Spain	329,400
Sweden and Norway	295,600
Sundry	273,900
China	109,100
Hawaii	105,200
Portugal	96,500
Russia	29,400
Austria	23,400
Belgium	16,500
Japan... ..	1,800
	Tls. 133,092,700

Germany did not fail to seize an opportunity, with the gradual expansion of her trade in China, to negotiate with China for the establishment of German concessions on the ground that the foreign concessions in China, except Shanghai, did not entitle the German

In 1869, German imports and exports held second place, next to the British, in the port of Chefoo; Inspector General of Customs, Reports on Trade at the Treaty Ports in China for the year 1869, p. 16; Inspector General of Customs, Reports on Trade at the Treaty Ports in China for the years 1871-72, p. 4: In 1871 and 1872, German trade held second place, again next to the British, in the port of Newchwang, being 28.1% (1871) and 29.9% (1872) of the entire trade of the port; Inspector General of Customs, Reports on Trade at the Treaty Ports in China for the year 1875, pp. 9, 12, 13, 19, 54: During the years 1871-75, the German import, export and carrying trade in the various treaty ports in China held the third place, next to the British and the American; Inspector General of Customs, Report on Trade at the Treaty Ports in China for the Year of 1881, pp. 16, 17: In 1881, German import and export trade in China was next to the British, the American and the Japanese, the volume amounting to 5,728,904 Haikwan taels. But the German coast trade still held the third next to the British and the American, amounting to 10,347,928 Haikwan taels out of the total amount of 297,970,571 Haikwan taels; Brandt, cited above, pp. 89, 91: In 1897, the German import and export trade was as follows:

	<i>Ships</i>	<i>Tons</i>	<i>Hk. Tls.</i>
German Import:	478	434,498	26,120,449
Total Import:	5,281	4,799,647	212,234,994
German Export:	505	453,115	14,284,742
Total Export:	5,325	4,800,455	172,907,727

Inspector General of Customs, Report on Trade at the Treaty Ports in China for the Year 1875, p. 19: In 1875, 1891 and 1897 respectively the number of German firms and German residents in China were as follows:

	<i>1875</i>	<i>1891</i>	<i>1897</i>
No. of German Firms:	52	82	104
No. of Foreign Firms:	343	547	636
No. of German Residents:	367	667	950
No. of Foreign Residents:	3,579	9,067	11,667

merchants to equal privileges.⁶² In Hankow and Tientsin, where the German interests were most considerable, next to Shanghai, with seven and twenty-four German firms respectively, the necessity for establishing German concessions was claimed to be most imperative.⁶³ Thus on October 3 and October 30 of 1895, the

⁶² A Précis of a Memorandum Submitted to the Reichstag on the Subject of the Establishment of German Settlements at Tientsin and Hankow, in Great Britain Parliamentary Papers, 1889, Vol. CIX, China No. 1 (1899), Inclosure in Correspondence No. 4: The China Association, representing the British interests in China, communicated on May 4, 1898, a memorandum regarding German interests in Tientsin and Hankow, denying that equal privileges were not enjoyed by the German merchants in the foreign concessions in China. The memorandum goes on to say: "Neither, certainly, is there any jealousy of the new German concessions. On the contrary; the British Community would, it is believed, view with satisfaction an extension of the principle. By a series of incidents which the committee of the Shanghai branch has lucidly described, the area originally marked off for a British settlement at that port has come to be treated as cosmopolitan; the Doyen of the consular body (instead of the British Consul) corresponding with the Chinese authorities respecting its affairs. British residents feel this to be somewhat of an anomaly and would be glad, probably, to see a German settlement marked off at Shanghai if it might aid them to recover the exclusively British status which they conceive to be their right. There is no desire to exclude residents of other than British nationality, and equal commercial advantages are available to all. The fact that the German firms have refused to come to the assistance of their government in developing the concession at Hankow and Tientsin tends on the contrary to prove a sense of contentment with their position that excludes any thought of international friction. The feeling is akin rather to that of desire to be master in one's house, and is not dissimilar probably from that which has impelled the German Government to acquire concessions that will, it is admitted, be 'half empty' unless settlers of other nationalities come in." Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, 1899, Vol. CIX, China No. 1 (1899), Correspondence No. 70.

⁶³ Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, 1899, Vol. CLX, China No. 1 (1899), Inclosure in Correspondence No. 4, A Précis of a Memorandum Submitted to the Reichstag: The memorandum of the China Association again denied the importance of German interests in Hankow and Tientsin. "As a matter of fact, there is no German shipping at present on the Yangtze. . . . It is submitted, however, that these facts scarcely justify the assertion that a large proportion of the trade of the port (Hankow) is in the hands of the seven German firms. . . . The statement that the trade in the hands of the twenty-four German firms settled at Tientsin 'exceeds that of all the other foreign firms put together' is equally at variance with the prevailing impression." Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, 1899, Vol. CIX, China No. 1 (1899) Correspondence No. 70.

Conventions for the concessions at Hankow and Tientsin were signed.⁶⁴

A review of German trade during this period would be incomplete without a mention of the carrying trade, her shipping or navigation in the Chinese waters. They had a big fleet, most of which were sailing vessels.⁶⁵ This enabled them to visit some of the treaty ports where big and heavy vessels could not go. In Newchwang, Amoy, Swatow, Chefoo and Kelung, German shipping was in close competition with the British.⁶⁶ The latter were quite aware of their own handicap, because the German ships, as a rule, charged cheaper freight-rates and were "better manned, found and conducted than those belonging to Great Britain."⁶⁷ Besides, the well merited confidence that German shipmasters have gained with the native charterers by their conciliatory manners and their care in handling merchandise, the practice of German ship-owners to retain their vessels on the coast for a lengthened period, often three years,

⁶⁴ MacMurray, cited above, Vol. I, pp. 42, 46: These two Conventions have been discussed at some length in Chapter I concerning the early relations between China and Germany. For the administration and management of these two concessions, see Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, 1899, Vol. CIX, China No. 1 (1899), Correspondence No. 4, Inclosure: China Imperial Maritime Customs, Decennial Reports on the Trade, etc., 1892-1901, Vol. I, pp. 294, 576.

⁶⁵ Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, 1867, Vol. LXVIII, Appendix p. 138.

⁶⁶ Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Commercial Reports from Her Majesty's Consuls in China (1862-64), "Shipping," Vol. LXIII; *Ibid.* (1866), Vol. LXXI; *Ibid.* (1867), Vol. LXVIII; *Ibid.* (1867-68), Vol. LXIX; *Ibid.* (1870), Vol. LXIV; *Ibid.* (1871), Vol. LXVI; *Ibid.* (1873), Vol. LXVI; *Ibid.* (1874), Vol. LXVIII; *Ibid.* (1875), Vol. LXXVII; *Ibid.* (1876), Vol. LXXVI; *Ibid.* (1877), Vol. LXXXIV; *Ibid.* (1880), Vol. LXXV; *Ibid.* (1881), Vol. XCI; *Ibid.* (1882), Vol. LXXVII; *Ibid.* (1883), Vol. LXXV; *Ibid.* (1883), Vol. LXXXVII; *Ibid.* (1884-85), Vol. LXXX; *Ibid.* (1886), Vol. LXVI; Inspector General of Customs, Reports on Trade at the Treaty Ports in China for the Years 1866-81. China Maritime Customs, Decennial Reports on Trade, etc., 1882-91, 1892-1901: At Newchwang, in the years 1862-64, 1867-68, 1873-74, 1876-77, German shipping was leading. In the years, 1865-66, 1869-72, 1875, 1878-80, British figures stood above the German. At Swatow, Amoy, Chefoo and other ports, the same keenness in competition is manifested.

⁶⁷ Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, 1867, Vol. LXVIII, Appendix, p. 138; *Ibid.* (1871), Vol. LXVI, China No. 2, (1871), p. 19; *Ibid.* (1876) Vol. LXXVI; *Ibid.* (1877), Vol. LXXXIV.

are all reasons conducive to keep these ships in favor with the Chinese.⁶⁸

There was such a general friendly feeling between the German ship-owners and the Chinese, that after several shipwrecks, the German shipmasters and their crews were, with only one exception, well taken care of by the Chinese local authorities.⁶⁹

However German shipping during this period shows no progress as compared with other countries.⁷⁰ This is to be explained by the increase of the carrying trade of the Scandinavian vessels, and the

⁶⁸ Inspector General of Customs, Reports on Trade at the Treaty Ports for the Year 1877, Part II, p. 194: Not only were the German vessels and crew liked by the Chinese, but they were also greatly admired by their competitors, the English. "I confess to a feeling of great admiration for the beautifully kept and shapely craft flying the tricolor that has succeeded to the respected emblems and the ancient maritime energy of the Hanse Towns . . ." Inspector General of Customs, Reports on Trade at the Treaty Ports in China for the Year 1874, p. 10: "Most deservedly German sailing vessels are popular on this coast, both with the Foreign critic, who can appreciate the sobriety and general good behavior of their crews, and with the native freight givers, who think solely of the safe conduct they thereby find ensured . . ." Inspector General of Customs, Report on Trade at the Treaty Ports in China for the Year 1880, Part II, p. 13.

⁶⁹ Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, (1874), Vol. LXVIII, China No. 6, p. 113; *Ibid.* (1875), Vol. LXXVII, China No. 1, p. 71: On July 10, 1873, the German schooner "R. J. Robertson" was wrecked near Kelung. On May 4, 1873, the German barque was wrecked on the island of Komi, near Kelung. In both cases, the shipwrecked were well treated; Inspector General of Customs, Reports on Trade at the Treaty Ports for the Year 1877, Part II, p. 255; *Ibid.* for the Year 1879, Part II, p. 21: On November 15, 1877, the German barque wrecked near Chefoo, in 1879, the German barque "Fidelio," on January 5th; the German brig "Rebecca," on January 21st; the German steamer "Cassandra," on January 24th; the German schooner "Christian," on July 7th; and the German barque "Von Werder" on July 13th, all near Chefoo; Great Britain Parliamentary Papers, (1882), Vol. LXXVII, China No. 2, Part 1, p. 70: In the case of the German steamer "Quinta," which was wrecked at Tinhosa near Kiungchow, on October 4, 1881, several peirtical boats of Chinese fishermen plundered the wrecked steamer. Afterwards the Germans were indemnified by the Chinese authorities. A detailed report of this incident and the negotiations between the German Consul at Canton and the Governor-General is to be found.

⁷⁰ Brandt, cited above, p. 89: The following is the comparison in percentage:

Year	Trips Made	Tonnage
1867	15.31 %	9.73 %
1897	4.18 %	4.91 %

lack of an encouraging direct trade between China and Germany.⁷¹ The Deutsch-Asiatische Bank had already started its activities in China in 1889, but for the sake of clarity, its entire history and activities will be dealt with in a separate section, without regard to the periods as outlined.

The lease of Kiaochow in 1898 marked the beginning of a still more rapidly increasing trade between China and Germany. It had been the declared understanding of the German authorities and the German public that the acquisition of Kiaochow was an important step towards the development of commerce with the Far East.⁷² So, on September 2, 1898, Tsingtao was declared to be a free port.⁷³ On April 17, 1899, an agreement was entered into for the establishment of a Maritime Customs station at Tsingtao.⁷⁴ According to this agreement, merchandise brought by sea to Tsingtao was exempted from paying import duties, but goods from the interior of China passing through the leased territory for shipment was subject to pay the export duties. On Chinese goods from Chinese treaty ports to Tsingtao, no duty would be paid, as long as

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 90 et seq. The lack of an encouraging direct trade between China and Germany will be discussed later in this chapter.

⁷² Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, (1899), Vol. CIX, China No. 1, Inclosure in Correspondence No. 65: It is recorded in the Proceedings before the Budget Commission of the Reichstag, April 29, 1898 that Dr. Lieber emphatically remarked that the first and essential point was not military, but commercial development; Deutschland Als Kolonialmacht, edited by Kaiser-Wilhelm-Dank, p. 250: Dr. W. Schrameier had once remarked that "Kiaochow is to be valued differently from our other colonies. Our aim there is not the exploitation of a German domain . . . , but the making of trade connections with the Chinese Empire under German guidance and its concentration upon an area sufficient for the necessary fortifications, harbor and business facilities." T. W. Overlach: The Lease of Kiaochow, The Foreign Financial Control in China, p. 147: "Germany considered Shantung as a field for commercial exploitation, as England considered her sphere in the Yangtze in the light of its economic possibilities." U. S. Bureau of Statistics, Commercial and Industrial, Development of the German Empire, 1899, p. 1687.

⁷³ Great Britain Foreign Office, British and Foreign State Papers, 1897-98, No. 90, p. 1039; China Imperial Maritime Customs, Decennial Reports on the Trade, etc., 1892-1901, Part I, pp. 87-89, Report About Kiaochow by E. Ohlmer, Commissioner of Customs: For a discussion of the advantages of a free port, such as Germany introduced in Tsingtao; *Ibid.*, 1902-11, Vol. I, pp. 237-9.

⁷⁴ MacMurray cited above, Vol. I, p. 189: For the full text of the agreement. The agreement and the system had been discussed in Chapter III about the Administration of Kiaochow.

they remained within the leased territory. The agreement was amended on December 1, 1905,⁷⁵ whereby duties were to be levied on all goods passing outside the free area which was to be delimited in size, and to twenty per cent. All the import duties collected were to be handed over annually to the German authorities as a contribution to the expenses of the leased territory. The arrangement, as a whole, was an important factor for the development of the leased area, especially the city of Tsingtao.⁷⁶ To the leased area, the city of Tsingtao was not rivalled by a Chinese frontier town which would have grown up if the Customs House was not stationed at Tsingtao, but at the frontier. To the merchants, as well as the customs authorities themselves, convenience was the most important consideration. The treaty also permitted trade with the hinterland.

Under such favorable circumstances, German trade was naturally concentrated at Kiaochow where the value of the trade, in which the Germans took a considerable part, rose with tremendous rapidity following the occupation.⁷⁷ The commercial progress of the

⁷⁵ MacMurray, cited above, p. 192: For the text of the amended agreement, which was carried into effect January 1, 1906.

⁷⁶ Paolo Giordani, *The German Colonial Empire: Its Beginning and Ending*, translated by G. W. Hamilton, pp. 72, 73: The establishment of the customs office at Tsingtao was an exceptional privilege conferred on the German leased area. The amended agreement of 1905, however, restricted to some extent the freedom previously enjoyed. Yet, the advantages of the open frontier, together with the German Government's reservation to exempt things for military, naval, public, manufacturing or industrial uses, such as machinery, manufacturing appliances, postal packages and traveller's luggage, etc. amply compensated the restriction imposed upon by the amended agreement; China Maritime Customs, *Decennial Reports on Trade*, etc., 1902-11, Vol. I, p. 237: For the advantages of the system of the Customs Authorities and to the Leased Territory respectively, see the report of E. Ohlmer, Commissioner of Customs; Great Britain Historical Section of the Foreign Office, *Kiaochow and Weihaiwei* (Handbook Series No. 71, p. 37); Official Report of the Shantung Rehabilitation Committee, ("Tsingtao"), pp. 10, 11, 15, 209, 210.

⁷⁷ China Maritime Customs, *Decennial Reports on the Trade*, etc., 1892-1901, Vol. I, p. 92: The net value of the trade of Kiaochow in 1900 and 1901 is as follows:

	1900	1901
Foreign Imports	Tls. 630,517	Tls. 3,429,503
Native Imports	2,222,059	2,539,547
Native Exports	1,104,574	2,761,870
Net Value of the Trade ...	3,957,150	8,730,920

port may also be measured by its increasing number of steamers. Between 1906 and 1913, the number of steamers doubled, while the aggregate tonnage quadrupled.⁷⁸ Its sudden rise caused great

Bülow, cited above, p. 13; China Maritime Customs, Decennial Reports on the Trade, etc., 1902-11, Vol. I, p. 242: "A glance at the 'Value-of-trade' table for the period under review shows a practically uninterrupted progress. The fact that this progress is steady and free from phenomenal figures proves that it is the result of a healthy, solid, trade development, free from speculation. Beginning with a net total of Hk. Tls. 10,345,000 in 1902, each of the years 1903, 1904 and 1905 shows an increase of about four million taels, which in 1906 increased to double that amount. In 1907 a decrease of two million taels is shown, which is accounted for by the fact that, commencing from that year, the junk trade values (above five million taels annually) was recorded separately and was no longer included in the comparable table. The year 1908, again shows an increase of three million taels, 1909, of eight millions, and the last two years—1910 and 1911—of about three million dollars each." Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, China No. 3 (1913). Inclosure in No. 3: For the rise of the trade in Kiaochow; *Ibid*, China No. 1, (1914). Inclosure in No. 16; Great Britain Historical Section of the Foreign Office, Kiaochow and Weihaiwei (Handbook Series No. 71), pp. 15-7; Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, China No. 3 (1913). Inclosure in Correspondence No. 3. "Until the present year (1911) there had been no statistics as to the import of German goods, and it had often been stated that the German imports bore a comparatively small proportion to those from England, Japan and America. This statement is now disproved by the present statistics, according to which, German goods were imported with a value of 6.8 million Haikwan taels (19 m.m.) in the year from July 1910 to July 1911. The principal imports from Germany were needles, cement and aniline dyes. Germany also supplies the majority of the railway construction materials for the Tientsin-Pukow Railway which is now approaching completion." Anton Paul Bruning, *Die Entwicklung des ausländischen, speziell des überseeischen deutschen Bankwesens*, p. 39: In 1907, there were at Kiaochow forty-four German firms and stock companies, among which twenty-four firms together had a nominal capital of about 40,000,000 marks, aside from the Shantung Railway Company, which alone had a capital of 54,000,000 marks.

⁷⁸ Great Britain Historical Section of the Foreign Office, Kiaochow and Weihaiwei, (Handbook Series No. 71) p. 15: The figures for the period of 1906 to 1913 are as follows:

	Number of Steamers	Aggregate Tonnage
1906-1907	499	546,843
1907-1908	432	519,292
1908-1909	511	670,025
1909-1910	568	806,759
1910-1911	618	1,070,702
1911-1912	785	1,209,154
1912-1913	923	1,298,622

Mohr, cited above, pp. 457-60; August Etienne, "Deutschlands Wirtschaftliche Interessen in China," in *Schriften der Centralstelle für Vorbereitung von Handelsverträgen*, pp. 1-3.

loss to Chefoo and even affected Tientsin, the leading commercial city of North China.⁷⁹

German trade with China as a whole during this period was, of course, greatly enhanced by the existence of the leased territory in Kiaochow. Even as early as 1897, a commercial mission had been sent to China and Japan to collect information and samples regarding suitable goods for sale there.⁸⁰ This they successfully did, and the information and samples were kept secret only for the special interest of German manufacturers. The German minister of commerce prepared a lengthy memorandum, which contained a list of goods which could be supplied by Germany to the interest of the Chinese so with the leasing of the territory, the usefulness of the memorandum could be easily appreciated.

However, German writers have lamented that most German merchants in China have been concerned with other than German products. A wholesale condemnation of the "intermediate trade" can be seen from the following statement:⁸¹

⁷⁹ Great Britain, Historical Section of the Foreign Office, pp. 16-7: Before the rise of Tsingtao, Chefoo had almost a monopoly of the foreign trade of Shantung. The Chefoo merchants had attempted, without success to organize a boycott of the German port. Even Tientsin was menaced by the rapid rise of Tsingtao. . . . The great advantage of Tsingtao over Tientsin lies in the fact that while Tientsin is usually ice-bound for some months in winter, Tsingtao is nearly always ice-free; Overlach, cited above, p. 148: *Deutschland Als Kolonialmacht*, edited by Kaiser-Wilhelm-Dank, p. 254: In 1914, before the War, Tsingtao was ranked as the sixth city in China, according to amount of customs collections.

⁸⁰ U. S. Bureau of Statistics: *Commercial and Industrial Development of the German Empire 1899*, p. 1687; *China Maritime Customs, Decennial Reports on the Trade, etc. 1892-1901*, Vol. II, p. 8: The German Commercial Mission visited Hangchow at the end of May 1897 and there made special inquiries into the manufacture and industry of the native cotton cloth.

⁸¹ Dewall, cited above, pp. 90, 93; Brandt, cited above, p. 36: The statement is true as applied to conditions in early years, when the cargo of German ships to China was mostly from Liverpool and Hongkong; Great Britain Parliamentary Papers, 1867, Vol. LXVIII, Appendix p. 138: "The Germans, not finding in their own country sufficient elements of business, go elsewhere to seek them, and thus create a trade for themselves; their houses in Shanghai order out manufactured goods from England, and return Chinese produce." Etienne, cited above, pp. 25-31: In later years after the lease of Kiaochow, there have been still laments for the intermediate trade; Giordani, cited above, p. 70: But the imports from Germany directly to China were certainly much more encouraging than before; Mohr, cited above, pp. 466-8; Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, China No. 3, (1913), Inclosure in Correspondence No. 3; The Manchester Guardian China Number, September

The German merchants in China represent an organization, such as no other nation dares. If our merchants were serving German industry exclusively, then German commerce in China would take the lead. At present, it has actually happened that German merchants represented in China goods which came from firms who are in direct competition with German manufactures. The situation in export business offers the same picture. The organization which has been created in China by German enterprise is chiefly serving the interests of other countries.

While such statement and the like represented the German anxiety to flood the Chinese markets with more goods of German manufacture, for fear of being outranked by the British, the jealousy of the latter over the rapid progress of German imports to China is revealed from the following statement:⁸²

Perhaps the first thing which has brought home to us is the great strength of German policy here. No matter to which branch of the trade we turn our attention, to the import of piece goods and metals, to the export of produce, or the installation of machinery, the German is always there, a little further into the field, a little more active, a little more before the eyes of the Chinese.

The method of the Germans in doing business is an important factor of their success.⁸³ Besides their readiness to study the taste of the consumers and the exercise of strict economy, the German merchants used more individual efforts in securing the assistance of men of smaller means among the native agents to whom they taught the meaning of push and enterprise. They created

21, 1915, p. 4A: "But the industrial evolution of Europe has thrown out its influences as far east as China. The increase of population and the steady advance of the industrial wave soon created some need of expansion in Germany, as has been the case in England. Germany began to produce goods which needed foreign markets, and men who sought for some career overseas. . . ."

⁸² The Manchester Guardian China Number, September 21, 1915, p. 4A.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, the article contains a thorough discussion of German business methods in China, which are considered to be superior to that of the British.

the demand by pushing forward their supplies.⁸⁴ They penetrated into the interior to increase the purchasing ability of the Chinese by collecting the native produce. Then followed Japanese competition.⁸⁵ So the ante-bellum commercial situation in China was a triangular fight with Germany, Great Britain and Japan in the field.

Before the outbreak of the war, the German influence in the commercial life in China could be easily felt.⁸⁶ The chief Chinese

⁸⁴ Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, 1884-85, Vol. LXXX, China No. 4 (1885) Part 1, p. 31. Cf. Manchester Guardian China Number, September 21, 1915, p. 5A: "The increase in the imports of needles, matches and kerosene shows that even here these minor conveniences of civilization need only to be known in order to be appreciated."

⁸⁵ Giordani, cited above, pp. 71, 74; Dewall, cited above, p. 98; Official Report of the Shantung Rehabilitation Committee, ("Tsingtao"), pp. 201-3; Mohr, cited above, pp. 466-7, 470-1; China Maritime Customs: Decennial Reports on the Trade, etc., 1902-11, Vol. II, Appendix pp. 316-7, 332; *Ibid*, 1912-21, Vol. II, Appendix pp. 413, 428; Etienne, cited above, pp. 32, 34.

⁸⁶ U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce: Statistics of German Trade 1909-13, Miscellaneous; Series No. 75, pp. 7, 8, 36: The following figures will attest to the rapid progress of German trade with China during the years preceding 1914:

1. China's Total Trade with Germany During the Years 1912 and 1913 (Value in Thousand Dollars)

Year	Import	Export	Total
1912	\$27,498	\$19,446	\$46,944
1913	31,052	29,259	60,311

2. China's Export to Germany During the Years 1909-13 (Value in Thousand Dollars)

1909	1910	1911	1912	1913
\$15,515	\$22,531	\$24,596	\$27,498	\$31,052

3. Germany's Export to China 1909-13 and the Kinds of Goods (Value in Thousand Dollars)

	1909 \$13,510	1910 \$15,821	1911 \$17,083	1912 \$19,446	1913 \$29,259
Indigo... ..	1,800	2,280	3,991	4,439	6,397
Aniline and other coal-tar dyes not specially mentioned	1,385	1,550	2,013	1,961	4,537
Cartridges... ..	424	572	559	2,444	1,557
Railway track ap- purtenances, lan- terns, stoves, other wares	226	346	360	237	1,195

exports to Germany consisted of the yolks and whites of eggs, straw braids, ground nuts and ground nut oil.⁸⁷ Germany previously had obtained great quantities of sesame seeds from India and China,⁸⁸ so since the German occupation of Kiaochow, she was expected to take care of the entire exportable harvest of sesame in China. Soya beans and bean oil were being exported from China to Europe with increasing quantities. The import of such was duty-free in Germany, so the amount imported by Germany increased enormously.⁸⁹

It is well to know that before the war there were in China many companies registered as British but which were in reality German. This was due to the clause in the corporation law of the German Empire, which forbade the issue of shares of less than 1,000 marks. To evade this clause, the German companies registered at Hongkong as British, so that they might sell small shares. The restriction was lifted in 1911, but until then, there was not a single joint stock company registered as German in all Eastern Asia.⁹⁰

The outbreak of the war in 1914 marks the beginning of the fourth period. Measures were introduced on the part of the Allies to annihilate the German trade.⁹¹ At Hongkong, commerce with Germany was prohibited by the ordinance of August 6, 1914, and all German firms there were liquidated.⁹² German trade with the Chinese ports was carried under various guises, but this was brought to an end through the working of the Black List in which the Allies coöperated.⁹³ This exclusion of Germany in China was readily taken advantage of by the American and Japanese merchants,⁹⁴ and the trade in the cheaper articles formerly produced

⁸⁷ Great Britain, Historical Section of the Foreign Office, *op. cit.*, p. 35; Mohr, cited above, p. 469.

⁸⁸ Dewall, cited above, p. 94.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 94.

⁹⁰ Great Britain, Historical Section of the Foreign Office, Kiaochow and Weihaiwei (Handbook Series No. 71), p. 31.

⁹¹ Dewall, cited above, pp. 99-102; China Maritime Customs, Decennial Reports on the Trade, etc., 1912-21, Vol. 1, p. 171.

⁹² Dewall, cited above, p. 101.

⁹³ China Maritime Customs, Decennial Reports on the Trade, etc., 1912-21, Vol. I, p. 171.

⁹⁴ Great Britain Parliamentary Papers, (1920), Vol. XLIII, p. 31; China Maritime Customs, Decennial Reports on the Trade, etc., 1912-21, Vol. I, p. 171.

largely in Germany was transferred mainly to Japan.⁹⁵ Aniline dyes which were formerly of German origin became "worth their weight in gold" in China, and the dealers who happened to be well-stocked with indigo or vermillion made many lacs of taels at the expense of the community.⁹⁶ The war indeed greatly affected German trade in China, while the American and Japanese trade and shipping rose in parallel with the decline of the German.⁹⁷

⁹⁵ China Maritime Customs, Decennial Reports on the Trade, etc., 1912-21, Vol. I, p. 171: "In this respect it may be mentioned that the toy market, which had previously been a German monopoly, was captured by the Japanese, who are said to have learned much of this art from German prisoners captured at Tsingtao."

⁹⁶ China Maritime Customs, Decennial Report on the Trade, etc., 1912-21, Vol. II, p. 72: "The importation of German aniline dyes, never of great dimensions as far as our statistics are concerned, came to an abrupt end with the outbreak of the war. The stoppage of supplies from Germany threw the dyeing industry on its own resources, with the result that the cultivation of native indigo, which had long been neglected, was taken up again." China Maritime Customs, Decennial Reports on the Trade, etc., 1912-21, Vol. II, p. 46: In other goods which were formerly imported from Germany, the sudden stoppage of importation also enriched the native importers who happened to have been well-stocked. "A case is on record where a merchant who bought 150 dollars worth of German needles sold them for \$5,000."

⁹⁷ Great Britain Parliamentary Papers, 1920, Vol. XLIII, pp. 39, 41, Tables C and G:

Foreign Trade in China 1913-19 (In million taels)

Country	1913		1915	
	Import	Export	Import	Export
Germany	28.30	17.02	.16	—
Great Britain ...	96.91	16.35	71.56	31.93
Hongkong	171.64	117.13	148.44	104.17
British India ...	48.29	6.19	40.75	7.94
United States ...	35.42	37.65	37.04	60.58
Japan	119.34	65.54	120.25	77.67

Country	1917		1919	
	Import	Export	Import	Export
Germany	—	—	—	.16
Great Britain ...	51.99	26.09	64.29	57.19
Hongkong	158.60	115.84	153.63	131.50
British India ...	26.99	6.95	26.98	9.60
United States ...	60.96	94.78	110.23	101.11
Japan	221.66	105.77	246.94	195.00

However, after the war, the Germans were quick to recover their lost ground. During the last three months of 1919, considerable quantities of German dyes were imported to China.⁹⁸ In 1922, due to the favorable rate of mark exchange, German dyes were imported in great quantities in Shanghai, the only port to which they were sent for distribution to the interior. The German importers handled 56%, thus completely ousting the other countries from the lead.⁹⁹ The German firms, in order to recover their lost business, led a price-cutting campaign. They were prepared to allow long credit and offer easy terms to the Chinese houses. These concessions together with the preference of the native consumers for German brands, boosted Germany's importation of dyes

Shipping 1913-19 (In million tons)

Country	1913		1915	
	Entries and Clearances	Total Ton	Entries and Clearances	Total Ton
Germany	5.382	6.32	.979	.06
Great Britain ...	32.186	38.12	33.339	37.67
United States ...	2.458	.89	3.148	.80
Japan	22.116	23.42	20.141	23.87

Country	1917		1919	
	Entries and Clearances	Total Ton	Entries and Clearances	Total Ton
Germany	.233	.01	—	—
Great Britain ...	34.902	33.57	36.074	36.28
United States ...	3.609	1.12	4.433	2.57
Japan	22.454	24.58	27.152	27.53

⁹⁸ Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, 1920, Vol. XLIII, p. 27: "The strong position held by German dyes in this market prior to the war still stands then in good stead, and as soon as sufficient stocks are available competition will be increasingly difficult. Unless British manufacturers succeed in introducing their own 'chops' during the present shortage of German dyes they will have the utmost difficulty in getting a share in this important market, and for this reason, it is to be hoped that the utmost encouragement and assistance will be given to British color manufacturers wishing to export to China. . . ."

⁹⁹ China Maritime Customs, China Trade, 1922, pp. 37, 375: The shares taken by various countries in the importation of dyes for the year 1922 are as follows: Germany 56%, Netherlands 25%, Belgium 5%, Japan 5%, United States 4%, Great Britain 2%, Switzerland 1% and other countries 2%.

to 62.8% of the total in 1925.¹⁰⁰ In the next two years, while there was a general decrease in the import of dyes, Germany's share remained practically stationary.¹⁰¹

In other lines of business, German competition was also appreciable. In 1922, German influence appeared in the iron and steel market.¹⁰² By the year 1923, Germany took third place in China's tea market at Hankow, the chief tea-exporting city on the Yangtze.¹⁰³ In 1924, Germany was well represented in cotton and woolen goods.¹⁰⁴ During 1925 and 1926, while most foreign goods suffered relapse as a result of the May 30 incident, Germany made progress in the importation of woolen goods and yarn.¹⁰⁵ The rise of the number of German firms also indicated the speed of their recovery. In 1919, there were only two German firms throughout China, but in 1923, there were seventy German firms in Shanghai alone.¹⁰⁶ The table given in the footnote shows the value of china's direct trade with Germany and Great Britain 1921-33.¹⁰⁷ The table speaks eloquently for the rapid progress of German trade in China, which has increased almost five times within the twelve years, while the British trade has remained at a standstill. There was, however, an appreciable drop of trade in 1932 and 1933. This was due to the disturbances in the three Eastern Provinces and the continued Sino-Japanese troubles there.

¹⁰⁰ China Maritime Customs, Annual Trade Report and Returns, 1925, p. 12: The shares taken by various countries in the importation of dyes for the year 1925 are as follows: Germany 62.8%, United States 21.9%, Switzerland 6.5%, Great Britain 5%, and France 3.5%.

¹⁰¹ China Maritime Customs, Annual Trade Report and Returns, 1926, pp. 11-2; *Ibid*, 1927, p. 11: Germany's share in 1926 was 61.4% and in 1927, 61.1%.

¹⁰² *Ibid*, China Trade, 1922, p. 36.

¹⁰³ *Ibid*, Annual Trade Report and Returns, 1923, p. 3.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid*, Annual Trade Report and Returns, 1924, p. 6.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid*, Annual Trade Report and Returns, 1926, pp. 9, 10.

¹⁰⁶ Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, 1920, Vol. XLIII, p. 3; China Maritime Customs, Annual Trade Report and Returns, 1923, p. 2: The number of German firms in Shanghai in 1914, before the war, was 104.

¹⁰⁷ China Maritime Customs, Annual Trade Report and Returns, 1928, Vol. I.

<i>Great Britain</i>	1921 <i>Hk. Tls.</i>	1922 <i>Hk. Tls.</i>	1923 <i>Hk. Tls.</i>	1924 <i>Hk. Tls.</i>
Import from... ..	149,935,615	145,292,550	120,397,229	126,011,025
Export to	30,913,956	38,507,874	43,207,130	50,250,851
TOTAL	180,849,571	183,800,424	163,604,359	175,261,876

<i>Germany</i>	1921 <i>Hk. Tls.</i>	1922 <i>Hk. Tls.</i>	1923 <i>Hk. Tls.</i>	1924 <i>Hk. Tls.</i>
Import from... ..	13,348,856	24,744,130	32,456,067	38,687,635
Export to	6,773,917	9,804,806	11,914,718	15,949,007
TOTAL	20,122,773	34,548,936	44,370,785	54,636,642

<i>Great Britain</i>	1925 <i>Hk. Tls.</i>	1926 <i>Hk. Tls.</i>	1927 <i>Hk. Tls.</i>	1928 <i>Hk. Tls.</i>
Import from... ..	93,137,777	116,269,419	75,072,394	113,756,588
Export to	47,643,185	55,858,783	57,991,169	61,063,733
TOTAL	140,780,962	172,105,202	133,063,563	174,820,321

<i>Germany</i>	1925 <i>Hk. Tls.</i>	1926 <i>Hk. Tls.</i>	1927 <i>Hk. Tls.</i>	1928 <i>Hk. Tls.</i>
Import from... ..	32,510,643	45,677,616	39,359,364	55,696,970
Export to	16,427,493	17,760,394	20,354,535	22,824,561
TOTAL	48,938,136	63,438,010	59,708,899	78,521,531

<i>Great Britain</i>	1929 <i>Hk. Tls.</i>	1930 <i>Hk. Tls.</i>	1931 <i>Hk. Tls.</i>	1932 <i>Hk. Tls.</i>	1933 <i>Hk. Tls.</i>
Import from	118,657,000	107,118,000	119,344,000	118,681,000	153,557,000
Export to ...	74,334,000	62,669,000	64,526,000	37,584,000	48,723,000
TOTAL... ..	192,991,000	169,787,000	183,870,000	156,245,000	202,280,000

<i>Germany</i>	1929 <i>Hk. Tls.</i>	1930 <i>Hk. Tls.</i>	1931 <i>Hk. Tls.</i>	1932 <i>Hk. Tls.</i>	1933 <i>Hk. Tls.</i>
Import from	66,753,000	68,799,000	83,168,000	71,615,000	107,653,000
Export to ...	22,458,000	23,361,000	23,138,000	29,831,000	20,783,000
TOTAL... ..	89,211,000	92,160,000	106,306,000	101,446,000	128,436 000

As the Germans had lost, by the Japanese occupation of T'sing-tao, their stronghold in the north, they began to concentrate their activities at Shanghai. Thus German shipping at this port again became "a factor in the Eastern freight market."¹⁰⁸ In 1922, German tonnage amounted to 210,000 tons and in 1923, it increased to 330,000.¹⁰⁹ In 1922, German shipping appeared at Kiaochow for the first time since 1914, with sixteen vessels and 62,100 tons.¹¹⁰ In 1924 and 1925, German shipping increased with such rapidity¹¹¹ that in December 1926, a German consulate was established at Kiaochow, with two hundred and nineteen German residents there.¹¹²

In July, 1929, when strained relations existed between China and Soviet Russia, arising from a dispute over the Chinese Eastern Railway in Manchuria, the German diplomatic representatives in China were requested by the Russian Government to take charge of the Russian interests in China.

Another Sino-German enterprise is the Eurasia Aviation Corporation. In 1928, the Luft Hansa, amalgamated German aviation corporation, sent their representative Herr Schmidt to negotiate with the Chinese Government for an air mail and passenger service between China and Germany. An agreement was finally entered into in February, 1930, for the incorporation of the Eurasia E Aviation Corporation, which was duly registered according to the Chinese laws with the Chinese Government.¹¹³ The line is scheduled to start from Shanghai passing through Nanking, Sian, Lang-

¹⁰⁸ China Maritime Customs, *China Trade*, 1922, p. 34: Quoted from the report of L. A. Lyall, Commissioner of Customs.

¹⁰⁹ China Maritime Customs, *Annual Trade Report and Returns*, 1923, p. 4.

¹¹⁰ China Maritime Customs, *China Trade*, 1922, p. 15.

¹¹¹ China Maritime Customs, *Annual Trade Report and Returns*, 1925, pp. 3-4: "The increase of German ocean-going steamers, from seventy-three in number with 296,000 tons to ninety-seven, with 412,000 tons, is also worthy of notice."

¹¹² China Maritime Customs, *Annual Trade Report and Returns*, 1926, p. 6.

¹¹³ According to the agreement, the capital of the corporation was 3,000,000 Chinese dollars. In November, 1933, it was increased to 5,100,000 dollars. Two-thirds of the directors and the controllers are to be Chinese, and the Chairman of the Board of Directors, the General Manager and the administrative officers are also Chinese, while the technical or mechanical part of the enterprise is borne by the Germans.

chow, Sinkiang, and to Berlin by way of Russia. It had once reached as far as Sinkiang, but due to the disturbed conditions in that province not long ago, the westernmost terminus at present is Langchow.

A description of the German banking activities in China will center upon the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank alone. It was established on February 12, 1889, with its main seat in Shanghai. The capital amounted originally to 5,000,000 Shanghai Taels in 5,000 shares, until 1904, when it was raised to 7,500,000 Shanghai Taels. The shares were originally held by a group of thirteen German banks, under the leadership of the Disconto-Gesellschaft which held eight hundred and five shares alone.¹¹⁴ Article 3 of the statutes provides for the purpose of the bank: "to carry on banking affairs and to aid in the development of commerce between Germany and Asia;" and Article 4 authorizes the bank to establish foreign branches and to collect all the kinds of interests that were collected by all other banks.

The legal status of the bank is worth our attention, for it has given rise to a dispute as to whether or not the bank was a private concern or a government organ, so as to determine whether indebtedness to the bank could be confiscated in the time of war.¹¹⁵ The facts reveal that in the course of establishment, the Directors-General of the Preussische Seehandlung had taken part. Article 21 of the statutes made evident the official character of the bank, because by that article, the election of its officers is made to depend upon the confirmation of the German Emperor. Since no other

¹¹⁴ Fritz Benfey: *Die Neuere Entwicklung des Deutschen Auslands-banwesens*, 1914-25, p. 82: The other 4,195 shares were taken by: the Deutsche Bank with 555 shares; S. Bleichroder & Company 555 shares; Berliner Handels-Gesellschaft 470 shares; Jacob S. H. Stern 470 shares; Norddeutsche Bank 380 shares, Bank für Handel und Industrie 310 shares; Mendelssohn & Company 310 shares; R. Warschauer & Company 310 shares; A. M. von Rothschild & Son 310 shares; Preussische Seehandlung 175 shares; Sal. Oppenheimer Jr. & Company 175 shares, and Bayrische Hypotheken und Wechselbank 175 shares.

¹¹⁵ This China did, to the protest of the Netherlands Minister who was then taking charge of the German interests in China. However, after the war, China made reparations to the bank by the exchange of notes in 1924.

private banks have this practice, the official, or at least semi-official character of the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank is apparent.¹¹⁶

By 1911, branches had been established in Berlin, Calcutta, Tientsin, Hankow, Tsingtao, Hongkong, Tsinanfu, Peking, Yokohama, Singapore and Canton.¹¹⁷ The Deutsch-Asiatische Bank had been of varied service in China. It coöperated with the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation in taking the Sino-Japanese War Indemnity Loan of 1896 and 1898, for the amount of 16,000,000 pounds.¹¹⁸ After Germany had leased concessions at Hankow and Tientsin, it was arranged that the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank was to found the settlements, take charge of draining, construction of roads and shore facilities, expropriating the native owners.¹¹⁹ In return, the bank was to administer the docks, sell lands and other property for its own profit, under certain German supervision. After the lease of Kiaochow, the branch of the bank took over the financial affairs of the customs house erected in Tsingtao.¹²⁰ In 1908 and 1910, the bank contracted with the Chinese Government for the financing and construction of the Tientsin-Pukow Railway.¹²¹ In June 1906, the bank was authorized by the German Government to issue bank-notes in Mexican dollars and taels, for which it paid to the government 10% of the average value of its issue each year.¹²² During 1909, a new branch was opened, called the Hypotheken Bank, for the purpose of lending money for mortgages.¹²³ Loans were granted only on lands and buildings within

¹¹⁶ Benfey, cited above, pp. 81-3: Other articles of the statutes all serve to make the bank conform to the characteristics of an oversea bank.

¹¹⁷ These places are named by order of the time of their establishment.

¹¹⁸ MacMurray, cited above, Vol. I, p. 55; *Ibid.*, p. 107; Anton Paul Bruning: *Die Entwicklung des ausländischen, speziell des überseeischen deutschen Bankwesens*, pp. 95, 97; Overlach, cited above, p. 154.

¹¹⁹ Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, 1899, Vol. CIX, China No. 1, Inclosure in Correspondence No. 4; Bruning, cited above, p. 96.

¹²⁰ Bruning, cited above, p. 97.

¹²¹ MacMurray, cited above, p. 684, et seq.; *Ibid.*, p. 814.

¹²² Benfey, cited above, p. 84; Great Britain, Historical Section of the Foreign Office, Kiaochow and Weihaiwei, p. 41: In 1913, was issued the greatest amount of dollar and tael notes, amounting to 2,595,968.80 taels. Towards the end of 1914, only 475,535.67 taels were still current. (The last figure does not include the notes issued by the branch in Tsingtao).

¹²³ Benfey, cited above, pp. 84-5; Great Britain, Historical Section, etc., p. 41.

the leased territory or within the German consular areas in China. The bank was to pay to the German treasury 25% of the average annual value of these mortgages.

The outbreak of the war in 1914 affected the business of the bank decisively. Its branches within the British and Japanese jurisdictions were one by one seized and liquidated. The branches in China were permitted to continue the business until the middle of 1917 when China went into the war, when they were closed and liquidated. Further circulation of its bank-notes was prohibited; and part of the bank buildings was sold. After the return of peace, Germany and China agreed (as shown in the appended notes to the agreement of May 20, 1921) that the procedure as to the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank was to be negotiated by the proper authorities separately. In an exchange of notes in 1924, the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank was permitted to resume its activity in China directly and in its own name. The bank, however, has lost its semi-official character as a colonial bank, as well as its character as a German stock company, since Germany has lost her claim for extraterritoriality.¹²⁴

German industrial or economic enterprises in China will be treated by kinds rather than by periods, because little was done by the Germans along that line until the lease of Kiaochow. The following paragraphs will discuss the railways, mining and other minor industrial or manufacturing enterprises of the Germans in China.

The Convention of March 6, 1898, contains three sections: the first relates to China's political concessions; the other two, to economic concessions. After its conclusion, Herr von Bülow announced that only the first section would be made public while the other two would be privately communicated to persons interested in the development of the leased territory.¹²⁵ Immediately, a powerful group of German banks and financiers took over the railway and mining concessions from the German Government on June 1,

¹²⁴ Benfey, cited above, p. 86: For post-bellum state of the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank; Bruning, cited above, pp. 100-101: For a complete statistical description of the working of the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank before 1907.

¹²⁵ Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, 1899, Vol. CIX, China No. 1, Correspondence No. 65, from Lascelles, English Ambassador at Berlin to the Marquess of Salisbury.

1899.¹²⁶ This syndicate was organized under the name of the Shantung Railway Company on June 14, 1899, with a capital at that time of 54,000,000 marks.¹²⁷ The concession secured by the Company included the three items: the construction of a railway from Tsingtao to Tsinan with a branch line to Poshan within five years; the option until 1908 to build the line from Kiaochow to Ichowfu and from Ichowfu to Tsinan; the exclusive right to search for minerals for a period of five years within thirty *li* (ten miles) along both sides of the railway.¹²⁸ In order to fulfil the terms of the Convention, which provided for the joint construction by Chinese and German capital, it was arranged that shares should be put on the local Eastern markets; while the building materials, also in conformity with the terms of the Convention, were to be supplied by the Germans.¹²⁹ The official character of the railway, though it was nominally a private concern, could be seen from the provision that the election of the president of the board of directors, as well as the chief operating official should be approved by the German Government, and that the line, under certain conditions, could be taken over by the German Government.¹³⁰ The government at Kiaochow also had the final supervision over traffic, tariff and rates as well as the sharing of profits. What the German Government conceived of this railway can be illustrated by the following:

¹²⁶ Great Britain, Historical Section of the Foreign Office, Kiaochow and Weihaiwei, p. 9; Overlach, *The Lease of Kiaochow*, Foreign Financial Control in China, p. 143; China Maritime Customs, *Decennial Report on Trade, etc.*, 1892-1901, Vol. I, p. 121: This powerful group included the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank, the Disconto-Gesellschaft, the Deutsche Bank, the Bank für Handel und Industrie, the Dresdner Bank, S. Bleichroder, R. Warschauer und Company, and Jacob Stern of Frankfurt.

¹²⁷ Great Britain, Historical Section of the Foreign Office, p. 10: The capital of the Company was increased to 60,000,000 marks when it took over the Shantung Bergbahngesellschaft in 1913.

¹²⁸ P. R. Kent, *Railway Enterprise in China*, pp. 143-4.

¹²⁹ Kent, cited above, p. 143; Overlach, cited above, p. 142: The third section of the Convention provided that whenever foreign assistance should be needed within the province of Shantung, the German manufacturers and merchants were to be applied to first; MacMurray, cited above, p. 116.

¹³⁰ Overlach, cited above, pp. 143, 146-7: As a condition for the concession, the German Government reserved the right to purchase, after sixty years, the whole railroad, the price to be assessed by an evaluation committee; Official Report of the Shantung Rehabilitation Committee, p. 138.

Indeed, as Prince von Bülow has suggested in his speech, the railroads from Kiaochow could be considered the first step towards German colonization in China, in case other Powers should set the example.¹³¹

The construction was commenced in September, 1899. The work did not encounter much difficulty, except for the lack of harbor facilities at the outset for landing material imported from Germany and the temporary cessation of the construction during the Boxer trouble.¹³² However, the main line from Tsingtao to Tsinan, 244.9 miles long, was completed in June, 1904, before the expiration of the five year term.¹³³ The cost of construction, when completed, amounted to 52,901,226 marks, but by the end of 1911 the investment had reached 56,929,324 marks owing to the constant improvement of the line and equipment.¹³⁴ A branch line from Changtien to Poshan was opened in 1906, and another branch from Tsaochwang to Taierchwang in 1910.

Economically, the building of this railroad meant the carrying of coal to Tsingtao, facilitation of commerce, and connection with other parts of China by joining the Tientsin-Pukow Railway which was built later.¹³⁵ So freight transportation was considered more

¹³¹ Overlach, cited above, p. 147: Prince Henry of Prussia drove the first spike in this railway in Tsingtao, saying: "To the Interior, to the Ocean, and to the new German Fatherland in Tsingtao." Kaiser-Wilhelm-Dank cited above, p. 252.

¹³² Kaiser-Wilhelm-Dank, cited above, p. 252; China Maritime Customs, Decennial Reports on Trade, etc. (1892-1901), Vol. I, p. 121: "The attitude of the Chinese authorities and people towards the building of the railway has been very satisfactory." Bülow, cited above, p. 18: "The preliminary studies had all been made ready, and the works had not suffered any delay, except at Kiaochow, owing to the disturbance in 1900. The laying of the line did not even meet with any technical difficulties; it was merely necessary to throw iron bridges, resting on great beds of sand, and the longest of these bridges did not exceed 400 meters." Giordani, cited above, p. 69.

¹³³ China Maritime Customs, Decennial Reports on Trade, etc., 1892-1901; Kent, cited above, p. 144: The first section, Tsingtao-Kiaochow, was opened on April 1, 1901; the second, Kiaochow-Kaumi, on September 1, 1901. Weihsen was reached on June 1, 1902, while Tsinan was reached early in 1904.

¹³⁴ Kent, cited above, p. 145: It was estimated that the road is worth about 9,500 pounds a mile; China Maritime Customs, Decennial Reports on Trade, etc., 1912-21, Vol. I, p. 224.

¹³⁵ Kaiser-Wilhelm-Dank, cited above, pp. 252-3; Giordani, cited above, pp. 69-70: Possibilities of the future were favorably commented by writers: "... Great advantages, actual or prospective, were offered to German commerce by these projected railways. By the Shantung line and its branches, Germany tapped the trade of northern Shantung, and the Tientsin-

vital than passenger service.¹³⁶ The rapid growth of commerce after the construction of the railway had been illustrated in a former discussion of export and import business during the period of German occupation of Kiaochow.¹³⁷ The following statement from the Customs Reports is worthy of attention:¹³⁸

The above figures afford a striking illustration of what even a single line of railway can do in a few years to develop a trade in a roadless country like Shantung. Produce which formerly could not bear the expense of the laborious cart journey to

Pukow line gave her access to Chili and southwest Shantung. The Ichowfu line would have opened up eastern Shantung; the Shunte extension would have extended German influence into Western Chili; and lastly, had the Kaiping plan been brought to maturity, Germany would have had an open door into Honan and Shansi. . . . Writers of a prophetic turn have discussed the possibility of a great railway across Central Asia, which would reach the Pacific along the valley of the Hwangho, cutting through the mountains between Shansi and Honan. Of such a railway Tsingtao might be a terminus, but if Shanghai, which would probably have superior claims, were preferred, Tsingtao might at any rate be the terminus of an important branch. . . ." Great Britain, Historical Section of the Foreign Office: Kiaochow and Weihaiwei, pp. 12-3; Giordani, cited above, Georg Wagner, *Geographische Zeitschrift*, p. 63: "One day, the Russians will construct the great Transasiatic Railway, of which Richthofen has already traced the natural lines across the lower regions of Sungaria and Mongolia. This line will be directed towards the city of Sianfu and thence to Tsingtao. The Germans will thus be masters of the eastern part of this great international route and Tsingtao will be the gate of entrance, not only of the Chinese province of Shantung, but of all northern China and Central Asia."

¹³⁶ Kaiser-Wilhelm-Dank, cited above, p. 253; China Maritime Customs, *Decennial Reports on Trade, etc.*, 1902-11, Vol. I, p. 253: Only 30% of the revenue of the Shantung Railway was derived from passenger traffic and the rest freight, half of which is from coal transport. "As on other Chinese railways, passenger traffic is considerable, and at first the receipts from this source far exceeded those arising from goods traffic. But the latter began to show signs of improvement with the completion of the line to Tsinanfu, and since that time a steady advance has been maintained, so that at the present time passenger traffic is responsible for one-third and goods traffic for two-thirds of the total receipts of the railway." Kent, cited above, p. 145.

¹³⁷ China Maritime Customs, *Decennial Reports on the Trade, etc.*, 1902-11, Vol. I, p. 242: "Beginning with a net total of 10,345,000 Hk. taels, each of the years 1903, 1904, 1905 shows an increase of about four million taels, which in 1906 increased to double that amount. In 1907 a decrease of two million is shown. . . . The year 1908, again, shows an increase of three million taels, 1909, of eight millions, and the last two years, 1910 and 1911, of about three million dollars each."

¹³⁸ China Maritime Customs, *Decennial Reports on the Trade, etc.*, 1902-11, p. 242; *Ibid.*, p. 253: "The influence of the railway on the trade of Tsingtao is very great; already the greater part of the staple articles have been diverted from Chefoo; for example, of imports, cotton piece goods, cotton yarn, kerosene oil; and of exports, straw braids, silk and pongees."

the coast now finds a ready market, and is produced in yearly increasing quantities. Prosperity is visible everywhere in the districts along the line and beyond, and the railway, at first bitterly opposed, is now pronounced a blessing, and extensions in other directions are eagerly looked for.

The capital, amounting to 54,000,000 marks in 1899, increased to 60,000,000 in 1913 when the interests of the Shantung Mining Company were taken over, and in 1914, another 7,000,000 marks were added when the Company decided to work the iron mines at Kinglinchen.¹³⁹ The revenues, expenditures and the dividends during the years 1905 to 1912 are as follows:¹⁴⁰

	1905	1906	1907	1908
Revenue, per Kilometer	—	\$4,970	\$5,460	\$5,990
Expenditure, per Kilometer	—	2,089	2,333	2,476
Dividend, in Percentage	3½%	4½%	4½%	4½%
TOTAL REVENUE ...	—	\$2,168,897	\$2,259,185	\$2,614,078

	1909	1910	1911	1912
Revenue, per Kilometer	\$7,818	\$8,548	\$8,082	—
Expenditure, per Kilometer	5,734	2,290	2,533	—
Dividend, in Percentage	6%	6½%	6%	7½%
TOTAL REVENUE ...	\$3,411,793	\$3,730,242	—	—

It is to be noted here that under the terms of the concession, the railway company had to pay the Kiaochow Government, in consideration of the large expenditure incurred by the government.

¹³⁹ China Maritime Customs, Decennial Reports on the Trade, etc., 1912-21, Vol. I, p. 224.

¹⁴⁰ China Maritime Customs, Decennial Reports on the Trade, etc., 1902-11, Vol. I, p. 253; *Ibid*, 1912-21, Vol. I, p. 225; Great Britain, Historical Section of the Foreign Office, Kiaochow and Weihaiwei, p. 10; Kent, cited above, pp. 145-6.

for harbor works, etc., a proportion of the surplus profits after having paid at least a 5% dividend to the shareholders.¹⁴¹

In 1914, the railway passed under Japanese administration until January 1, 1923, when it was transferred to China from Japan.¹⁴² Improvement was made under the Japanese administration in the increase of the rolling stock.¹⁴³ Between 1912 and 1921, the passenger traffic advanced to 266%, and freight traffic 244%.¹⁴⁴ The following table is interesting in showing the yearly average of freight and passengers carried during the three stages of the railway, that is, under German, Japanese and Chinese management:¹⁴⁵

	<i>Freight No. of Tons</i>	<i>No. of Passengers</i>
1905-12 (German)	575,000	844,000
1915-22 (Japanese)	1,444,000	2,341,000
1923-26 (Chinese)	2,039,000	3,767,000

During the year 1926, due to internal disturbances, freight amounted to only 1,700,000 tons, while the number of passengers was 3,400,000.

The name of the railway has, since the Chinese administration, been changed to the Kiao-Tsi Railway. Its increasing utility is to be expected in view of the increase in both the freight traffic and passenger traffic.

Another important railway enterprise in China undertaken by the Germans, though only in part, is the Tientsin-Pukow Railway. The concession to build a line from Tientsin to Chinkiang was

¹⁴¹ Official Report of the Shantung Rehabilitation Committee, pp. 137-8; China Maritime Customs, Decennial Reports on the Trade, etc., 1892-1901, Vol. CXXI; Kent, cited above, p. 144: The proportion of the profits to be paid to the Kiaochow Government was regulated as follows: When the dividend was between 5% and 7%, 5% was to be paid to the Kiaochow Government; when between 7% and 8%, 20%; when between 8% and 10%, 25%; when between 10% and 12%, 33 1/3%; when above 12%, 50%.

¹⁴² China Maritime Customs, China Trade, 1922, p. 13.

¹⁴³ China Maritime Customs, Decennial Report on Trade, etc., 1912-21, Vol. I, p. 224: The number of locomotives was 46 in 1914, but 94 in 1921. The number of passenger cars was 102 in 1913 but 143 in 1921. The number of freight cars was increased from 1152 in 1913 to 1515 in 1921. There was a general improvement in the equipment of the cars and stations.

¹⁴⁴ China Maritime Customs, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 224 et seq.

¹⁴⁵ China Maritime Customs Annual Trade Report and Returns, p. 1.

originally granted in 1897 by the Chinese Government to Yung Wing. He made arrangements with an Anglo-American Syndicate for a loan of 5,500,000 pounds.¹⁴⁶ But the German occupation of Kiaochow and subsequently the Kiaochow Convention of March 6, 1898, together with the fact that Yung Wing's rights were still indefinite, depending upon the final consent of the Throne, prevented the execution of his plans.¹⁴⁷ In the meantime, a German Syndicate, headed by the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank and a British Syndicate started negotiations for a joint enterprise to take over the concession. From that time till September, 1898, the negotiations were progressing with little success. When the British group was apprehensive of the risk to lay out a long trunk line,¹⁴⁸ Germany was contending for her exclusive rights over the province of Shantung.¹⁴⁹ Count von Hatzfeldt, the German Ambassador at London, in a conversation with Lord Salisbury on May 11, 1898, remarked:

Germany, by her occupation of Kiaochow, and her agreement with China respecting Shantung, has acquired a special position in that province which consequently is not unreservedly

¹⁴⁶ Great Britain, Historical Section of the Foreign Office, Kiaochow and Weihaiwei, p. 10; Kent, cited above, p. 148.

¹⁴⁷ Kent, cited above, p. 148.

¹⁴⁸ Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, 1898, China No. 1, p. 168: Sir Claude MacDonald, British Minister at Peking, reported that the line would not pay, according to the opinion of experts, and that the head of Messrs. Jardine, Matheson and Company had informed him that the risk of a long trunk line was too great to permit them to undertake it; Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, 1899, China No. 1, Correspondence No. 5: The British group was further apprehensive of the powerfulness of the German Syndicate. Early in April, 1898, when the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation informed the British Government that negotiations with the German group for the joint enterprise had been terminated, it made the following comment about the German group: "I may here mention that the German Syndicate, always a powerful combination, has of late consolidated its position very much, and now includes all houses of any importance in Germany. It also enjoys the confidence of, and receives the support of, the German Government."

¹⁴⁹ Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, 1899, China No. 1, Correspondence, No. 305: The German Government, at the end of August of 1898, instructed the German Minister at Peking, Baron von Heyking, to prevent the Chinese Government's granting any concession, without considering the German claims. The German Government was also apprehensive that the concession would be granted to the British alone. When both parties were suspicious of each other negotiations were greatly impeded.

open to British enterprise, whereas, Great Britain, not having occupied any place in the Yangtze region, that region is still unreservedly open to German enterprise.¹⁵⁰

Hatzfelds further remarked on the same occasion that the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank had forfeited all claims to the concession by withdrawing from their agreement with the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank.¹⁵¹

After several months' protracted negotiations, the Germans and British groups came to an understanding in the meetings held on September 1 and 2, 1898 and an agreement was signed, the vital parts of which are as follows:¹⁵²

The line from Tientsin to Tsinan, or to another point on the northern frontier of the Province of Shantung, and the line from the southern point of the Province of Shantung to Chinkiang to be constructed by the Anglo-German Syndicate (meaning the German Syndicate on the one part and the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation and the British and Chinese Corporation Limited on the other part), in the following manner; viz:

1. The capital for both lines to be raised jointly.
2. The line from Tientsin to Tsinan, or to another point on the northern frontier of the Province of Shantung to be built, equipped and worked by the German group.

¹⁵⁰ Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, 1899, China No. 1, Correspondence No. 96.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 96

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, Correspondence No. 312, Inclosure No. 1, Minutes of Meetings Held at New Court, St. Swithen's lane, London on the 1st and 2nd of September, 1898. The minutes started with the proposal of M. von Hansemann, representing the German Syndicate which was to define the British and German spheres of interest, viz: (1) British sphere of interest, viz: The Yangtze Valley subject to the connection of the Shantung lines to the Yangtze at Chinkiang; the provinces south of Yangtze; the province of Shansi with connection to the Peking-Hankow Line at a point south of Chengting and a connecting line to the Yangtze Valley, crossing the Hwangho Valley. (2) German Sphere of interest, viz: The Province of Shantung and the Hwangho Valley with connection of Tientsin and Chengting, to other point of the Peking-Hankow Line, in the south with connection to the Yangtze at Chinkiang or Nanking. The Hwangho Valley is understood to be subject to the connecting lines in Shansi forming part of the British sphere of interest, and to the connecting line to the Yangtze Valley also belonging to the said sphere of interest."

3. The line from the southern point of the Province of Shantung to Chinkiang to be built and equipped and worked by the English group.
4. On completion, the lines to be worked for joint account.

Thereupon a joint application was made by the British and German ministers at Peking for the grant of this concession.¹⁵³ Following a few minor obstacles, a preliminary agreement was arrived at on May 18, 1899,¹⁵⁴ but the Boxer Risings impeded the progress of this project, until a new agreement was signed on January 13, 1908, by which the Chinese Government authorized the joint Anglo-German Syndicate to issue a loan for £5,000,000, for the construction of the railway, the southern terminal was changed to Pukow, instead of Chinkiang, in order to secure connection with the Shanghai-Nanking Railway.¹⁵⁵ On September 28, 1910, by the supplementary agreement, another £4,800,000 loan was authorized, "in order to permit the uninterrupted continuance of the work of construction."¹⁵⁶

This long trunk line connecting the north and the Yangtze Valley being laid, its effect upon the general conditions of China is easy to be imagined. However, its effect upon the German interests in

¹⁵³ Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, 1899, China No. 1, Correspondence No. 368, Inclosures 1 and 2; Kent, cited above, p. 151.

¹⁵⁴ MacMurray, cited above, p. 694: For the text of the preliminary agreement; Kent, cited above, p. 151: When the joint application was first presented, the Chinese Government replied that Yung Wing's concession barred the way. This was merely a temporary obstacle. Another difficulty arose out of the German claim of the construction of the section of the line within Shantung as a German railway. To this the Chinese Government objected. The German claim was afterwards withdrawn; Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers: In the middle of December, 1898, an Imperial Decree was issued to the effect that no more railway proposals would be entertained by the Chinese Government, and that the Chinese Commissioners of Railways were instructed to enter into negotiations for the construction of the Tientsin-Chinkiang Line with the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank and the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank.

¹⁵⁵ MacMurray, cited above, p. 684; Kent, cited above, p. 152, published in 1907 said: "Early in 1905 the draft for the final contract was formally laid before the Chinese Government. It is still under consideration. The terms of this document are not available, but it is understood that the chief differences are that the terminus is changed, as already noted, to Pukow opposite Nanking, while the loan is increased to 10,000,000 pounds, of which 6,500,000 pounds is to be German and 3,500,000 pounds British capital." Historical Section of the Foreign Office, Kiaochow and Weihaiwei, p. 10: A similar statement of facts was made.

¹⁵⁶ MacMurray, cited above, p. 814.

Shantung can be seen more plainly. Thus, in 1911 and 1912, the rapid growth of commerce in the domain of Kiaochow was reported to be influenced by the completion of the Tientsin-Pukow Railway."¹⁵⁷ During the same period, the considerable increase in the receipts of the Shantung Railway Company was also laid to the completion of the Tientsin-Pukow Railway, joining up to the terminus of the Shantung Railway at Tsinan.¹⁵⁸ German administration of the northern section of this railway terminated with the outbreak of the war.¹⁵⁹

The wealth of minerals in Shantung was made known to the world long before the German occupation of Kiaochow. In 1869, von Richthofen made the investigation, and the result of his investigation was made public in 1882.¹⁶⁰ On October 10, 1899, the Shantung Mining Company, with a capital of 12,000,000 marks, was granted by the German Government the mining rights within a zone of thirty Chinese *li* (ten miles) along both sides of the Shantung Railway.¹⁶¹ According to the terms of the concession, the company was given the right to test the coal and other mineral fields for a period of five years, and the company also undertook to pay to the Kiaochow Government, in consideration of the large expenditure incurred for harbor works, etc., a proportion of the surplus profits after having paid a 5% or higher rate of dividend to the shareholders, under the same terms as the railway company.¹⁶² The

¹⁵⁷ Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, 1914, China No. 1, Inclosure in Correspondence No. 16: "This rise was due principally to the above-mentioned increase in the Chinese population, but was also influenced by the completion of the Tientsin-Pukow Railway."

¹⁵⁸ Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, 1914, China No. 1, Inclosure in Correspondence No. 16: "There was a considerable increase in the receipts of the Shantung Railway Company, which was partly due to the fact that the Tientsin-Pukow Railway, joining up to the terminus of the Shantung Railway at Tsinanfu, was given over to traffic."

¹⁵⁹ China Maritime Customs, Decennial Reports on the Trade, etc., 1912-21, Vol. I, p. 171.

¹⁶⁰ Official Report of the Shantung Rehabilitation Committee, p. 160; Kaiser-Wilhelm-Dank, cited above, p. 253.

¹⁶¹ Official Report of the Shantung Rehabilitation Committee, pp. 160-1; China Maritime Customs, Decennial Reports on the Trade, etc., 1912-21, Vol. I, p. 220.

¹⁶² Official Report of the Shantung Rehabilitation Committee, pp. 160-2.

German Government also reserved the preferential right to purchase fuel for the German warships.¹⁶³

The company at once started activities. Actual coal mining was begun on October 1, 1902, at Fangtse on the Weihsien coal field, and the coal was found to be abundant and superior in quality to the Japanese.¹⁶⁴ But it was later proved that the coal produced at Weihsien was not suitable for the use of steamers, but all right for household use.¹⁶⁵ The company's enterprise near Poshan was more successful. The Poshan coal field is a valley twenty miles long, a few hundred yards wide at the eastern end, but broadening to the width of six miles at the northwestern end.¹⁶⁶ The coal there produced is of better quality than that of Weihsien, being similar to Cardiff and Ruhr coal and suitable for ships' boilers.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶³ Kaiser-Wilhelm-Dank, cited above, p. 253: This arrangement was to make the German navy in Far East independent of the supply from other Powers, especially Japan.

¹⁶⁴ Bülow, Denkschrift, Concerning the Development of the Domain of Kiaochow 1901-02, p. 16.

¹⁶⁵ Kaiser-Wilhelm-Dank, cited above, p. 253; Great Britain, Historical Section of the Foreign Office, Kiaochow and Weihaiwei, p. 24.

¹⁶⁶ Great Britain, Historical Section of the Foreign Office, Kiaochow and Weihaiwei, p. 24: A British company had worked there until 1891 and the Germans bought its machinery and used it at the Hungshan colliery, which they opened in 1906.

¹⁶⁷ Great Britain, Historical Section of the Foreign Office, Kiaochow and Weihaiwei, p. 25: The following shows the output of the Weihsien and Poshan coal fields, the principal ones within the domain of Kiaochow from 1902 to 1914, under the German management:

<i>Year</i>	<i>Weihsien Tons</i>	<i>Poshan Valley Tons</i>	<i>Total Tons</i>
1902-03	9,179	—	9,179
1903-04	50,601	—	50,601
1904-05	100,631	—	100,631
1905-06	136,990	—	136,990
1906-07	164,000	14,600	178,600
1907-08	149,300	40,900	190,200
1908-09	250,200	72,500	322,700
1909-10	273,355	183,450	456,805
1910-11	194,897	237,544	432,441
1911-12	205,185	283,208	488,393
1912-13	—	—	573,600
1913-14	—	—	548,600

In the middle of 1908, the Governor of Shantung repeatedly reported to the Chinese Government that further grant,¹⁶⁸ or even continuance of the German mining rights would endanger the peace of the locality because further enjoyment of these rights by the Germans would increase the economic pressure on the natives who depended upon the minerals for a living.¹⁶⁹ It was also recommended that diplomatic negotiations be started with the German Minister at Peking, for the total restoration of these rights to China, if possible, or that these areas be delimited. After prolonged and protracted negotiations, the Shantung Provincial Government, on July 24, 1911, succeeded in procuring an agreement from the Shantung Mining Company cancelling the extensive mining rights already given, and reserving only three places for German exploitation.¹⁷⁰ The salient points of that agreement are as follows:¹⁷¹

¹⁶⁸ It is to be noted that only a year ago, in 1907, a grant of mining rights was obtained by Deutsche Gesellschaft für Bergbau und Industrie in Auslande at five places, viz., south of Ichowfu, zone around Yishui, south and east of Chucheng, southwest of Weihsien, and the place near Chefoo, although these places were much delimited than those designed in the preliminary negotiations with Baron von Ketteler before the Boxer Rising. This grant was independent of the Kiaochow Convention which granted the rights to work mines within thirty *li* along both sides of the railway. For details of this transaction, see a later paragraph and the citations therein referred.

¹⁶⁹ Memorial of the Governor of Shantung, dated the 14th day of the 6th moon, 34th year of Kwang Hsu (1908); Memorials, dated 17th day of the 6th moon, of the same year; 23rd day of the 8th moon, 1st year of Hsuan-tung (1909); 16th day of the 2nd moon, 2nd year of Hsuan-tung (1910) in the Manuscripts of Diplomatic Affairs now kept by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs: "Now the Germans are asking for mining rights more strenuously day by day, while the dread of and pressure on the people of Shantung increases also day by day. There are already demonstrations, involving public speeches and the distribution of handbills and circulars. Although the local authorities have been instructed to appease, disperse, and secretly prohibit, but, as it involves the people's living, force alone can not put them to an end. . . . The gentry and the merchants in Shantung can be made to listen to advice, but the people are pugnacious by habit. Minerals are the source of their clothes and food. One day, they be all deprived of by others, the people would not be able to choose how to act."

¹⁷⁰ Official Report of the Shantung Rehabilitation Committee, pp. 167, 168: The Germans at first refused the Chinese proposal. But their dreams of wealth from the mines were becoming less hopeful after many attempts and studies, and furthermore the period granted by the German Government which was to expire in 1914 was almost closing. They agreed to the cancellation upon compensation by the Chinese authorities.

¹⁷¹ MacMurray, cited above, p. 261; Manuscripts on Diplomatic Affairs now kept by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs; For the lengthy negotiations preceding this agreement.

Article I. The Shantung Government and the Shantung Mining Company agree that the mines of Fangtzu and Tzu-chuan together with those of Chinglingchen and Changtien for the space of thirty *li* wide shall be exclusively operated by the Shantung Mining Company.

Article III. Outside of the special rights reserved by the Shantung Mining Company as specified above, the rights to mines within thirty *li* of the finished Shantung Railway and of the unfinished Tientsin-Pukow Railway and of the recently surveyed Kiaochow-Ichow Railway which were originally granted by China to the Shantung Mining Company are hereby cancelled.

China also undertook to pay in two instalments \$210,000 as a compensation for the expenses incurred by the Shantung Mining Company, within one year after the signing of that agreement.

In 1913, due to financial difficulties, the mining company came to terms with the railway company, whereby the former received shares of the railway company to the value of £270,000 and the capital of the railway company was increased.¹⁷² The company in 1914 inaugurated large iron mining operations at Kinglingchen, near Changtien on the Shantung Railway. Lack of capital again prevented the exploitation until after the amalgamation of the mining company with the railway company.¹⁷³ The mines were seized by the Japanese in September 1914, but being hopelessly flooded, they were abandoned for several years.¹⁷⁴

Other German and Sino-German mining companies engaged in mineral enterprise in Shantung deserve mention, especially the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Bergbau und Industrie im Auslande. The diplomatic negotiations for the grant of the concessions form an

¹⁷² China Maritime Customs, Decennial Reports of the Trade, etc., 1912-21, Vol. I, p. 224: Since the operations, no dividends were ever paid. A loan of £150,000 for two years was obtained in 1908 from the group of German banks which had supplied the original capital, but the necessity for further outlay on the Weih sien collieries compelled the mining company to come to terms with the railway company; Great Britain, Historical Section of the Foreign Office, Kiaochow and Weihaiwei, p. 25.

¹⁷³ Great Britain, op. cit., p. 26; China Maritime Customs, op. cit., p. 224.

¹⁷⁴ China Maritime Customs, Decennial Reports on the Trade, etc., 1912-21, Vol. I, p. 220; Official Report of the Shantung Rehabilitation Committee, pp. 157-201: For detailed information about the output and the administration of the mines in Shantung under the management of the Shantung Mining Company.

episode in themselves and they will be briefly dealt with here.¹⁷⁵ Early in 1899, request had been made to the Chinese Government by the German Minister at Peking, Baron von Ketteler, on behalf of the German company, for a grant of rights to operate mining activities at five places; namely, (1) the locality around Ichowfu, (2) a circular zone round Yishui, (3) the territory south and east of Chucheng, (4) a circular zone southwest of Weih sien, and (5) a circular zone round Chefoo. This would be a grant of concessions, independent of the thirty *li* zone along both sides of the railway, as provided in the Kiaochow Convention.¹⁷⁶ The Boxer Risings in 1900 interrupted the progress, until the negotiations were resumed in 1901. The German Consul at Chefoo, during the negotiations, showed every sign of impatience and aggressiveness and even insisted that the Chinese Government should be held responsible for damages since June 1901, as a result of their procrastination in the course of negotiations. In the middle of 1907, an agreement was signed whereby the five places, formerly of 120,000 square *li* in size, was reduced to only 210 square *li*. Chinese were allowed to hold shares, and as soon as the Chinese shares amounted to 100,000 marks, a Chinese Manager-General was to be put into office, upon equal footing with the German Manager-General. It also provided for the amount of the land rent to be paid to the Chinese Government in proportion to the output of minerals, and the amount to be paid for licenses. The agreement, as yet unpublished, contains eight articles, showing every turn of workmanship in diplomacy of the provincial authorities, in view of the restoration of the

¹⁷⁵ Manuscripts on Diplomatic Affairs, now kept by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs: For the complete minutes of the negotiations for that transaction.

¹⁷⁶ Manuscripts on Diplomatic Affairs, now kept by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs: The Chinese Government at first permitted the German company to select only one place for testing the minerals, and the period was to be limited to four months. But the German Minister, on behalf of the company, replied that the time limit was too short, and extension to one year was requested. The Chinese Government afterwards permitted, as a compromise, to extend the period to ten months, the company to select one place at a time. This the German Minister interpreted as a total extension to fifty months for testing the five fields at five different times and the Chinese Government did not object to this interpretation; Ketteler's note to the *Yamen*, dated August 7, 1899; *Yamen's* reply to Ketteler, dated August 24, 1899; and Ketteler's note to *Yamen*, dated September 8, 1899.

import rights which in the previous negotiations had been through neglect and lack of tact, lost to the Germans.¹⁷⁷ Soon the Chinese authorities started a move to regain mining rights in Shantung. The Deutsche Gesellschaft für Bergbau und Industrie im Auslande (called the Sino-German Corporation for Mining Industry since the agreement of 1907) seeing that the enterprise was not so profitable as it had expected, and that its capital was inadequate, agreed in 1909 to come to terms with the Chinese Government. At the end of that year, the provincial authorities at Shantung, and the company signed an agreement, whereby the company withdrew while the Chinese Government undertook to pay to the company the sum of 340,000 taels in four instalments.¹⁷⁸ No statistics of its output are available.

Another mining enterprise in Shantung deserving mention is the Chung Hsing Coal Mining Company. It was started by the Chinese in 1880.¹⁷⁹ In 1898 German capital entered the undertaking and remained until withdrawn in 1908 or 1909. On the other hand, a German loan of about 39,000 pounds had been obtained from Germany for rolling stock and machinery.¹⁸⁰ In 1913, a German engineer discovered an important new seam on the company's property, containing both coal and iron of good quality. The company had been under foreign supervision since 1914.

The German authorities had attached considerable importance to forestry. On the one hand, measures had been devised for forestation, and the Governor-General at Tsingtao issued a number

¹⁷⁷ Manuscripts on Diplomatic Affairs, now kept by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs: For the complete text of the agreement and the negotiations preceding this agreement.

¹⁷⁸ Great Britain, Historical Section of the Foreign Office, Kiaochow and Weihaiwei, p. 27: The company's capital of 84,000 pounds was found inadequate, and the Chinese Provincial Government succeeded to buy the concessions from the company at 44,540 pounds.

¹⁷⁹ China Maritime Customs, Decennial Reports on the Trade, etc., Vol. I, p. 221: In 1880, it first opened the coal mine at Changkiu, on the recommendation of Li Hung-chang; Great Britain, Historical Section of the Foreign Office, Kiaochow and Weihaiwei, p. 27: It also worked at Tsaochwang on the Ihsien coal field.

¹⁸⁰ Great Britain, Historical Section of the Foreign Office, Kiaochow and Weihaiwei, pp. 27-8.

of ordinances, for the protection and taking care of timber.¹⁸¹ Taking of timber without authority and smoking in the forest or its surrounding were to be heavily fined. This has been commented as "a typical instance of the general influence exercised by German industry in the Far East."¹⁸²

Manufacturing enterprises of the Germans in China deserve mention. The Deutsche-Chinesische Seiden-Industrie Gesellschaft was established at Tsangchow during 1902-03 for reeling tussore silk after a new method to improve its quality.¹⁸³ After several abortive attempts, the company was able to put on market tussore silk of unsurpassed quality in 1907.¹⁸⁴ But the cost of production was about 25% higher and the price realized in Europe some 40% higher than the best Chefoo reeled silk.¹⁸⁵ Owing to misconceptions and misunderstandings between the Berlin Head Office and the Tsingtao manager, the company stopped working in 1909 at the very moment when full success appeared in view.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸¹ Official Report of the Shantung Rehabilitation Committee, pp. 257-9: The German Government at Tsingtao issued the following ordinances regarding forestry: (1) Ordinance for the Protection of Forests; (2) Ordinance with Regard to Trespass into the Forests; (3) Ordinance Prohibiting the Taking of Merchantable Timber; (4) Ordinance Regulating the Manufacture of Charcoal; and (5) Ordinance Prohibiting Smoking in Forests and Surroundings.

¹⁸² Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, 1913, China No. 3, Inclosure in Correspondence No. 3: "The German authorities have always attached considerable importance to forestry; the efforts in this direction have met with great success, not only in the colony itself, but in the interest which has awakened in this industry in the Hinterland of Shantung. This is," the report concludes, "a typical instance of the general influence exercised by German industry in the Far East."

¹⁸³ China Maritime Customs, Decennial Reports on the Trade, etc., 1902-21, Vol. I, p. 251: The company was founded at Berlin in 1901.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid*, The first trials made with wild cocoons from the neighboring Chucheng district proved a failure, due to the insufficient strength of the ligament. The Manchurian cocoons, tried next, were found satisfactory.

¹⁸⁵ Giordani, cited above, p. 70: "New establishment arose alongside the original one, and within the last five years the silk of Shantung with its bold German stamp has invaded every market in Europe."

¹⁸⁶ Great Britain, Historical Section of the Foreign Office, Kiaochow and Weihaiwei, p. 28: "Political troubles interfered with its success; it had to close down temporarily in 1911, and up to 1912 it paid no dividends. Information as to its present position is lacking." The report as to the date of its closing seems to be conflicting. But the report of the Customs is preferred, because the reporter is nearer to the place about which he made the report.

After the war, a straw braid bleaching and dyeing factory under German management opened as an experiment at Tsingtao in June, 1922. It has been reported that it has been so successful that even some Japanese braid will be imported to undergo the process before being shipped to Europe and America.¹⁸⁷ Information about its present status is lacking.

Other German industries in China of minor importance include the German-owned factory for cotton spinning and cotton weaving at Tsimohsien, near Tsingtao. Within the former leased territory, there were two albumen factories, Karl Ebers' and the Columbia; a large brick factory belonging to H. Diederichen and Company; two breweries, the "Germania" and the "Gomoll;" a factory for aerated waters; and a soap factory.¹⁸⁸ All of these were interrupted by the war. There were four German-owned oil mills at Hankow, which were closed during the war, but probably re-opened by this time.¹⁸⁹

¹⁸⁷ China Maritime Customs, *China Trade, 1922*, p. 16.

¹⁸⁸ Great Britain, Historical Section of the Foreign Office, *Kiaochow and Weihaiwei*, p. 28.

¹⁸⁹ China Maritime Customs, *Decennial Reports on the Trade, etc., 1912-21*, Vol. I, p. 317.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

IN this concluding chapter, an attempt will be made to state the several significant facts and their consequences observed in the earlier chapters and to add new facts arising from the resumption of the diplomatic relations between China and Germany and the new agreement of 1921.

It was on November 14, 1897, that Germany seized Kiaochow Bay and its fortifications, thirteen days after the murder of two German Catholic priests in the province of Shantung. This action culminated in the signing of the Convention for the Lease of Kiaochow on March 6, 1898, for a term of ninety-nine years. This seizure of Kiaochow Bay by Germany started the international scramble for leases and concessions; namely, railway and mining concessions and the establishment of so-called spheres of interest. This international scramble amounted to partition of the Chinese Coast, and threatened the entire Celestial Empire. This naturally intensified the hatred of the Chinese, not only toward the Germans alone, but toward the other foreigners and the Chinese converts alike, and prompted the fear in the minds of the Chinese culminating in the Boxer Rising of 1900.

Suffice it to recall that Germany, during the Boxer Expedition, though not successful in causing further partition of China and other complications, demanded a large indemnity with which she was enabled to build her fleet and secured England's consent for any mutual partition of the Yangtze Valley in the future. But the effect of this upon Germany was fatal, since it contributed to the Anglo-German naval rivalry which afterwards led to the downfall of the German Empire.

For quieting the feeling of the Chinese people, whose hatred against Germany and the German people was kindled by successive aggressions during 1898 and 1900, attempts were made by Germany to establish more schools, colleges, medical colleges and hospitals in the different parts of China. Thus the Germans were very

successful in all their enterprises in China,—commercial, cultural and missionary.

The outbreak of the World War turned over another page in the diplomatic relations between China and Germany. Japan, Germany's bitter commercial rival in China, with the help of the English troops took Kiaochow Bay and the Leased area by force in 1914. China's severance of diplomatic relations with Germany and her declaration of war entitled her to take back all the concessions and other special privileges which she had granted to Germany before the War.

Trade relations were resumed in the latter part of 1921. A comparative study of the figures concerning the increasing trade between China and Germany is immensely interesting. In 1921 Germany imported to China goods amounting in value to 13,348,856 taels. After seven years, the increase of German imports into China was so great that they were worth nearly four times as much as in 1921 (German imports amounting to 55,696,970 taels in 1928), thus ranking second, next to Great Britain. An increase of nearly four hundred per cent was also shown in China's exports to Germany during the same period. (In 1921 it was 6,773,917 taels and in 1928 it was 22,824,561 taels).¹ This growth of trade is the direct result of the amicable feeling between the two countries.

After signing the Sino-German treaty in 1921, Germany formally renounced all her extraterritorial rights, special privileges and concessions in favor of China. From January, 1924, to June, 1925, cases, civil and criminal, involving German citizens in China came under the jurisdiction of the Chinese courts.² Of the 191 civil cases, 66 were litigations between Chinese and Germans; 19 between Germans and Germans; 16 between Germans and foreigners in China. Analysis of these cases shows the following results:

¹ China Maritime Customs: Annual Trade Report and Returns, 1928, Vol. I, cited in Chapter VII, footnote 107.

² A collection of these cases is taken from the Tables Relating to Cases Involving Subjects of Non-Extraterritorial Powers, of the Republic of China, published by The Commission on Extraterritoriality, Peking, 1925. The courts before which these cases came up include the Metropolitan High Court, Chili High Court, Fengtien High Court, Shantung High Court, Kiangsu High Court, Hupeh High Court, Metropolitan District Court, Tientsin District Court, Wanchuan District Court, Shenyang District Court, Kirin District Court, Chang Chun District Court, Tsinan District Court, Fushan District Court, Tsingtao District Court, Shanghai District Court, Wuhkien District Court, and Hsiakow District Court. It is to be noted that decisions of the Shanghai Mixed Court, or later called the Shanghai Provisional Court are not included in this collection.

Civil cases between Chinese and Germans

I. Original jurisdiction:

When Germans were plaintiffs

For Germans 13

Against Germans 3

When Germans were defendants

For Germans 4

Against Germans 15

II. Appellate jurisdiction:

When Germans were appellates

For Germans 2

Against Germans 3

When Germans were respondents

For Germans 9

Against Germans 4

Cases were withdrawn. 7

Cases compromised. 6

TOTAL 66

Civil cases between Germans and other foreign nationals in China

I. Original jurisdiction:

When Germans were plaintiffs

For Germans 5

Against Germans 1

When Germans were defendants

For Germans 1

Against Germans 2

II. Appellate jurisdiction:

Cases against Germans 2

Cases withdrawn 2

Cases compromised. 3

TOTAL 16

Civil cases between Germans and Germans

I. Original jurisdiction 15

II. Appellate jurisdiction 3

III. Case compromised 1

TOTAL 19

These figures are given to show that Germans have received justice in the Chinese courts, and this conclusion is strengthened by the fact that all the cases were decided without protest. In the same period, that is, between January, 1924 and June, 1925, five cases were tried involving Germans as defendants. They were punished in accordance with the Provisional Criminal Code, and no sign of maladministration was shown. As to the prison facilities, which have been always a ground for refusal to relinquish extraterritorial rights by the other Powers, the following article of the Regulations Relating to Civil and Criminal Cases Involving Subjects of Non-Extraterritorial Powers will illustrate:

Article III. Where subjects of non-extraterritorial Powers in cases provided by Article I are to be detained or imprisoned in the execution of sentences in criminal cases, they shall be kept in the proper modern prisons. In a locality where there is no modern prison, a proper house may take its place.³

And this has really been followed in practice in the cases involving Germans as defendants in criminal matters. A close examination of these cases also indicates that the Chinese courts have always been prompt to dispose of the cases which they have accepted. With a very few exceptions, due to intrinsic complexities, all the cases that have been collected and studied were disposed of in about two or three months after the date of accepting them.⁴

One more instance will be cited to prove that China not only administered equal and prompt justice to Germans and Chinese alike, but also secured the recall of the English Consul at Tsingtao, Mr. Mantse in 1927, because he had intentionally freed the guilty

³ Regulations and Tables Relating to Cases Involving Subjects of Non-Extraterritorial Powers of the Republic of China, p. 2. (pp. 1-3 contain Ordinance No. 9, promulgated on May 23, in the 8th year of the Republic, Amended by Ordinance 24 Promulgated on October 30th in the 9th. Year of the Republic.)

⁴ The delay of the Chinese courts over litigation matters has been often cited as an argument against the relinquishment of extraterritorial rights by other Powers. But that such a reported condition is untrue is shown by the cases reported in Regulations and Tables Relating to Cases Involving Subjects of Non-Extraterritorial Powers of the Republic of China, pp. 1-64, and 1-25.

party, a Mr. Lock, an Englishman, who was involved in the murder case of the German, Fmlin Karl Fischer in Tsingtao, without even a trial by the English Consul himself.

Fischer was murdered on August 5, 1926, at Tsingtao by two Russians, who went into his jewelry store and killed him in an attempt to rob his store, but succeeded in escaping. In the meantime, an Englishman by the name of Lock, the owner of a coffee house in Tsingtao, was held as a suspect of the murder because several incriminating articles were found at his premises and since he had had previous dealings with Fischer, the Chinese authorities had reason to believe that he was related to the case either as the actual murderer or as an accessory. Before the Russians were apprehended and arrested at Shanghai, Lock was held at the English Consulate pending criminal prosecution. Due to the extra-territorial rights of the Englishmen in China, the prosecution of Lock was delayed and he was afterwards released without a trial, notwithstanding the protest of the Chinese authorities. The action of the Chinese authorities resulted in the recall of Mr. Mantse for his misconduct in regard to the Fischer case. Although the conviction of the two Russians afterwards had changed the attitude toward Lock, the evidence is nevertheless preponderant that the two murderers had visited his premises; then too, a ricksha coolie testified that one of the Russians did look like Lock.

The Fischer case is worth mention here because the records disclose the energetic investigation by the Chinese authorities in an effort to apprehend the criminals, and the prompt action of Chinese diplomatic officials in protesting against the English Consul's loose way of handling suspected criminals. The murder was an unfortunate accident, but the Chinese authorities have shown at every turn their sense of responsibility when subjects of non-extraterritorial Powers in China are placed in jeopardy of their lives or the right to pursue their peaceful vocations.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. Public Documents and Official Reports.

British and Foreign State Papers, compiled by the Librarian and Keeper of the Papers, Foreign Office, London.

Bülow, Count von: Denkschrift, Concerning the Development of the Domain of Kiaochow During the Period of October 1901 to October 1902, No. 832, Reichstag, 10th Legislative Period, Berlin.

Bülow, Graf von: Denkschrift an den Reichstag, 1900-03.

China Maritime Customs:

1. The Inspector General of Customs . . . Reports on Trade at the Ports in China Open by Treaty to Foreign Trade, 1866-81, 15 vols., Shanghai, printed at the Imperial Maritime Customs Press.
2. China Maritime Customs . . . Decennial Reports on the Trade, Navigation, Industries, etc. of the Ports Open to Foreign Commerce in China (and Corea), and on the Condition and Development of the Treaty Port Provinces, 1882-91, 1892-1901, 1902-11, 1912-21, Shanghai, 1893.
...
3. China Maritime Customs . . . China Trade, 1922, Shanghai.
4. China Maritime Customs . . . China Annual Trade Report and Returns, 1923-28.

China Ministry of Foreign Affairs: China War Documents, 1917, published by the "Peking Leader."

China Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Manuscripts on Chinese Diplomatic Affairs, (unpublished). 外交部檔案

Conference on the Limitation of Armament, Washington, November 12, 1921 to February 6, 1922. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1922.

- Die Deutsche Kolonial-Gesetzgebung, Sammlung der auf die Schutzgebiete bezüglichen Gesetz, Verordnungen, Erlasse und internationalen Vereinbarungen, mit Anmerkungen, Sachregister, Berlin, 1903.
- Deutsche Marine und Kolonialgeschichte im Rahmen einer der See fahrt und des Seekrieges.
- Great Britain, Department of Overseas Trade: Report on Economic and Financial Conditions in Germany, London, His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1924.
- Great Britain: Parliamentary Papers, Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of His/Her Majesty, London, His/Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1865. . . .
- Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette, 1871-1914, Sammlung der Diplomatischen Akten des Auswärtigen Amtes. Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte M. B. H. in Berlin, 1924, by Johannes Lepsius, Albrecht Mendelsohn Bartholdy, Friedrich Thimme. Vols. IX, XIV, XVI, XVII, XXV, XXXII.
- Livres Jaunes: Documents Diplomatiques de la Chine, 1900-01.
- Manuscripts of the Official History of the Ch'ing Dynasty.
- Papers Relating to the Foreign Affairs of the United States, Washington, Government Printing Office.
- Regulations and Tables Relating to Cases Involving Subjects of Non-Extraterritorial Powers of the Republic of China, translated and published by the Commission on Extraterritoriality, Peking, 1925.
- Schwertfeger, Bernhard: Die Diplomatischen Akten des Auswärtigen Amtes, 1871-1914.
- Das Staatsarchiv: Sammlung der officiellen Aktenstücke zur Geschichte der Gegenwart. Gegründet von Aegidi und Klanhold. Herausgegeben von Gustav Roloff. Einundsechzigster Band, Leipzig, 1898.
- "Tsingtao," an Official Report of the Shantung Rehabilitation Committee, Peking, 1922.
- U. S. Bureau of Statistics: Commercial and Industrial Development of the German Empire, 1899.

U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce: Statistics of German Trade, 1909-13.

II. Collections of Treaties, etc.

China Maritime Customs: Treaties, Conventions etc., Between China and the Foreign States, Shanghai, 1917.

China Treaties, etc., 1921, *L'Accord Sino-Allemand et Les Documents Annexes*.

Hertzlet, Sir Edward: Treaties, etc., Between Great Britain and China and Between China and Foreign Powers, London, 1908.

MacMurray, John Van Antwerp: Treaties and Agreements with and Concerning China, published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington and New York, 1921.

Rockhill, W. W.: Treaties and Conventions with or Concerning China and Korea, 1894-1904.

The Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, signed at Versailles, July 28, 1919. Published by His Majesty's Stationery Office.

III. Letters, Memoirs, Speeches and Similar Sources.

Correspondence of Li Hung-chang (Li Wen Chung Kung Chuan Shu).

The German Emperor's Speeches, A Selection from the Speeches, Edicts, Letters and Telegrams of the Emperor William II. Translated by Louis Elkind, London, New York and Bombay, 1904.

Letters from the Kaiser to the Czar, copied from government Archives in Petrograd, unpublished before 1920, edited by Isaac Don Levine, New York, 1920.

The Life and Letters of John Hay, 2 vols., Boston and New York, 1915, edited by William Roscoe Thayer.

Letters to Lord Palmerston on British Relations with China, edited by H. H. Lindsay, 1836.

Memoirs of Hsu Ching-chen, edited by Zung Yuen, 10 vols., Peking, 1901. (in Chinese)

Memoirs of Li Hung-chang, edited by William Francis Mannix, New York and Boston, 1913.

Memoirs of Liu Hai-kwan, 4 vols., Shanghai, 1902. (in Chinese)
 Memoirs of Count von Waldersee:

A Field-Marshal's Memoirs, translated from German into English by Sir Frederic Whyte.

Count von Waldersee's Memoirs on the Boxer Rising, translated from German into Chinese by Wang Kwang-gi, Shanghai, 1928.

Wilhelm II, German Emperor: My Memoirs 1878-1918, London and New York, 1922.

The Willy-Nicky Correspondence, edited by H. Berstein.

Witte, Count S. I.: Memoirs, translated by Yaomotensky, New York, 1921.

IV. Newspapers and Periodicals.

Chang, Carson: "The Inside History of China's Declaration of War," in Millard's Review, August 17, 1918.

Franke, Otto: "Japan's Activities and Aims in Asia," in Deutsche Rundschau, August, 1903.

"Kiaochow and Open Port," in The Nation 115: 674-6, December 13, 1922.

Manchester Guardian: China Number (China, British Trade Prospects), September 21, 1915.

Peffer, Nathaniel: "Shantung and the Conference," in the Nation 114:12 January 4, 1922.

Peking Daily News, July 14, 1924.

The Peiping Leader, Peiping, China, November 30, 1929.

V. General Works, Treaties and other Secondary Sources.

Bau, Minchien Joshua: The Foreign Relations of China, New York and Chicago, 1921.

. . . The Open Door Doctrine in Relations to China, New York, 1923.

Benfey, Fritz: Die Neuere Entwicklung des Deutschen Auslandsbankwesens, 1914-25, Berlin, 1925.

Beresford, Lord Charles: The Break-up of China, London, 1899.

- Bernhardi, F. von: *Germany and the Next War*, translated by Allen H. Powles, New York, 1914.
- Beyer, Georg: *China Als Missionsfeld*, Berlin, 1923.
- Bland, J. O. P. and Backhouse, E.: *China Under the Empress Dowager*, Philadelphia and London, 1910.
- Boulger, D. C.: *England's Arch Enemy, Indictment of German Policy During the Last Sixteen Years*, London, 1914.
- Brandenburg, Erich: *From Bismarck to the World War*, translated by Annie Elizabeth Adams, London, 1927.
- Brandt, M. von: *China und Seine Handelsbeziehungen zum Auslande, mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Deutschen*, Berlin, 1899.
- Brandt, M. von: *Dretunddreissig Jahre in Ostasien*, Leipzig, 1901.
- Brandt, M. von: *Zeitfragen*, Berlin, 1900.
- Brown, Frederick: *China's Dayspring After Thirty Years*, London, Murray and Evenden, Ltd.
- Bruning, Anton Paul: *Die Entwicklung des ausländischen, speziell des überseeischen deutschen Bankwesens*, Borna-Leipzig, 1907.
- Bülow, Prince von: *Imperial Germany*, New York, 1917.
- Burkhardt, G. E.: *Kleine Missions-Bibliothek*, Bielefeld und Leipzig, 1880.
- Clarke, Charles H.: *Germany Yesterday and To-morrow*, London, 1923.
- Cordier, Henri: *Histoire Générale de la Chine*, 4 vols., Paris, 1920.
- Dawson, William Harbutt: *The Evolution of Modern Germany*, 6th ed., London, 1914.
- Dennis, Alfred L.: *Adventure in American Diplomacy*, New York, 1928.
- Dewall, Wolf von: "Die Wirtschaftlichen Aufgaben Deutschlands in China," in *Deutschland und China nach dem Kriege*, Berlin, 1916.
- Etienne, August: "Deutschlands Wirtschaftliche Interessen in China," in *Schriften der Centralstelle für Vorbereitung von Handelsverträgen*. Berlin
- Fife, Robert Herndon: *The German Empire Between the Two Wars*, New York, 1918.

- Fletcher, C. Brunsdon: *The New Pacific, British Policy and German Aims*, London, 1917.
- Franke, Otto: *Deutschland und China vor, in, und nach dem Kriege*, Hamburg, 1915.
- . . . *Ostasiatische Neubildungen*.
- Franzius, Georg: *Kiautschou, Deutschlands Erwerbung in Ostasien*, Berlin, 1900.
- Giordani, Paolo: *The German Colonial Empire, Its Beginning and Ending*, translated by Mrs. Gustavus W. Hamilton, London, 1916.
- Grunsfeld, Ernst: *Hafenkolonien und Kolonialische Verhältnisse in China, Japan und Korea*, Jena Verlag von Gustav Fischer 1913.
- Gutzlaff, Charles: *A Sketch of Chinese History*, 2 vols., London, 1834.
- Hall, William E.: *International Law*, 7th ed., Oxford, 1917.
- Hammann, Otto: *Deutsche Weltpolitik, 1890-1912*, Berlin, 1925.
- Hausen, Marcus: *German Schemes of Colonization Before 1860*, Northampton, Mass., 1923-24.
- Hauser, Henri: *Germany's Commercial Grip on the World*, translated by Manfred Emmanuel, London, 1917.
- Hirth, Frederich: *Chinesische Studien*, München und Leipzig, 1890.
- Hornbeck, Stanley K.: *Contemporary Politics in the Far East*, New York and London, 1916.
- Hovermann, Otto: *Kiautschou, Verwaltung und Gerichtsbarkeit*, Tübingen, 1914.
- Hsia, Ching-lin: *Studies in Chinese Diplomatic History*, Shanghai, 1925.
- Hurd, Archibald, and Castle, Henry: *German Sea Power*, London, 1913.
- Hyde, Charles Cheney: *International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United States*, Boston, 1922.
- Kaiser-Wilhelm-Dank, Verein für Soldatenfreunde: *Deutschland als Kolonialmacht, Dreissig Jahre deutscher Kolonialgeschichte*, Berlin, 1914.
- Kent, Percy Horace: *Railway Enterprise in China*, London, 1907.

Knappe, Wilhelm: *Deutsche Kulturbestrebungen in China*, Berlin, 1906.

Koetzler, Job Fr. Gottlob: *Neuer Wegzeiger für die Deutschen Schutzgebiete in Afrika, der Südsee, und Ostasien*, Stuttgart, 1900.

Krausse, Alexis: *The Story of the Chinese Crisis*, London, 1900.

Kriegestin, E. Baron Binder: *Die Kämpfe des Deutschen Expeditionskorps in China und ihre militärischen Lehren*.

Latourette, K. S.: *China, the United States and the War*, Boston, 1919.

. . . *A History of Christian Missions in China*, New York, 1929.

Lawrence, J. T.: *Les Principes de Droit International*.

Liu, Yen: *The Recent Diplomatic History of China*, Shanghai.

Markus, A. und Webers: "Deutsche Kriegsschriften," Heft 4, Kontinentalpolitik, by "A Rhenish Capitalist," Verlag in Bonn.

Mattern, Johannes: *Principles of the Constitutional Jurisprudence of the German National Republic*, Baltimore, 1929.

Max, Franz: *Unsere Chinafahrt Feldzugerinnerungen eines deutschen Offiziers*.

Meinecke, Gustav und Bülow, W. von: *Seidenzucht in den Kolonien*, Berlin, 1901.

Michie, Alexander: *China and Christianity*, Boston, 1900.

Millard, Thomas, F.: *The Great War in the Far East*, Shanghai, 1915.

. . . *Our Eastern Question*, New York, 1916.

Mohr, F. W.: *Die Deutsche Kolonial-Gesetzgebung*, 1903.

. . . *Handbuch für das Schutzgebiet Kiautschou, Tsingtau*, 1911.

Moore, John Bassett: *A Digest on International Law*, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1906.

Morse, Hosea Ballou: *International Relations of the Chinese Empire*, London, 1918.

Mowat, R. B.: *A History of European Diplomacy, 1815-1914*, London, 1922.

Murray, Gilbert: *A Problem of Foreign Policy*, London, 1921.

O'Neill, H. C.: *The War in Africa and in the Far East*, London, New York, etc.

- Overlach, The Foreign Financial Control in China, New York, 1919.
- Peace Handbooks, Issued under the direction of the Historical Section of the Foreign Office of Great Britain, No. 71, Kiaochow and Weihaiwei, edited by Charles William Campbell, London, 1920.
- Peace Handbooks, German Colonization.
- Peace Handbooks, German Opinion.
- Peace Handbooks, Pacific Islands.
- Phillimore: Commentaries Upon International Law, 3rd ed., 1885.
- Pohl, Otto: Die Überlassung von Kiautschou seitens Chinas an das Deutsche Reich, Borna-Leipzig, 1908.
- Reid, Gilbert: China, Captive or Free, New York, 1921.
- Remarks on British Relations and Intercourse with China by an American Merchant, London, 1834.
- Richter, D. Julius: Das Werden der Christlichen Kirche in China, C. Bertelsmann in Gütersloh, 1928.
- Rohrbach, Paul: German World Policies translated by Edmund von Mach, New York, 1915.
- Rosthorn, Arthur von: Unser Verhältnis zu China vor und nach dem Kriege, Leipzig, 1919.
- Schnee, Heinrich: The German Colonies Under the Mandate Berlin, 1922.
- Schrämmeier, Ludwig Wilhelm: Aus Kiautschous Verwaltung, Die Land-, Steuer-, und Zoll-politik des Kiautschougebietes, . . . Jena, Verlag von Gustav Fischer, 1914.
- . . . Kiautschou und die Ostasiatische Frage, Berlin, 1898.
- . . . Kiautschou, seine Entwicklung und Bedeutung, Berlin, 1915.
- . . . Wie die Landordnung von Kiautschou entstand? Verlag von J. Hanwitz Nachfolger, 1903.
- Schultze, Galvernitz: How England Looks Upon Germany, New York, 1915.
- Smith, A. H.: China in Convulsion, New York, Chicago, etc., 1901.
- Smith, Frederick Edwin: International Law, London, 1900.
- Spencer, John A.: The Foundations of British Policy reprinted from the Westminster Gazette.

- Stabsarzt, Velde: *Jahresbericht des Württembergischen Vereins für Handelsgeographie und Interessen im Auslande*, Stuttgart, Kommissions, Verlag von W. Kohlhammer, 1905.
- Opinion of Mr. Stanbury, Attorney-General, October 15, 1866, 12 Ops. Atty-Gen. 72, 74.
- Steiger, George Nye: *China and the Occident, The Origin and the Development of the Boxer Rising*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1927.
- Stenz, George M.: *The Life of Father Richard Henle*, New York, 1900.
- Temperley, A *History of the Peace of Paris*, 6 vols., London, 1924.
- Treat, Payson Jackson: *The Far East*, New York and London, 1928.
- Tyau, M. T. Z.: *China Awakened*, New York, 1919.
- . . . *The Legal Obligations Arising Out of the Treaty Relations Between China and other States*, Shanghai, 1917.
- Vinacke, Harold Monk: *A History of the Far East in Modern Times*, New York, 1928.
- Weale, B. L. Putnam: *The Fight for the Republic of China*, New York, 1917.
- Weissmuller, Andreas: *Die Interessensphären*, Würzburg, 1908.
- Wheeler, W. Reginald: *China and the World War*, New York, 1919.
- Whyte, Frederic: *China and the Foreign Powers*, London, 1927.
- Will, Allen S.: *World Crisis in China*, Baltimore, 1900.
- Williams, E. T.: *A Short History of China*, New York and London, 1928.
- Willoughby, Westel Woodbury: *Foreign Rights and Interest in China*, 2nd ed., 2 vols., Baltimore, 1927.
- . . . *The Fundamental Concepts of Public Law*, New York, 1924.
- Wilson, George Grafton, *Handbook of International Law*, St. Paul, Minn., 1910.
- Zia Kai-shun: *Kiaochow in the Last Twenty-two Years*, Shanghai, 1910. (in Chinese)

INDEX

A

Abolition of the likin, 154
 Acquisition of Kiaochow, 22, 28
 Acquisition of land, 94
 Acting Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 43
 Act of retaliation, 107
 Adjutant von Plessen, 47
 Admiral Diederich, 44, 45, 47, 74
 Admiral Tirpitz, 28, 47
 Admiralty Staff, 72
 Admiral von Hintze, 180
 Admiral von Knorr, 28
 Admiral von Seden-Bibran, 47
 Aggression, 146
 Agreement of 1921, 187
 Agriculture, 73
 Alhalt-Dessau-Kothen, 4
 Allied and Neutral states, 179
 Allied forces, 118
 Allied naval forces, 102
 Allied troops, 161
 Allies, 175
 All Soul's Day, 149
 Ambassador, 160
 America, 2, 114, 156, 158
 American, 145
 American army opinion, 146
 American force, 114
 American offer, 156
 American popular opinion, 146
 American President, 155
 Americans, 69, 77
 Amoy, 24, 25, 28, 29, 30, 42, 61, 147
 An armistice, 135
 A Nationalist Movement, 93
 Anglo-American Syndicate, 246
 Anglo-German agreement, 165, 166
 Anglo-German Loan, 15
 Anglo-German loan to China, 13
 Anglo-German Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, 205
 Anglo-German Party, 128
 Anglo-German Syndicate, 13
 Anglo German Yangtze Agreement, 169
 Anglo-German Yangtze Treaty, 167
 Anglo-Russian understanding, 165
 Anglo-Saxon cousin, 155
 Anhalt-Beraburg, 4

Anhwei, 7
 Anking, 7
 Annan Railway, 10
 Annual income, 79
 Anti-Catholic riots, 6
 Anti-Christian Boxers, 39
 Anti-Christian Movement, 41
 Anti-English measure, 165
 Anti-missionary, 17
 Anti-Missionary Movement, 6
 Anzer, 6, 41
 Appellate Court, 75
 Appointment of Waldersee, 164
 Armistice, 186
 Artillery Executive Committee, 71
 Asiatic Countries, 117
 Assassination, 136
 Assassination of the missionaries, 5.
 Assessors, 75
 Associated Powers, 184
 Austria-Hungary, 114, 168
 Austrian, 101
 Author, 118

B

Bacteriological, 89
 Baden, 4
 Balance of Power, 38
 Balance of Power in East Asia, 36
 Balkan whirlwind, 174
 Banishment, 76
 Banking, 206
 Baron Hayashi, 9
 Baron Ketteler, 108
 Baron von Heyking, 48, 50
 Baron von Ketteler, 104, 105, 136, 253
 Baron von Rehfues, 219
 Baron von Richthofen, 133
 Basel Evangelische Society, 4
 Basel Mission, 3
 Basel Missionary Society, 3
 Basel Missions, 208
 Bases for future negotiations, 123
 Baton, 117
 Bavaria, 4
 Bavarian, 145
 Bazoches, 185
 Berlin, 38

Berliner Hauptverein, 208
 Berlin Missionary Society, 3, 4
 Berlin Women's Missionary Society, 3, 4
 B. F. deCologan, 139
 Big Knife Society, 40
 Big Sword (or Knife) Society, 18
 Bishop Anzer, 6, 41, 209
 Bishop of Telepte, 209
 Bismarck, 6, 22, 27, 41
 Bismarck Mountain, 87
 Black List, 232
 Blockade, 137
 Boxer, 168, 242
 Boxer Expedition, 146, 150, 164, 168, 170, 201, 206, 257
 Boxer indemnity, 181
 Boxer Protocol, 158, 168, 181, 187
 Boxer Rising, 63, 93, 216, 253, 257
 Boxer Rising in Chili, 116
 Boxer Rising of 1900, 18
 Boxer Trouble, 104
 Branch post offices, 81
 Brandenburg, 22
 Bremen, 5
 Bridgeman Parker, 2
 British, 145
 British force, 114
 British Government, 166
 British India, 82
 British naval supremacy, 166
 British Post Office in Hongkong, 82
 Brunswick, 4
 Building Director, 72
 Building Police, 72
 Bülow, 43
 Bureau for Chinese Affairs, 71
 Bureau of Internal Affairs, 71

C

Cable lines, 83
 Calcutta, 4
 Callery, 2
 Canton, 12, 217
 Cape Colony, 82
 Captain Korvett, 65
 Captain Zeye, 30
 Capture of Peking, 117
 Capture of Tsingtao, 175
 Cardiff, 250
 Catechists, 208
 Catholic missionaries, 1
 Catholic priest, 138
 Catholics, 209
 Cavalry, 87

Celebration of Christmas, 163
 Celestial Empire, 21, 24, 63, 168
 Census, 71
 Cession of a harbor, 39
 Chamber of Commerce, 72
 Chancellor, 46, 85
 Chancellor Hohenlohe, 30
 Chang Kan-yuen, 19
 Changkiakow, 138
 Chafee, 128
 Chefoo, 9, 24, 25, 28, 41, 105, 106, 118, 229
 Chefoo Convention, 7
 Chekiang, 7
 Chekiang Guilds, 12
 Chemical laboratory, 89
 Chia Ching, 17
 Chief Commander, 161
 Chief Lieutenant Truppel, 65
 Chili, 97, 148
 Chili Province, 127, 132
 China, 166
 China Inland Mission, 209, 212
 China's financial capacity, 151
 Chinese artillery depot, 86
 Chinese Boundary Commission, 59
 Chinese cemetery, 12
 Chinese citizenship, 91
 Chinese Civil Law, 91
 Chinese Committee, 71, 73
 Chinese Criminal Law, 91
 Chinese Customs administration, 171
 Chinese Eastern Railway, 205
 Chinese Emperor, 126
 Chinese Government, 44, 121
 Chinese Maritime Customs, 14
 Chinese Maritime Customs House, 78
 Chinese Maritime Customs Revenue, 14
 Chinese Minister, 38
 Chinese Neutrality, 172
 Chinese penal code, 133
 Chinese plenipotentiaries, 158
 Chinese Plenipotentiary, 114
 Chinese Post Office Staff, 61
 Chinese revolution, 173
 Chinese students in Germany, 197
 Chinese Telegraph Company, 83
 Chinesische Stiftung, 208
 Ching-Hsin Mining Corporation, 203
 Chingwangtao, 127
 Chinkiang, 17
 Chinkiang to Tientsin, 62
 Chiposan Island, 58
 Chi Tsai Ti, 17
 Chosan, 24, 30
 Chosan in the North, 26

Christian churches, 3
 Christlichen Verein zur Ausbreitung
 des Evangeliums, 207
 Chung How, 5
 Chung Hsing Coal Mining Company,
 254
 Chungking, 17
 Chung Lun, 5
 City Magistrate, 12
 City of Kiaochow, 46
 Civil and Criminal Laws in force in
 Germany, 77
 Civil cases, 76
 Civil Commissary, 72
 Civil Department, 71
 Colonial troops, 71
 Columbia, 256
 Commander at service, 87
 Commander-in-Chief, 116
 Commercial interest, 38
 Commercial operations, 56
 Commissary for Chinese Affairs, 72,
 74
 Commissioner of Customs, 15
 Common military action, 108
 Compulsory Military Service Law, 87
 Concession at Tientsin, 12
 Concessions at Hankow, 224
 Concessions at Tientsin, 224
 Conference of Tuchuns, 182
 Confucius, 211
 Conger, 139, 148
 Consular jurisdiction, 16, 133, 189,
 193, 194, 202
 Convention, 54
 Convention for Concession at Tien-
 tsin, 13
 Convention for the Concession at
 Hankow, 11
 Convention for the Lease of Kiao-
 chow, 257
 Coöperation of the Powers, 121
 Copenhagen, 181
 Cormoran, 44, 45, 46
 Corporation law, 232
 Council of Scholars, 206
 Count von Hatzfeldt, 246
 Count von Seckendorff, 41
 Count von Waldersee, 115, 116, 126
 Count Witte, 51
 Court in Sianfu, 137
 Court of appeals, 75
 Court of Justice, 71
 Court of Justice or tribunal, 75
 Courts of justice, 75
 Criminal law, 76
 Customs Bonds, 15

Customs House, 78
 Czar, 33, 46

D

Danish Government, 179
 Dead pledge, 29, 42
 Deutsch-Asiatische Bank, 13, 14, 197,
 198, 199, 201, 203, 204, 226, 238,
 239, 240, 246, 247
 Deutsche-Chinesische Seiden-Indus-
 trie Gesellschaft, 255
 Deutsche Gesellschaft für Bergbau
 und Industrie im Auslande, 252,
 254
 Deutschland, 53
 Diplomatic corps, 128, 134, 164
 Diplomatic corps in Peking, 134
 Diplomatic gestures, 98
 Diplomatic representatives, 138
 Director, 81, 118
 Direct tax, 79
 Disconto-Gesellschaft, 238
 Dispatch of the Expeditionary force,
 118
 Disposal of Kiaochow, 176
 District Administrators, 74
 Divine Providence, 40
 Divine Service, 149
 Doyen, 99
 Doyen of the Diplomatic Corps, 139
 Dr. Reinch, 178
 Dr. Steubel, 10
 Dr. Stubel, 156
 Dr. Tyau, 182
 Dr. Voretzsch, 190
 Dr. Wu Ting-fang, 177, 194
 Dr. W. W. Yen, 179
 Dyes, 234, 235

E

Earl Li Hung-chang, 114
 East Asiatic Division, 44, 50
 East-Asiatic Expedition, 165
 Eight Dragons Sect, 17
 Elder Brother Society, 17
 Electoral Hessen, 4
 Emden, 185
 Emperor Kwang Hsu, 62
 Emperor of China, 131
 Emperors of Austria, 161
 Empress Dowager, Tze Hsi, 61, 62,
 95, 102
 England, 26, 60, 62, 113, 114, 122,
 147, 158, 161, 162, 163

English, 69
 English Ambassador, 164
 English colonial system, 70
 English Government, 111
 English sphere of interest, 24, 25, 26
 En Hai, 108
 Entente, 175, 184
 Essay System of Examination, 62
 Eulenburg's, 5
 Eurasia Aviation Corporation, 237
 Eurasia E Aviation Corporation, 237
 European missionaries, 40
 Europeans, 77
 European War, 174
 Evangelische Missionsverein in Kurhessen, 208
 Excuse, 141
 Executive Committee for Harbor Work, 71
 Expeditionary Corps, 153
 Extra duty, 78
 Extraordinary mission of apology, 139
 Extraterritorial rights, 194, 202, 258

F

Faber, 215
 Faber Hospital, 214
 Far East, 38
 Father Henle, 41
 Fatherland, 117
 Father Francis Nies, 39
 Father Franz Nies, 18
 Feeling of patriotism, 108
 Field-Marshal, 116
 Field-Marshal Waldersee, 138
 Fight of Asia, 108
 Final protocol, 158
 First battalion, 86, 119
 First mail assistant, 81
 Fleet, 119
 Fmlin Karl Fischer, 261
 Food-stuff, 73
 Forbidden City, 128
 Foreign detachments, 102
 Foreign Office, 41, 119
 Foreign Policy of Germany, 22
 Forest, 73
 Forestation and forestry, 206
 Forestry, 71
 Formal declaration of war, 182
 Formosa, 8, 20, 24, 27
 Fortification servant, 87
 Fortresses of Kiaochow, 87
 Forts of Taku, 159

France, 10, 61, 98, 114, 147, 163, 168
 Franco-Russian Loan, 15
 Frankfurt, 5
 Franzius, 29
 Frau Luschewitz, 215
 Free harbor at Tsingtao, 78
 Free port, 77
 Freiherr von Heyking, 28
 Freiherr von Rotenhan, 27
 French Catholic missionaries, 16
 French Protection, 42
 French railway official, 100
 French text, 160
 Friedrich zu Eulenburg, 218
 From Bismarck to the World War, 22
 Fukien, 12, 147
 Fukien Province, 17
 Fundamentalist, 212
 Fürst von Bülow, 85

G

Garrison auditor, 87
 Garrison Executive Committee, 71
 Garrison physician, 87
 Gefion, 47, 53
 Genah, 3
 General Yorck, 138
 George M. Stenz, 39
 German, 69, 101, 119, 128
 German Admiral, 46
 German Admiral von Diederich, 65
 German-American-Chinese Alliance, 172
 German Boundary Commission, 59
 German Catholic Bishop, 41
 German Catholic missionaries, 2, 3
 German Catholic missions, 6
 German Catholic priests, 4, 6, 18, 39
 German Chancellor, 49
 German Chinese College, 213, 216
 German Chinese Commission, 12
 German Concession, 11, 192
 German Concession at Tientsin, 13
 German Concessions, 193, 222
 German consul, Herr Knappe, 126
 German Debts and Property in China, 204
 German East Asiatic Squadron, 170
 German Emperor, 41, 44, 46, 111, 125, 126, 163
 German Empire, 2, 119
 German flag, 119
 German forces, 145
 German Foreign Office, 136

German frontier, 78
 German garrison, 175
 German General, 109
 German goods, 2
 German Government, 106, 123, 166
 Germanism, 256
 Germanic gentleman, 155
 German laws and regulations, 56
 German marines, 49, 104
 German merchants, 170
 German Military Governor, 45
 German Minister, 46, 100, 105
 German Minister, Mumm, 156
 German officers, 170
 German officials, 104
 German Post Office, 81
 German Post Office in China, 81
 German post offices, 171
 German proposal to England, 166
 German Protectorate, 71
 German Public School, 213
 German Reichstag, 70
 Germans, 77
 German shipping, 224
 German sphere of interest, 166
 German Squadron, 23
 German squadrons and troops, 158
 German subjects, 56
 German submarine warfare against
 neutral shipping, 177
 German Syndicates, 15
 German Telephone Company, 83
 German trade, 2
 German warships, 41
 German World Policy, 86
 Germany, 41, 47, 62, 98, 114, 115,
 142, 147, 151, 162, 164
 Germany's attitude and the Kaiser's
 Speech, 119
 Germany's demand, 131
 Germany's policy, 118
 German Zoll, 4
 Gesellschaft des Gottlichen Wortes,
 209
 Gomoll, 256
 Gotha, 4
 Governmental monopoly, 80
 Government Council, 72
 Government Observatory, 128
 Government Physician, 72
 Government Repair Shop, 85
 Government Superintendent, 72
 Governor Rosendahl, 71
 Graf Eulenburg, 4, 5
 Graf zu Eulenburg, 23
 Grand Ducal Hessen, 4
 Grand Ducal Saxony, 4

Great Britain, 60, 98
 Great Wall, 138, 145
 Great War, 169
 Gulf of Pechili, 98
 Gutzlaff, 2, 3, 206, 207, 208

H

Hague Conventions, 183
 Hague provisions, 198
 Hamberg, 3
 Hamburg, 5
 Handels-Verein, 4
 Hanlin, 207
 Hankow, 10, 17, 61, 189, 190, 191,
 223, 235
 Hanover, 4
 Hanseatic, 5
 Hanseatic League, 2
 Hanyang District Magistrate, 11
 Harbor Administration, 85
 Harbor office, 86
 Hatzfelds, 247
 H. Diederichen and Company, 256
 Herr Cordes, 105
 Herr Detring, 28
 Herr von Brandt, 6
 Herr von Bülow, 240
 Herr von Mumm, 151
 Himalayas, 4
 Hindustani, 4
 Hohenlohe, 21, 29, 49
 Hukow, 10
 Hollmann, 26, 27
 Hongkong, 3, 4, 25, 207, 232
 Hongkong and Shanghai Banking
 Corporation, 13, 14, 239
 Hongkong Territory, 61
 Hospitals, 88, 206
 Hostilities at Tungchow, 114
 Hsu Ching-cheng, 38
 Hukow, 7
 Hu-Kuang Railway bonds, 204
 Hupeh, 7
 Hypotheken Bank, 239

I

Ichang, 7
 Ichowfu, 19
 I Ho Tuan, 17, 18, 96
 Imperial Decree of September, 25, 139
 Imperial German Naval Department,
 65
 Imperial Governor, 71
 Imperial Naval Department, 70

Imperial tablet, 48
 Imperial Tomb in Peking, 138
 Importation of arms, 159
 Import duties, 156
 Import duty, 77
 Indemnity, 118
 Independence of Korea, 8
 India, 232
 Indirect tax, 79, 80
 Industrial enterprises, 206
 Infantry Brigade, 149
 Inland navigation papers, 78
 Inland Steam Navigation, 78
 Inland trade, 7
 Inspector General, 61
 Intendanture official, 87
 Intermediate trade, 229
 International control of the finance
 of China, 118, 136
 International control of the Yangtze
 District, 162
 Intervention, 173
 Island Amoy with Kulangsu, 26
 Isolation of Germany, 130
 Italian troops, 145
 Italy, 96, 98, 114, 161, 168

J

Japan, 108, 147, 161, 163, 168, 174,
 186
 Japanese, 69, 77, 81, 145
 Japanese force, 114
 Japanese goods, 78
 Japanese in Kiaochow, 77
 Japanese settlements, 61
 Japan's sphere of interest, 61
 Jarlin, 138
 J. B. Anzer, 209
 Jealousy, 164
 Joint Note, 155
 Jurisdiction of the local courts, 203

K

Kaiser, 21, 23, 29, 33, 44, 45, 47, 113,
 126, 147, 148, 151, 157, 160, 161,
 164
 Kaiserin Augusta, 47
 Kaiserliches Gericht von Kiaochow,
 75
 Kaiserliches Obergericht von Kiao-
 chow, 75
 Kaiserlich Gouverneur, 71
 Kamerun, 26
 Kang Hsi, 1, 2

Kaumi, 92
 Kansu, 59
 Kao Yuan-chang, 45
 Karl Ebers' 256
 Kassel, 116
 Kasseler Missionsverein, 208
 Kiachta, 217
 Kiachwang, 18
 Kiangsi, 7
 Kiangsu, 7
 Kiangsu Province, 62
 Kiangyin forts, 163
 Kiaochow, 4, 19, 20, 23, 24, 26, 27,
 43, 44, 54, 59, 78, 84, 92, 147, 170,
 182, 201, 206, 210, 211, 212, 213,
 215, 226, 227, 229, 232, 237, 239,
 240
 Kiaochow Bay, 19, 26, 28, 29, 35, 45
 Kiaochow Convention, 206, 246, 253
 Kiaochow-Ichow Railway, 252
 Kiaochow-Peking Railway, 48
 Kiaochow-Tsinan Railway, 84
 Kiao-Tsi Railway, 245
 Koffler, 1
 Ko Lao Hui, 17
 Korea, 25, 27
 Korean, 81
 Koreans, 69
 Kucheng, 17
 Kulangsu, 24, 25, 30
 Kwangchouwan, 61
 Kwang Hsu, the Chinese Emperor,
 126
 Kwangsi, 10
 Kwangtung, 4, 7, 10, 23

L

Laiwuhsien, 19
 Land, 71
 Land Tax, 79
 Laws for naturalizing the Chinese,
 91
 Lease of Kiaochow, 19, 52, 55
 Leased area, 170
 Leased territory, 55
 Leased territory of Kiaochow, 58
 Leetsung, 71
 Liaotung Peninsula, 8, 9, 52, 60
 Liberal church, 212
 Li Hung-chang, 130, 132, 153, 164
 Likin, 7
 Li Ping-ying, 19
 Lippe, 4
 Listun, 75
 Li Yuan-hung, 178, 183

Local militia, 95
 Local Supervisors, 74
 London, 105, 106, 154, 156
 Lord Salisbury, 246
 Lubeck, 5
 Luft Hansa, 237
 Lukikow, 7
 Lungchow, 10
 Lung-Hai Railway, 59
 Luxemburg, 4

M

Macao, 207
 Macao Portuguese India, 82
 Mail assistant, 81
 Malay Island, 83
 Manchu Dynasty, 15, 17, 18, 105, 206, 115
 Manchuria, 59, 147
 Maneuvers near Danzig, 158
 Mauritius, 82
 Maps, 49
 Marinebaurats, 29
 Marine division, 87
 Marine-field battery, 87
 Marine infantry, 87
 Marine physicians, 88
 Maritime Customs, 61
 Maritime Customs Office, 77
 Marshall, 21
 Massacre, 160
 Massacres of foreigners, 139
 Mecklenburg-Schwerin, 5
 Mecklenburg-Strelitz, 5
 Meinigen, 4
 Meisenheim, 5
 Mencius, 211
 Mengtsz, 10
 Meteorologic-astronomic station, 215
 Meyer-Waldeck, 71
 Military army, 87
 Military court, 88
 Military Department, 71
 Military experts, 112
 Military hospital, 86
 Military institutions in Germany, 87
 Mine depot, 86
 Ming Dynasty, 1
 Mining, 206
 Mining operations, 56
 Minister Liu, 133
 Minister W. W. Yen, 181
 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 160
 Ministry of Marine, 79
 Ministry of War, 119

Mirs Bay, 24, 25, 26
 Missionaries, 206
 Missionary activities, 206
 Mission of apology to Germany, 159, 160
 Mixed court, 11
 Mixed forces, 145
 Mob or populace in Berlin, 107
 Mongolia, 4
 Monopoly, 89
 Montebello Islands, 24, 25, 27
 Moravian Unitas Fratrum, 4
 Morphine, 89
 Mr. Conger, 155
 Mr. Lock, 261
 Mr. Mantse, 260, 261
 Mr. Wu Chung-lien, 190
 Mumm, 152, 153
 Mumm von Schwarzenstein, 126, 134, 139
 Murder of Margary, 16
 Murder of Mr. Sugiyama, 139
 Murder of the German Minister, 103, 107
 Mutual policy in China, 167
 M. von Brandt, 210, 220

N

Narcotic drugs, 89
 Nassau, 4
 Natal, 82
 National army, 95
 National defense, 96
 Nationality, 91
 Na Tung, 159
 Naval and Coaling Station, 27
 Naval Artillery Detachment, 71
 Naval demonstration of the warships, 98
 Naval demonstrations, 98
 Naval office, 119
 Naval rivalry, 169
 Navigation, 206
 Navy, 44
 Navy Department, 29
 Netherlands consular officials, 197
 Netherlands Consuls, 192, 194, 201
 Netherlands Minister, 180, 188, 190, 193, 194, 195, 197, 198, 200
 Neutral Zone, 55, 66
 Neverstorff, 116
 Nicholas II, 31, 46
 Ningpo, 24
 Non-intervention, 173
 Northern German States, 4, 5, 23
 No territorial acquisitions, 166

O

Observance of Neutrality, 174
 Occupation of Kiaochow, 48
 Office of Foreign Affairs, 160
 Oldenberg, 4
 Open Door, 166
 Open Door Policy, 165, 168
 Operations at Lungkow, 174
 Opium, 89
 Opium Tax, 77
 Opium War, 20
 Orient, 43

P

Pact of London, 176
 Pakhoi, 7
 Paotingfu, 127
 Partition of China, 100, 165, 168
 Patriotism, 95, 98
 Paulum Hospital, 214
 Peace Conference, 176
 Peace of Shimonoseki, 9
 Pehtaiho, 197
 Peking, 5, 59, 97, 164, 128
 Pescadores, 25
 Pescadores Islands, 8, 20, 24, 27
 Peter-Court, 33
 Peterhof, 33
 Petersburg, 32, 38
 Plenipotentiaries, 142
 Plenipotentiary, 115
 Police, 71
 Port Arthur, 9, 35, 60
 Poshan, 19
 Post Master, 81
 Pouli, 209
 Powers, 144, 156
 Precepts of Neutrality, 174
 Preliminary treaty, 135
 Presidential Mandate, 179, 184
 Presidential Proclamation, 179
 Presidential Proclamation of Feng
 Kuo-chang, 183
 Press in America, 150
 Press in England, 150
 Press in Germany, 150
 Press in Russia, 150
 Prince Ching, 130, 140, 158
 Prince Chun (Tsai Feng), 159
 Prince Henry, 86
 Prince Henry of Prussia, 50
 Prince Lobanov, 31
 Prince of Wales, 164
 Princess Wilhelm, 44

Prince Tsai Tao, 171
 Prince von Bülow, 33, 242
 Prince von Hohenlohe, 28, 33
 Principles, 168
 Principles of international law, 135
 Protestant missionaries, 17
 Protectorate troop, 50
 Protocol, 159
 Province of Shantung, 118
 Province of Shensi, 158
 Provisional Criminal Code, 260
 Provisional government, 65
 Prussia, 4, 5
 Prussian, 145
 Prussian infantry division, 108
 Pymont, 4

Q

Quadruple entente, 172
 Quemoy, 24

R

Railway and mining concessions, 56
 Railways, 206
 Razing of Taku, 140
 Red Fist Society, 17
 Registration, 71
 Reichs-Marine-Amt, 65, 70
 Reichstag, 50, 85
 Relinquishment of Consular Jurisdiction, 193
 Return of the Court, 131, 136
 Reuss elder line, 4
 Reuss younger line, 5
 Revision, 6
 Rhenish Missionary Society, 3
 Rhenish Missions, 208
 Rhenish Society, 4
 Rho, 206
 Richard Henle, 18, 39
 Righteous and Harmonious Militia, 18
 Righteous Harmony Fist, 17
 Rolin Company, 23
 Roman Catholic Church, 6
 Roman Catholic Missionaries, 18
 Roman Catholic villages, 98
 Roman Catholics, 95
 Roman See, 2
 Roster, 3
 Rotenhan, 43
 Rotterdamers Missionsgesellschaft, 207
 Rudolf Lechler, 3

Ruhr, 250
 Russia, 2, 26, 31, 108, 168, 112, 114,
 158
 Russia and Siberia, 4
 Russian Czar, 115, 161
 Russian Czar, Nicholas II, 112
 Russian General, 128
 Russian Government, 2
 Russians, 69, 145, 147
 Russia's approval, 113
 Russo-Japanese War, 172

S

Safety Police, 73
 Sailor's artillery division, 87
 Salisbury, 165
 Salt gabelle, 159
 Samoa, 26
 Samsah Bay, 24, 25, 30, 42
 Sanctity of international law, 178
 Sanitarium, 89
 Sanmen Bay, 96
 Saxe, 4
 Saxe-Altenburg, 4
 Saxe-Coburg, 4
 Saxony, 4
 Schaal, 1, 2
 Schall, 206
 Schenck, 25
 Schmidt, 237
 Schools, 170, 206
 Schwarzburg, 4
 Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt, 4
 Schwarzhoff, 157
 Secretary of Navy, 41
 Secretary of the Imperial Navy, 77
 Secretary of War, 149
 Secret convention, 31
 Secret societies, 17, 95
 Secret Society in Shantung, 6
 Seizure of the Chinese ships, 164
 Servants Police, 73
 Severance of diplomatic relations, 200
 Seymour expedition, 102
 Shameen Affair, 205
 Shanghai, 61, 106, 126, 143, 162
 Shanghai to Soochow, 62
 Shanhaikwan, 99, 127
 Shansi Province, 145
 Shantung, 44, 97, 144, 147, 148, 182,
 186, 215
 Shantung Mining Company, 244,
 249, 251, 252
 Shantung Peninsula, 25, 170
 Shantung Railway, 171, 249, 252

Shantung Railway Company, 69, 84,
 241, 249
 Shasi, 7, 61
 Shensi, 59, 132, 138, 144, 148
 Sianfu, 138
 Siberia, 2
 Sinkiang, 59
 Sino-German Company, 56
 Sino-German Corporation for Mining
 Industry, 254
 Sino-German Treaty, 206
 Sino-Japanese War, 8, 10, 23
 Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5, 20
 Sir B. Alston, 184
 Sir Frank Lascelles, 164
 Social-Democrats, 148, 149
 Sondershausen, 4
 South Africa, 26
 Sovereignty, 89
 Spanish legation, 140
 Sphere of interest, 110, 118
 Stenz, 40
 Sterling loan, 14
 Steyl, 6
 St. Petersburg, 51, 106
 Straits Settlements, 82
 Street Police, 73
 Summer Palace, 128
 Supervisor, 81
 Supplementary Memorial, 98
 Supreme command of Waldersee,
 166
 Survey of Formosa, 23
 Swatow, 23, 41
 Szemao, 10

T

Taisietzun, 68
 Tai Tao Hui, 18, 39, 95
 Taitungzun, 68
 Taku, 126
 Taku Forts, 121
 Talienwan, 35
 Tanku, 197
 Taomakwan, 145
 Tapautao, 73
 Taputour, 59
 Tartar (Peking) City, 114
 Tatung, 7
 Tax Collectors, 74
 Telegraph line, 83
 Telephone system, 83
 Temporary occupation of Chili, 110
 Territorial acquisitions, 167
 Territorial advantages in Chinese
 dominions, 167

Territorial privileges, 167
 The Chief Justice (Oberrichter), 75
 The Emperor's Palace (Winter Palace), 128
 The Period of Bismarck, 22
 The Period of Emperor William II, 22
 The Republican Period, 22
 The Society of the Divine Word, 6
 Third Naval Battalion, 71
 Third sea battalion, 86
 Tibet, 4
 Tibetan, 4
 Tientsin, 5, 12, 59, 61, 114, 127, 189, 190, 191, 223, 229
 Tientsin administration, 164
 Tientsin Massacre, 16
 Tientsin-Pukow Railway, 239, 245, 249, 252
 Tientsin-Pukow Railway bonds, 204
 Tientsin to Lukouchiao, 62
 Tinghai, 24
 Tokyo, 106
 Tolosan Island, 58
 Tongking, 147
 Tonkin, 10
 Traffic Police, 73
 Transfer of land, 79
 Transvaal, 82
 Treaties of commerce, 140
 Treaties of commerce and navigation, 160
 Treaties of Nanking, 2
 Treaty of May 20, 1921, 202
 Treaty of Nanking, 3
 Treaty of Shimonoseki, 26, 31
 Treaty of Tientsin, 4, 5, 6, 23, 193, 196, 208
 Treaty of Versailles, 186, 205
 Trial of Enemy Subjects in Civil and Criminal Cases, 195
 Tripartite Intervention, 10, 13
 Triple Intervention, 20, 37, 52
 Tsai Feng, 160
 Tsinan, 19
 Tsinanfu of Shantung, 17
 Tsingchowfu, 19
 Tsingtao, 73, 75, 147, 171, 212, 213, 216, 226, 227, 237, 239
 Tsingtao German Post Office, 82
 Tsingtao, the German Naval Station, 86
 Tsiningchow, 209
 Tsooping, 19
 Tsungli Yamen, 6, 7, 12, 15, 19, 51, 97, 100, 140, 160,
 Tuan Chi-jui, 178, 182, 183
 Tzechwan, 19

U

Unexpected murder, 107
 Unification of Germany, 23
 United naval demonstration, 99
 United States, 148
 United States of America, 98, 168
 United States War Department, 145
 Unity, 89

V

Vegetarians, 17
 Verbiest, 1, 2
 Versailles, 187
 Versailles Treaty, 204
 Veterinary Police, 73
 Viceroy of the Liang Kwang provinces, 15
 Viscount Aoki, 8
 Von Giers, 127
 Von knorr, 28
 Von Richthofen, 249
 Von Seckendorff, 12
 Vuyron, 127

W

Wai Wu Pu (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), 160
 Waldeck, 4
 Waldersee, 116, 118, 119, 128, 130, 132, 144, 145, 147, 149, 150, 156, 157, 161
 Washington, 155
 Weihaiwei, 24, 25, 26, 42, 60, 147
 Weihsien, 19
 Wellington V. K. Koo, 204
 Wenchow, 7
 Western penal codes, 133
 White Lotus Society, 17
 Wilhelmshohe, 116
 William II, 27, 29, 31, 50, 112, 171
 Wilson Note, 176
 Wireless stations, 83
 Witte's words, 51
 Women criminals, 76
 Woosung, 7, 44, 47, 164
 World's peace, 178
 World War, 258
 Wuchang incident, 46
 Wuhu, 7, 17
 Wurtemberg, 4
 Wusih, 17
 Wusueh, 7
 Wuttemberg, 145

Y

- Yanchow, 17
- Yangtze, 147
- Yangtze region, 166
- Yangtze River, 137, 143, 164
- Yangtze River Valley, 118
- Yangtze Valley, 59, 147, 248, 257
- Yangtze viceroys, 137
- Yenchow, 6
- Yenchowfu, 41
- Yin Tsang, 161
- Yuan Shih-kai, 162, 164, 175, 176
- Yung Wing, 246
- Yünnan, 10, 61, 147
- Yünnan case, 6
- Yünnan Province, 16

VITA

Feng-Djen Djang was born on August 1, 1902, in Shanghai, Kiangsu, China. She acquired her early education in Shanghai and Soochow of the Kiangsu Province and Huchow of the Chekiang Province. In the summer of 1923 she entered Shanghai College, Shanghai, Kiangsu and from which institution she received her B. A. in June, 1927. She came in the fall of the same year to the States to study in the Political Science Department of the Johns Hopkins University as a graduate student.



MADE IN CHINA